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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO DIVISION, POLOKWANE
CASE No: A 34/2018
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED: YES
DATE: 3/03/2026
SIGNATURE: PILLAY AJ
THABANG DERRICK MAKHAFOLA 1ST APPELLANT
RAYMOND PONANA LEKALAKALA 2ND APPELLANT
V
THE STATE RESPONDENT
Delivered 03 March 2026
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by e -mail. The date and time for hand
down of the judgment is deemed to be 03 March 2026 at 10:00 am.
Date heard 05 December 2025
Coram Pillay AJ et Mashifane AJ
JUDGMENT
PILLAY AJ:
INTRODUCTION:
[1] The Appellants were convicted in the Mokopane Regional Court on 25 May
2015 of C/S 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters)
Amendment Act 1 (Rape), read with the provisions of Section 51(1) part 1 of
Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 2. The Appellants were sentenced to
life imprisonment on 25 May 2015.
[2] The appellants were legally represented throughout the proceedings. They
were entitled to an automatic right of appeal in terms of Section 309(1)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 3 flowing from being sentenced to life imprisonment, in terms
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. Before this Court, both parties argued the
appeal.
[3] The appellants raised various grounds of appeal as contained in the notice of
appeal, and heads of argument, which can be highlighted as follows;
AD CONVICTION:
[3.1] The Court erred in finding that the state had successfully proved the guilt
of the appellants beyond any reasonable doubt. The following shortcomings in
respect of the complainant's evidence were highlighted
[3.1.1] The incident took place in the bushes and it was around 3AM in
the early hours of the morning with only the moon as the source of light.
[3.1.2] To show that she was unable to account for everything that
happened, she did not know who had sexual intercourse with her, at
what stage of the incident.
[3.1.3] She kept referring to Mr Mashwahle (First Appellant) who was
accused 2 at the trial stage, as the person who stabbed her from the
right side, yet at the time she was on top of someone, with another boy
kissing her.
1 Act 32 of 2007 as amended
2 Act 105 of 1997 as amended
3 Act 51 of 1977as amended
[3.2] The Court further erred in finding that the complainant identified the
appellants as the perpetrators of this offence and that the evidence of the
complainant should have been treated with caution which was not done.
[3.3] This Court was requested to reject the evidence of the complainant in
respect of the roles played by the appellants due to the fact, that she said it
herself, that her face was covered with a hat.
[3.4] The Court erred in finding that the appellants intentionally had sexual
intercourse with the complainant, in light of the fact that the appellants sent
their family to the complainant's place to return her things and apologise,
despite the fact, that she did not know them. That is not an act of someone
who wilfully attacked the complainant.
[3.5] The Court erred in finding that the version of the appellants were not
reasonably possibly true.
AD SENTENCE:
[4] An effective life term of imprisonment was harsh and disproportionate under
the circumstances of this case in that:
[4.1] It was out of proportion to the totality of the accepted facts in mitigation of
sentence.
[4.2] The Court erred by not attaching due weight to the personal
circumstances of both appellants when considered cumulatively amounted to
substantial and compelling factors, warranting a deviation from imposing the
prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment.
[4.3] The Court erred in not considering the personal circumstances of the
appellant who both were relatively young and first offenders and by not
considering the influence of the co - perpetrators on the appellants. Moreover,
they sent their family members to return the items of the complainant and
apologised. They initiated all this realizing what they did and this showed
remorse.
[5] It is a trite principle that the findings of fact of the trial Court, are presumed to
be correct unless there are demonstrable and material misdirection on its part.
Those findings will only be disregarded if the recorded evidence shows them to be
clearly wrong. In the same vein, the credibility findings of the trial Court cannot be
disturbed unless the recorded evidence shows them to be clearly wrong4.
[6] Regard was had to the case of S v Francis 5 with specific reference to the
powers of an appeal Court when considering the fact findings of the Court a quo,
"the powers of the Court of appeal to interfere with the findings of fact of a trial
Court are limited 6 in the absence of any misdirection the trial Court's
conclusions including the acceptance of a witness evidence is presumed to be
correct. To succeed on appeal, the appellant must therefore convince the
Court of appeal, on adequate grounds that the trial Court was wrong in
accepting the witness evidence, a reasonable doubt will not suffice to justify
interference with its findings, bearing in mind the advantage which a trial
Court has of seeing, hearing, appraising a witness. It is only in exceptional
cases that the Court of appeal will be entitled to interfere with trial Court
evaluation of oral testimony7."
