1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Not Reportable
Case Number: 1583/2025
In the matter between:
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL Applicant
and
SCHALK WILLEM BOTHA Respondent
Coram: Petersen ADJP and Reddy J
Date enrolled: 20 March 2026
Judgment reserved: 20 March 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically, circulated to the
parties’ representatives via email, uploaded to CaseLines, and released to
SAFLII. The date and time for the handing down of the judgment are deemed to
be 10h00 on 08 May 2026.
Summary: Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 — Application for removal from roll
of legal practitioners — Respondent consents to removal — Opposition limited
to costs and condonation — Failure to lodge audit reports for ten consecutive
~ 1-""'"'" 1 I~~ ~ Y~i~J
lc,-,w?~ ~ , ~
2
years — Failure to hold Fidelity Fund Certificates for ten consecutive years —
Failure to pay membership fees — Respondent’s claim that he resigned from the
Law Society of the Northern Provinces in December 2015 — Effect of automatic
transfer of membership to LPC — No documentary proof of prior resignation —
Condonation for late filing of answering affidavit granted — Costs — Whether
standard attorney-and -client costs order appropriate where respondent co-
operates, consents to removal, was sequestrated, and made sustained settlement
overtures that were met with dilatory response — Party-and-party costs ordered.
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
REDDY J
Introduction
[1] This is an application by the South African Legal Practice Council (‘the
LPC’) for the removal of the name of Schalk Willem Botha (‘Botha’) from the
roll of legal practitioners. Alternatively, the LPC seeks his suspension from
practice. The application is brought in terms of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014
(‘the LPA’).
[2] The complexion of this matter is unusual. Botha filed an answering
affidavit consenting to the removal of his name from the roll. His opposition
pivots on two issues , first, condonation for the late filing of his answering
affidavit and second, the costs of the application. The substantive merits are
accordingly not in dispute.
[3] The costs issue raises questions that warrant careful analysis. Botha
contends that he applied for removal from the former Law Society of the Northern
Provinces in December 2015, has not practi ced as an attorney since, was
3
subsequently sequestrated, and has made sustained efforts to settle this
application since at least August 2025. The LPC disputes that a valid resignation
was ever effected and bolsters its costs claim by invoking the general principle
that an attorney-and-client order is standard in applications of this nature.
Botha’s background
[4] Botha was admitted and enrolled as an attorney in the then Gauteng
Division of the High Court on 26 March 1985. He practiced at various law firms
from 1 May 1985 to 14 June 2012. Subsequently, he commenced practice as a
sole practitioner under the name ‘Botha Attorneys’, operating from Farm
Vlakpan, Jagersfontein, Mahikeng. His name remains on the roll of legal
practitioners of this Court.
Nature of these Proceedings
[5] Applications of this nature are sui generis . There is no lis between the
parties. The LPC acts as the guardian of the honour and integrity of the legal
profession, placing facts before the Court so that the Court may exercise its
inherent disciplinary jurisdiction over its officers. The Court acts in the public
interest.
1
[6] A three -stage enquiry governs these applications. First, the Court
determines whether the alleged offending conduct has been established on a
balance of probabilities. Secondly, it makes a value judgment on whether the
person is not a fit and proper person to practise. 2 Thirdly, it determines whether
1 Hassim v Incorporated Law Society of Natal 1977 (2) SA 757 (A) at 767C–G; Law Society Transvaal v Matthews
1989 (4) SA 389 (T) at 393F; Prokureursorde van Transvaal v Kleynhans 1995 (1) SA 839 (T) at 851E–F.
2 Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v C 1986 (1) SA 616 (A) at 637C –E; A v Law Society of the Cape of
Good Hope 1989 (1) SA 849 (A) at 851A–E.
4
the appropriate sanction is removal from the roll or suspension from practice,
which is ultimately a question of degree.3
Procedural History
[7] The application was launched by notice of motion dated 13 March 2025
and mailed to Botha on 5 May 2025. Notwithstanding an initial unsuccessful
attempt at personal service, it was served on Botha personally by the sheriff on
12 August 2025.
[8] On 1 December 2025, Botha, through LFS Attorneys Incorporated, filed a
notice of intention to oppose and a notice to mediate in terms of Rule 41A of the
Uniform Rules of Court. The LPC opposed mediation.
