1
IN THE COMPANIES TRIBUNAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case no.: CT02574ADJ2026
In the matter between:
NATIONAL BRANDS LIMITED Applicant
and
JUMPIN JACK PIMPIN RIDES (PTY) LTD First Respondent
COMMISSIONER OF THE COMPANIES AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMISSION
Second Respondent
Presiding member:
Date of decision:
Richard Bradstreet
5 May 2026
DECISION (Reasons and Order)
1. This application concerns a company name objection brought in terms of
section 160 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Act”), in which the Applicant
seeks a determination that the First Respondent’s name does not satisfy the
requirements of section 11 of the Act. The Applicant further seeks a default
order in terms of regulation 153 of the Companies Regulations 2011, the Fir st
Respondent having failed to file an answering affidavit in response to the
application.
2
2. The Applicant is National Brands Limited, a wholly -owned subsidiary of AVI
Limited, and the proprietor of the registered trade mark JUMPIN JACK and a
number of related marks incorporating the JUMPIN JACK identifier, all
registered in class 30 in respect of, inter alia, popcorn and other foodstuffs. The
Applicant is one of South Africa’s larger fast -moving consumer goods
businesses, and its JUMPIN JACK popcorn products are marketed nationally
through major retailers under its Baker Street Snacks and Willards divisions.
3. The First Respondent is Jumpin Jack Pimpin Rides (Pty) Ltd, a private company
incorporated under the Act on 28 August 2025, with its registered address at 69
Shady Avenue, Chatsworth, Durban. The First Respondent’s business
activities are not specified in the Applicant’s papers and have not been
disclosed in any answering affidavit, none having been filed. The Second
Respondent is the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, cited in
its capacity as the custodian of the companies register.
DEFAULT RELIEF
4. The application papers were served on the First Respondent on or about 29
January 2026 by email to the address recorded for the First Respondent’s
director (with whom the Applicant’s attorneys had previously corresponded),
and a sheriff’s return of service dated 3 February 2026 confirms personal
service at the registered address. No answering affidavit has been filed and the
time period prescribed for doing so has long expired. I am satisfied that there
has been adequate service in compliance with regulation 153(2)(b), and that the
matter properly proceeds on an unopposed basis.
3
APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
5. Section 160(1) of the Act provides that any person with an interest in the name
of a company may apply to the Companies Tribunal for a determination whether
the name satisfies the requirements of section 11. Such an application may be
made “on good cause shown at any time after the date of the reservation or
registration of the name that is the subject of the application” (section 160(2)).
6. Section 11(2) of the Act provides, inter alia, that a company name must not:
(a) be the same as the name of another company, a registered trade mark
belonging to another person, or a mark in respect of which an application
has been filed for registration as a trade mark in the Republic;
(b) be confusingly similar to such a name, trade mark or mark; or
(c) falsely imply or suggest, or be such as would reasonably mislead a person
to believe incorrectly, that the company is part of or associated with
another person.
Confusing similarity
7. “Similar” in section 11(2)(b) means “having a marked resemblance or likeness”
(Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC 2001 (1) SA 844 (SCA), and the offending name
should immediately bring to mind the well-known trade mark or other name.
8. Whether there is a confusing similarity involves a value judgment ( Cowbell AG
v ICS Holdings 2001 (3) SA 941 (SCA) para 10), and presupposes that the
names are to be used together in a normal and fair manner, in the ordinary
course of business (SmithKline Beecham Consumer Brands (Pty) Ltd v Unilever
plc 1995 (2) SA 903 (A) at 912H).
4
9. 9.In particular, one must ask whether there is “a reasonable likelihood that
ordinary members of the public, or a substantial section thereof, may be
confused or deceived into believing” that the goods or services of one are those
of the other or are connec ted therewith (Adidas AG & another v Pepkor Retail
Limited (187/12) [2013] ZASCA 3 (28 February 2013) para 28; Capital Estate
and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Holiday Inns Inc 1977 (2) SA 916 (A) at 929).
10. 10.The comparison must be made by reference to how the names will be
perceived by the “ordinary reasonable careful man, i.e. not the very careful man
nor the very careless man” (Link Estates (Pty) Ltd v Rink Estates (Pty) Ltd 1979
(2) SA 276 (E) at 280), bearing in mind that the comparison is not undertaken
with the two names presented side by side, and that allowance must be made
for the ordinary imperfections of human memory, sometimes referred to as the
“doctrine of imperfect recollection” (Ewing t/a The Buttercup Dairy Company v
Buttercup Margarine Corporation Ltd 1917 (34) RPC 225 at 232 and 238).