[7] The appellants pleaded not guilty and exercised their right to remain silent.
The respondent led evidence of witnesses who testified under oath with the use of a
language practitioner, concerning the incident. The evidence briefly summarised was
as follows.
[8] On the 18 March 2012 at Mosetane Village in the Regional Division of
Limpopo, the complainant A[...] N[...] and her boyfriend William Letswalo were at
China City tavern, where they had spent the evening. On their way home, they were
chased by four men, her boyfriend managed to escape being chased by two of the
four men and the other two chased, grabbed and assaulted her. She tried to scream
and was stabbed with a knife. The other two men thereafter returned, and the four
carried her into the bushes where her pants and shoes were removed and she was
carried her into the bushes where her pants and shoes were removed and she was
made to lie on the ground with her face being covered by a type of hat.
4 See S v Hadebe & others 1998 (1) SACR 422 (SCA) p 645E - 6461
5 1991 (1) SACR 198(A)
6 R v Dhlumayo and Another 1948(2) SA 677 (A
7 S v Robinson and Others 1968(1) SA 666 (A) at 675 G – H).
[9] She testified concerning being penetrated by the four perpetrators and the
various positions she was placed in during this encounter. She indicated that all four
of the men sexually penetrated her, vaginally and anally. She indicated that there
were multiple penetrations, and at some point, she was instructed to sit on top of the
one perpetrator, who penetrated her in this position, instructing her to shake, and at
this stage another perpetrator removed the hat and started kissing her. It was at this
stage that she was stabbed by another perpetrator. She was warned not to look at
their faces as they accused her of knowing them, and therefore they threatened to
kill her if she looked at them. She was also told that once they were finished sexually
penetrating her, they were going to kill her.
[10] She was released after they finished, but her shoes and cellular phone were
kept by the perpetrators. She went home and reported the incident to her boyfriend
and mother who accompanied her to the hospital, where she was medically
examined and treated. Samples were obtained for DNA analysis and she was
discharged. The ID Parade where the appellants were pointed out by the
complainant was handed in by consent, the content admitted. Her boyfriend and
mother testified concerning the circumstances of the i ncident and their role in -
respect of same.
[11] The J88 medical examination form depicted the injuries sustained and the
resultant DNA results confirmed that the two appellants had sexually penetrated the
complainant on the night in question. She denied the appellant's version of being
afraid of Tonic Kekana and that they were forced to grab and hold her and were
forced to have sexual intercourse with her. She indicated that all perpetrators were
actively involved and that the first appellant stabbed her at the time she was being
kissed. She was cer tain it was him because his name was mentioned as the one
who stabbed her.
who stabbed her.
[12] The complainant confirmed she did not know the identity of the four
perpetrators, however the parents of the two appellants, had come to her home after
the incident and returned her shoes and cellular phone, apologizing for their
behaviour and seeking her forgiveness. The police were contacted and these items
were handed to the police and recorded as exhibits in the SAP 13 Register and
eventually returned to her after some time. She denied the appellants version of
being forced to sexually penetrate her. She maintained that there was an opportunity
for the appellants to run away from the scene when Tonic Kekana was absent
chasing her boyfriend. She maintained that they were actively involved in her attack,
including hitting her, stabbing her and penetrating her. The J88 and DNA report
corroborated her version concerning the incident and the injuries she sustained, due
to the attack on her by the appellants.
[13] That in brief was the evidence for the State and the State closed their case.
[14] The first appellant testified and indicated that on the date in question he was
in the company of the second appellant when they met Phila (Tonic Kekana), who
was in possession of a knife pulling a girl. They were instructed to hold the girl and
because he was afraid, he agreed to accompany Phila (Tonic Kekana).
[15] When they arrived at the bushes the second appellant was forced to have
sexual intercourse with this girl and when the second appellant refused Phila (Tonic
Kekana) stabbed him. Thereafter the second appellant agreed to have sexual
intercourse with the girl. After the second appellant was finished, he was forced to
have sexual intercourse with this girl, because of the fear in him he also had sexual
intercourse with this girl. Thereafter they fled the scene. He had no knowledge of his
family going to t he complainant's homestead with her shoes and cell phone. He had
no knowledge of the circumstances as alleged by the state concerning the four men
attacking the complainant and her boyfriend and being in possession of a knife.
