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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Not reportable
Case No: 2044/2013
In the matter between:
K[...] E[...] M[...]
obo O[...] M[...] Plaintiff
and
THE MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR HEALTH, NORTH WEST PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT Defendant
Coram: Petersen ADJP
Heard: 18–19 August 2025; 26–28 January 2026
Judgment reserved: 18 February 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically, circulated to the
parties’ representatives via email, uploaded to CaseLines, and released to
SAFLII. The date and time for the handing down of the judgment are deemed to
be 14h00 on 13 May 2026.
Summary: Medical negligence — delict — liability of provincial health
authority for intrapartum hypoxic -ischaemic brain injury — prolonged rupture
of membranes at term — materially inadequate foetal surveillance during active
labour — no continuous foetal monitoring — MRI demonstrating watershed
hypoxic-ischaemic injury consistent with prolonged evolving intrapartum
hypoxia — alternative explanations not established as more probable —
negligence and causation proved on a balance of probabilities.
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
PETERSEN ADJP:
Introduction
[1] This is an action for damages instituted by the plaintiff in her representative
capacity as mother and natural guardian of her minor daughter, O[...] M[...]
(“O[...]”), who was born on 28 December 2006 at Schweizer -Reneke Hospital.
The plaintiff alleges that O[...] sustained a severe hypoxic -ischaemic brain
injury during the intrapartum period as a consequence of negligent obstetric and
neonatal management by the defendant’s medical and nursing staff, resulting in
cerebral palsy and associated sequelae.
[2] At the commencement of the trial, and by agreement between the parties, an
order was granted in terms of Rule 33(4) separating the issue of liability from
the determination of quantum. This Court is accordingly required to determine
only whether the defendant is liable for the damages alleged.
[3] The claim arises from events occurring between 27 and 28 December 2006,
when the plaintiff presented at Schweizer -Reneke Hospital with prolonged
rupture of membranes of approximately 48 hours’ duration. The plaintiff’s case
is, in essence, that the defendant’s employees failed adequately to monitor the
progress of labour and foetal wellbeing, administered labour augmentation in
circumstances of inadequate surveillance, and thereby failed to detect and
respond to evolving foetal compromise, resulting in hypoxic-ischaemic brain
injury.
[4] The trial was conducted over four hearing days in August 2025 and January
2026. The plaintiff adduced the expert evidence of Dr L Murray, an obstetrician
and gynaecologist; Dr H Lewis, a paediatrician; and Dr D Pearce, a paediatric
neurologist. The defendant adduced the evidence of Dr D Bowen, an
neurologist. The defendant adduced the evidence of Dr D Bowen, an
obstetrician and gynaecologist; and Dr P Mteshana, a paediatric neurologist.
The parties further placed before the Court, by agreement, the joint minute of
the radiologists, Dr B Alheit for the plaintiff and Dr J Swartzberg for the
defendant.
[5] Following the conclusion of the evidence, written heads of argument were
filed at the direction of the Court. Both parties indicated that oral argument was
unnecessary, and judgment was accordingly reserved.
The factual background
[6] The material factual chronology is largely common cause. The plaintiff, then
a 23 -year-old primigravida, attended antenatal care at Ipelegeng Clinic. No
material antenatal complications were identified. On 27 December 2006 at
approximately 12h30, the plaintiff presented at Schweizer -Reneke Hospital
complaining of clear liquor drainage since approximately 25 December 2006.
She reported no vaginal bleeding and no significant labour pains. Examination
revealed a term pregnancy, cephalic presentation, no pa lpable contractions, and
a recorded foetal heart rate of 134 beats per minute. Vaginal examination
revealed a closed cervix with continued liquor drainage. Maternal observations
were within normal limits.
[7] At approximately 15h51, a doctor examined the plaintiff. The history of
prolonged rupture of membranes was confirmed. Ultrasound assessment
suggested a term gestation. The diagnosis was prelabour rupture of membranes
at term, and a decision was taken to induce labour. No criticism was directed at
that decision, which all obstetric experts accepted as clinically appropriate.
[8] At approximately 18h00, misoprostol (Cytotec) was administered for
induction. Subsequent labour progress was recorded at intervals. At
approximately 20h00, mild contractions were noted, with a foetal heart rate
recorded within normal limits and cervical dilatation of 2 cm. At approximately
22h30, moderate contractions were present, the cervix was 4 cm dilated, and a
partogram was commenced.
