SAFLII Note: Certain personal/privat e details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
CASE NO: M164/2023
In the matter between:
MANKUROANE TSHEPO FREDRICK First Applicant
BAPHUDUHUCWANA TRADITIONAL
COUNCIL Second Applicant
RETHUSE RE DIRE PRIMARY
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE LIMITED Third Applicant
And
BUTI SEKAMOENG First Respondent
KGOLOLO KGAMANYANE Second Respondent
MXOLISI GOTYANA Third Respondent
OLEBILE GAOKUMELWE Fourth Respondent
GAOBUSE AOBAKWE Fifth Respondent
MARUPING ERIC Sixth Respondent
PHOLO TUMELO Seventh Respondent
CHIPETA JAMES Eighth Respondent
THE UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF THE LAND
NEXT TO N18 ROAD STARTING FROM THE
ENTRANCE OF TAUNG EXPERIMENTAL
FARM TO ITIRELENG VILLAGE Ninth Respondent
THE UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF THE LAND
SITUATED IN TAUNG AT THE CORNER OF N8
AND R372 ROAD Tenth Respondent
GREATER TAUNG LOCAL MUNICIPALITY Eleventh Respondent
Coram: Reddy J
Heard: 14 October 2025
Judgment reserved: 14 October 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically, circulated to the
parties' representatives via email, uploaded to CaseLines, and released to
SAFLII. The date and time for the handing down of the judgment are
deemed to be 28 April 2026 at 16h00.
Summary: Core Legal Findings and Locus Standi - Unlawful Occupation -
The court confirmed that the occupation of the Rethuse Re Dire Primary
Agricultural Land was unlawful, and the respondents had no legal right to
occupy it. Locus Standi - The first applicant, Par amount Chief Mankuroane
Tshepo Fredrick, was found to have locus standi as the "person in charge"
and custodian of the land under the PIE Act. Nature of the Occupation -
Confirmatory affidavits from the 6 th, 7 th, and 8 th respondents revealed that
the occupation was not a spontaneous search for shelter but a coordinated,
unauthorised land allocation scheme. The Just and Equitable Inquiry Section
4 of the PIE Act - The court applied the two -stage inquiry required by the
PIE Act. Alternative Accommodation - The Paramount Chief identified four
villages-Takalaneng, Gasebusho, Qhoo, and Vaaltyn -totalling over 200
hectares for relocation. The court ruled this fulfilled the landowner's
obligation to provide alternative land. Personal Circumstances - The court
found that several principal respondents (1 st, 2 nd, and 5 th) already owned
homes in other villages and were not truly homeless or destitute.
Balancing Rights - While the respondents argued that the Municipality had
provided electricity and they had built perma nent structures, the court held
that personal preferences of occupiers are irrelevant to whether an eviction is
just and equitable. The respondents were ordered to vacate the land by a
specific date, failing which the Sheriff was authorised to carry out th e
eviction. Costs - The 1 st, 2 nd, and 5 th respondents were ordered to pay costs
on a punitive attorney -and-own-client scale based on their "contumacious
conduct" in defying previous court orders and persisting in an unlawful
scheme. The 9 th and 10 th respondents were ordered to pay costs on a party -
and-party scale. Exemptions - No order as to costs was made against the 6 th,
7th, and 8 th respondents, who withdrew their opposition and aligned with the
applicants, nor against the Greater Taung Local Municipality.
JUDGMENT
REDDY J
Introduction
[1] This is a continuation of Mankuroane and Others v Buti and Others 1
judgment handed down on 15 July 2025 ("the first judgment"). The key
findings in the first judgment naturally lead to this one. Due to the close
connection between the two judgments, it is important to outline the factual
and legal findings that supported the first judgment.
Findings of the first judgment
[2] The first judgment made the following conclusive findings. First, the
occupation of the Rethuse Re Dire Primary Agricultural Land by the
respondents, under the stewardship of the Paramount Chief, is unlawful. It
follows that the respondents have no legal right to occupy the land. Second,
the applicants have locus standi, as the Paramount Chief is th e person in
charge within the meaning of s1 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 ("the PIE Act"). Third, the
respondents presented no valid defence on the papers before the Court.