[16] During cross - examination, he conceded that altogether there were four men
and the girl, who he conceded was the complainant. He was unable to identify the
unknown man who according to him was just walking around the scene. He could
unknown man who according to him was just walking around the scene. He could
not explain why he did not flee on meeting Phila (Tonic Kekana.) and this unknown
person. In his evidence this unknown person was now holding the girl whilst Phila
(Tonic Kekana) was holding the knife. When confronted concerning his fear and
having had an erection to sexua lly penetrate the complainant, he indicated that
seeing a woman's private part was sufficient to cause him to have an erection,
regardless of his fear.
[17] He indicated he did not report the incident due to his fear of Phila (Tonic
Kekana). According to his evidence the second appellant was first to sexually
penetrate the complainant and thereafter he sexually penetrated the complainant.
Once he was finished, they were made to leave and were not present to see what
happened to the complainant. According to him he was forced, by being tripped to
the ground and he was instructed to sit there, until he was forced to stand up and
have sex with that girl and he complied because he was frightened.
[18] The second appellant confirmed that he sexually penetrated the complainant,
but he indicated he was forced to do so. He confirmed being in the company of the
first appellant and that they were consuming alcohol at China City and that they were
drunk when they were walking to the residence of the Aunty of the first appellant.
They came across two boys, one in possession of a knife and the other dragging a
girl. He identified Tonic Kekana as the person who stopped them and instructed
them to grab the com plainant. For fear of the knife, he and the first appellant
grabbed the complainant on either side and following the instructions dragged her to
the bushes.
[19] Whilst in the bushes the complainant was tripped, her clothing removed by an
unknown male person in the company of Tonic Kekana. Thereafter he was instructed
to have sexual intercourse with the complainant. He refused and was subsequently
stabbed on his shoulder. He indicated that he was unable to have an erection, which
was when he was instructed to kiss the complainant and she was made to touch his
private parts until he got an erection. He asked Tonic Kekana whether he should
penetrate the complainant without a condom to which he was instructed to penetrate
her without it which he did until he finished. After he was done the first appellant also
her without it which he did until he finished. After he was done the first appellant also
sexually penetrated the complainant, and thereafter the first appellant and him ran
away. The stab wound was not a bad one requiring medical attention as he was able
to sleep.
[20] He denied being present when the complainant was initially accosted and her
boyfriend chased away. He denied that any of his family members went to the
complainant's home to apologise returning her belongings. According to him her
clothing was still there with Tonic Kekana when they were chased away.
[21] The second appellant indicated during cross - examination that he tried to tell
the police what had happened, but they refused to listen to him and instead
assaulted him. He described Tonic Kekana as walking behind them pushing them to
the bushes and the unknown person as being responsible for removing the clothing
of the complainant. When confronted with the aspect that the First appellant did not
testify to being pushed or seeing the complainant having her clothing removed, he
indicated that it was h ow he observed the situation. He confirmed the presence of
Tonic Kekana as being the person with the knife threatening him and the first
appellant to have sexual intercourse with the complainant.
[22] He indicated that it was Tonic Kekana who brought the police to his house
and identified him and the complainant was in the company of the police at this stage
and he was the one who took them to the first appellant's home. It was put to him
that this version was never put to the complainant that she was present when they
were arrested and prior to the Identity Parade which he conceded. He disputed that
any family member of his had gone and apologised to the complainant and returned
her cellular phone and shoes.
[23] That was in brief the first and second appellant's evidence and they closed
their case.
[24] The Court a quo found that the evidence of the complainant was supported by
the medical evidence, justifying the allegation of being sexually penetrated on that
night in question. The Court a quo was satisfied that the appellants admitted to the
sexual penetration of the complainant, however, had raised the defence of being
sexual penetration of the complainant, however, had raised the defence of being
forced to participate, in the commission of the offence by Tonic Kekana. The Court a
quo was satisfied that the complainant identified the appellants, as the perpetrators
in the company of Tonic Kekana and had participated with him in the commission of
the offence. The Court a quo further found that both the appellant's versions were
improbable and rejected it, and based on the totality of the evidence, convicted the
appellants of the offence charged.
