IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MTHATHA)
REPORTABLE
Case no: 118/2025
In the matter between:
MVELELI VA Appellant
and
KING SABATA DALINDYEBO LOCAL MUNICIPALITY Respondent
and
Case no: 125/2025
In the matter between:
MTHETHO HLAMANDANA First Appellant
BHEKAMEVA ROYAL FAMILY Second Appellant
and
PREMIER, EASTERN CAPE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT First Respondent
MEC, COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND Second Respondent
TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS, EASTERN CAPE
ISIKELO TRADITIONAL COUNCIL Third Respondent
ADV. N. JAMES N.O. Fourth Respondent
___________________________________________________________________
REASONS FOR ORDERS GRANTED ON 28 APRIL 2026
___________________________________________________________________
Govindjee J
[1] These appeals were heard together because they raise the same anterior
question, namely whether a full court sitting at a local seat of a division may entertain
an appeal where the Supreme Court of Appeal has granted leave to appeal
specifically to the main seat of that division. Although the procedural histories differ,
it was convenient to determine that common issue in a single judgment. Separate
orders were made in each matter on that day with reasons to follow. These are the
reasons.
Mveleli Va v King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality (Va)
[2] The appellant approached this court, sitting as a single judge, for the return of
his motor vehicle, which had been seized by members of the respondent. The
application was dismissed with costs. An application for leave to appeal suffered the
same fate. On 25 November 2025, the SCA granted leave to appeal ‘to the Full
Court of the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, Grahamstown’. Thereafter, the
appellant filed a notice of appeal in this court on 5 December 2025 and a notice of
set down on 18 February 2026, with the result that the matter was enrolled for
hearing on this court’s roll.
[3] The respondent opposed the matter, inter alia, on the basis that it was
irregular for the appeal to be set down for hearing in Mthatha when the SCA had
granted leave to appeal to this division sitting at its main seat in Makhanda.
[4] All courts function in terms of national legislation, and their rules and
procedures must be provided for in terms of national legislation. 1 The High Court of
South Africa consists of Divisions determined by the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
(the Act), with one or more seats in each division. 2 The Act provides that the main
seat of the Eastern Cape Division (the division) is ‘Grahamstown’, now known as
Makhanda.3 When the Act came into operation on 23 August 2013, s 50 provided
that various existing High Courts became local seats of the relevant divisions. Thus,
the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, became a local seat of this division, 4 and its
pre-existing area of jurisdiction became part of the area of jurisdiction of the
division.5
[5] Section 50 of the Act must be read with s 21(1) of the Act, which provides that
a division has jurisdiction over all persons residing or being within, and in relation to
all causes arising and all offences triable within, its area of jurisdiction. 6 The local
seats of the division are endowed with concurrent jurisdiction over smaller areas
than that enjoyed by the main seat.7 In addition, s 6(4)(a) provides that the main seat
of the division has concurrent appeal jurisdiction over the area of jurisdiction of any
local seat of that division. The Judge President of the division may direct that an
appeal against a decision of a single judge or of a magistrates’ court within that area
of jurisdiction be heard at the main seat of the division.8
[6] It is therefore clear that this court would, in the ordinary course, enjoy
territorial competence to entertain the present appeal, the cause of action having
1 Section 171 of the Constitution.
2 Section 169(2) of the Constitution.
3 Section 6(1)( a) of the Act. The main seat of the Eastern Cape Division is still described in the
Superior Courts Act as ‘Grahamstown’. The town’s official geographical name was changed from
Superior Courts Act as ‘Grahamstown’. The town’s official geographical name was changed from
Grahamstown to Makhanda (GN 641 in GG 41738 of 29 June 2018). The Judge President of the
division has also issued a directive that, for purposes of court process, the division be referred to as
the ‘Eastern Cape Division, Makhanda’. I accordingly use ‘Makhanda’ when referring to the main seat,
save when quoting the Act or the SCA’s order.
4 Section 50(1)(c) of the Act. The history of the creation of this court was summarised in Thembani
Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd v September and Another 2014 (5) SA 51 (ECG) (Thembani).
5 See Kamupungu v Road Accident Fund [2023] ZAECMKHC 37; [2023] 3 All SA 176 (ECG); 2023 (4)
SA 627 (ECM) para 13.
6 Section 21(1) of the Act.
7 Thembani fn 4 para 10, citing C Hoexter & M Olivier (eds) The Judiciary in South Africa (Juta, 2014)
at 19–20.
8 Section 6(4)(a) of the Act.
arisen within its area of jurisdiction, and that the main seat in Makhanda likewise
enjoys concurrent appeal jurisdiction by virtue of s 6(4)( a). The difficulty in
proceeding to the merits lies not in the ordinary principles of concurrent jurisdiction,
but in the terms of the order made by the SCA.
