IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 015484/2023
In the matter between:
FIPRO INVESTMENTS CC Applicant
And
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (SANRAL) First Respondent
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (SANRAL) Second Respondent
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
(3) REVISED.
(4) Date: 21 April 2026
Signature: _
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SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ROADS AGENCY SOC LTD Third Respondent
SANKOFA INSURANCE BROKERS (PTY) LTD Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT
NYATHI J
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and order granted by
this Court on 18 September 2025 , in terms of which the applicant’s application for
contempt of court, ancillary review relief, and related prayers were dismissed with costs.
[2] The application is opposed by the first to third respondents. The fourth respondent
similarly opposes the grant of leave.
[3] The applicant contends that this Court misdirected itself in adjudicating issues which,
so it is argued, fell outside the proper scope of the contempt proceedings and had already
been determined in an earlier review before Lingenfelder AJ. Central to the application is
the submission that there are reasonable prospects that another court would arrive at a
different conclusion.
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THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[4] Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 provides that leave to appeal may
only be granted where:
“(a) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(b) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard…”
[5] The threshold is deliberately stringent. It requires more than a mere possibility that a
different court may disagree. As was stated by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Smith v
S 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA) at para 7, an applicant must demonstrate a sound, rational
basis for the conclusion that an appellate court could reasonably come to a different
result.
[6] Even where prospects of success are found wanting, the Court must still consider
whether there exists some other compelling reason to entertain the appeal.
[7] The fourth respondent raised a further point, highlighting the fact that the appeal is
moot. Section 16(20)(a)(i) permits a dismissal of an appeal which would have no practical
effect or result due to mootness.
THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
[8] As was recorded in the judgment sought to be appealed against, the applicant’s
founding affidavit and notice of motion expressly sought:
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8.1 an order declaring the first and second respondents to be in contempt of the
order granted by Lingenfelder AJ on 7 October 2024; and
8.2 further relief reviewing, setting aside, and substituting the decision by SANRAL
to award the tender to the fourth respondent.
[9] The contention advanced on behalf of the applicant that this Court ought to have
confined itself solely to the issue of contempt cannot be sustained when regard is had to
the relief as framed. A court is bound to determine the dispute placed before it by the
parties, as defined by the pleadings.
[10] The applicant did not amend its notice of motion, abandon any prayers, or seek a
separation of issues. In those circumstances, it was neither competent nor appropriate
for this Court to ignore substantive relief squarely sought on the papers.
MOOTNESS: A JURISDICTIONAL AND DISPOSITIVE CONSIDERATION
[11] The relief sought throughout this litigation concerns the award of a specific public
tender for the provision of insurance brokerage services to SANRAL for a fixed period
of three years, ending in September 2025.
[12] It is common cause, and recorded in the judgment a quo, that the tender has expired.
[13] Any appeal against the order of this Court would therefore have no practical effect
on the rights or obligations of the parties. The applicant can no longer be awarded the
tender, nor can the award be undone in any meaningful sense.
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[14] Section 16(2)(a)(i ) of the Superior Courts Act provides that an appeal may be
dismissed on this ground alone. The jurisprudence of the SCA consistently affirms that
courts should not entertain appeals that are abstract, academic, or hypothetical.
[15] While courts retain a discretion to entertain a moot appeal in exceptional
circumstances, that discretion is exercised only where the matter raises a discrete legal
issue of public importance or where clarity of the law is required for future cases.
[16] The present matter raises neither. It concerns the application of settled principles of
contempt and administrative review to a closed factual matrix.
[17] This consideration alone is sufficient to refuse leave to appeal.
ALLEGED MISDIRECTION BY THE COURT
[18] The applicant’s principal complaint is that this Court impermissibly revisited issues
already determined by Lingenfelder AJ, alternatively that it relied on factual material
(including annexure AA4) that was not before that Court.
[19] This submission is misconceived.
[20] Firstly, the proceedings before this Court were not a continuation of the original
review. They constituted a new application, albeit issued under the same case number,
in which the applicant sought fresh relief, including a declaration of contempt and a further
review and substitution.
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[21] Secondly, in contempt proceedings, the Court is enjoined to consider all evidence
relevant to the question whether the prior order was complied with, including evidence
explaining alleged impossibility of compliance or demonstrating bona fide execution of
the order. Such evidence is not confined to the record that served before the court
granting the original order.
[22] The applicant’s attempt, in effect, to preclude the respondents and the fourth
respondent from placing relevant evidence before this Court because it had not been
introduced earlier, finds no support in principle or authority.
[23] This Court considered annexure AA4 and related evidence solely for the purpose of
determining whether the respondents had complied with the order of Lingenfelder AJ and
whether the elements of contempt —wilfulness and mala fides —had been established
beyond reasonable doubt. No misdirection has been demonstrated in that regard.
SECTION 17(1): REASONABLE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS
[24] Even assuming the matter were not moot, the applicant has failed to meet the
heightened threshold required by section 17(1)(a)(i).
[25] The applicant has not identified any material error of law, misapplication of principle,
or plainly wrong factual finding in the judgment of this Court.
[26] The submissions advanced largely reprise arguments fully ventilated in the main
hearing and rejected for reasons clearly articulated in the judgment. Disagreement with
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the outcome does not equate to reasonable prospects of success on appeal. (Ewels v
Francis and Others 2025 ZAWCHC).
[27] Nor has the applicant demonstrated that another court would reasonably conclude
that this Court ought to have ignored portions of the relief expressly sought, or that it erred
in finding that the respondents complied with the prior order and were not in contempt.
NO OTHER COMPELLING REASON
[28] The matter raises no novel question of law, no conflict in the authorities, and no issue
of public importance warranting appellate intervention notwithstanding poor prospects of
success.
[29] The dispute is fact -bound and turns largely on the applicant’s litigation strategy in
framing its relief. Such circumstances do not constitute a compelling reason for an appeal
to be entertained.
COSTS
[30] The applicant also challenges the costs order. It is trite that costs lie within the
discretion of the court of first instance and will not lightly be interfered with absent a
demonstrable misdirection.
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[31] No basis has been laid for the conclusion that this Court exercised its discretion
capriciously, upon a wrong principle, or without substantial reason.
CONCLUSION
[32] The application for leave to appeal cannot succeed because the proposed appeal is
moot and would have no practical effect as contemplated in section 16(2)(a)(i). And
[33] The applicant has failed to satisfy the requirements of section 17(1) of the Superior
Courts Act. There is no reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different
conclusion, nor is there any other compelling reason for the appeal to be heard.
ORDER
Accordingly, the following order is made:
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application for leave to appeal,
including the costs of senior counsel where so employed. (Party-and-party scale
B).
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__
J.S. NYATHI
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Date of hearing: 09 April 2026
Date of Judgment: 21 April 2026
Appearances:
On behalf of the Applicant: Ms. L Mbanjwa
Applicant’s attorneys: L. Mbanjwa Inc.
On behalf of Respondents 1 to 3: Adv. Thema
Attorneys for the 1st to 3rd Respondents: Madiba Motsai Masitenyane & Githiri Attorneys,
c/o Ndaba H.E. Inc.; Pretoria
On behalf of the 4th Respondents: Adv. SR Mabaso
Attorneys for the 4th Respondents: MOTA Attorneys Inc.
Delivery: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties' legal
representatives by email and uploaded on the CaseLines electronic platform. The date for hand-
down is deemed to be 21 April 2026.