[9] At approximately 00h30 on 28 December 2006, the cervix was recorded as 8
cm dilated. At approximately 02h30, full dilatation was recorded. The
contemporaneous records described foetal observations at those recorded
intervals as reassuring.
intervals as reassuring.
[10] At approximately 02h30, an intravenous infusion containing oxytocin was
commenced to augment labour because the plaintiff was noted to have poor
pushing effort. At approximately 02h45, the plaintiff removed the intravenous
line. At approximately 02h55, she delivered a live female infant vaginally
following episiotomy. The infant weighed 3.74 kg. The umbilical cord was
recorded as wrapped twice around the neck. Thick meconium -stained liquor
was noted after delivery of the infant. Recorded Apgar scores w ere 5/10 at one
minute and 8/10 at five minutes. The infant required tracheal suctioning, oxygen
administration, medication, and monitoring.
[11] On 29 December 2006, the infant was transferred to Klerksdorp Hospital
with respiratory distress. Complete records from that institution were
unavailable.
[12] In subsequent years, O[...] manifested significant developmental and
neurological impairment. In 2012, a developmental assessment raised the
possibility of cerebral palsy secondary to hypoxic -ischaemic encephalopathy.
Chromosomal investigations did not identify deletions or duplications,
rendering a chromosomal explanation less likely.
[13] An MRI brain scan performed on 6 November 2013 revealed findings
subsequently agreed by the radiologists to demonstrate a watershed hypoxic -
ischaemic brain injury.
The expert evidence
The plaintiff’s obstetric evidence: Dr Murray
[14] Dr Murray, an experienced obstetrician and gynaecologist, testified that the
plaintiff’s labour required enhanced vigilance because prolonged rupture of
membranes of approximately 48 hours materially elevated obstetric risk. She
referred to the applicable Guidelines for Maternity Care in South Africa (2000),
which required materially closer foetal surveillance during active labour and
enhanced monitoring in higher-risk circumstances.
[15] Her evidence was that no CTG monitoring was performed at any stage and
that foetal surveillance during active labour fell materially below acceptable
obstetric standards. She emphasised that the significance of monitoring lies not
in record-keeping as an end in itself, but in the clinical opportunity it creates to
detect evolving foetal compromise and intervene appropriately.
[16] Dr Murray further testified that oxytocin is a recognised clinical
intervention, but that augmentation of labour in circumstances of inadequate
foetal surveillance requires particular caution because increased uterine activity
may exacerbate foetal compromise where such compromise exists. Importantly,
may exacerbate foetal compromise where such compromise exists. Importantly,
Dr Murray explained that the MRI pattern of watershed hypoxic -ischaemic
injury is consistent with a prolonged evolving hypoxic insult rather than an
instantaneous catastrophic event. In her opinion, such a p attern is consistent
with progressive foetal compromise developing during labour.
The plaintiff’s paediatric evidence: Dr Lewis
[17] Dr Lewis addressed the neonatal condition and early postnatal
management. He expressed reservations regarding the internal consistency of
the recorded Apgar scores and criticised aspects of neonatal management. More
materially for present purposes, Dr Lewis distinguished between the mere
presence of meconium and clinically significant meconium aspiration syndrome
causing profound hypoxic injury. His evidence was that the available objective
evidence did not establish meconium aspiration syndrome as the probable
explanation for O[...]’s later neurological condition.
The plaintiff’s paediatric neurology evidence: Dr Pearce
[18] Dr Pearce examined O[...] several years later and recorded findings
consistent with significant permanent neurological impairment. She accepted
the MRI findings as demonstrating hypoxic-ischaemic injury and concluded that
the most probable timing of the insult was intrapartum.
The defendant’s obstetric evidence: Dr Bowen
[19] Dr Bowen accepted that induction of labour was clinically appropriate, that
prolonged rupture of membranes materially elevated obstetric risk, and that
foetal monitoring during active labour was less frequent than contemplated by
accepted obstetric practice. He nevertheless relied on intermittently recorded
reassuring foetal observations, emphasised the modest oxytocin dose and
limited duration of administration, and explored alternative explanations for the
child’s condition.
[20] Dr Bowen testified that the dose of oxytocin administered was modest and
that, because the plaintiff removed the intravenous line after a short interval, he
considered it unlikely that the infusion, viewed in isolation, materially altered
the foetal condition. His evidence in this regard was directed principally at the
question of causation rather than the standard of care.
