IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case No: 2024-10966
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) NOT REVISED
DATE
In the matter between:
STANLEY DE JAGER APPLICANT
and
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICE FIRST RESPONDENT
THE MINISTER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
VAN DER MERWE, AJ
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INTRODUCTION
[1] The Applicant was arrested on or about 22 May 2002 in connection with multiple
serious offences, namely three counts of rape, eight counts of kidnapping, and
seven counts of indecent assault, committed between October 2001 and May
2002. The offences involv ed eight complainants, all female, aged between 15
and 25 years. In most instances, the Applicant lured the complainants into his
motor vehicle and subjected them to acts of indecent assault, including non -
consensual and degrading sexual conduct. Three of the complainants were
raped. The Applicant was 24 years old at the time. He was subsequently
convicted and, on 5 December 2003, sentenced to life imprisonment. He is
currently serving his sentence at Kgosi Mampuru II Correctional Centre.
[2] The Applicant has been incarcerated for over 21 years and first became eligible
for parole in February 2018.
[3] Prior to his initial parole consideration, the Applicant successfully completed a
range of rehabilitative programmes and acquired various skills and qualifications.
These include Individual Psychological Therapy; Victim -Offender Dialogue
(VOD); Criminal Th inking Programme; Restorative Thinking; Sexual Offenders
Programme; Anger Management; Anti -Gangsterism Course; DCS Anger
Management Programme; DCS Restorative Justice; DCS Changing Lanes
Programme; DCS Sexual Offenders Programme; DCS Community Project –
Alternatives to Violence; DCS Emotional Intelligence Programme; CIT
Development Course; DCS HIV and AIDS Programme; Grow for Life Recognition
Letter; various Bible courses; and several certificates in sporting and community
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activities. A comprehensive list of these programmes and qualifications appears
from paragraph 4.4 onwards in the founding affidavit.
[4] The Applicant was first considered for parole in 2017. His placement was not
recommended, and he was issued with a further 24 -month profile. He was also
required to complete the following programmes:
• Repeat VOD;
• Sexual Offenders Programme;
• Repeat Individual Therapy;
• Repeat Risk Assessment.
[5] The Applicant avers that he was informed of this decision only verbally and was
not provided with a written copy. He further contends that there was an
approximate nine-month delay in communicating the outcome, which deprived
him of the opportunity to atte nd and complete the required rehabilitative
programmes during that period.
[6] In April 2020, the Applicant was again considered for parole. The Respondents
took six months to communicate the outcome, which mirrored the 2017 decision.
[7] Parole was again refused on 1 August 2024. The Applicant was once more
instructed to repeat the same programmes , Individual Therapy and Risk
Assessment, despite having already completed them twice. The Minister’s
reasons were as follows:
“Having considered the documentation of the aforesaid offender and the
recommendations of the NCCS, parole is not approved. This matter should
be placed before the Council after 12 months. The offender is urged to
improve his situation as follows:
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1. To undergo intensive individual psychotherapy to address deviant
sexual behaviour and the risk of reoffending.
2. A risk assessment by a non-treating psychologist should be conducted,
indicating the risk level and tools used, if any.
3. Updated reports must be attached when the profile is resubmitted.”
[8] The Applicant was accordingly issued with a further 12-month profile.
[9] The Applicant failed to reapply for parole in August 2025. There is no evidence
that he underwent the recommended therapy or risk assessment.
[10] A review of the documentation placed before the Parole Board reveals that it is
dated. The psychological reports, in particular, date back as far as 2019. No
updated psychological reports were placed before either the Parole Board or this
Court.
[11] The Applicant, aggrieved by the Minister’s decision, launched the present
application on 30 September 2024. In the notice of motion, he seeks the following
relief:
“1. That the First Respondent’s decision to refuse parole be declared irrational,
unconstitutional, unlawful, and lacking in logic, and that it be set aside with
an order directing his release on parole;
2. Alternatively, that the decision be set aside and remitted to the
Respondents for reconsideration;
3. That the First Respondent be ordered to pay the costs of the application on
an attorney-and-client scale, alternatively on Scale C, including the costs of
any opposing Respondent;
4. Further and/or alternative relief.
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[12] The application is not opposed by either of the Respondents.
DISCUSSION
[13] Parole decisions constitute administrative action within the meaning of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”). There can be no
doubt that, in requiring a further profile in August 202 4, the Minister exercised a
public power under the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998. It is trite that all
public power is constrained by the principle of legality, an incident of the rule of
law enshrined in section 1(c) of the Constitution. Where the exercise of such
power fails to meet the requirements of lawfulness and rationality, a court is
obliged, in terms of section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, to declare such conduct
invalid.
[14] Before addressing the legality of the Minister’s decision, it is necessary to
consider the significance of the Minister’s failure to oppose this application. The
Minister is the only functionary capable of defending the impugned decision. It
must also be n oted that the Applicant’s papers, although prepared by legal
representatives, are disorganised and poorly presented. The documents
uploaded to Caselines were in disarray, lacking proper indexing and pagination,
and contained numerous duplications. Ev en the hard copies provided were
inadequately arranged. This significantly hampered the Court’s ability to identify
the documents placed before the Parole Board, as well as the decision and
reasons of the Minister. Despite a request for supplementary heads of argument
and a clear practice note, the assistance provided remained inadequate. In the
absence of any justification from the Minister, the Court is left to draw conclusions
from the limited material available and the brief reasons provided.