[9] The matter was enrolled for hearing on 20 February 2026. On 4 February
2026, Botha filed a combined condonation application and answering affidavit.
The LPC filed its replying affidavit on 13 February 2026. On 16 February 2026,
LFS Attorneys Incorporated withdrew as attorneys of record.
[10] At the hearing on 20 February 2026, Botha was absent from the virtual
platform. The matter was postponed to 20 March 2026 to ensure Botha received
proper direct notice. On 24 February 2026, the Judge’s Registrar emailed Botha
the court order and the new hearing date. The matter proceeded on 20 March
2026. Botha was not on the platform via the MS Teams link, which had been
made available to him.
Condonation for Late Filing of the Answering Affidavit
[11] Before turning to the merits, the issue of condonation falls to be
determined. Botha’s answering affidavit was filed on 4 February 2026, well after
3 Jasat v Natal Law Society 2000 (3) SA 44 (SCA) at 51B –I; Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Budricks
2003 (2) SA 11 (SCA) at 13I –14B; Summerley v Law Society Northern Provinces 2006 (5) SA 613 (SCA) at
615B–F; Malan v The Law Society of the Northern Provinces (568/2007) [2008] ZASCA 90 at [9].
5
the period contemplated in the notice of motion. He seeks condonation for the
late filing. Botha explains that from August 2025, his attorneys were engaged in
settlement discussions with the LPC’s attorneys and had been requested to hold
their file pending the LPC’s instructions, which never came. The LPC indicated
that it does not oppose the granting of condonation, while maintaining that no
adequate case for condonation was made out.
[12] The applicable test governing condonation is well established. In Melane v
Santam Insurance Co Ltd
4, Holmes JA held that the Court has a discretion
whether to grant condonation, to be exercised having regard to: the degree of non-
compliance; the explanation therefor; the importance of the case; the respondent’s
prospects of success on the merits; Botha’s interest in finality; the convenience
of the Court; and the avoidance of unnecessary delay in the administration of
justice. The se factors are not individually decisive; they must be weighed
holistically.
In Minister of Health and Another v Treatment Action Campaign and
Others (No 1)5, the Constitutional Court confirmed that condonation should not
be withheld where the interests of justice favour the matter being decided on the
merits, particularly where the delay has not prejudiced the other party.
[13] The correspondence trail attached to the answering affidavit reflects a
genuine attempt at settlement from August 2025 and a reasonable, if misplaced,
expectation that the LPC’s attorneys were processing a response. We are
persuaded that a satisfactory explanation for the delay exists. The delay caused
the LPC no material prejudice, as the LPC was able to file a replying affidavit.
The interests of justice are best served by having Botha’s version on record,
particularly in view of the disputed costs question. Condonation is granted. It
follows that Botha’s answering affidavit is properly before the Court.
4 Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (A) at 532C–E.
4 Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (A) at 532C–E.
5 Minister of Health and Another v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 1) 2002 (5) SA 703 (CC) at para
[8].
6
The Alleged Misconduct
Failure to lodge audit reports and to hold Fidelity Fund Certificates
[14] Botha failed to lodge unqualified audit reports for the periods ending
February 2015 through February 2024, a total of ten consecutive years. As a direct
consequence, he was not issued with Fidelity Fund Certificates for the years
commencing January 2016 through January 2025. During this period Botha was
not entitled to practice for reward, and both his clients and the Legal Practitioners’
Fidelity Fund were exposed to risk. This conduct contravenes sections 84(1) and
84(2) of the LPA and Rules 54.23, 54.24 and 54.29 of the LPC Rules.
[15] It is also recorded that Botha failed to attend two Disciplinary Committee
meetings convened in respect of his non-compliance.
Failure to pay annual membership fees
[16] Botha failed to pay annual membership fees to the LPC in the total amount
of R33 182.00, in contravention of Rules 4.1 and 6 of the LPC Rules read with
Clause 3.16 of the Code of Conduct.
Failure to respond to LPC correspondence
[17] Botha failed repeatedly and systematically to respond to correspondence
from the LPC, in contravention of Clauses 16.1, 16.2 and 16.3 of the Code of
Conduct.