[21] Dr Bowen further explored the possibility that meconium aspiration
syndrome may have contributed to the infant’s later neurological condition. He
accepted, however, that the diagnosis and clinical implications of meconium
aspiration syndrome fall more appropriately within paediatric expertise than
obstetric expertise.
obstetric expertise.
[22] Under cross-examination, Dr Bowen accepted that foetal monitoring during
the active phase of labour was materially inadequate and that intermittent
surveillance necessarily creates the risk that clinically significant deterioration
may occur between recorded observations without detection.
The defendant’s paediatric neurology evidence: Dr Mteshana
[23] Dr Mteshana examined O[...] on 30 July 2025. Certain aspects of her
clinical findings differed from those of Dr Pearce, particularly in relation to
motor manifestations. Dr Mteshana considered alternative neurodevelopmental
explanations for aspects of O[...]’s presentation, including developmental and
behavioural features not necessarily specific to hypoxic-ischaemic injury.
[24] However, Dr Mteshana accepted that the MRI findings demonstrated
hypoxic-ischaemic injury of a watershed pattern and that such injury is
consistent with a prolonged evolving hypoxic process rather than an acute
catastrophic event. She further accepted that, on the available evidence,
intrapartum hypoxia remained a probable explanation for the neurological
injury reflected on imaging and manifested clinically.
[25] While certain alternative developmental possibilities were canvassed, no
definitive alternative diagnosis was established sufficient to displace the
objective radiological findings.
The radiologists’ joint minute
[26] The parties placed before the Court the joint minute of Dr Alheit and Dr
Swartzberg. The radiologists agreed that the MRI demonstrated a watershed
hypoxic-ischaemic injury pattern. They further agreed that the imaging did not
support infective or inflammatory pathology as the sole explanation for the
injury, and that recognisable genetic disorders with characteristic imaging
signatures were unlikely to account for the findings.
[27] The radiological evidence was therefore materially common cause and
provides an important objective evidential anchor in the causation enquiry.
The issues
[28] The principal issues for determination are whether the defendant’s
employees were negligent in the management of the plaintiff’s labour and
delivery, and if so whether such negligence probably caused the hypoxic -
ischaemic injury sustained by O[...].
The applicable legal principles
Negligence
[29] The test for negligence remains that articulated in Kruger v Coetzee 1,
namely whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would
foresee the reasonable possibility of harm and take reasonable steps to guard
foresee the reasonable possibility of harm and take reasonable steps to guard
against it, and whether such steps were not taken.
1 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A).
[30] In the context of medical negligence, the standard is one of reasonable
professional competence rather than perfection. As recognised in Mitchell v
Dixon2, a medical practitioner is required to exercise reasonable skill and care.
[31] Th is Court must evaluate expert evidence critically and not defer to
professional opinion merely because it is sincerely held. In Michael and
Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another 3, the Supreme Court of
Appeal emphasised that expert opinion must be logically defensible, grounded
in fact, and capable of withstanding analytical scrutiny.
Causation
[32] Factual causation is ordinarily determined by applying the but -for test
articulated in International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 4, namely whether
the harm probably would have been avoided absent the negligent conduct. The
plaintiff bears the legal onus throughout to establish causation on a balance of
probabilities. Absolute scientific certainty is not required.
[33] In Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 5, the Supreme Court
of Appeal emphasised that causation in civil matters is determined on a practical
and probabilistic basis, informed by common sense and the evidence.
[34] The Constitutional Court in Oppelt v Department of Health, Western Cape 6
reaffirmed that the causation enquiry in medical negligence matters requires a
practical assessment of what probably would have occurred had reasonable
medical intervention been provided.
Evaluation of expert evidence
[35] Before addressing the disputed issues, it is appropriate to identify the
matters that emerged as common cause or substantially uncontested. The
plaintiff presented with prolonged rupture of membranes of approximately 48
hours’ duration. This elevated obstetric risk and justified induction of labour. It
is uncontested that the MRI demonstrated a watershed hypoxic-ischaemic injury
pattern consistent with a prolonged evolving hypoxic process rather than an
pattern consistent with a prolonged evolving hypoxic process rather than an
acute sentinel catastrophic event. No expert credibly suggested placental
abruption, uterine rupture, cord prolapse, or comparable acute intrapartum
catastrophe as the explanation for the injury.
