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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2024-046126
In the matter between:
ABSA BANK LIMITED
(Registration No: 1986/004794/06) Applicant/Plaintiff
and
GTL PETROLEUM (PTY) LTD
(Registration No: 2005/011127/07)
(In Liquidation) First Defendant
RAMTAL INVESTMENTS CC
(Registration No: 1999/039214/23) Second Defendant
BHAVANISHA PILLAY
(ID No: 6[…]) Third Defendant
JUDGMENT ON APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MAUNATLALA AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an application for summary judgment brought by the Plaintiff, ABSA Bank Limited
(1) REPORTABLE: YES
(2) OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED :NO
DATE: 29 APRIL 2026………… SIGNATURE…………………
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("the Bank"), against the Second and Third Defendants, Ramtal Investments CC ("Ramtal")
and Ms Bhavanisha Pillay ("Ms Pillay") (collectively, "the Sureties"). The First Defendant,
GTL Petroleum (Pty) Ltd ("GTL" or "the Principal Debtor"), is in final liquidation and is not
opposing the relief sought.
[2] The Bank seeks judgment for:
[2.1] R8,184,591.60 (Claim A) plus interest at 16.75% per annum from 18
November 2023; and
[2.2] R383,133.76 (Claim B) plus interest at 8.00% per annum from date of
summons.
These amounts arise from two overdraft facilities extended by the Bank to GTL. The
Bank's claim against the Sureties is founded on unlimited deeds of suretyship executed
by each of them on or about 27 March 2006.
[3] The Sureties have filed a plea and oppose the summary judgment application. The
central question for this Court is whether the Sureties have disclosed a bona fide defence
that is triable at trial. For the reasons that follow, I find that they have not.
BACKGROUND AND UNDISPUTED FACTS
[4] The following material facts are undisputed or clearly established on the papers:
[4.1] On 3 January 2023, the Bank extended an overdraft facility of R7,500,000
(account 4[…] ) to GTL. On 29 September 2020, the Bank extended a further
overdraft facility of R5,000,000 (account 4[…] ) to GTL. The facility letters are
annexed to the founding affidavit as "A" and "B".
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[4.2] On 27 March 2006, both Ramtal and Ms Pillay executed deeds of suretyship
in favour of the Bank, binding themselves as sureties and co- principal debtors
for the obligations of GTL (then named GTL Resources Marketing (Pty) Ltd).
The suretyship agreements are annexed as "D" and "E".
[4.3] GTL was placed under final liquidation on 18 April 2024. The liquidation order
is annexed as "C".
[4.4] The Sureties do not dispute the existence or validity of the overdraft facilities
or the suretyship agreements. Their plea admits the facility agreements and
does not challenge the execution of the suretyships.
[4.5] On 22 November 2023, the Bank sent letters of demand to GTL, Ramtal, and
Ms Pillay. The Sureties do not dispute receipt of these demands.
THE SURETIES’ DEFENCE AS ARTICULATED IN THEIR HEADS OF ARGUMENT
[5] The Sureties’ defence is set out in their "First and Second Defendants' Concise Heads
of Argument" filed on 23 September 2025. Their argument is remarkably narrow and can be
distilled to a single proposition: because the principal debtor, GTL, is in liquidation, the
quantum of the Bank's claim against the Sureties "has not been quantified" and cannot be
ascertained until the Liquidator files a Liquidation and Distribution Account.
[6] Specifically, the Sureties argue:
[6.1] At paragraph 6.6 of their Opposing Affidavit (record p. 5), Ms Pillay states:
"The effect of GTL Petroleum having been wound up, and being the principal
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debtor is that the quantum of the Plaintiff's claim against me has not been
quantified."
[6.2] At paragraph 6.7, she states: "The same applies to Ramtal Investments. Until
such time as the Liquidation and Distribution Account has been filed, it is not
possible to ascertain the amount owing by myself and Ramtal as Sureties."
[6.3] At paragraph 6.9, she states: "I deny the correctness of the Certificates of
Balance, and I deny the quantum claimed by the Plaintiff."
[6.4] In their Heads of Argument (p. 4), the Sureties submit that "until ABSA place
the final Liquidation and Distribution Account in the wound up estate of GTL
Petroleum before the Trial Court, the quantum of the claim against the
Sureties cannot be determined."