1 [2025] ZANWHC 118.
[3] Fourth, the application against the third respondent (Mxolisi Gotyana)
and the fourth respondent (Olebile Gaokumelwe) was dismissed because the
applicants failed to serve the peremptory s4(2) notice of the PIE Act on these
two respondents. That dismissal constitutes a final judgment, and this
judgment does not revive these issues.
[4] Fifth, notwithstanding these findings, a final eviction order could not
be granted because the applicants had not comprehensively addressed the
just and equitable factors required by Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Municipality2 and City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74
(Pty) Ltd. 3 Notably, the personal circumstances of the occupiers and the
availability of alternative land were wholly inadequate. Instead of dismissing
the application, the Court invoked s4(12) of the PIE Act to allow the parties
to present evidence to address the just and equitable factors, as evinced by s
4(7) of the PIE Act. Costs were reserved as costs in the cause.
The orders of the first judgment
[5] The order of the first judgment reads:
“[45] What the applicants lose focus of, is that before an eviction order, it must be
found that it would be just and equitable to do so. On the conspectus of the evidence
the respondents have presented no defence. In the premises this Court must order the
eviction. Given the paucity of facts, it would be prudent to make use of the
mechanism provided by section 4(12) of PIE to craft an appropriate order to give life
to the principle of whether it would be just and equitable to evict the respondents. It
would be easy to dismiss the application predicated on the failure to, by the
applicants, [sic] to comprehensively address the various factors set out in Pheko and
Changing Tides.’
2 2012 (2) SA 598 (CC).
3 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA).
[6] Dovetailing on the dispositional findings made, the following order
was handed down:
‘The application is postponed to 11 September 2025 to the opposed roll for a
further hearing before Reddy J.
The applicants will amend or supplement their papers, if necessary, within 15 days
of this order to address the primary issue raised by t his Court. The respondents
shall file their answering affidavit within 15 days of the receipt of the applicants
amended papers, if any.
The respondents shall file their heads of argument within five days of receiving
the applicants heads of argument.
Costs are to be costs in the cause.’
The purpose of this judgment
[7] It is necessary to underscore the purpose of this second judgment. It is
not a reconsideration of the findings already made in the first judgment.
Those findings stand. The purpose o f this judgment is to apply the s4(7) and
s4(8) inquiry under the PIE Act together with the additional evidence
presented by the parties in compliance with the order of the first judgment.
[8] In sum, in the face of the additional evidence presented, this Court can
now determine whether the eviction is just and equitable and, if so, on what
terms. The onus to cure the evidential deficiency identified in the first
judgment rested on the applicants. They have discharged that onus by way of
supplementary founding and replying affidavits. The respondents were given
the right to answer, and they did so.
Litigation history following the first judgment
[9] On 11 September 2025, the matter was postponed. The first to ninth
respondents filed supplementary answering affidavits on 16 September 2025.
The 6th, 7th and 8th respondents filed separate confirmatory affidavits on the
same date, withdrawing their opposi tion. On the same date, the applicants
filed their replying affidavit. The matter was subsequently postponed to 14
October 2025 for argument. The applicants’ supplementary heads of
argument were filed on 18 September 2025. The matter was argued before
me on 14 October 2025, and judgment was reserved.
The parties
[10] The first applicant is Mankuroane Tshepo Fredrick, the Paramount
Chief (Kgosikgolo) of the Baphuduhucwana Traditional Council, conducting
his statutory duties at 1[…] Chiefs Court Village, Taung. He is the custodian
of the land with the power to rationally allocate it in accordance with the
laws of the Republic. The second applicant is the Baphuduhucwana
Traditional Council, established under the Traditional Leadership and
Governance Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of
20034. The third applicant is Rethuse Re Dire Primary Agricultural
Cooperative Limited.