[25] The appellants were subsequently sentenced, and the appeal was directed
against both conviction and sentence in respect of both appellants. This Court must
determine whether in the light of the evidence adduced at trial, the guilt of both
appellants was established beyond reasonable doubt. If it is found that the
appellants were properly convicted, whether the sentence meted out to the
appellants was appropriate.
[26] The onus rests on the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no onus on the appellant. In the case of S v JACKSON8,the Court said:
"the burden is on the state to prove the guilt of an accused beyond a
reasonable doubt, no more or no less."
[27] This Court must consider the totality of the evidence led, considering the
probabilities and improbabilities of the respective versions as well as the credibility of
the witnesses. In evaluating evidence regard was had to the case of S v Chabalala9,
the Honourable Judge Hefer AJA said:
"to weigh up all the elements which point towards the guilt of the Accused
against all those which are indicative of his innocence, taking proper account
of inherent strengths and weaknesses, probabilities and improbabilities on
both sides and, having done so, to decide whether the balance weighs so
heavily in favour of the state as to exclude any reasonable doubt about the
accused's guilt."
[28] The appellants admitted that they were present and had committed the acts of
sexual penetration on ,the complainant but alleged that they had participated due to
being forced and for fear of the other perpetrator Tonic Kekana. It is this crisp issue
that needed ventilation in the Court a quo and in the Appeal Court.
8 1988[1] SACR 470 at 476 e-f
9 2003(1) SACR 134 (SCA) at paragraph 15
[29] From the accepted evidence, the complainant was a single witness, and the
provisions of Section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Act 10 were applicable. The
complainant was clear with details as to how the incident unfolded. Her evidence
was straightforward and reliable in respect of the location and circumstances
surrounding her being sexually penetrated by the two appellants. This was not in
dispute by the appellants, except for their willingness to participate.
[30] She confirmed identifying the two appellants, first on leaving the China City,
and later at the scene of the incident. She indicated that amidst her face being
covered initially, she was able to see them, because of the light of the moon, which
had illuminated the vicinity, and at the time when the hat was removed so that the
one perpetrator could kiss her. The Court a quo found that the witness, was truthful
concerning the circumstances in which she found herself, on the night in question.
This Court appreciated that the evidence of the witness was tested concerning the
multiple penetrations and holistically 'her evidence was consistent and found to be
accepted by the Court a quo as reliable.
[31] The Court a quo accepted the State's version concerning the recovery of the
complainant's cell phone as well as her shoes. These exhibits were left at the scene,
brought to her home by the family of the two appellants and subsequently handed in
at the Police. This evidence was put to the complainant as their version concerning
their unwillingness to be involved, however during their testimony their versions
changed and they now denied having family take back the complainant's belongings
and further according to them, they alleged leaving the scene first, leaving the
complainant with her belongings, behind with Tonic Kekana and the unknown person.
[32] The State's version concerning the sequence of events before and following
the incident with specific reference to the complainant's boyfriend and her mother
the incident with specific reference to the complainant's boyfriend and her mother
were not disputed by the appellants. The appellants put to the complainant in cross
examination that they were present when the complainant's boyfriend ran away. The
complainant's mother and boyfriend corroborated he r concerning what transpired
10 Act 51 of 1977as amended
before and after the incident and the Court a quo found them to be honest and
reliable witnesses, concerning the sequence of events before her attack and her
condition on returning home after the incident. This Court aligns itself with those
findings.
[33] The appellants did not challenge the Section 212 affidavit in respect of the
DNA, due to their version being that of being forced to have sexual intercourse with
the complainant without their consent as well as without her consent. The appellant's
version concerning the sexual penetration, was that she was lying on her back when
she was penetrated, however they failed to explain the presence of their DNA with
specific reference to her injuries on and in her anus.
[34] This Court was satisfied that the complainant's testimony identifying them as
the perpetrators, the role they played on the night in question, coupled with the
medical evidence verifying her physical injuries, gave credence to her allegation of
being assaulted physically and sexually by the appellants who were unknown to her,
but whose DNA located in her vagina and anus placed them as persons who
perpetrated this attack on her on the day in question. Her evidence concerning the
incident was that of being sexually penetrated multiple times by the perpetrators in
various positions. Her evidence concerning being strangled, beaten and stabbed
whilst being sexually penetrated by those four men was verified by the medical
evidence. The safeguards in respect o f single witness evidence wa s overcome by
the independent corroboration of her boyfriend, concerning the circumstances before
the incident and also by the appellants concerning their presence and participation in
her assault, amidst their version of being unwilling participants.