[7] There can be little doubt that the granting of leave to appeal by the SCA
constitutes an order made under s 17 of the Act. 9 In terms of its provisions, an
applicant whose application for leave to appeal has been refused by the court of first
instance may apply to the SCA for leave to appeal. The application is ordinarily
considered by two judges of that court, who may dispose of it without hearing oral
argument and who may grant or refuse the application or refer it to that court for
consideration.10 Importantly, leave to appeal may be granted subject to such
conditions as the court concerned may determine.11
[8] The SCA has confirmed that the ordinary principles applicable to the
interpretation of documents also apply to the interpretation of a court’s judgment or
order. That includes an order of that court granting leave to appeal under s 17(2) of
the Act.12
‘The starting point is to determine the manifest purpose of the order. In interpreting a
judgment or order, the court’s intention is to be ascertained primarily from the language of
the judgment or order in accordance with the usual well -known rules relating to the
interpretation of documents. As in the case of a document, the judgment or order and the
court’s reasons for giving it must be read as a whole in order to ascertain its intention.’
9 There is no essential difference between an ‘order’ and a ‘judgment’: HLB International (South
Africa) (Pty) Ltd v MWRK Accountants and Consultants (Pty) Ltd 2022 (5) SA 373 (SCA) para 18. The
order granting leave to appeal on application is often loosely referred to in practice as leave granted
‘on petition’, wording which does not appear in the Act itself: see, for example, Sithangu v Capricorn
District Municipality [2023] ZASCA 151 (Sithangu) para 20.
10 Section 17(2)(b) – (d) of the Act. The language of s 17 is itself consistent with the characterisation
of the grant of leave as an order of court. Section 17(2)( d) empowers the judges considering the
application to ‘order’ that it be argued before them, and thereafter to grant or refuse the application or
refer it to the court for consideration.
11 Section 17(5) of the Act.
12 Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA
204 (SCA) para 13, as endorsed by the Constitutional Court in Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC);
2015 (11) BCLR 1319; [2015] ZACC 30; para 29. On the interpretation of orders granted following an
application in terms of s 17 of the Act, see Sithangu fn 9 para 23.
[9] Properly construed, the order granting leave to appeal is unambiguous. It
granted leave to appeal to the full court of this division sitting at Grahamstown, now
Makhanda. That court was plainly a competent forum to hear the appeal and its
specification was not incidental. It is, at the least, consistent with the inference that
leave was granted in the terms sought, and the order did not grant leave simply to a
full court of the Eastern Cape Division.13 On its language, read in context and in light
of its manifest purpose, the order directed that the appeal be heard by a full court
sitting at the main seat of the division.
[10] It is true that s 17(6)( a) of the Act provides that, where leave is granted to
appeal against a decision of a division sitting as a court of first instance before a
single judge, the judge or judges granting leave must direct that the appeal be heard
by a full court of that Division, save in circumstances where leave is granted to the
SCA. Read literally, the Act therefore directs that leave be granted to the division,
rather than to a specific seat, which would notionally enable the matter to be heard,
at the direction of the Judge President, at any of the seats in the division which enjoy
jurisdiction. The difficulty is that the SCA did not stop at directing a full court of the
division; it specifically identified the full court at Grahamstown. In those
circumstances, to permit the appeal to be heard in Mthatha would be to disregard the
order that was made, rather than give effect to it.
[11] The Constitution provides that an order or decision issued by a court binds all
persons to whom and organs of state to which it applies. 14 The Constitutional Court
has repeatedly emphasised that court orders, whether correctly or incorrectly
granted, must be obeyed unless and until they are properly set aside. That principle
is foundational to the effectiveness of the judicial process and the rule of law.15
13 Section 17(5) of the Act.
13 Section 17(5) of the Act.
14 Section 165(5) of the Constitution.
15 Secretary, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture v Zuma and Others
2021 (5) SA 327 (CC) para 59. Also see Municipal Manager OR Tambo District Municipality v
Ndabeni (2022) 43 ILJ 1019 (CC) paras 23–26.
[12] In addition, our system of precedent requires lower courts to follow both the
legal determinations and the orders of courts higher in the judicial hierarchy. As the
Constitutional Court has explained:16
‘This argument raises issues concerning the principle that finds application in the Latin
maxim of stare decisis (to stand by decisions previously taken), or the doctrine of precedent
… What it boils down to, according to [Hahlo & Kahn], is: “Certainty, predictability, reliability,
equality, uniformity, convenience: these are the principal advantages to be gained by a legal
system from the principle of stare decisis .” Observance of the doctrine has been insisted
upon, both by this court and by the Supreme Court of Appeal. And I believe rightly so. The
doctrine of precedent not only binds lower courts, but also binds courts of final jurisdiction to
their own decisions. These courts can depart from a previous decision of their own only
when satisfied that that decision is clearly wrong. Stare decisis is therefore not simply a
matter of respect for courts of higher authority. It is a manifestation of the rule of law itself,
which in turn is a founding value of our Constitution. To deviate from this rule is to invite
legal chaos.’ (References omitted.)