[36] It further emerged, both from the documentary records and the expert
evidence, that foetal monitoring during active labour was materially less
2 Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519.
3 Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA).
4 International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A).
5 Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA).
6 Oppelt v Department of Health, Western Cape 2016 (1) SA 325 (CC).
frequent than contemplated by accepted obstetric standards. It is common cause
that no CTG monitoring was performed at any stage.
[37] Dr Bowen suggested that CTG equipment may not have been available at
Schweizer-Reneke Hospital at the relevant time. That proposition remained
speculative. No factual evidence was adduced from hospital personnel
concerning equipment availability, staffing constraints, operational limitations,
or other institutional impediments that may have affected monitoring capability.
In any event, even if CTG monitoring were unavailable, that would not absolve
the defendant if reasonable foetal surveillance by other means was not provided.
[38] The defendant relied in part on recorded notations suggesting reassuring
foetal status, including references to apparently normal foetal heart
observations. Those entries are contemporaneous and therefore important.
However, they represent isolated time -point assessments only. Their evidential
significance must be evaluated in that context. Sparse intermittent reassuring
observations do not establish continuous foetal wellbeing throughout the entire
active phase of labour, particularly where the centra l issue is whether evolving
deterioration occurred between those observations.
[39] Particular reliance was placed on the notation suggesting “good
variability”. Dr Murray explained that beat -to-beat variability is most reliably
assessed through objective continuous monitoring. Dr Bowen accepted
limitations in drawing firm conclusions from such entries absent formal CTG
evidence. The notation cannot be equated with reliable continuous foetal
assessment sufficient to exclude evolving compromise. At best, it records a
contemporaneous clinical impression at a particular moment.
[40] The administration of oxytocin at approximately 02h30 is common cause.
Oxytocin is a recognised obstetric intervention and its use is not inherently
negligent. Its significance depends on context. Dr Murray’s evidence, which I
negligent. Its significance depends on context. Dr Murray’s evidence, which I
accept, was that augmentation of labour in circumstances of inadequate foetal
surveillance requires particular caution because increased uterine activity may
exacerbate foetal compromise if compromise is already developing. Dr Bowen’s
evidence that the dose was modest and adminis tration brief is relevant to
causation, but does not negate the broader significance of administering
augmentation in circumstances of inadequate surveillance.
[41] Dr Lewis criticised the internal consistency of the recorded Apgar scores.
While his reasoning in that regard was logical, caution is required in attributing
determinative forensic significance to retrospective reconstruction of neonatal
scoring. Apgar scores are clinical tools subject to observer variability. It is
unnecessary to resolve the precise reliability of the recorded scores, as the
causation analysis does not depend materially on that issue.
[42] The meconium aspiration theory requires careful scrutiny. The presence of
meconium is not disputed. However, the mere presence of meconium does not
establish meconium aspiration syndrome as the probable cause of profound
neurological injury. Dr Lewis drew a clear distinction between aspiration of
meconium and clinically significant meconium aspiration syndrome causing
severe hypoxic injury. No objective paediatric respiratory evidence was
produced establishing the latter as the probable explanation for the injury
demonstrated on MRI.
[43] Dr Bowen’s exploration of meconium aspiration as a causative mechanism
must be viewed in the context of his expertise. He appropriately accepted that
the diagnosis and clinical implications of meconium aspiration syndrome fall
more naturally within paediatric rather than obstetric expertise. More
importantly, the radiological evidence reflects a prolonged evolving watershed
injury pattern, which is materially inconsistent with a purely post -delivery
respiratory event as the most probable explanation.
[44] The alternative developmental or neurobehavioural explanations canvassed
through Dr Mteshana similarly do not displace the plaintiff’s case. While certain
developmental features were identified, no definitive alternative diagnosis was
established sufficient to explain away the objective hypoxic -ischaemic
radiological findings. Dr Mteshana ultimately accepted that intrapartum hypoxia
remained a probable explanation.
[45] Evaluating the expert evidence in accordance with Linksfield, Dr Murray’s
evidence was careful, clinically coherent, and logically grounded in the
objective evidence. Her reasoning concerning the significance of inadequate
monitoring and the implications of the MRI findings was persuasive.
[46] Dr Lewis’s evidence was helpful, particularly in relation to the limits of the
meconium aspiration theory, though I do not regard retrospective precision
concerning Apgar scoring as materially determinative.
concerning Apgar scoring as materially determinative.