[35] When considering both the appellant's vers ions, regard was had to the case
of Shackell v S 2001 (4) ALL SA 279 (SCA) Brand AJA stated the following:
"A Court does not have to be convinced that every detail of an accused's
"A Court does not have to be convinced that every detail of an accused's
version is true. If the accused's version is reasonably possibly true in
substance the Court must decide the matter on the acceptance of that version.
Of course, it is permissible to test the accused's version against the inherent
probabilities. But it cannot be rejected merely because it is improbable; it can
only be rejected on the basis of inherent probabilities if it can be said to be so
improbable that it cannot reasonably possibly be true."
[36] The appellants unfortunately, were exceptionally poor witnesses. Their
version of events of the evening tryst with the complainant appeared unrealistic and
far-fetched especially when their version was disputed in totality. The allegation of
being forced to sexually penetrate the complainant on account of being threatened
by Tonic Kekana was far from the truth with specific reference to the second
appellant Mr Lekalakala, being stabbed by Tonic Kekana to force him to sexually
penetrate the complainant, against her will. His version of having to kiss the
complainant and having his penis touched by the complainant to be aroused was
new evidence, which was not seen by the first appellant, who was present and not
put to the complainant during cross examination of her evidence. It wa s also only
when he testified that it came to light that he had no parents and that no one from his
family had approached the complainant to apologise and return her belongings a
version which was put to the complainant under cross - examination.
[37] Moreover, the fear experienced by the first appellant Mr Makhafola after
observing his friend being stabbed was also without merit, justifying them to have
committed the acts of sexual penetration on the complainant, against her will. He
was also a poor witness who sought to l ay blame on Tonic Kekana as being the
source of their involvement in the incident. His version that they were allowed to
have sexual intercourse with the complainant first, because Tonic Kekana wanted
them to be like him was nonsensical. He also now in his evidence disassociated
himself from the shoes and cell phone as not having occurred. On his version, they
left first leaving the complainant behind.
[35] Their evidence when tested during cross examination was shown to be
[35] Their evidence when tested during cross examination was shown to be
seriously lacking and untruthful. It was such that their versions were so false that it
had to be rejected beyond reasonable doubt and their defence of being forced to
participate had no merit resulting in the Court a quo having to dismiss this version as
false and subsequently convicting the appellants. This Court aligned itself with those
findings. The grounds raised by the appellants are also without merit based on the
accepted evidence and the poor quality of the appellant's versions.
The appeal on conviction stands to fail.
[36] In respect of the Sentence, the appellants were convicted of C/S 3 Act 32 of
2007, read with Section 51(1) part 1 of schedule 2 Act 105 of 1997 as amended. The
prescribed sentence was Life Imprisonment, unless the appellants were able to show
the Court that substantial and compelling circumstances existed to warrant the Court
imposing a different sentence.
[37] In Kgosimore v the State11,the Court restated that;
"It is trite law that sentence is a matter for the discretion of the Court burdened
with the task of imposing the sentence. Various tests have been formulated as
to when a Court of appeal may interfere. These include, whether the
reasoning of the trial Court is vitiated by misdirection or whether the sentence
imposed can be said to be startlingly inappropriate or to induce a sense of
shock or whether there is a striking disparity between the sentence imposed
and the sentence the Court of Appeal would have imposed. All these
formulations, however, are aimed at determining the same thing; viz whether
there was a proper and reasonable exercise of the discretion bestowed upon
the Court imposing sentence. In the ultimate analysis this is the true inquiry.
Either the discretion was properly and reasonably exercised or it was not. If it
was, a Court of appeal has no power to interfere; if it was not, it is free to do
so."
[38] Applying the principles set out in S v Zin n12 this Court had regard to the
evidence tendered in mitigation and in aggravation of sentence. The appellants
argued that the Court a quo misdirected itself by not attaching sufficient weight to the
mitigating circumstances of the appellants, to deviate from imposing life
imprisonment.
[39] The first appellant Mr Makhafola was 19 years old at the time of the offence,
single with a daughter of two years old. The child was currently staying with her
11 1999 (2) SACR 238 (SCA) at paragraph 10
12 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540G
mother, who is the child's primary caregiver. The minor child was a recipient of a
social grant. The first appellant was unemployed in good health physically and
psychologically. He indicated th at he had an ancestral calling and that was what
motivated him to stop with his schooling.