[13] The result, in the present matter, is that this court is bound to give effect to the
order of the SCA granting leave to appeal to a full court sitting in Makhanda. It
follows that, notwithstanding the ordinary principles of concurrent jurisdiction within
the division, the appeal cannot be entertained by this court consistently with the
terms of that order.
[14] It may be added that the fact that the same judges may sit from time to time at
different seats of the division, or that the matter might conceivably have been heard
virtually, is immaterial. Judges allocated appeal duties exercise authority as
members of a court sitting at a particular seat in accordance with the allocation of
members of a court sitting at a particular seat in accordance with the allocation of
roles and responsibilities made by the Acting Judge President (AJP) under the Act; 17
they are not a free -floating panel able to assume whatever seat designation may
appear convenient. This court is sitting in Mthatha, whether physically or by virtual
means, and not at the main seat in Makhanda. The matter is enrolled for hearing in
Mthatha, and the use of virtual means cannot alter the seat at which this court is
16 See, for example, Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and
Another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC) para 28.
17 See s 6(4)(c): the Judge President of a division may assign all the judges of that division within the
division as he or she deems fit.
sitting. It would be artificial, and contrary to the AJP’s proper allotment of duties, to
suggest otherwise merely because the hearing could, notionally, take place online.
The real question is not one of practical convenience, but whether the appeal may
lawfully be entertained by this court consistently with the order of the SCA. For
reasons already given, it may not. Nor does the inherent power of this court assist,
since that power cannot be used to justify a course inconsistent with a binding order
of a superior court.18
Mthetho Hlamandana and Another v Premier, Eastern Cape and Others
(Hlamandana)
[15] The same issue arises in this matter, albeit against a different procedural
background. In this matter, the appellants’ attorney explains that, after the SCA
granted leave to appeal, he initially proceeded on the basis that the appeal lay to the
main seat and prepared the notice of appeal accordingly. Only thereafter, following
engagement with the registrar’s office and what was conveyed as the position of the
AJP, was the matter redirected to Mthatha and the notice amended. The issue is
therefore raised in a form that squarely engages the question whether an
administrative step within the division could overtake the terms of the SCA’s order.
[16] The appellants contend that nothing turns on the SCA’s reference to
Grahamstown; that Mthatha retained concurrent jurisdiction because the matter
emanated from its territorial area; and that, on the authority of Standard Bank of SA
Ltd and Others v Mpongo and Others ,19 (Mpongo) this court cannot decline to hear
an appeal properly brought before it.
[17] Subject to what follows, the reasoning in Va applies equally here. Properly
understood, Mpongo does not answer the present difficulty. It is authority for the
ordinary statutory position that, within a division, the main seat has jurisdiction over
the whole province and is obliged to entertain matters that fall within the jurisdiction
the whole province and is obliged to entertain matters that fall within the jurisdiction
18 See Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American Express Travel Service 1996 (3) SA 1 (A) at 7E –I. Cf
National Credit Regulator v Lewis Stores (Pty) Ltd and Another 2020 (2) SA 390 (SCA) paras 57 and
58, where the SCA, in special circumstances, invoked its inherent power to condone an irregular
procedural route to avoid a gross technicality and a waste of resources. That situation is
distinguishable from the present, where the difficulty lies in the terms of the SCA’s own order.
19 Standard Bank of SA Ltd and Others v Mpongo and Others 2021 (6) SA 403 (SCA) (Mpongo) para
31.
of a local seat because of its concurrent jurisdiction. 20 The case did not, however,
concern the effect of an order of the SCA granting leave to appeal specifically to the
full court at the main seat. The present issue is not whether this court would
otherwise have been a competent seat. It is whether, once the SCA directed that
leave to appeal be granted to the full court at Makhanda, the appeal could
nevertheless be enrolled and heard at Mthatha. That question is not addressed by
Mpongo.