[7] The Sureties also rely on the legal principles set out in Maharaj v Barclays National
Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) and Tesven CC and Another v South African Bank of
Athens 2000 (1) SA 268 (SCA), correctly noting that the court retains a discretion to refuse
summary judgment where there is doubt as to whether the plaintiff's case is unanswerable.
THE PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN ITS HEADS OF ARGUMENT
[8] The Bank, in its "Plaintiff/Applicant's Heads of Argument" filed on 9 September 2025,
makes the following counter-arguments:
[8.1] The Sureties do not dispute the underlying causa (the overdraft facilities) or
the suretyship agreements themselves. The only dispute is quantum.
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[8.2] The suretyship agreements contain a certificate of balance clause (clause 14)
which provides that a certificate signed by a manager of the Bank "shall be
sufficient proof of any applicable rate of interest and of the amount owing" and
that if the surety disputes the correctness of such certificate, "the onus of
proving the contrary shall rest on me/us."
[8.3] The suretyship agreements also contain a waiver of benefits and a reverse
onus clause (clause 10.2): "if, in any legal proceedings which are instituted by
the Bank in terms of this suretyship against me/us, I/we dispute the existence
of the amount owing by the Debtor, the onus of proving this shall rest on
me/us."
[8.4] The Bank relies on the principle in Rossouw and Another v First Rand Bank
Ltd t/a FNB Home Loans that a certificate of balance is sufficient proof of
indebtedness in the absence of contrary evidence from the defendant.
[8.5] The Sureties have failed to adduce any evidence to disturb the prima
facie proof established by the certificates of balance. Their bare denial of
quantum, without any supporting facts, does not constitute a bona
fide defence.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[9] The principles governing summary judgment are well -established and were correctly
cited by both parties. I restate them briefly:
[9.1] As held in Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at
425E-F, the court must determine (a) whether the defendant has disclosed
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the nature and grounds of their defence, and (b) whether on the facts so
disclosed, the defendant appears to have a defence which is bona fide and
good in law.
[9.2] In Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint
Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA) at para 32, the Supreme Court of Appeal
reaffirmed that summary judgment is "not intended to deprive a defendant
with a triable issue or a sustainable defence of her/his day in court."
[9.3] However, as stated in Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk 1976 (2) SA 226 (T)
at 228D -E, a defendant seeking to avoid summary judgment must set out
facts that, if proved at trial, will constitute a defence. A bare denial or a
defence that is "so unconvincing that it can be characterised as fictitious or so
inherently implausible that it can be rejected out of hand" will not suffice.
[9.4] The court retains a discretion to refuse summary judgment even where the
formal requirements of Rule 32 are not met, as held in Tesven CC v South
African Bank of Athens 2000 (1) SA 268 (SCA) at 274C -D. However, this
discretion is exercised only where there is a "reasonable possibility that the
defendant's defence is a good one."
EVALUATION OF THE SURETIES’ DEFENCE
[10] I now turn to evaluate the Sureties’ defence against these legal principles. For the
following reasons, I find that the Sureties have failed to disclose a bona fide defence, and
that their opposition is without merit.
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The Sureties’ defence is a point of law that is manifestly unsound
[11] The Sureties’ central argument—that the liquidation of the principal debtor renders the
quantum of the claim unquantifiable until a Liquidation and Distribution Account is filed—is
legally untenable. I reach this conclusion for several reasons.
[12] First, the suretyship agreements signed by the Sureties contain express clauses that
directly contradict their argument. Clause 9.1.1 of the suretyship deed (record p. 34, also p.
41) provides:
"If the estate of the Debtor or any person who has bound himself as surety for the
Debtor is sequestrated, liquidated, surrendered or placed under judicial
management... the Bank may, in its discretion, decide to institute a claim against
such estate and to calculate the extent of such claim , without affecting or
diminishing my/our liability in terms hereof." (Emphasis added)
This clause makes it pellucidly clear that the liquidation of the principal debtor does not
affect the surety's liability. The Bank may pursue its claim against the
liquidator and simultaneously pursue the sureties. The filing of a liquidation account is
entirely irrelevant to the Sureties’ liability.