[11] The first respondent is Buti Sekamoeng. The second respondent is Kgololo Kgamanyane. The first and second respondents are alleged to be the principal organisers of the unlawful land allocation scheme on the N18 Road portion of the dispute. The third respondent is Mxolisi
Gotyana. The fourth respondent is Olebile Gaokumelwe. The fifth
respondent is Gaobuse Aobakw e. The sixth respondent is Maruping Eric.
The seventh respondent is Pholo Tumelo, an adult female. The eighth
respondent is Chipeta James. The ninth respondent comprises the unnamed
4 Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 . The Traditional and Khoisan
Leadership Act 3 of 2019, which was intended to replace the TLGFA, was declared unconstitutional and
invalid in its entirety by the Constitutional Court in Mogale and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly
and Others [2023] ZACC 47; 2024 (2) SA 110 (CC).
unlawful occupiers of the land next to the N18 Road from the entrance of the
Taung Experimental Farm to Itireleng Village. The tenth respondent
comprises the unnamed unlawful occupiers at the corner of N8 and R372
Road. The eleventh respondent is the Greater Taung Local Municipality.
The Applicants’ Case
[12] The applicants' case, as amplified in the supplementary founding and
replying affidavits and the supplementary heads of argument prepared by
Advocate Mpya, pivots on the following submissions.
[13] On locus standi, the applicants contend that the Paramount Chief is the
land's custodian and has the authority to allocate it in accordance with the
laws of the Republic. The Traditional Council owns the land. No permission,
express or implied, was granted to any of the respondents to occupy,
construct structure s, or develop the land for residential purposes. The
respondents' own admission that they are under the leadership and authority
of the Paramount Chief confirms both his authority and the breach of that
authority. The applicants rely on the finding of locus standi in the first
judgment, which remains valid law.
[14] On the just and equitable inquiry, the applicants submit as follows.
First, alternative accommodation is widely available to the respondents. To
this end, the Paramount Chief has identified four villages, Takalaneng,
Gasebusho, Qhoo, and Vaaltyn. These fou r villages cover a combined area
of over 200 hectares, which is more than sufficient to accommodate the
respondents and their families for generations to come. The obligation to
provide alternative land under section 4(7) of the PIE Act has been fulfilled
by the Paramount Chief in his capacity as landowner, in accordance with
Grobler v Phillips and Others5.
[15] Second, Advocate Mpya asserts that the respondents are not homeless
or destitute. Put simply, Advocate Mpya states that the first and second
respondents have homes at Matolong Village, and the fifth respondent
resides at Maphoitsile Village. The respondents can readily afford alternative
accommodation and are not homeless. Third, the respondents do not deny
that their occupation is unlawful. Fourth, they acknowledge proper service of
all legal processes. Fifth, the occupation was conducted in bad faith,
intentionally, in defiance of a final court order and repeated demands to
vacate. Sixth, the personal preferences or wishes of unlawful occupiers a re
irrelevant to the just and equitable inquiry.
[16] Insofar as the sixth, seventh, and eighth respondents, Advocate Mpya
submits that their confirmatory affidavits effectively confirm every material
aspect of the applicants' case and dispel any suggest ion that the occupation
was a bona fide housing exercise. These respondents have officially admitted
involvement in the unlawful allocation scheme and aligned themselves with
the applicants.
[17] In respect of costs, Advocate Mpya proposes that a punitive order be
sought on the attorney and the client scale against the first, second, fifth,
ninth and tenth respondents, including the costs of employing counsel, in
respect of both the first judgment and this judgment. Advocate Mpya claims
that the contumacious conduct of the respondents, in defying court orders,
ignoring demands to vacate, and persisting in a coordinated unlawful
scheme, warrants nothing less.
5 2024 (1) SA 1 (SCA).
[18] Advocate Mpya bolsters the applicant's contentions with the following
authorities: Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, 6 City of
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39
(Pty) Ltd and Another,7 Hattingh and Others v Juta ,8 Coleman and Others v
Unlawful Occupiers and Others ;9 Van Der Valk N.O. and Others v Johnson
and Others ;10 Modder East Squatters and Another v Modderklip Boerdery
(Pty) Ltd11.
