IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
In the matter between:
TEBOGO DESIREE KUKAMA
BETHUELL GAOTINGWE RAMOKOKA
EUGENE LETLAPE
REGINALD NA THANIEL LETLAPE
GOMOT SEGAANG MOSES MOKOKA
LEBOGAANG KHUMO LETLAPE
and
THEBAPHALANEBARAMOKOKA
Not Reportable
Case No: M655/2022
FIRST APPLICANT
SECOND APPLICANT
THIRD APPLICANT
FOURTH APPLICANT
FIFTH APPLICANT
SIXTH APPLICANT
COMMUNAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION FIRST RESPONDENT
THE MINISTER OF RURAL
DEVELOPMENT AND LAND REFORM SECOND RESPONDENTT
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT
AND LAND REFORM THIRD RESPONDENT
Heard on: 30 April 2026
Reserved on: 30 April 2026
Coram : Reddy J
This judgment was electronically circulated to the parties' legal representatives
by e-mail and released on SAFLII. The date and time of hand down are deemed
to be 18 May 2026 at 14h00.
JUDGMENT ON APPLICATION FOR LEA VE TO APPEAL
REDDY J
Introduction
[ 1] The first respondent, the Baphalane Ba Ramokoka Communal Property
Association (the CPA), seeks leave to appeal this Court's judgment and order
dated 5 January 2026. The applicants oppose the application. The second and
third respondents do not oppose this Court's decision.
The applicable test
[2] Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 governs this
application. It provides that leave to appeal may only be given where the judge is
of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success, or
that there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard. The
word "would" is significant.
[3] In MEC for Health Eastern Cape v Mkhitha1, leave to appeal must not be
granted unless there truly is a reasonable prospect of success. An applicant must
convince the court on proper grounds that there is a realistic chance of success. A
mere possibility of success, an arguable case or one that is not hopeless, is
insufficient. There must be a sound, rational basis for concluding that a
reasonable prospect of success exists.
[ 4] In Mont Chevaux Trust v Goosen2 the formulation of the test for leave to
appeal is instructive. The word 'would' indicates a measure of certainty that
another court would differ, not merely that it might. That is the lens through which
this application must be assessed.
Application of the test
[ 5] The CPA advances multiple grounds of appeal. It is not the function of this
Court, in deciding a leave application, to conduct a detailed interrogation of each
ground as though sitting as a court of appeal. The inquiry is narrower and more
direct. It is whether, viewed as a whole and with appropriate reference to the most
substantial of the grounds advanced, another court would reasonably come to a
different conclusion.
[ 6] Several of the grounds raise significant questions of law and fact that are
genuinely amenable to appellate scrutiny. I have considered the applicant's
submission that the grounds amount to no more than disagreement with the
outcome of the matter and that the judgment is, on the facts and the law,
unimpeachable. I accept that leave to appeal is not to be granted simply because
a litigant is aggrieved or because alternative reasoning was available.
1 MECfo r Health Eastern Cape v Mkilha ( 122 1/201 5) [20 15] ZASCA 176 [as at para 16 and 17].
2 Mont Chevaux Trust v Goosen 20 14 JDR 2325 {LCC) [as at page 6].2014 JDR 2325 (LCC) - "would
indicates a measure of certain ty".
[7] The test demands more. To this end, the grounds of appeal identify specific
legal questions of substance. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
(PAJA) 3 of 2000, the treatment of factual disputes in motion proceedings, and
the enforceability of the order, on which there is a sound, rational basis for
concluding that another court would reason and decide differently.
Conclusion
[8] Taken together, the grounds advanced satisfy me that the appeal would have
a reasonable prospect of success within the meaning of section l 7(l)(a)(i) of the
Superior Courts Act. The conflicting judgments on the PAJA question further
provide an independent basis for the appeal to be heard in terms of section
17(1)(a)(ii). Leave to appeal must accordingly be granted.
Order
[9] In the premises, the following order is made:
1. Leave to appeal the judgment and order of this Court dated 5 January
2026 is granted.
2. The First Respondent is granted leave to appeal to a Full Court of this
Division.
3. The costs of this application shall be costs in the appeal.
REDDY J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Appearances
Counsel for the Applicant:
Attorney for Applicant:
Adv C Louis
Strydom & Bredenkamp Attorneys,
C/O Minchin & Kelly Inc
Mahikeng
Counsel for the Respondent: Adv A J Schoeman
Attorney for the Respondent: Padayache Attorneys
C/O Labuschagne Attorneys
Mahikeng