[47] Dr Pearce’s neurological conclusions aligned with the objective
radiological evidence and were not materially undermined.
[48] Dr Bowen was appropriately candid in important respects, particularly his
acceptance that foetal monitoring during active labour was materially
inadequate. His evidence on the meconium theory, however, remained tentative
and insufficiently supported by objective evidence.
[49] Dr Mteshana’s evidence narrowed rather than materially expanded the
dispute, given her acceptance of the objective hypoxic -ischaemic radiological
findings and the probability of intrapartum hypoxia.
Negligence
[50] The question is whether the conduct of the defendant’s employees fell
below the standard reasonably to be expected of competent practitioners in the
prevailing circumstances. Those circumstances included a term primigravida
undergoing induced labour following prolonged rupture of membranes of
approximately 48 hours. This was not an uncomplicated low -risk labour. A
reasonable practitioner would foresee the possibility that inadequate foetal
surveillance in such circumstances could permit evolving foetal compromise to
go undetected, with potentially grave neurological consequences.
[51] The evidence establishes that foetal monitoring during active labour was
materially below accepted standards. This conclusion does not depend solely
upon proof that CTG monitoring ought specifically to have been deployed.
Even absent CTG availability, materially closer surveillance by reasonable
means was required. That did not occur.
[52] The defendant’s own obstetric expert accepted that the monitoring was
materially inadequate. The records reflect only intermittent observations over a
prolonged active labour period. The foreseeable risk created by such inadequate
surveillance is precisely that clinically significant deterioration may occur
between observations without detection.
[53] The administration of oxytocin in circumstances of inadequate foetal
surveillance reinforced the substandard nature of the intrapartum management.
While it is unnecessary at this stage to attribute independent causal significance
to the brief infusion, its administration formed part of the broader pattern of
inadequate clinical management.
[54] Applying the principles in Kruger v Coetzee , I am satisfied that the
defendant’s employees failed to take reasonable steps that competent
practitioners would have taken in the circumstances to guard against foreseeable
foetal harm.
[55] Negligence is accordingly established.
Causation
[56] Negligence alone does not determine the matter. The plaintiff bears the
Causation
[56] Negligence alone does not determine the matter. The plaintiff bears the
onus of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, that the negligent conduct
found was a factual cause of the injury sustained by O[...]. The enquiry is
whether, had reasonable intrapartum care been provided, the injury probably
would have been avoided.
[57] The starting point in that enquiry is the objective radiological evidence.
The agreed MRI findings demonstrate a watershed hypoxic -ischaemic injury.
That finding is of central significance because it materially informs both
mechanism and timing. A watershed injury is consistent with a prolonged
evolving hypoxic process rather than an instantaneous catastrophic insult. That
proposition was materially common cause.
[58] The plaintiff was not required to establish the exact minute at which
irreversible injury commenced. Civil causation does not demand scientific
precision of that order. What must be shown is probability. The evidence
establishes that the injury pattern is materially consistent with progressive
hypoxic compromise developing during the labour process.
[59] The plaintiff’s case is not that inadequate monitoring itself caused
neurological injury. Monitoring is diagnostically significant because it creates
the opportunity to detect evolving foetal compromise and intervene before
injury becomes irreversible. The relevant enquiry is therefore sequential ,
whether proper monitoring would probably have detected evolving
compromise, whether timely clinical response would probably have followed,
and whether such intervention would probably have prevented the injury.
[60] Dr Murray testified that progressive hypoxic compromise of the kind
reflected in watershed injury would ordinarily manifest through evolving foetal
heart abnormalities capable of detection through reasonable foetal surveillance.
Her evidence in this regard was logically coherent, clinically grounded, and not
materially displaced. Dr Bowen accepted that inadequate monitoring creates the
risk that clinically significant deterioration may occur undetected between
observations.
[61] The defendant relied on intermittently reassuring recorded foetal
observations. Those entries do not defeat the plaintiff’s case. The purpose of
regular monitoring is precisely because foetal condition may evolve between
observations. Sparse isolated reassuring entries do not establish sustained foetal
wellbeing throughout a prolonged active labour period, particularly where the
objective radiological evidence demonstrates that a prolonged evolving hypoxic
process did in fact occur.
process did in fact occur.