The respondents’ case
[19] The opposition to the application was maintained by the first, second,
fifth, and ninth respondents. The case for the opposing respondents, as set
out in their supplementary answering affidavit and heads of argument, rests
on the following submissions.
[20] On the question of meaningful engagement, the respondents su bmit
that the Paramount Chief instituted these proceedings in April 2021 without
informing or consulting the community, in breach of section 4(1) of the
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 200312, which
obliges the Traditional Council to administer the affairs of the traditional
community in accordance with customs and tradition. They aver that it is
peculiar that the Paramount Chief has sought to evict his own subjects from
land he is enjoined to administer in the interests of the tra ditional
community, and that this conduct is inconsistent with the principle of
6 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC).
7 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC).
8 2013 (3) SA 275 (SCA).
9 [2013] 4 All SA 569 (SCA).
10 Van Der Valk N.O. and Others v Johnson and Others (unreported).
11 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA).
12 Op Cit fn 4.
cooperative governance in section 5 of the Traditional Leadership and
Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003.13
[21] In the background of the occupation, the respondents submit t hat the
dispute has deep roots in the Traditional Council's failure to manage a
previous dispute over the same land. The second respondent is a serving
member of the sub -council of the Matolong Village Community. The land
has historically been used for com munal grazing. The dispute originated
when the late Mr MK Pule obtained an allocation of the land and then
purportedly sold it to a Mr TJ Lepholletse (Lepholletse), an outsider from
Schweizer-Reneke.The community was aggrieved by this transaction, which
is the genesis of the present occupation. The respondents submit that the
Paramount Chief became aware of the dispute only when Lepholletse
approached the Magistrates' Court, and that his failure to address the land
crisis at that stage is the root cause of the present situation.
[22] On the just and equitable inquiry, the respondents present the
following arguments. First, that (i) the respondents have inhabited the land
for approximately five years, (ii) they have built permanent structures at
significant personal cost, (iii) they have established a social fabric and a
community, and (iv) over forty (40) independent households are settled on
the land. The respondents contend that an eviction at this stage would not be
in the interests of justice and would be harmful to the right of access to
adequate housing under section 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa.
[23] Second, the Municipality provided electricity services and allocated
census stand numbers to the occupiers, which t he respondents contend
13 Op Cit fn 4.
constitutes administrative recognition of their presence and an investment of
public resources in the land. They allege that an eviction will occasion
fruitless and wasteful expenditure, as the Municipality has already serviced
the land.
[24] Third, the Paramount Chief did not indicate, at the genesis of this
dispute, a willingness to relocate his subjects to other land. The offer of the
four villages is a recent strategic move to obtain an eviction order. It does
not adequately addr ess the adequacy of water and other services at the
proposed relocation sites. The respondents aver that the Paramount Chief has
not engaged them on whether the proposed alternative land is adequate for
all the families that have established themselves on the disputed land.
[25] Fourth, as subjects of the Paramount Chief, the respondents allege that
he owes them a fiduciary duty under customary law to ensure they are not
rendered landless. They describe themselves as the children of the soil, under
the lea dership of Kgosi, yet they are being evicted from land under his
custodianship by that same Kgosi.
[26] Fifth, the respondents assert that the community includes families
with young children and some households headed by females. An eviction
would violat e the rights of these vulnerable categories of persons under
section 4(7) of the PIE Act.
[27] Regarding costs, the respondents do not seek a costs order against the
applicants but oppose the applicants' punitive costs order. They argue that a
punitive c osts order would be overly harsh on individuals who genuinely
believed they had a valid grievance concerning the administration of their
traditional land.