Discussion and Findings
Establishment of the offending conduct
[18] Botha consents to the removal order and does not dispute the misconduct.
The founding affidavit stands unchallenged on the merits. On the conspectus of
the evidence, Botha has failed to lodge unqualified audit reports for ten
consecutive years, has practiced without Fidelity Fund Certificates for the same
period, and has failed to pay membership fees totalling R33 182.00. We are
7
satisfied that the offending conduct has been established on a balance of
probabilities.
Fitness to practice
[19] The failure to lodge audit reports and to hold Fidelity Fund Certificates for
ten consecutive years represents a profound and sustained dereliction of the most
fundamental obligations of a legal practitioner. The regulatory framework
governing these requirements exists precisely to protect clients and the public. A
practitioner who ignores these obligations for a decade, whatever the subjective
reasons, cannot be regarded as fit and proper. We are therefore satisfied that
Botha is not a fit and proper person to practice as a legal practitioner.
Removal or suspension
[20] Botha consents to removal and does not seek a suspension in lieu. The
duration of the non- compliance, ten uninterrupted years, and the scale of the
regulatory defaults plainly exclude any lesser sanction. We are of the view that
removal from the roll is the appropriate order.
Costs
The general principle
[21] The starting point is well established. Since these proceedings are sui
generis and the LPC acts not as an ordinary litigant but as the statutory guardian
of professional standards, it is, as a general rule, entitled to its costs. The rationale
is that the LPC performs a public function and must be able to discharge it without
bearing the financial risk of doing so.
6
[22] In applications of this nature, the standard costs order is made on the
attorney-and-client scale. Such an order reflects not only the sui generis character
of the proceedings but also the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the
8
profession. The LPC underscores its costs claim with this general principle and
seeks its costs accordingly.
Botha’s contentions
[23] Botha does not dispute the LPC’s entitlement to costs as such. Botha’s case
on costs is predicated on the following contentions. First, he claims to have
personally attended the offices of the Law Society of the Northern Provinces in
Pretoria in December 2015 and delivered all required notices and documentation
to terminate his membership and cease practice. He thereafter relocated to a farm
in the Mahikeng district and has not practiced as an attorney since. Second, he
and his wife were sequestrated by this Court in July 2017, as confirmed by the
sequestration order attached to his answering affidavit.
[24] Third, he had, since 2015, been under a bona fide belief that he had been
properly removed from the roll and that the necessary regulatory steps had been
taken. He has had no trust account, no clients and no files for approximately ten
years. Fourth, from 18 August 2025, the day the application came to his attention
through his attorneys, he took active steps to settle the matter without costs. To
this end, h is attorneys wrote to the LPC’s attorneys on that date proposing that
the LPC take its removal order without a costs order. They followed up on 0 4
September 2025, had a telephone consultation with the LPC’s attorney on 8
September 2025, during which they were told to ‘hold the file’ while instructions
were obtained. Additionally, further correspondence was sent on 10 September
2025, 26 September 2025, 15 October 2025, 20 October 2025 and 21 January
2026. Notably, none of this correspondence was substantively answered. Fifth,
he is currently insolvent and has no means to pay the costs of this application.
The prior resignation from the Law Society of the Northern Provinces
[25] We first address Botha’s claim that he duly resigned from the Law Society
of the Northern Provinces in December 2015 and that this should relieve him of
9
accountability for the regulatory defaults. This argument must be assessed against
the applicable statutory framework.
[26] Section 115(1) of the LPA provides that, upon the commencement of
Chapter 2 on 1 November 2018, every person who was a member of any former
law society immediately became a member of the LPC. The former law societies,
including the Law Society of the Northern Provinces, ceased to exist on that date.
The LPC is therefore not the Law Society of the Northern Provinces. It follows
axiomatically that any steps Botha may have taken in December 2015 were
directed at a predecessor body that no longer exists.
[27] Botha has produced no documentary evidence of the alleged notification.
Simply put, no letter of resignation, no acknowledgement of receipt, and no
correspondence from the former Law Society confirming the termination of his
membership is before this Court. The LPC’s records continued to reflect him as
a practicing attorney throughout. Botha could, with relative ease, have obtained
a closing audit report from his former auditors and procured documentary
evidence of any communication with the former Law Society. Notably, none has
been placed before the Court.