[13] Second, the Sureties have waived the benefits of excussion and division. Clause 10 of
the suretyship deed (record p. 34) contains a renunciation of "cession of actions" and other
benefits. The Sureties are liable as "co- principal debtors" (clause 1 of the suretyship deed).
The legal consequence is that the Bank is entitled to proceed directly against the Sureties
without first demanding payment from the principal debtor or its liquidator. This principle is
confirmed by the case of Van Zyl v Auto Commodities (Pty) Ltd 2021 (5) SA 171 (SCA) at
para 11, the SCA provides that “Where the surety signs as co- principal debtor, as Mr van
Zyl did the addition of those words shows that the surety is assuming the same obligations
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as the principal debtor. In other words, the obligation of the surety is the same as that of the
principal debtor.” It is for this reason that I submit that the Sureties cannot now argue that
the quantum is uncertain when they have contractually agreed to be treated as principal
debtors.
[14] Third, the argument that the Liquidation and Distribution Account is necessary to
quantify the claim fundamentally misunderstands the nature of a liquidation account. The
purpose of such an account is to distribute the assets of the insolvent estate to creditors. It
does not create or quantify the underlying debt; it merely records the claims proved against
the estate. The debt owed by GTL to the Bank was fixed and quantified when GTL drew
down on the overdraft facilities and failed to repay them. The liquidation account does not
and cannot alter the amount owed to the Bank.
[15] Fourth, the Sureties’ argument, if accepted, would lead to an absurd result. It would
mean that a surety could avoid liability indefinitely simply by pointing to the liquidation of the
principal debtor, no matter how clear the suretyship agreement or how well -documented
the debt is. Such a result would render suretyship agreements largely meaningless and
would be contrary to established principle. A surety's obligation is accessory to that of the
principal debtor, but the liquidation of the principal debtor does not extinguish the surety's
liability; it merely suspends the creditor's right to prove against the principal estate pending
the finalisation of the liquidation process.
The Certificates of Balance are prima facie proof of the debt
[16] The Bank has produced two Certificates of Balance signed by Ms Maria Eugenia
Camacho, Manager: Relationship Banking Recoveries at ABSA. These certificates (record
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pp. 45-46) certify the indebtedness of GTL and the Sureties as at 17 November 2023:
[16.1] Account 4[…] : R8,184,591.60
[16.2] Account 4[…] : R383,133.76
[17] Clause 14 of the suretyship deed (record p. 35, also p. 42) provides:
"A certificate signed by any manager of the Bank shall be sufficient proof of any
applicable rate of interest and of the amount owing in terms hereof or of any other
fact relating to the suretyship for the purposes of judgment, including provisional
sentence and summary judgment, proof of claims against insolvent and deceased
estates or otherwise and if I/we dispute the correctness of such certificate, I/we shall
bear the onus of proving the contrary."
[18] In Rossouw and Another v First Rand Bank Ltd t/a FNB Home Loans (formerly First
Rand Bank of SA Ltd) [2011] 2 All SA 56 (SCA) ,the court held at para 47:
"To the extent that the certificate reflects the balance due at the date of hearing, it is
merely an arithmetical calculation based on the facts already before the court which
the court would otherwise have to perform itself."
[19] The legal effect of clause 14 is that the certificate constitutes prima facie proof of the
indebtedness. The onus then shifts to the Sureties to adduce evidence to rebut that prima
facie proof. The Sureties have not done so. They have not pointed to a single payment that
was omitted, a single interest calculation that is incorrect, or a single fee that was
improperly charged. They have not produced any bank statements, reconciliations, or other
documentary evidence to challenge the certificates.
[20] A bare denial, unsupported by any facts, does not discharge the onus placed on the
Sureties by clause 14. A defendant who disputes a certificate of balance must set out the
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basis upon which the correctness of the certificate is disputed. The Sureties have failed to
do so. Their denial is merely a bald assertion, which is insufficient to raise a triable issue.
The Sureties have not raised a triable issue of fact
[21] A careful reading of the Sureties' Opposing Affidavit reveals no factual dispute
whatsoever. The Sureties do not allege:
[21.1] That they did not sign the suretyship agreements;
[21.2] That the suretyship agreements are invalid or void;
[21.3] That GTL did not receive the overdraft facilities;
[21.4] That GTL repaid the facilities in full;
[21.5] That the interest rates applied are incorrect;
[21.6] That any specific payment made by GTL or the Sureties was not credited;
[21.7] That the Bank breached any duty owed to them; or
[21.8] That the Bank acted in bad faith.