[28] In accentuating their contentions, the respondents place much store in
Port Elizabeth Municipal ity, Pheko, Changing Tides, and Blue Moonlight
Properties. Moreover, the respondents draw specific attention to Blue
Moonlight14 where the apex court stated:
‘It could reasonably be expected that when land is purchased for commercial purposes,
the owner, who is aware of the presence of occupiers over a long time, must consider the
possibility of having to endure the occupation for some time. Of course, a property owner
cannot be expected to provide free housing for the homeless on its property for an
indefinite period. But in certain circumstances an owner may have to be somewhat
patient, and accept that the right to occupation may be temporarily restricted, as Blue
Moonlight's situation in this case has already illustrated. An owner's right to use and
enjoy property at common law can be limited in the process of the justice and equity
enquiry mandated by PIE.’
[29] The respondents also rely on section 26(3) of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa and contend that the eviction of more than forty
(40) households without adequate provision for alternative accommodation
would constitute an arbitrary eviction.
The confirmatory affidavits of the sixth, seventh and eighth respondents
[30] The complexion of the matter changed for the sixth, seven th, and
eighth respondents, who each filed confirmatory affidavits on 16 September
2025, formally withdrawing their opposition and aligning themselves with
the applicants' case. Their affidavits state, in relevant part, that they are not
opposing the Kgosi ; that they knew that what they attempted to do at the
land dispute was not authorised by the Traditional Council; and that all
14 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC).
respondents from the first to the eighth were responsible for the unlawful
allocation of land at the Rethuse Re Dire Primary Agricultural Cooperative.
[31] The affidavits are significant on two scores. First, they include
admissions by three of the eight named respondents that the occupation was
a coordinated, and an unauthorised scheme. These admissions eradicate any
suggestion t hat the respondent's actions were a spontaneous search for
shelter by persons in housing need. Second, they corroborate the applicants'
case and show that the remaining opposition of the first, second, fifth and
ninth respondents is denuded of credibility. A court is entitled to take a
robust, common-sense approach to disputed facts on affidavit and should not
be hamstrung by bald denials contradicted by co-respondents.
Section 4 of the PIE Act
[32] The statutory framework governing this application is s4 of the PIE
Act. It reads:
‘Section 4 Eviction of unlawful occupiers at the instance of owner or
person in charge
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or
the common law, the provisions of this section apply to proceedings by an
owner or person in charge of land for the eviction of an unlawful occupier.
(2) At least 14 days before the hearing of the proceedings
contemplated in subsection (1), the court must cause written and effective
notice of the proce edings to be served on the unlawful occupier and the
municipality having jurisdiction.
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), the procedure for the
serving of notices and filing of papers is as prescribed by the rules of the
court in question.
(4) If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for less
than six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated, a court may
grant an order for eviction if it is just and equitable to do so, after
considering all the relevant circumstan ces, including the rights and needs
of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by
women.
(5) The court must request a report from the relevant municipality on
the availability of suitable land or alternative accommodation within the
jurisdiction of the municipality for relocation of the unlawful occupier, and
the municipality must provide such report within a reasonable time.
(6) If an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for more
than six months at the time when the pro ceedings were initiated, a court
may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just and
equitable to do so, after considering all relevant circumstances, including,
except where the land is sold in a sale of execution pursuant to a mortgage,
whether land has been made available or can reasonably be made available
by a municipality or other organ of state or another land owner for the
relocation of the unlawful occupier, and including the rights and needs of
the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women.
(7) If the court is satisfied that all the requirements of this section have
been complied with and that no valid defence has been raised by the
unlawful occupier, it must grant an order for the eviction of the un lawful
occupier,
(8) If the court grants an order for eviction, it must determine —
(a) a just and equitable date on which the unlawful occupier must
vacate the land under the circumstances; and
(b) the date on which an eviction order may be carried out i f the
unlawful occupier has not vacated the land on the date contemplated in
paragraph (a).
(9) An eviction order may, subject to section 16(2), only be carried out
on any day that is not a Sunday or public holiday, and between 05h00 and
21h00.
(10) If the court is not satisfied that the requirements for a just and
21h00.
(10) If the court is not satisfied that the requirements for a just and
equitable eviction have been met, the court may dismiss the application.
(11) Nothing in this section prevents any person from making an
application to a court for the urgent eviction of an unlawful occupier.
