THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case 2026-00056
In the matter between:
SPARES WORLD GROUP (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
MUAZZ ALI
First Respondent
SAMPADA RETAIL PROPERTIES
(PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
DU PLESSIS J
Introduction
[1] This application was enrolled as one of extreme urgency for a hearing at 10h00
on Saturday, 25 April 2026. The applicant sought an order interdicting the first
respondent from interfering with its occupation of the premises until 1 July 2026 and
authorising it to remain in occupation during that period.
(1) REPORTABLE: Yes☐/ No ☒
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes☐ / No ☒
(3) REVISED: Yes ☒ / No ☐
Date: 30 April 2026
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[2] The applicant and the first respondent entered into a written “separation
agreement” on 25 February 2026, under which the applicant undertook to vacate
certain premises and hand over the keys to the first respondent on 26 April 2026. The
applicant continued to trade from the premises and to pay the rent in the interim.
[3] On 9 April 2026, the first respondent’s attorneys addressed a letter to the
applicant, expressly reminding him of his obligation under clause 6 of the separation
agreement to deliver vacant occupation and the keys on 26 April 2026. Thereafter, the
applicant’s attorneys sought an indulgence, by letter of 20 April 2026, for an extension
of time to vacate until 1 July 2026. That request was refused by the first respondent’s
attorneys on 21 April 2026, and that stance was confirmed again on 24 April 2026.
[4] Despite having known the agreed vacate date since 25 February 2026, and
despite correspondence dated 9, 21 and 24 April 2026, the applicant only launched
this application on the evening of Friday, 24 April 2026, setting it down for hearing at
10h00 on Saturday, 25 April 2026. Service on the first respondent consisted of sending
the notice of motion via WhatsApp at approximately 22h43 on Friday night, coupled
with a truncated time period requiring that any answering affidavit be filed by 17h00
that same Friday, a deadline which had already expired before service.
[5] The founding affidavit was not included in the initial WhatsApp message. It was
sent only to the first respondent’s attorneys at 09h48 on Saturday morning,
approximately twelve minutes before the scheduled hearing. No return of service by
the sheriff, no practice note, no service affidavit, and no compliance statement were
filed. The matter was not enrolled on the ordinary “Thursday for Tuesday” urgent roll
but was instead placed, without explanation on affidavit, for a Saturday morning
hearing.
[6] After the respondent gave an undertaking not to “evict” the applicant, the matter
[6] After the respondent gave an undertaking not to “evict” the applicant, the matter
was set down for hearing on Tuesday and then postponed to Thursday, when it was
heard.
[7] The applicant submitted that the matter is urgent for the following reasons: first,
the respondent insisted on enforcing the requirement that the applicant vacate the
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premises on the agreed date of 26 April 2026, creating a real and imminent risk that
this insistence would interfere with its possession, stock and business operations.
Once that happens, there is a serious risk of stock removal and damage, which cannot
wait until the ordinary motion court. Second, it contended that it could not obtain
substantial redress in due course because the vacation of the premises would disrupt
its stock-taking process and audit, which it had not completed by the agreed-upon
date. Lastly, to avoid arguments against self-created urgency, the applicant states that
it acted without delay from the date of conclusion of the contract with the audit, but
that it simply could not finish the process of stock-taking, auditing and moving in the
agreed-upon period. It only instituted proceedings when it became absolutely clear,
after yet another refusal of an extension, that the respondent would not allow it to
remain on the premises past the agreed-upon vacation date of 26 April 2026.
[8] The respondent submits that the applicant knew, since signing the separation
agreement on 25 February 2026, that it had to vacate and hand over the keys on 26
April 2026. He was reminded again on 9, 21 and 24 April 2026, and did nothing in a
timely manner. Instead, they waited until late on Friday evening to launch the
application. This, the respondent says, is self-created urgency.
[9] The respondent further submits that the matter was improperly enrolled “at the
apex” of urgency: a Saturday morning hearing, without timely filing, and without
adequate time for the respondent to respond. The respondent states that the service
was procedurally abusive, leaving them with no meaningful opportunity to prepare. For
these reasons, the respondent submits that the matter must be struck from the roll
with punitive costs. I agree.
