IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
In the matter between: CASE: CC 02/2025
THE STATE
and
JOHN MMOLOTSI ACCUSED
Coram: Reddy J
Date enrolled: 5 May 2026
Judgment reserved: 5 May 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down on 7 May 2026 at 14h00 at the
Klerksdorp Circuit, and was uploaded to CaseLines and released to SAFLII
on 12 May 2026 at 10h00.
Summary:
Criminal law — Sentence — Murder — Premeditation — Section 51(1) of
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 — Accused convicted of two
counts of premeditated murder — Prescribed minimum sentence life
imprisonment — Personal circumstances — Accused aged 35 years,
unmarried, father of three minor children aged 12, 9 and 3 years — Active
role in children's lives, providing emotional and financial support — Not
primary caregiver — Permanently employed as painter and general
construction worker — Grade 12 education — First offender — Pre-trial
detention since December 2023 (approximately two and a half years) — No
genuine remorse — Absence of remorse undermines rehabilitation, which
presupposes acknowledgement of responsibility — S v Matyityi 2011 (1)
SACR 40 (SCA) applied — Verbal threats by deceased against accused
accepted as common cause for sentencing purposes — Threats incapable of
affording substantial mitigation given gross disproportionality of response —
Deceased Ivy Mbese, aged 42 years, stabbed eighteen times, cause of death
multiple stab wounds — Deceased Palesa Mbese, aged 23 years, stabbed
five times, cause of death multiple stab wounds — Victim impact statements
presented by Mxolo Beauty Mbese and Mmabatho Christina Mbese — Pre-
trial detention one factor in proportionality enquiry, not free -standing
substantial and compelling circumstance — S v Radebe and Another 2013
(2) SACR 165 (SCA); S v Ludidi and Others (983/2022; 056/2024) [2024]
ZASCA 162; 2025 (1) SACR 2 25 (SCA) applied — First-offender status
alone insufficient — S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) applied — No
substantial and compelling circumstances found — Life imprisonment
imposed on each count, sentences to run concurrently — Accused ex lege
unfit to possess a firearm in terms of section 103(1) of the Firearms Control
Act 60 of 2000 — Section 299A notification ordered.
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________
REDDY J
Introduction
[1] The accused, John Mmolotsi, has been convicted on two counts of
murder, this court being satisfied in each instance that the murder was
planned and premeditated as contemplated in section 51(1) read with Part 1
of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the
CLAA). It is now the duty of this court to impose an appropriate sentence.
The determination of an appropriate sentence is universally recogni sed as
one of the most arduous and exacting duties a judicial officer must
undertake, demanding profound reflection and a meticulously balanced
mind.
[2] In deciding what that sentence should be, this Court must bear in mind
three main factors. These are the personal circumstances of the accused, the
seriousness of the crimes of which he has been convicted, and the interests of
society.1 Although these interests may at times be in tension with one
another, it is expected of this court to maintain a fine balance between them
and not to over or underemphasise any one of them.
[3] On the question of mercy, I can do no better than to quote the
celebrated passage of Holmes JA in S v Rabie 2 where the following was
posited:
"To sum up, with particular reference to the concept of mercy (i) it is a balanced and
humane state of thought; (ii) it tempers one's approach to the factors to be considered
in arriving at an appropriate sentence; (iii) it has nothing in common with maudlin
sympathy for the accused; (iv) it recognises that fair punishment may sometimes have
to be robust; (v) it eschews insensitive censoriousness in sentencing a fellow mortal,
and so avoids severity in anger; (vi) the measure of the scope of mercy depends upon
the circumstances of each case."
1 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) as at 540[G-H].
2 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862[ D–F].
Personal circumstances of the accused
[4] I turn to address the first pillar of the triad, the personal
circumstances of the accused. He is an adult male, thirty five (35) years of
age. He is unmarried and the father of three minor children, aged twelve
(12), nine (9), and three (3) years, respectively. Although he is not their
primary caregiver, it was placed before this court that he has played an active
and meaningful role in their lives, providing both emotional and financial
support.
[5] The accused holds a Grade 12 certificate, which he completed
notwithstanding the financial constraints that precluded him from pursuing
the tertiary education in agriculture and technology to which he aspired. At
the time of his arrest, he was permanently employed as a general
construction worker at Sanwes. He has no previous convictions and is a first
offender.
[6] The accused was arrested on 2 December 2023 and has remained in
custody throughout these proceedings, a period of approximately two and a
half years.