(12) A court may, on application and after giving all parties an
opportunity to be heard, suspend an eviction order on such terms and
conditions as it deems just and equitable.’
Discussion of the Applicable Legal Framework
[33] Section 4 of the PIE Act gives expression to section 26(3) of the
Constitution, which provides that no one may be evicted from their home
without a court order made after considering all relevant circumstances, and
that no legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. S ection 26(1) of the
Constitution guarantees everyone the right of access to adequate housing. It
is trite that the PIE Act reinforces section 26(3) of the Constitution by
providing that a court may not grant an eviction order unless the eviction is
just and equitable.
[34] The phrase "just and equitable" signals that the inquiry is not purely
technical. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers15, Sachs J held
that the emphasis on justice and equity underlines the central philosophical
objective of PIE, where the following was posited:
‘In Grobler v Phillips and Others , the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the “just and
equitable” inquiry requires a court to move away from a purely legalistic approach and
have regard to extraneous factors such as morality and fairness, so as to produce an
equitably principled judgment. Each case must be decided on its own facts, and where
eviction is ordered, it sh ould preferably be implemented with a specific plan of
resettlement in mind.
The approach by Horn AJ has been described both judicially and academically as
sensitive and balanced. Sachs J in Port Elizabeth Municipality makes it plain that the
criteria to b e applied are not purely of the technical kind that flow ordinarily from the
common law. Rather than envisage the foundational values of our society as distinct from
and in tension with each other, PIE treats these values as interactive, complementary and
15 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC).
mutually reinforcing, to be balanced and reconciled by a close analysis of the actual
specifics of each case.
The court is thus called upon to go beyond its normal functions, and to engage in active
judicial management according to equitable principles of an ongoing, stressful and law -
governed social process. This has major implications for the manner in which it must deal
with the issues before it, how it should approach questions of evidence, the procedures it
may adopt, the way in which it exercises its powers and the orders it might make. The
Constitution and PIE require that, in addition to considering the lawfulness of the
occupation, the court must have regard to the interests and circumstances of the occupier
and pay due regard to broader considerati ons of fairness and other constitutional values,
so as to produce a just and equitable result. Thus, PIE expressly requires the court to
infuse elements of grace and compassion into the formal structures of the law’.
[35] In Changing Tides the Supreme C ourt of Appeal articulated the two -
stage inquiry, first, whether it is equitable to grant an eviction order at all,
having regard to all relevant factors including the availability of alternative
land under section 4(7); second, having decided to grant it, what justice and
equity demand in relation to the date and conditions of implementation,
having regard to the impact on the occupiers and whether they may be
rendered homeless. Both stages must be completed before the order is
issued.
[36] In Grobler v Phillips and Others 16 the pronouncement of the court on
the just and equitable inquiry is instructive. Insofar as the just and equitable
enquiry, the court held:
“There are two reasons. The first, and perhaps obvious reason, is that all facts must be
taken into account when deciding what is just and equitable. The second is that
considerations of what is just and equitable may persuade a court not to evict a person
considerations of what is just and equitable may persuade a court not to evict a person
who is found to be in unlawful occupation. As I have said, it was not disputed that the
first respondent and her husband were given the right to occupy the property for the rest
16 2023 (1) SA 321 (CC).
of their lives. It was also not in dispute that some, if not all, of the previous o wners were
aware of this right and were prepared to honour it. The first respondent believed, albeit
incorrectly, that the right protected her from eviction and she continued to occupy the
property in this belie f. She can hardly be expected to have known t hat her right was
precarious inasmuch as it had not been reduced to writing and registered against the title
deeds of the property. The fact is that she lost the absolute protection against eviction
precisely because she was unaware that she needed to tak e further legal steps to ensure
that her rights were enforceable against successors in title. ” The relevance of
Grobler to the present matter lies not in the personal circumstances of the
occupier in that case , which were materially different, involving a bona fide
belief in a right of occupation , but in the general principle that all facts must
be considered in the just and equitable inquiry, applied to the specific facts
of each case. In the present matter, those specific facts deliberate defiance of
two court orders, a coordinated unauthorised allocation scheme, and the
existence of established alternative residences for the principal respondents
weigh decisively against the respondents. Grobler confirms the
methodology; the facts of this case determine the outcome. This approach is
reinforced by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and
Another v Jika 17, where the Court held that the conduct of unlawful
occupiers, including deli berate and wilful disregard of legal process, is a
relevant consideration in the just and equitable inquiry and may weigh
decisively against them. In the present matter, the conduct of the respondents
organising an unauthorised land allocation scheme, defying two court orders,
and ignoring repeated vacation demands places them squarely within the
category of occupiers whose equitable claims are substantially diminished by
their own conduct.