[28] Moreover, even if Botha notified the former Law Society of his intention
to cease practice, that notification would not, of itself, have constituted a valid
resignation from the profession or a removal from the roll. The roll is maintained
by the court, and removal therefrom requires a formal court order. A practitioner
cannot unilaterally remove himself from the roll by notifying an administrative
body of his intention to cease practice. Botha’s name has remained on the roll at
all times.
[29] Even if this Court accepts at face value that Botha ceased active practice
in December 2015, his regulatory obligations did not lapse merely because he
stopped practicing. The obligation to lodge audit reports, to hold Fidelity Fund
10
Certificates, and to pay membership fees subsists for as long as a practitioner’s
name remains on the roll. The failure to discharge these obligations for over ten
years is no less serious because Botha chose to jettison his practice without
following the correct procedures for formal removal.
[30] Botha’s bona fide belief that he had properly left the profession is
misplaced and not a complete answer to the misconduct alleged. It does, however,
have a bearing on his subjective culpability and on the costs discretion, to which
we return below.
The LPC’s dilatory response to settlement overtures
[31] The correspondence trail in the answering affidavit merits careful scrutiny.
On 18 August 2025, within days of personal service, LFS Attorneys wrote to the
LPC’s attorneys, explained that their client was not practicing, outlined the basis
for a proposed settlement, and specifically proposed that the LPC take its removal
order without a costs order.
[32] That letter was not acknowledged until 2 October 2025, a delay of
approximately six weeks. At that point, the LPC’s attorneys merely asked Botha
to put his position in writing, an exercise that had already been completed in the
August letter. A further consultation occurred on 8 September 2025, during which
the LPC’s attorney asked Botha’s attorneys to ‘pend the file’ while further
instructions were obtained. Those further instructions never materialized.
[33] Botha’s attorneys followed up on 4 September 2025, 10 September 2025,
26 September 2025, 15 October 2025, 20 October 2025, and 21 January 2026.
The correspondence reflects a persistent, good-faith effort to avoid contested
litigation. The LPC’s response was to proceed with the application, file for a court
date, and set the matter down, without engaging meaningfully with the settlement
proposal.
11
[34] To this end, we make no finding that the LPC acted in bad faith. The LPC’s
attorneys may simply have been awaiting instructions that were slow in coming.
The trickling nature of these instructions had a practical effect. Botha’s attorneys
were induced to hold their file for several months on the misconception that the
LPC was considering their proposal. Whilst Botha lay in limbo, his proposal was
never answered; the matter was already enrolled, and Botha was compelled to file
an answering affidavit o n extremely short notice. This sequence of events is
relevant to the assessment of the costs order.
The appropriate costs order
[35] The LPC’s entitlement to some costs order is not in dispute and cannot
seriously be contested. The LPC was duty-bound to bring this application to fulfil
its statutory mandate. The LPC is successful in the proposed relief sought. What
stands out is that Botha's consent to his removal does not deprive the LPC of its
entitlement to the costs incurred in bringing the proceedings.7
[36] The question is whether costs should be awarded on the attorney-and-client
scale or the ordinary party-and -party scale. An attorney-and -client order is
punitive in character. It goes beyond compensation for reasonably incurred costs,
and either marks the court’s displeasure or is intended to reflect that the party’s
conduct has been unreasonable, vexatious, or in bad faith. The sui generis
character of these proceedings does not make an attorney- and-client order
axiomatic or constrain the court’s discretion. The scale of the costs order is within
the court’s discretion, to be exercised judicially, having regard to the conspectus
of relevant circumstances.
[37] The following considerations weigh against an attorney-and-client order in
this matter. First, Botha did not oppose the removal order. He consented to it from
the outset of his answering affidavit. The entire litigation was contested only on
12
costs and condonation. A punitive costs order in these circumstances would, in
effect, penalize Botha for something he did not oppose. Second, Botha has been
sequestrated. A costs order will rank as a creditor’s claim in his insolvent estate.