[62] Detection alone would not suffice unless timely intervention would
probably have followed. The evidence supports that inference. If foetal
compromise had been detected in a monitored obstetric setting, ordinary clinical
responses would probably have included cessation of augmentation, intrauterine
resuscitative measures, escalation of clinical concern, and expedited delivery if
deterioration persisted. Dr Murray’s evidence supports that conclusion. There is
no evidential basis to conclude that appropri ate intervention, had foetal
compromise been detected, would probably have been unavailable.
[63] The nature of the injury remains significant. A prolonged evolving hypoxic
insult inherently presents a window during which detection and intervention
may prevent irreversible injury. This case is materially distinguishable from one
involving an acute catastrophic event producing injury instantaneously. The
MRI findings materially support the conclusion that the injury evolved over
time.
[64] The alternative explanations advanced by the defendant do not materially
displace the plaintiff’s causation case. Meconium aspiration syndrome was not
established as the probable cause of the injury. The developmental or
neurobehavioural alternatives canvassed similarly lacked sufficient evidential
foundation to displace the objective hypoxic-ischaemic explanation.
[65] The oxytocin administration forms part of the broader clinical context, but
I do not consider it necessary to make a discrete finding that the brief infusion
independently caused material deterioration. The causation finding does not
depend on such a conclusion.
[66] Considering the totality of the evidence, including the agreed MRI
findings, the prolonged evolving nature of the injury, the materially inadequate
foetal surveillance, the probability that evolving compromise would have
manifested detectably, and the probability that timely clinical response would
have followed if deterioration were detected, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has
established factual causation on a balance of probabilities.
[67] Legal causation presents no independent difficulty. Permanent hypoxic
neurological injury is plainly the kind of harm reasonably foreseeable from
negligent failure adequately to monitor foetal wellbeing during a high -risk
labour.
[68] I accordingly find that both factual and legal causation have been
established.
Conclusion
[69] The plaintiff has proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant’s
employees were negligent in their management of her labour and delivery, and
that such negligence probably caused O[...] to sustain the hypoxic -ischaemic
brain injury reflected on MRI and manifested clinically thereafter.
Costs
[70] Costs ordinarily follow the result, and no persuasive reason exists to depart
Costs
[70] Costs ordinarily follow the result, and no persuasive reason exists to depart
from that principle. The plaintiff has succeeded on the separated issue of
liability in a matter involving complex expert medical evidence across multiple
disciplines. The employment of counsel and expert witnesses was plainly
reasonable and necessary for the proper adjudication of the issues.
Order
[71] In the premises, the following order is made:
1. The defendant is declared liable for payment of 100% (one hundred
percent) of the plaintiff’s proven or agreed damages, in her
representative capacity on behalf of O[...] M[...], arising from the
negligent management of the plaintiff’s labour and delivery at
Schweizer-Reneke Hospital on 27 and 28 December 2006, resulting in
hypoxic-ischaemic brain injury and its sequelae.
2. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s costs relating to the separated
issue of liability, such costs to include:
2.1 the costs of counsel;
2.2 the reasonable qualifying, preparation, reservation (where
applicable), attendance and testimony fees of the plaintiff’s expert
witnesses, insofar as such costs relate to the issue of liability;
2.3 the reasonable costs associated with consultations, joint meetings
and preparation of joint minutes by the plaintiff’s expert witnesses
relevant to the issue of liability;
2.4 the reasonable costs of obtaining medico -legal reports relevant to
the determination of liability;
2.5 the reasonable costs associated with the MRI investigation and
radiological reporting relied upon for purposes of the liability
determination;
2.6 the reasonable travelling and accommodation costs necessarily
incurred by the plaintiff and the minor child in attending medico -legal
consultations and examinations relevant to the issue of liability, subject
to taxation where not agreed.
3. In the event that the costs are not agreed:
3.1 the plaintiff shall be entitled to have such costs taxed;
3.2 the defendant shall pay the taxed costs within 30 (thirty) calendar
days of taxation or agreement;
3.3 failing such payment, interest shall accrue on the taxed or agreed
costs at the prescribed legal rate from the 31st day after taxation or
agreement to date of payment.
_______________________
A H PETERSEN
ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Appearances:
For the Plaintiff: Adv M Coetzer
Instructed by: Wim Krynauw Attorneys
c/o Nienaber & Wissing Attorneys, Mafikeng
For the Defendant: Adv T Kwape
Instructed by: The State Attorney, Mafikeng