[18] Nor can the core difficulty be overcome by what was conveyed from the
registrar’s office or by an administrative allocation within the division. There is no
statutory basis for concluding that the powers of judicial administration vested in the
Judge President, in directing the enrolment of a particular matter, include a power to
vary the legal effect of an order made by the SCA in the matter itself. 21 This point is
reinforced by the wording of s 6(4)( a) of the Act. It expressly empowers the Judge
President to direct that an appeal from the area of jurisdiction of a local seat may be
heard at the main seat of the division but contains no converse provision authorising
the reverse.22
[19] This approach is reinforced by an illustration discussed in Herbstein and Van
Winsen, drawn from an extra -curial contribution by Malcolm Wallis. The example
highlights precisely the difficulty that arises when, after the SCA has granted leave to
appeal to a specified seat, a directive is issued within the division pointing
elsewhere. It also suggests that, in Gauteng, it was considered impermissible to
seek, by directive, in effect, to vary the SCA’s choice of seat:23
‘A further problem has recently come to light. Applications for leave to appeal addressed to
the Supreme Court of Appeal sometimes ask for leave to appeal to the local seat of a
division in disregard of the provisions of s 6(4)(a) of the Superior Courts Act. The grant of an
order in those terms has the potential to cause chaos, as occurred recently in the Gauteng
Division. An order by the Supreme Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal to the Gauteng
20 Mpongo fn 19 para 88.
21 See Mhlongo and Others v Mokoena NO and Others 2022 (6) SA 129 (SCA) para 12.
22 Section 6(7) empowers the Judge President, after consultation with the Minister, to hold a sitting at
a place other than the main or a local seat of the division where that is expedient or in the interests of
justice. That provision concerns an exceptional sitting other than at the main seat or a local seat and
does not assist the appellant in the present circumstances.
23 M Wallis ‘What’s in a name? A note on nomenclature’ (2020) 137 SALJ 25 at 31.
Local Division of the High Court [the local seat]. The appellant obtained a directive from the
Deputy Judge President that the appeal be heard in Pretoria [the main seat, and a court
which, in terms of s 6(4), would have enjoyed jurisdiction] and delivered a record to the court
in Pretoria. The Deputy Judge President then reversed his previous directive in the light of
the Supreme Court of Appeal order. All this is most undesirable.’
[20] While the present matter is, in one sense, the converse of the Gauteng
example, it should lead to the same conclusion. Although Mthatha would ordinarily
have been a competent seat for the hearing of the appeal, the SCA granted leave
specifically to the full court at Makhanda. That component of the order was certainly
not a nullity, as suggested during argument. The AJP’s directive, as conveyed by the
registrar, could not displace that order or authorise the appeal to be set down and
heard in Mthatha notwithstanding the terms on which the SCA granted leave to
appeal.
[21] It is unnecessary for present purposes to speculate as to whether, and if so
how, the SCA could be approached to vary its order, or whether any application
might competently be brought for the removal of the appeal from one seat to
another. No such application served before this court, and the matter must be
decided on the basis on which it was enrolled and argued. 24 If, as appears from the
above, the AJP could not make a determination that had the effect of overtaking the
SCA’s order, it follows that the parties themselves could not achieve that result by
consent. The SCA’s order is a binding order of a superior court, and the parties could
not by agreement authorise the enrolment and hearing of the appeal in a manner
inconsistent with its terms.25
[22] It follows that the appeal in this matter could not lawfully be enrolled and
heard in Mthatha consistently with the terms of the SCA’s order. As is the case with
heard in Mthatha consistently with the terms of the SCA’s order. As is the case with
the Va matter, the appeal must accordingly be struck from the roll.
Costs
24 Cf Thembani fn 4 para 13.
25 Section 165(5) of the Constitution.
[23] As to costs, a distinction must be drawn between the two matters. In Va, the
respondent squarely raised the irregularity flowing from the terms of the SCA’s order,
yet the matter remained enrolled for hearing in Mthatha. In those circumstances,
there is no reason to depart from the ordinary rule that costs follow the result. In
Hlamandana, however, the position is different. The papers indicate that the
appellants’ attorney initially proceeded on the footing that the appeal lay to the main
seat, and that th e subsequent enrolment in Mthatha followed what was conveyed
from the registrar’s office as the AJP’s position. In those circumstances, fairness
dictates that there should be no order as to costs.
Orders
[24] For these reasons, the following orders were issued:
1. In Va v King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality, the appeal is struck from
the roll with costs.
2. In Hlamandana and Another v Premier, Eastern Cape and Others , the appeal
is struck from the roll with no order as to costs.
_________________________
A GOVINDJEE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree, and it is so ordered.
_________________________
M MAKAULA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I agree.
_________________________
M T JORDAAN
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Heard: 28 April 2026
Delivered: 30 April 2026
Appearances:
Va v King Sabata Dalindyebo Local Municipality
For the Appellant: Adv SST Mapekula
Instructed by: Chuma Ngqongwa Attorneys Inc.
Mthatha
For the Respondent: Mr Malala
Instructed by: Mvuzo Notyesi Inc
Mthatha
Hlamandana & Another v Premier, EC & Others
For Appellants: Adv L.L Ngumle
Instructed by: D.Z. Dukada & Company
Mthatha
For Respondents: Adv N.M Mdodana
Instructed by: The State Attorney
Mthatha