Third, Botha operated under a genuine, if legally erroneous, belief that he had left
the profession in December 2015. This belief is self -evident, given that he has
resided on a farm in the Mahikeng district for approximately a decade, with no
clients, no trust account , and no legal practice. His culpability, while not
extinguished, is meaningfully different from that of a practitioner who continues
to practi ce while consciously ignoring regulatory obligations. Fourth, Botha
made genuine and persistent settlement proposals from August 2025. His
attorneys communicated clearly that he was willing to submit to a removal order
and sought only to avoid a costs order. The LPC’s attorneys’ protracted failure to
respond substantively to those proposals prolonged the litigation a nd increased
the costs.
[38] Against this backdrop, Botha’s non-compliance spanned ten years. Even
on his own version, Botha could, at any point during that decade, have taken the
relatively simple step of applying to court for the formal removal of his name
from the roll, or at the very least ensured that a closing audit report was lodged.
Botha did not do so. It is inevitable that the regulatory defaults are not trivial.
[39] On a conspectus of these considerations, we are of the view that the
appropriate order is costs on the party-and-party scale. This order recognises the
LPC’s entitlement to recover the costs of performing its statutory function,
without visiting upon Botha the full punitive effect of an attorney-and-client order
in circumstances where, (i) he consented to the substantive relief sought; (ii) he
was sequestrated and held a genuine belief that he had ceased to be a member of
was sequestrated and held a genuine belief that he had ceased to be a member of
the profession; and (iii) his settlement attempts were met with a protracted and
dilatory response. An attorney-and-client order, in these particular circumstances,
would be disproportionate.
13
Order
[40] As a result, the following order is made:
1. Condonation for the late filing of the Respondent’s answering
affidavit is granted.
2. The name of SCHALK WILLEM BOTHA is removed from the roll
of legal practitioners.
3. The Respondent shall forthwith surrender and deliver to the Registrar
of this Court his certificate of enrolment as a legal practitioner.
4. In the event of the Respondent failing to comply with paragraph 3 of
this order within two (2) weeks of service thereof upon him, the sheriff
of the district in which the certificate is located is authorised and
directed to take possession of the certificate and to deliver it to the
Registrar.
5. The Respondent is prohibited from operating on or handling the trust
accounts referred to in paragraph 6 of this order.
6. SANELISIWE PRINCESS NGCOBO, Director of the North West
Provincial Office of the Applicant, is appointed as curator bonis to
administer and control the trust accounts of the Respondent, including
accounts relating to insolvent and deceased estates and any estate under
curatorship connected with the Respondent’s practice, as well as any
separate banking, savings or interest -bearing accounts operated by the
Respondent in terms of sections 86(1), 86(2), 86(3) and/or 86(4) of the
LPA (‘the trust accounts’), with the following powers and duties:
6.1. immediately to take possession of the Respondent's accounting records,
records, files and documents as referred to in paragraph 7 and, subject to
the approval of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Board of Control, to
14
sign all forms and generally to operate upon the trust accounts, but only to
such extent and for such purpose as may be necessary to bring to
completion current transactions in which the Respondent was acting at the
date of this order;
6.2. subject to the approval and control of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund
Board of Control, where monies were paid incorrectly or unlawfully from
the trust accounts, to recover such monies and, if necessary, to institute
legal proceedings for their recovery;
6.3. to ascertain from the Respondent's records the names of all trust creditors
and to call upon the Respondent to furnish, within 30 days of service of
this order (or such further period as the curator may agree in writing), the
names, addresses and amounts due to all trust creditors;
6.4. to call upon trust creditors to furnish such proof, information and affidavits
as the curator may require to determine the validity and quantum of their
claims, subject to the requirements of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund
Board of Control;
6.5. to admit or reject, in whole or in part and subject to the approval of the
Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Board of Control, the claims of trust
creditors, without prejudice to their right of access to the civil courts;
6.6. having determined the amounts lawfully due to trust creditors, to pay such
claims in full, subject to the approval of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity
Fund Board of Control;
6.7. in the event of any surplus remaining after payment in full of all admitted
claims, to apply such surplus firstly to any claim of the Fund in terms of
section 86(5) of the LPA and secondly to the costs, fees and expenses
referred to in paragraph 11 of this order, and to pay any remaining balance
to the Respondent (if solvent) or to the trustee of his insolvent estate (if
15
insolvent), subject to the approval of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund
Board of Control;
6.8. in the event of insufficient trust monies to pay all admitted claims in full,
to distribute the available balance equitably amongst the trust creditors or
to pay such balance to the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund;
6.9. subject to the approval of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Board of
Control, to appoint nominees, representatives or consultants as may be
necessary to assist in carrying out her duties; and
6.10. to render periodic returns to the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund Board
of Control showing how the trust accounts have been dealt with, until
notified by the Board that her duties as curator are terminated.