[7] The accused maintained his innocence throughout the trial, advancing
a version of events this court found elaborate and contrived. Following his
conviction, no genuine expression of remorse was forthcoming. The absence
of genuine remorse is an aggravating factor relevant to his moral
blameworthiness and, as this court further addresses below, it fundamentally
undermines any meaningful prospect of rehabilitation, since one cannot
rehabilitate what one refuses to acknowledge.3
The seriousness of the crimes
[8] The second pillar concerns the seriousness of the crimes. Murder is one
of the most serious crimes that any person can commit. The right to life is
enshrined in section 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, and is foundational to our entire constitutional order. As was
enunciated in S v Chapman4, courts are under a duty to send a clear message
that they are determined to protect the dignity and physical integrity of every
person. Notwithstanding that these remarks were made in Chapman, which
concerned a rape conviction, those principles apply with no less force to
premeditated murder.
[9] It is common cause, for purposes of sentencing, that verbal threats
against the life of the accused were made by the deceased prior to the events
of 2 December 2023. This court takes note of those threats and accepts that
they formed part of the background against which the events of that day
unfolded. To the extent that they provide context, they have been considered.
They are, however, incapable of affording the accused any substantial
mitigation. Verbal threats, however alarming, do not license the response
that followed.
[10] Our law does not recognise self -help of the kind inflicted on Ivy and
Palesa Mbese that day. Moreover, the nature of the accused's response,
which included scaling a fence, pursuing two fleeing women into their home,
3 S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) at para 13.
4 S v Chapman 1997 (3) SA 341 para [4].
and inflicting eighteen stab wounds on one and five on the other, was grossly
disproportionate to any threat that had been expressed as to deprive those
threats of any meaningful mitigating force. What stands out is that the
accused did not act to protect himself, but with the clear intention to murder.
[11] On 2 December 2023, the accused deliberately decided to scale the
fence separating his property from that of Ivy Mbese and her daughter,
Palesa Mbese. He pursued them as they fled into their home. He followed
them inside and subjected each of them to a sustained and vicious attack.
Palesa Mbese, aged 23 years, sustained five stab wounds and was declared
dead at the scene. The post-mortem examination established that the cause of
her death was multiple stab wounds.
[12] Ivy Mbese, aged forty two (42) years, sustained eighteen stab wounds.
Notwithstanding the severity of her injuries, she survived the initial attack,
was transported to the hospital, and succumbed to her wounds on 6
December 2023. The post -mortem examination established that the cause of
her death was multiple stab wounds. The number and severity of the wounds
inflicted on each of the deceased are not consistent with a single impulsive
act. They speak to a sustained and deliberate assault, visited upon two
defenceless women with deeply disturbing ferocity . The accused thereafter
returned to his own property and sought forgiveness from his partner,
brother, and uncle. Thereafter, the accused voluntarily surrendered to the
police, conduct wholly consistent with deliberate, premeditated action.
[13] One cannot imagine the terror Ivy and Palesa Mbese experienced as
they fled to the sanctuary of their home, only to be found and killed there. It
follows that, as a result of the accused's conduct, their families have been
permanently deprived of their love, friendship, and companionship. It bears
underscoring that nothing this court can say or do today can properly
comfort those families for the tragic and irreversible loss they have suffered.
The interests of society
[14] I move to the interests of society, the final pillar of the triad. Afore
addressing the legislative framework governing this sentencing process, this
court must place on record that two written victim impact statements were
presented during the sentencing proceedings. The first was presented by
Mmabatho Christina Mbese, the mother of the deceased, and the second by
Mxolo Beauty Mbese, the surviving daughter and sister of Palesa. Their
statements are profoundly moving, and this court has taken full cognizance
of their contents.
[15] Mmabatho Christina Mbese described the emotional devastation of
losing her first born child and her grandchild in a single act of violence. She
states that she has no peace in her life, that she lives in fear, and that the
shock of learning of the deaths of her daughter and grandchild revisits her
every day. She stated that seeing the accused in court deepened her pain to
the point where she no longer wished to live. She described persistent crying
since the killings, attending counselling without finding relief, and being
unable to accept their deaths.
[16] In her statement, she disclosed that she prefers to die because she sees
no point in living without them and that she is heartbroken. This has changed
her irrevocably. She further placed on record the financial devastation
occasioned by the murders. As a pensioner, she was wholly unprepared for
the cost of burying two family members, and her daughter had no life policy
in place at the time of her death.