[10] The chronology reveals no genuine urgency. The applicant knew, from the
separation agreement dated 25 February 2026, that it was obliged to vacate the
separation agreement dated 25 February 2026, that it was obliged to vacate the
premises and hand over the keys on 26 April 2026. It was expressly reminded on 9
April 2026 that vacant occupation would be required in accordance with that
agreement. Its attorneys thereafter sought an indulgence on 20 April 2026, which was
refused on 21 April 2026. The refusal was reiterated after the meeting of 23 April 2026
in correspondence dated 24 April 2026. Notwithstanding all of that, the applicant
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waited until the night of 24 April 2026 to launch the present application. It thus fails the
test in East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd.1
[11] Nor does this matter come close to satisfying the demanding standard for a
Saturday hearing. In Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another
(t/a Makin’s Furniture Manufacturers), 2 the court explained the ascending scale of
urgency and made it clear that the greatest relaxation of the rules, including hearings
after hours or during the weekend, is reserved for matters that cannot wait even until
the next ordinary sitting of the court. The degree of departure from the rules of court
(as far as service and filing are concerned) must be commensurate with the exigency
of the case. This matter is far removed from that category. The applicant had known
of the agreed vacate date for two months, had been warned on 9 April 2026 that vacant
possession would be demanded in terms of a validly concluded contract that is not
challenged, and had its request for an extension expressly refused days before it
launched proceedings.
[12] The manner in which the application was presented underscores the abuse.
The notice of motion afforded the respondents until 17h00 on Friday, 24 April 2026, to
file answering affidavits, even though the application was sent by WhatsApp at
approximately 22h43 that night. The founding affidavit was then sent only at 09h48 on
Saturday morning. This meant the first respondent was expected to answer, overnight,
an application for substantial relief on papers he had not yet received. That is not
merely irregular; it is inexcusable.
[13] There is a further and equally important difficulty. Although this court does not
decide the merits, the supposed urgency is rendered even more untenable by the
applicant’s failure to assert a clear right requiring immediate protection. On its own
version, it agreed to vacate the premises by 26 April 2026. The relief it now seeks is,
version, it agreed to vacate the premises by 26 April 2026. The relief it now seeks is,
in substance, an indulgence permitting it to remain in occupation until 1 July 2026,
because it says compliance has become difficult for operational reasons and it secured
a new premise only for 1 July 2026. Put differently, the applicant asks the court, on an
1 2012 JDR 1836 (GSJ).
2 1977(4) SA 135(W) at 137F.
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urgent basis, to suspend the agreed date of performance and to substitute a different
one more favourable to it. That is not the protection of an existing right - it is an
invitation to rewrite the parties’ contract.
[14] The absence of merit is not the reason for the order in this case, but it does
illuminate the true nature of the application. The applicant’s own heads characterise
the relief as a “temporary indulgence”. Courts do not sit in urgent motion court to
relieve commercial litigants of bargains freely entered into merely because subsequent
compliance has become inconvenient, expensive or operationally disruptive. The first
respondent’s heads correctly point out that, at its core, the applicant’s case is an
attempt to secure judicial sanction for non-compliance with a binding separation
agreement. Whichever way one wants to categorise the case, the applicant identifies
no legal right to remain in occupation beyond the agreed handover date.
[15] In those circumstances, the matter should be struck from the roll for lack of
urgency. The procedural abuse is serious. A litigant who waits until the eve of an
agreed contractual deadline, serves a notice of motion late on a Friday night for a
Saturday hearing, and provides the founding affidavit only minutes before the set-
down time cannot expect indulgence from the urgent court. This is an appropriate case
for a punitive costs order.
Order
[16] The following order is made:
1. The application is struck from the roll for lack of urgency.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs on the
attorney and client scale.
______________
WJ du Plessis
Judge of the High Court, Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
Date of hearing:
30 April 2026
Date of judgment:
30 April 2026
For the applicant:
K Maponya instructed by TE Ramovha
attorneys
For the respondent:
M Cajee instructed by Yusuf Ismail
Attorneys