7. The Respondent shall immediately deliver to the curator all accounting
records, records, files and documents relating to:
7.1. any monies received, held or paid by the Respondent for or on account of
any person while practising as a legal practitioner;
7.2. any monies invested by the Respondent in terms of sections 86(3) and/or
86(4) of the LPA;
7.3. any interest on such invested monies paid to or credited to the
Respondent;
7.4. any deceased, insolvent or curatorship estate administered by the
Respondent in any capacity;
7.5. any trust administered by the Respondent as trustee or on
behalf of the trustee in terms of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988;
7.6. any company or close corporation administered by the
Respondent as or on behalf of a liquidator; and
16
7.7. the Respondent's practice generally, provided that the Respondent shall be
entitled to reasonable access to such records subject to the supervision of
the curator or her nominee.
8. Should the Respondent fail to comply with paragraph 7 of this order
upon service thereof, or should service be impossible, the sheriff of the
district in which the records are located is authorised and directed to
search for and take possession of such rec ords wherever they may be
and to deliver them to the curator.
9. The curator shall be entitled to:
9.1. hand over to persons entitled thereto all records, files and documents upon
receipt of a satisfactory written undertaking to pay any fees and
disbursements due to the firm, either by agreement or in terms of a taxed
bill of costs;
9.2. require from such persons such documentation or information as she
considers relevant to any actual or anticipated claim against the
Respondent, the Respondent's clients or the Fidelity Fund, provided that
reasonable access and copying rights are afforded;
9.3. publish this order or an abridged version thereof in any newspaper she
considers appropriate; and
9.4. wind up the Respondent's practice.
10. The Respondent is hereby removed from all offices to which his
status as a legal practitioner was a prerequisite, including as:
10.1. executor of any estate appointed in terms of section 54(1)(a)(v) of the
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 or section 72(1) thereof;
10.2. curator or guardian of any minor or other person's property in terms of
sections 72(1) and 85 of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965;
17
10.3. trustee of any insolvent estate in terms of section 59 of the Insolvency Act
24 of 1936;
10.4. liquidator of any company in terms of section 379(2) read with section
379(e) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, read with the Companies Act 71
of 2008;
10.5. trustee of any trust in terms of section 20(1) of the Trust Property Control
Act 57 of 1988;
10.6. liquidator of any close corporation in terms of section 74 of the Close
Corporations Act 69 of 1984; and
10.7. administrator appointed in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts
Act 32 of 1944.
11. The Respondent shall pay:
11.1. the reasonable costs of the inspection of the Respondent's accounting
records in terms of section 87(2) of the LPA;
11.2. the reasonable fees of the auditor engaged by the Applicant;
11.3. the reasonable fees and expenses of the curator, including travelling time;
11.4. the reasonable fees and expenses of any person engaged by the curator as
provided for herein; and
11.5. the costs of publication of this order or an abridged version thereof.
12. The Respondent shall pay the costs of this application on the party- and-
party scale.
13. If trust funds are available, the Respondent shall, within six (6) months of
being requested by the curator to do so (or such longer period as the curator
may agree in writing), satisfy the curator by means of taxed bills of costs
or otherwise as to the fees and disbursements due to him in respect of his
18
former practice. Failure to do so shall disentitle the Respondent to recover
such fees and disbursements from the curator, without prejudice to any
rights he may have against the relevant trust creditors.
14. A certificate issued by a director of the Legal Practitioners' Fidelity Fund
shall constitute prima facie proof of the curator's costs, and the Registrar is
authorised to issue a writ of execution on the strength of such certificate to
collect such costs.
AREDDY
JUDGE OF THE IDGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
I agree.
AH PETERSEN
ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE IDGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
19
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Ms Moolman
Instructed by: Damons Magardie Richardson Attorneys
c/o Maponya Attorneys
Mahikeng
For the Respondent: No appearance