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[15] It may be assumed that the Minister considered all relevant documents that
served before him and that this formed part of the record before this Court.
INTERNAL REMEDIES
[16] Section 7(2)(a) of PAJA provides that a court may not review administrative
action unless any internal remedy has first been exhausted. The purpose is to
ensure that effective internal mechanisms are utilised before judicial intervention
is sought.
[17] In this matter, the “further profile” scheduled for August 2025 does not constitute
an internal remedy as contemplated in section 7(2)(a). It is not a mechanism to
challenge or overturn the impugned decision but forms part of the ordinary parole
process under the Correctional Services Act.
[18] An internal remedy must be a genuine mechanism capable of correcting or
reversing the impugned decision, such as a statutory appeal or formal
reconsideration process.
[19] The decision to subject the Applicant to further profiling is itself an exercise of
public power, not a remedial process. It is therefore conceptually incorrect to
characterise it as an internal remedy under PAJA.
[20] Where an internal process does not provide redress or finality but merely defers
reconsideration, it cannot qualify as an internal remedy in law.
[21] The Applicant is accordingly not barred from approaching this Court for relief.
IS THE DECISION OF 1 AUGUST 2024 REVIEWABLE
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[22] The Applicant adopt ed a broad, unfocused approach, advancing multiple
grounds of review. However, the Minister’s failure to oppose does not entitle the
Applicant to automatic relief. This Court must still determine whether the decision
is lawful and rational.
[23] If any one ground of review is established, the decision falls to be set aside under
section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution.
[24] As held in Van Vuuren v Minister of Correctional Services 2010 CC 17 these
proceedings concern the application of section 136 of the Correctional Services
Act. The Applicant has served the requisite portion of his sentence and has
undergone multiple assessments.
[25] The Applicant contends that the decision is irrational, particularly as the reports
are not adverse to parole. The reports are outdated, many dating back to 2019.
[26] In Walus v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others 2023
(1) SACR 477 (CC) , the Constitutional Court confirmed that rationality is
assessed objectively, requiring a connection between the decision, its purpose,
and the material before the decision-maker.
[27] Similarly, in Moodley v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and
Others (21/53385) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1447 (13 December 2023), the Court held
that parole decisions must be based on a proper and rational consideration of all
relevant material.
[28] In this case, no explanatory affidavit has been provided by the Minister, which
impedes the Court’s ability to conduct the required objective enquiry.
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[29] The Constitution requires that all exercises of public power be objectively rational
and justifiable.
[30] In the absence of an affidavit, it is unclear what factors informed the Minister’s
decision. The only indication is that further psychotherapy, risk assessments and
updated reports were required.
[31] It appears that the decision was mainly influenced by the outdated nature of the
reports.
[32] While the Minister has a discretion under section 136(3)(c) of the Correctional
Services Act , this entails an independent evaluative function and not a mere
endorsement of recommendations.
[33] That discretion cannot be fettered by requiring a favourable recommendation as
a precondition.
[34] Public power must be exercised rationally and on the basis of relevant material.
[35] The Minister’s reliance on outdated reports, without further explanation, renders
the decision difficult to justify. As noted in Walus, an unexplained decision is
likely to be irrational. The absence of reasons leaves the Court uninformed as
to the basis of the decision.
[37] Although the offences are undeniably serious, considerations such as risk of
reoffending and rehabilitation are relevant in parole determinations. However,
it remains unclear why further assessments were required when similar
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processes had already been completed. Given the lack of explanation, the Court
can only infer that the decision was based on outdated reports
[39] In the absence of a proper evidentiary foundation, the decision appears irrational
and falls to be set aside. A single valid ground of review suffices to invalidate the
decision.
CONCLUSION
[42] The decision is irrational and must be set aside. The question is whether the
Court should substitute its own decision or remit the matter. This requires a
careful exercise of judicial discretion, mindful of the separation of powers.
[43] The Court has extensive documentation, however, the reports are indeed
outdated, undermining their reliability. In these circumstances, remittal for
reconsideration on a properly updated record is appropriate.
COSTS
[45] Costs are within the Court’s discretion. In matters involving constitutional and
administrative law, courts are generally reluctant to award costs against the State
absent bad faith. Although, the Applicant has succeeded, the relief is a remittal,
and the papers were poorly presented. There is no basis for a costs order.
ORDER
[46] The following order is made:
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46.1 The recommendation of the Second Respondent dated 1 August 2024
regarding the Applicant’s suitability for parole is reviewed and set aside.
46.2 The Second Respondent is directed, within 60 days, to schedule a new
parole hearing.
46.3 All necessary reports and preparatory steps must be completed at least 30
days prior to the hearing.
46.4 Not less than two weeks before the hearing:
46.4.1 The Applicant must be informed of the date and time;
46.4.2 The Applicant must be granted access to all material to be considered;
46.4.3 The Applicant must be granted access to all relevant policies, manuals,
and directives.
46.5 The First Respondent must take all necessary steps to ensure compliance
of the Second Respondent with this order.
46.6 No order as to costs.
_____________ ______
VAN DER MERWE, AJ
Acting Judge of the High Court
of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria
HEARD ON: 4 DECEMBER 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:20 APRIL 2026
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For the Applicant: Advocate Daniel Melaphi
Instructed by: Me Makgopa Attorneys
For Respondents: No Appearance