[40] The second appellant Mr Lekalakala was 21 years old at the time of the
offence, single and unemployed. He was a first offender in respect of this offence.
They were in custody following their conviction. Both appellants in mitigation sought
the Court a quo o to appreciate that they were under the influence of alcohol and out
of fear for Tonic Kekana that they had sexual intercourse with the complainant.
Neither appellant showed remorse for their conduct or took responsibility for their
role in the incident.
[41] On appeal it was argued that the sentence was harsh and disproportionate
under the circumstances in this case. It was further argued that the appellants had
sent their parents to apologise and returned the complainant's belongings which was
an indication of remorse. This argument is without merit as the appellants claimed
that they had not told anyone about what happened and that they did not send
anyone to the complainant's residence.
[42] The respondent argued that the personal circumstances of the appellant were
properly ventilated and cumulatively tak en in to c onsideration, by the trial Court. In
aggravation of sentence the responde nt highlighted that the complainant was
sexually penetrated more than once. The incident had impacted the complainant,
especially as no remorse was shown, as alluded to, by the defence raised. The
Respondent sought that the Court should not deviate, from the prescribed minimum
sentence.
[43] The Court a quo considered all the applicable legislation, the principles as laid
out in State v Ma lgas13, and found no substantial and compelling factors were
present which warranted the Court to intervene with the applicable sentencing
present which warranted the Court to intervene with the applicable sentencing
regime. In considering all the relevant factors, the Court a quo was satisfied that the
13 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA)
applicable term of life imprisonment rendered the prescribed sentence just, in that it
was not disproportionate to the offence, the appellants and the needs of society. To
impose the prescribed term would not result, in an injustice being done, especially in
light of there being no evidence to warrant a deviation from the prescribed sentence.
The appellants in sentence sought the Court a quo to deviate based on them being
under the influence of alcohol. This was a bold averment with no evidence verifying
the extent of their intoxication and how this affected their behaviour and conduct.
From cross - examination of the second appellant he indicated he had consumed
alcohol but at the time of his alleged stabbing he was sober. Nothing turns on this
averment and the Court a quo could therefore not be faulted as this aspect was
appropriately ventilated during sentence and was raised without any evidence to
justify same to be considered.
[44] The Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of The Director of Public
Prosecutions, Grahamstown v Mantashe14 stated that:
"The reality is that Sou th Africa has five times the global average in violence
against women. 15 There is mounting evidence that these disproportionally
high levels of violence against women and children, has immeasurable and
far-reaching effects on the health of our nation, and its economy. 16 Despite
severe underreporting, there are 51 cases of child sexual victimisation per day.
UNICEF research has found that over a third (35.4 %) of young people have
been the victim of sexual violence at some point in their lives. What cannot be
denied is that our country is f acing a pandemic of sexual violence against
women and children. Courts cannot ignore this fact. In these circumstances
the only appropriate sentence is that which has been ordained by statute ".
[45] As was highlighted in Malgas in instances where the prescribed term would
not result in an injustice being done as there were no factors which cumulatively
not result in an injustice being done as there were no factors which cumulatively
weighed in the appellants favour then the sentencing Court was obliged to impose
14 (131/2019) [2020] ZASCA 05 (12 March 2020) at para 15
15 N Sibanda-Moyo et al 'Violence Against Women in South Africa: A Country in Crisis' (2017) at 8
16 BMJ Global Health C Hsiao et al 'Violence against children in South Africa: the cost of inaction to
the society and the economy' (2017).
the prescribed sentence. The Court a quo could therefore not be faulted for imposing
the sentence of life imprisonment on the appellants.
The appeal on sentence also stands to fail.
ORDER:
[46] In the result the following order is made
[46.1] The Appeal on both the conviction and sentence is dismissed.
K.L. PILLAY AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
LIMPOPO DIVISION, POLOKWANE
I CONCUR,
R.S. MASHIFANE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
LIMPOPO DIVISION, POLOKWANE
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPELLANT : Ms. Scott
INSTRUCTED BY : Legal Aid South Africa, Limpopo
Polokwane
FOR THE RESPONDENT : Adv. Magoda
INSTRUCTED BY : National Prosecuting Authority,
Limpopo Polokwane