their own conduct.
17 2003 (1) SA 113 SCA.
[37] In Hattingh and Others v Juta 18 the Court held that section 6(2) of the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act (by analogy applicable to the PIE Act a
just and equitable standard) calls for a balance between the rights of the
occupier and those of the owner.
[38] The fundamental principles governing this Court's inquiry are:
(i) The applicant bears the onus of establishing that it is just and equitable
to grant an eviction order. Proof of ownership and unlawful
occupation triggers, but does not determine the inquiry.19
(ii) Evictions leading to homelessness are not generally just and
equitable20.
(iii) The PIE Act does not require automatic dismissal where homelessness
may result. A court ordinarily crafts a conditional order executable
once an alternative accommodation is available.21
(iv) Where eviction may lead to homelessness, the duty to provide
alternative accommodation falls generally on the local authority or
may be discharged by another landowner.22
(v) The conduct of the occupiers, including contempt of court orders,
reduces the equitable weight to be accorded to their interests.
(vi) A private landowner cannot be expected to provide free
accommodation indefinitely.23
18 2013 (3) SA 375 (CC).
19 Changing Tides at para 34.
20 Berea v De Wet 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC) at para 57.
21 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe [2015] 2 All SA 251 (SCA).
22 Moonlight Properties at para 54, Grobler at para 37.
(vii) An occupier asserting potential homelessness must show how they
have tried and failed to find alternative accom modation within their
available resources.
(viii) A court must take a robust, common -sense approach to disputed facts
on affidavit and is not compelled to treat bald denials as genuine
disputes.24
[39] The obligation of meaningful engagement before appro aching court is
a constitutional imperative grounded in the values of dignity, equality and
ubuntu. In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg 25, these
constitutional injunctions were expressed as follows:
"[9] The need for meaningful engagement between the City and the occupiers was not
directly raised by the parties before this Court. It was however in some sense
foreshadowed by their contention that the City was obliged to give the occupiers a
hearing before deciding to evict on the basis that the decision was an administrative one.
The City contended that the occupiers had indeed been given a hearing because they had
had an opportunity to file affidavits in the High Court in opposition to the ejectment
application.
[10] In Grootboom this Court said, on the relationship between reasonable state action
and the need to treat human beings with the appropriate respect and care for their dignity,
to which they have a right as members of humanity-
"All levels of government must ensure that the housing program is reasonably and
appropriately implemented in the light of all the provisions in the Constitution. All
implementation mechanisms and all State action in relation to housing falls to be assessed
against the requirements of s 26 of the Constitution. Every step at every level of
23 Modder East Squatters and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) at 57 C – E.
24 Soffiantini v Mould 1956 (4) SA 150 (E) at 154 E – H.
25 [2008] ZACC 1, 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC).
government must be consistent with the constitutional obligation to take reasonable
measures to provide adequate housing.
But s 26 is not the only provision relevant to a deci sion as to whether State action at any
particular level of government is reasonable and consistent with the Constitution. The
proposition that rights are interrelated and are all equally important is not merely a
theoretical postulate. The concept has imme nse human and practical significance in a
society founded on human dignity, equality and freedom. It is fundamental to an
evaluation of the reasonableness of State action that account be taken of the inherent
dignity of human beings. The Constitution will be worth infinitely less than its paper if
the reasonableness of State action concerned with housing is determined without regard to
the fundamental constitutional value of human dignity. Section 26, read in the context of
the Bill of Rights as a whole, mu st mean that the respondents have a right to reasonable
action by the State in all circumstances and with particular regard to human dignity. In
short, I emphasise that human beings are required to be treated as human beings. This is
the backdrop against which the conduct of the [State] must be seen.
