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[2026] ZAGPJHC 440
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IDC Architects CC v Trustees of Independent Development Trust (Leave to Appeal) (2024/099637) [2026] ZAGPJHC 440 (29 April 2026)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number:
2024-099637
In
the matter between:
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/NO
IDC
ARCHITECTS
CC
Applicant
And
THE TRUSTEES OF THE
INDEPENDENT
DEVELOPMENT
TRUST
Respondent
JUDGMENT – LEAVE
TO APPEAL
STRYDOM, J
[1]
This is an application for leave to appeal
against this Court's judgment, in terms of which the applicant’s
claim for payment
of a monetary amount was dismissed.
[2]
To be successful in this application, the
applicant had to show that leave to appeal should be granted as it
would have a reasonable
prospect of success on appeal.
[3]
Although the notice of application for
leave to appeal states that the appeal lies against the part of the
judgment and order at
paragraph [60](d) of the judgment, including
the relevant conclusions made in the judgment, the Court will accept
that the application
for leave to appeal lies against the whole of
the judgment, including the cost order.
[4]
The background of this matter has been
fully set out in the written judgment of this Court and is not
repeated. I will, however,
provide a brief summary of the facts, most
of which were common cause.
[5]
The matter concerns an application for an
arbitration award to be made an order of Court. An award was made in
favour of the applicant
in terms of which the respondent was ordered
to pay to the applicant the amount of R11 854 620.88 plus
interest and costs
(“the award”). After the award was
made, there was a delay in payment. The parties then engaged in
settlement negotiations
to settle the amount to be paid to the
applicant. The applicant alleged that this negotiation led to naught,
whilst the respondent
alleged a full and final settlement in the
lesser amount of R8 960 051.27. It was not disputed that this
amount was paid and
accepted by the applicant on 5 April 2022. Whilst
the applicant alleged that it constituted partial payment of the
award, the Court
found that the award was settled in the lesser
amount and that the respondent paid this amount in full and final
settlement of
the claim. Accordingly, the award was compromised for a
lesser amount and paid. After the applicant accepted the amount it,
for
two (2) years and three (3) months, did nothing to claim the
alleged balance. After this delay, a demand was made for the payment
of the difference between the award amount and the amount actually
paid. This demand failed to include a payment for interest and
costs
as per the original award.
[6]
The
applicant now alleges that the Court erred in finding that the
respondent's version regarding the alleged settlement of the
award
was not far-fetched and untenable. It was argued that the Court
should have rejected this defence by applying the principles
established in the well-known matter of
Plascon
Evans Paints.
[1]
[7]
It was argued that the Court was wrong to
find that a second settlement agreement was concluded in writing and
that the parties
orally adjusted the amount payable from
R9 000 000.00 to the amount of R8 960 051.27. It was
argued that, as the
respondent failed to produce the email in which
the second settlement agreement was sent to the applicant, the Court
could not
have found that this agreement was concluded. This, so the
argument went, constituted conclusive evidence that the second
agreement
was never concluded.
[8]
It was argued that the Court should have
found on the papers before it that the second settlement agreement,
which was in signed
form attached to the respondent’s answering
affidavit, was not signed on behalf of the applicant. The signature
appearing
thereon was fraudulently appended.
[9]
Further,
it was submitted that the Court could not have found that the
respondent orally amended the amount contained in the second
agreement, as such a verbal amendment would render the second
agreement to be in conflict with the terms of the
Public Finance
Management Act 1 of 1999
. The Court was referred to the matter of
TLJ
Securities v Tswaing Local Municipality
.
[2]
[10]
It was submitted that the Court ought to
have found that the payment which was received constituted part
payment.
[11]
It was argued that there was no
bona
fide
factual dispute before the Court,
and thus no reason existed for the referral of the matter for the
hearing of oral evidence on
the issue of whether the second agreement
was concluded. The Court should merely have rejected the respondent's
version that a
second agreement was concluded and later verbally
amended that day. It was argued that no binding agreement was
concluded.
[12]
Most of these grounds for leave to appeal
were fully dealt with in the judgment of this Court. The Court was
fully aware of a factual
dispute regarding the conclusion and
amendment of the second agreement and, during the argument, invited
the applicant to have
the matter referred for the hearing of oral
evidence. The applicant elected not to do this and persisted in
arguing that the defence
of settlement was far-fetched and could be
rejected on the papers. I found that this defence could not have been
rejected outright,
even though the email in which the document was
allegedly sent to the applicant was not produced by the respondent. I
found that
the probabilities overwhelmingly pointed to a settlement
of the award in the amount of R8 960 051.27.
[13]
Before this Court, the applicant could not
explain why a very specific amount was paid to the applicant. This
indicates an agreement
in this regard. The applicant was willing to
settle for a lesser amount. This was not contested. If the applicant
was amenable
to settle for a lesser amount, it supports the view that
a higher amount was accepted in full and final settlement. The delay
of
two (2) years and three (3) months after receipt of the payment,
during which period nothing was done to claim the
alleged balance, is telling. If it
constituted part payment, the applicant would certainly have demanded
full payment, plus interest
and costs, shortly thereafter. This was
not done for an extended period, and then a demand was made only for
the balance, still
without a claim for the interest and costs.
[14]
The argument that the Court should have
ignored the “
without prejudice
”
settlement negotiation does not hold water. Nowhere was it stated
that the negotiations were conducted in that manner. Moreover,
in a
case where the contentious issue is whether a settlement was
concluded, evidence of the negotiations would be admissible.
It is a
relevant consideration.
[15]
The case of
TLJ
Securities
,
supra
,
referred to by the applicant is distinguishable. That matter
concerned procurement by a governmental entity, not with a compromise
of an amount payable.
[16]
The Court provided its reason for the
punitive cost order. In this regard, the Court exercised a discretion
which is unlikely to
be overturned on appeal. This ground of appeal
does not support a reasonable prospect on appeal.
[17]
The Court is of the view that there is not
a reasonable prospect that another court would find differently from
this Court and that
the application for leave to appeal should be
dismissed.
[18]
The respondent sought a punitive cost
order. I do not think it is warranted. The application for leave to
appeal cannot be said
to constitute an abuse of process. Costs should
merely follow the result.
[19]
The following order is made:
a.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed with costs on scale B.
R. STRYDOM
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Heard
on:
Delivered
on:
23
April 2026
29
April 2026
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:
Instructed
by:
Mr.
K. Matlala
Matlala
K Incorporated
For
the Respondent:
Instructed
by:
Adv.
B. Ledwaba
MBA
Incorporated
[1]
Plascon-Evans
Paints Limited v. Van Riebeek Paints (Pty) Limited
1984 (3) SA 623 (A)
[2]
TLJ
Securities v Tswaing Local Municipality
(Case n: 1376/22. North West Provincial Division, Mahikeng.)