[17] She also described the secondary trauma experienced by other family
members, including her son, Lucky Mbese, the deceased's brother and uncle,
who is receiving counselling at Tsepong Hospital, and the surviving
granddaughter, Mxolo Beauty Mbese, who is struggling to come to terms
with the loss of her mother and sister. She concluded with a simple plea for
justice for the deceased and peace.
[18] Mxolo Beauty Mbese, the surviving daughter, addressed the accused
directly in her written statement. She posed several rhetorical questions,
questioning whether the accused had considered what would become of her,
who she would live with, what she would eat, and whether she would be
well, and concluded that the accused had not thought of any of it. She
described the accused as selfish and stated that she despised him for what he
did to her mother and her sister.
[19] She stated that her life is no longer contented, that she blames the
accused for everything, and that she wants him to be banished to jail for
what he has done. She placed before this court a deeply personal account of
the academic consequences of the trauma she suffered. Towards this end, in
2024, while completing her Grade 12, she was unable to cope and failed her
trial examinations as a direct result of the trauma occasioned by the events of
2023. She stated in plain terms that she will never forgive the accused.
[20] These statements speak to the full and irreversible extent of the harm
caused by the accused's conduct. They show that the consequences of what
occurred on 2 December 2023 extend far beyond the deaths of Ivy and
Palesa Mbese. An entire family has been shattered. A mother has lost the
will to live. A daughter has lost her academic footing. A son is in
counselling. A grandchild is struggling to comprehend these unrequited
circumstances. The interests of society demand a sentence that properly
reflects the totality of that harm.
[21] Society has a compelling interest in protecting life and in the deterrent
effect of sentences imposed for the most serious crimes. In enacting section
51 of the CLAA, Parliament expressed a clear legislative choice that
premeditated murder must attract a sentence of life imprisonment unless
substantial and compelling circumstances justify a lesser sentence. As
Ponnan JA stated in S v Matyityi:5
"Parliament has spoken. It has ordained minimum sentences for certain specified
offences. Courts are obliged to impose those sentences unless there are truly
convincing reasons for departing from them."
Aims and purposes of punishment
[22] It would be well to remind ourselves that, within the context of the
sentencing triad as enunciated in Zinn, proper consideration and application
of the aims and purposes of punishment are apposite. Punishment in our law
serves four recognised purposes, namely deterrence, prevention,
rehabilitation, and retribution. In S v Banda and Others 6 it was held that a
court must impose a sentence that properly reflects all of these purposes,
though the circumstances of a particular case may require that emphasis be
5 Matyityi at para 23.
6 1989 (4) SA 519 (BG),
placed on one or more of them at the expense of others, depending on the
trilogy of pillars that constitute the triad.
[23] Deterrence operates on two levels . It discourages the individual
offender from future offending, and signals to the broader community that
conduct of this nature will attract the most severe sanction known to our law.
Prevention speaks to the protection of society from an offender who has
demonstrated both the capacity and the willingness to commit serious
violence. Rehabilitation, whilst always a legitimate consideration,
presupposes a foundation of genuine remorse and an acknowledgement of
wrongdoing, without which its prospects are necessarily limited. The weight
to be accorded to each of these purposes must be determined having regard
to the totality of the circumstances, including the nature of the offences and
the personal circumstances of the accused.7
[24] As regards retribution, it represents society's moral condemnation of
conduct that violates the most fundamental of all rights, the right to life. The
constitutional validity of prescribed minimum sentences has been confirmed
by the Constitutional Court, 8 and reflects a considered legislative choice that
certain categories of serious offending must attract prescribed sentences
unless there are truly convincing reasons for departing from them. I will
return to how these purposes bear upon the particular circumstances of this
matter.
7 S v Swart 2004 (2) SACR 370 (SCA) at 378C–D.
8 S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC) at para 38.
Whether substantial and compelling circumstances exist
[25] The approach to substantial and compelling circumstances is set out in
S v Malgas.9 The sentencing court must approach the question conscious that
the minimum sentence has been ordained by the legislature as that which
should ordinarily be imposed. Deviation is not for flimsy or sentimental
reasons. Simply put, the test is whether, viewed cumulatively, the
circumstances of the case satisfy the court that the prescribed sentence would
be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal, and the needs of society, so
that an injustice would be done by imposing it.