11. Regard must also be had to “the class of persons who are likely to be the
purchasers of the goods in question” ( Reckitt & Colman SA (Pty) Ltd v SC
Johnson & Son SA (Pty) Ltd 1993 (2) SA 307 (A) at 315F –G), and the names
“must be viewed as they would be encountered in the marketplace and against
the background of relevant surrounding circumstances” (Plascon-Evans Paints
Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 640G–641E).
EVALUATION / ANALYSIS
12. The Applicant places before the Tribunal evidence of registrations for the trade
mark JUMPIN JACK across a number of classes, together with evidence
directed at showing longstanding and extensive use of, and reputation in, the
5
mark in South Africa, including its presence in the country’s major retailers and
on the Applicant’s digital and social media platforms.
13. The Applicant also places before the Tribunal evidence of its proprietorship of
five trade mark registrations in class 30, all of which incorporate the words
JUMPIN JACK. The earliest, and most directly relevant for present purposes,
is registration number 1993/01782 for the word mark JUMPIN JACK, with a filing
date of 9 March 1993 and a registration date of 18 February 1997. The other
four registrations comprise extensions of that core mark – JUMPIN JACK
GOURMET POPCORN (word and logo), the JUMPIN JACK logo on its own,
and the JUMPIN JACK packaging design – all in the same class and covering
substantially the same range of foodstuffs.
14. The Applicant has used the JUMPIN JACK mark in respect of popcorn products
in South Africa for some three decades, and has placed before the Tribunal
printouts from major retail platforms (including Pick n Pay, Checkers, Game,
Makro, Shoprite, Takealot and Dischem), social media references, and a
Google search confined to the South African result set, all of which point to the
JUMPIN JACK mark being one which the South African popcorn- buying public
would readily associate with the Applicant.
15. An important feature of the registered mark is its deliberately unusual spelling.
The mark is “JUMPIN JACK” – without a “g” at the end of the first word, and
without an apostrophe. That is not the ordinary English present participle
“jumping”. The word as registered is an invented or stylised form, and the
distinctiveness of the mark lies in part in that stylisation. Protection has been
6
granted in the precise stylised composite “JUMPIN JACK” and not two English
distinct English words.
16. The First Respondent’s name is “Jumpin Jack Pimpin Rides (Pty) Ltd”. The first
observation is that the name reproduces the Applicant’s registered word mark
“JUMPIN JACK” in its entirety, in the exact stylised form (without the “g”), and
as the leading element of the company name. There is therefore no question
of similarity between the two: the Applicant’s mark is wholly incorporated as the
first two words of the impugned name.
17. The remaining element, “Pimpin Rides”, does not dispel the link. The
expression mirrors the same unusual “-in” elision (replacing “Pimping”) that
distinguishes the Applicant’s mark . This would only serve to reinforce the
impression that the entire name has been constructed in the style of the
Applicant’s brand. More importantly, “Pimpin Rides” reads as a separate
descriptor sitting beneath the JUMPIN JACK source identifier, in much the way
that any sub-brand, product line or trading style reads beneath a parent mark.
To a notional ordinary member of the public encountering the company name
in commerce, the name is structured to read as “JUMPIN JACK – Pimpin
Rides”, in the sense that “Pimpin Rides” describes a particular activity or offering
operating under the JUMPIN JACK source identifier.
18. Although “Pimpin Rides” does suggest an entirely different field of activity to
popcorn in that it points loosely toward motor vehicles, customisation, or related
entertainment-style services, the relevant inquiry for the present purpose is
whether the impugned name is confusingly similar to the Applicant’s mark
(section 11(2)(b)), and/or whether the name would reasonably mislead a person
7
into believing that the First Respondent is associated with the Applicant (section
11(2)(c)(i)). The fact that the parties operate, or may in future operate, in
different commercial fields does not, without more, preclude either inquiry from
being answered in the Applicant’s favour.