[22] The only "defence" raised is a legal argument about the effect of the liquidation. As I
have found, that argument is without merit. In Maharaj (supra), the court held that a
defence that is "bad in law" cannot defeat summary judgment. That is precisely the case
here. The Sureties’ defence is not a triable issue of fact; it is an erroneous point of law.
[23] In their Heads of Argument, the Sureties rely on Tesven CC for the proposition that the
court retains a discretion to refuse summary judgment. That is correct, but the discretion
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must be exercised judicially. Where, as in this case, the defence is manifestly unfounded
and the plaintiff's case is unanswerable, the discretion must be exercised in favour of
granting summary judgment. To do otherwise would be to countenance a purely dilatory
opposition.
The Sureties’ opposition is for the purpose of delay
[24] The Bank submits that the Sureties’ opposition is not bona fide and is raised "solely for
the purposes of delay" (founding affidavit, para 27). I am inclined to agree.
[25] The Sureties have admitted the existence of the overdraft facilities and the suretyship
agreements. They have not challenged the Bank's right to recover the amounts advanced.
They have not offered any alternative calculation of the debt. Their sole argument —that the
quantum cannot be determined until a liquidation account is filed—is not only legally
incorrect but also has the practical effect of delaying the Bank's recovery indefinitely.
Liquidation proceedings can take years to finalise. During that time, interest continues to
accrue, and the Bank's security (the suretyship) remains unenforced.
[26] The Sureties have not tendered any payment, proposed any repayment plan, or
offered any alternative to judgment. Their approach is consistent only with an intention to
postpone the inevitable for as long as possible.
THE RELIEF SOUGHT
[27] The Bank seeks summary judgment for the full amounts claimed, together with interest
and costs on the attorney and client scale. Clause 15 of the suretyship deed (record p. 35)
provides that the surety is liable for "all costs which may be incurred in the enforcement of
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this suretyship, including collection costs and legal costs on the scale as between an
attorney and his own client."
[28] The Bank has also sought condonation for the late filing of the summary judgment
application. The delay was of a few days, and the explanation (that the Bank was unaware
of GTL's liquidation and had to revise its papers) is reasonable. The Sureties have not
opposed the condonation application. Condonation is hereby granted.
CONCLUSION
[29] The Sureties have failed to disclose a bona fide defence. The defence raised is not a
triable issue but a legally unsustainable argument that is contradicted by the express terms
of the suretyship agreements. The Certificates of Balance constitute prima facie proof of
the indebtedness, and the Sureties have adduced no evidence to disturb that proof.
[30] The application for summary judgment is unanswerable. To refuse it would be to
deprive the Bank of the very remedy that Rule 32 was designed to provide: a speedy
judgment against a defendant who has no genuine defence.
ORDER
[31] In the premises, the following order is granted:
1. Summary Judgment is granted against the first and the second defendants,
jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved for:
1.1. In respect of Claim A - (Overdraft Facility Account No: 4[…] ):
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1.1.1. payment of R8 184 591.60 (eight million hundred and
eighty thousand five hundred and ninety one and sixty
cents); and
1.1.2. interest on the above-mentioned amount from the date of
issue of the summons to the date of final payment at the rate
of 16.75% in terms of the overdraft facility.
1.2. In respect of Claim B - (Overdraft Facility Account No: 4[…] ):
1.2.1. payment of R383 133.76 ((three hundred and eighty
three thousand one hundred and thirty); and
1.2.2. interest of the above- mentioned amount from the date of
issue of the summons to the date of final payment at the rate
of 8.00 % in terms of the overdraft facility agreement.
2. The lateness of the summary judgment application is hereby condoned.
3. Pursuant to the orders above, the respondents are ordered to pay the
applicant's costs of suit on an attorney and client scale.
MI MAUNATLALA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
JOHANNESBURG, GAUTENG DIVISION
DATE OF HEARING: 29 January 2026
DATE OF ORDER: 29 January 2026
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DATE OF REASONS FOR JUDGMENT: 29 April 2026