[26] This court has carefully considered all the accused's personal
circumstances. He is a 35 year old first offender, unmarried, the father of
three minor children in whose lives he played an active role providing both
emotional and financial support. He holds a Grade 12 certificate, was
permanently employed at the time of his arrest, and has been in pre -trial
detention since 2 December 2023, a period of approximately two and a half
years. These circumstances, taken together with the total absence of genuine
remorse, have been weighed. The first three categories carry some mitigating
weight. The absence of remorse is aggravating.
[27] The period of pre -trial detention has been taken into account as one
factor in the broader proportionality enquiry, as required by S v Radebe and
Another10 and confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Ludidi and
Others 11and by this Division in Radebe and Others v S (Sentence Appeal) 12
9 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 496 as at para 25.
10 S v Radebe and Another 2013 (2) SACR 165 (SCA) at paras 13–14.
11 S v Ludidi and Others (983/2022; 056/2024) [2024] ZASCA 162; 2025 (1) SACR 225 (SCA)
12 Radebe and Others v S (Sentence Appeal) [2026] ZANWHC 18 at para 4.
and Molema v S 13 As the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed in Ludidi,14 a
period of pre -trial detention, even when substantial, does not automatically
justify deviation from a prescribed life sentence . In the present matter, a
period of two and a half years cannot render the sentence disproportionate on
the facts.
[28] In S v Matyityi 15 Ponnan JA drew a sharp distinction between regret
and genuine remorse, describing the latter as a gnawing pain of conscience
for the plight of another that can arise only from a true appreciation and
acknowledgement of the extent of one's error. Notwithstanding the accused
having testified in mitigation, none of that appreciation was demonstrated
before this court. The absence of genuine remorse is not only an aggravating
factor, but it also fundamentally undermines any meaningful prospect of
rehabilitation. This is because one cannot rehabilitate what one refuses to
acknowledge.
[29] Viewed cumulatively and weighed against the gravity of deliberate,
premeditated murders committed against two women who were fleeing into
the sanctity of their own home, these factors do not constitute substantial and
compelling circumstances. In sum, the period of pre-trial detention does not
render a sentence of life imprisonment shockingly disproportionate , the
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed as much in Ludidi16 even in respect of
a period of five years and eight months. A period of two and a half years
cannot achieve that outcome. Being a f irst offender, in the absence of other
truly exceptional personal circumstances, does not, in itself, tip the scales.
13 Molema v S [2023] ZANWHC 209 at paras 19–21 and 29.
14 Op cit fn 11 at para 15.
15 Matyityi Op cit fn 3 at para 13.
The absence of remorse forecloses any ground for greater leniency on that
basis.
[30] This court can find no substantial and compelling circumstances,
whether individually or cumulatively, that would justify the imposition of a
lesser sentence than that prescribed by s 51(1) of the CLAA.
[31] Given that the accused is a first offender, this court cannot entirely
rule out the possibility of future rehabilitation. It is hoped that the accused
will avail himself of such rehabilitation programmes as are offered within
the correctional system, as this can only be to his long-term benefit.
[32] In conclusion , I would like to thank both Advocate Goloda and Mr
Semino for the way in which they presented their case and for the assistance
they gave me in a very serious and traumatic matter.
Order
[33] In the premises, the accused is sentenced as follows:
[1] On Count 1 :
Life imprisonment, the court was satisfied that the murder of Xoliswa
Ivy Mbese was premeditated as contemplated in section 51(1) read
with Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997.
[2] On Count 2:
Life imprisonment, the court was satisfied that the murder of Nomsa
Palesa Mbese was premeditated as contemplated in section 51(1) read
with Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997.
[3] No order is made directing that the sentences imposed in terms of
counts 1 and 2 run concurrently. By virtue of section 39(1) of the
Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, all sentences of imprisonment
imposed upon an offender who has been sentenced to life
imprisonment are subsumed into and merge with the life sentence by
operation of law. A separate concurrency order is therefore neither
necessary nor appropriate.
[4] In terms of section 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, the
accused is ex lege unfit to possess a firearm.
[5] In terms of section 299A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977,
the victims' next of kin are to be informed of the date upon which the
accused becomes eligible for consideration for placement on parole, or
any other form of release, so as to afford them the opportunity to make
representations to the relevant authority.
__________________
A REDDY
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
APPEARANCES
For the State: Advocate Goloda
Instructed by: Director of Public Prosecutions
North West Province
For the Accused: Mr. Semino
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa
Date of hearing: 5 May 2026
Date of sentence: 7 May 2026
Revised : 11 May 2026