19. On the question of confusing similarity, the test in Plascon-Evans contemplates
a comparison having regard to the marketplace perception of the average
customer. The relevant likely customer here, for purposes of the JUMPIN JACK
mark, is the South African popcorn-buying consumer who has encountered the
Applicant’s product on supermarket shelves, in social media advertising and in
the everyday snack market. Such a person, encountering the name “JUMPIN
JACK PIMPIN RIDES” in the ordinary course – on a vehicle, an invoice, a social
media page – is not engaged in side- by-side dissection of the words, but is
operating with an imperfect recollection of the two names/marks. Such a
person’s attention is most likely to be drawn to “JUMPIN JACK”. The remaining
element will at best register as a sub-brand or trading style.
20. The matter is reinforced by a particular feature of the Applicant’s evidence: a
Google search for “JUMPIN JACK SOUTH AFRICA” returns results which all
relate to the Applicant’s products. The unusual spelling means that the words
“JUMPIN JACK”, in that compound form, function in the South African market
as a virtually unique source identifier for the Applicant. To select that exact
compound mark, in that exact spelling, as the leading element of an unrelated
company name is to anchor the company in the public’s existing understanding
of who or what “JUMPIN JACK” is.
8
21. As Greenberg JA observed in American Chewing Products Corporation v
American Chicle Co 1948 (2) SA 736 (A) at 744:
“the Court must . . . have regard to the position of a person who might at one time see
or hear one of the marks and later, possibly with an imperfect recollection of that mark,
come across the other mark”.
22. A person who has previously seen JUMPIN JACK on popcorn packaging is, in
my view, reasonably likely later to encounter “JUMPIN JACK PIMPIN RIDES”
and to assume some connection between the two.
23. The fact that the parties’ areas of trade do not currently coincide does not, on
its own, preclude relief. In Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd v
Holiday Inns Inc (supra) at 929, Rabie JA observed that the absence of a
common field of activity is “a factor which one has to take into account”, but
went on to hold that “it cannot be suggested that the absence of a common field
of activity will always be sufficient to bar a party from obtaining relief”.
24. The crucial question remains whether there is a reasonable likelihood of
confusion. In the present case, the strength and reputation of the JUMPIN
JACK mark, the unique spelling, the reproduction of the entire mark as the
leading element of the impugned name, and the fact that the First Respondent
has not chosen to specify or constrain its trading activities, together produce a
reasonable likelihood that members of the public will assume that the First
Respondent operates with the Applicant’s authorisation, or as a related
undertaking, when neither is the case.
25. Taking these considerations together, and applying the value judgment required
by Cowbell (supra), I am satisfied that the First Respondent’s name is
9
confusingly similar to the Applicant’s registered trade mark JUMPIN JACK,
contrary to section 11(2)(b) of the Act.
26. For substantially the same reasons, section 11(2)( c)(i) is also contravened.
Faced with the name “Jumpin Jack Pimpin Rides (Pty) Limited”, a member of
the public familiar with the Applicant’s well-established JUMPIN JACK brand is
reasonably likely to draw the inference that the First Respondent is part of, or
licensed by, or otherwise associated with, the Applicant – whether as a related
venture, a brand extension or a co-branded promotional activity. That inference
would be incorrect. The First Responde nt’s name is therefore such as would
reasonably mislead a person into believing incorrectly that it is associated with
the Applicant.
27. The Applicant has also asked for an order as to costs in terms of regulation 156.
The Tribunal’s power to award costs is sparingly exercised, and is generally
reserved for cases of misconduct or abuse of process by a respondent. While
the First Respondent’s failure to engage substantively with the Applicant’s
correspondence (beyond a single brief WhatsApp message in November 2025
indicating an intention to consult its accountant, which was never followed
through) has caused inconvenience and expense, I do not, on the papers before
me, regard the First Respondent’s conduct as crossing the threshold that would
ordinarily justify an adverse costs order.
ORDER
28. In the result, I make the following order:
(a) The application for default relief is granted.
10
(b) The First Respondent is directed to:
(i) the First Respondent is directed to change its name to one which
neither incorporates, nor is confusingly similar to, the Applicant’s
JUMPIN JACK trade mark, and which does not otherwise imply an
association between it and the Applicant and/or its business
operations; and
(ii) file a notice of amendment to its Memorandum of Incorporation
within 3 (three) months of the date of this order.
(c) In the event that the First Respondent fails to comply with paragraph (b)
above, the Second Respondent is directed to substitute the First
Respondent’s registration number as its interim company name.
(d) The Tribunal’s Recording Officer (Registrar) is directed to serve this order
on the First and Second Respondents.
__________________________
Richard Bradstreet
Member of the Companies Tribunal
5 May 2026