[11] The Court went on to say more specifically about engagement and its importance-
"The respondents began to move onto the New Rust land during September 1998 and the
number of people on this land continued to grow relentlessly. I would have expected
officials of the municipality responsible for housing to engage with these people as soon
as they became aware of the occupation. I would have also thought that some effort
would have been made by the municipalit y to resolve the difficulty on a case -by-case
basis after
an investigation of their circumstances before the matter got out of hand. The
municipality did nothing and the settlement grew by leaps and bounds.
[12] In Port Elizabeth Municipality this Court said-
[12] In Port Elizabeth Municipality this Court said-
" . . . the procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity cannot always be
separated. The managerial role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative
ways. Thus, one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving susta inable
reconciliations of the different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to
engage with each other in a proactive and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable
solutions. Wherever possible, respectful face -to-face engagement or mediation through a
third party should replace arm's-length combat by intransigent opponents.
[13] It became evident during argument that the City had made no effort at all to
engage with the occupiers at any time before proceedings for their eviction we re brought.
Yet the City must have been aware of the possibility, even the probability, that people
would become homeless as a direct result of their eviction at its instance. In these
circumstances, those involved in the management of the municipality oug ht at the very
least to have engaged meaningfully with the occupiers both individually and collectively.
[14] Engagement is a two -way process in which the City and those about to become
homeless would talk to each other meaningfully in order to achieve ce rtain objectives.
There is no closed list of the objectives of engagement. Some of the objectives of
engagement in the context of a city wishing to evict people who might be rendered
homeless consequent upon the eviction would be to determine-
(a) what the consequences of the eviction might be;
(b) whether the city could help in alleviating those dire consequences;
(c) whether it was possible to render the buildings concerned relatively safe and
conducive to health for an interim period;
(d) whether the city had any obligations to the occupiers in the prevailing
circumstances; and
(e) when and how the city could or would fulfil these obligations.'
Discussion of the Just and Equitable Inquiry
[40] Against this backdrop, I propose to unpack our jurisprudence as it
applies to this matter. Before doing so, it is necessary to address two
preliminary matters: the applicable subsection of section 4 of the PIE Act,
and the scope of the Municipality’s role on communal tribal land. The
occupation having commenced on 27 March 2021 and having endured for
well in excess of six months before these proceedings were initiated, section
4(6) of the PIE Act governs this application, not section 4(4). Section 4(6)
requires the Court to consider, among all relevant circumstances, whether
land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by a
municipality, another organ of state, or another landowner for the relocation
of the unlawful occupiers.
[41] As set out below, the Paramount Chief in his capacity as landowner
has identified over 200 hectares of communal land at four villages for
reallocation. The s4(6) alternative land criterion is therefore satisfied by the
landowner directly, without reliance on the Municipality. Section 4(5) of the
PIE Act requires the Court to request a report from the relevant municipality
on the availability of suitable land or alternative accommodation within the
jurisdiction of the municipality. On the facts of this case, t he land in dispute
and the four identified relocation villages are communal tribal land held
under the custodianship of the Baphuduhucwana Traditional Council in
terms of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of
200326. The Greater Taung Local Municipality has no authority to allocate,
demarcate, or administer communal land, as the functions vest exclusively in
the Traditional Council under the Paramount Chief’s leadership.
[42] Accordingly, the Municipality’s reporting obl igation under section
4(5) is limited to matters within its own jurisdiction: the availability of
municipal housing programmes to which displaced persons may apply, and
the provision of basic services , water, sanitation, and electricity at the
relocation villages in its capacity as the services authority for the area. The
26 Op Cit fn 4.
Court is satisfied that, in the context of communal tribal land, the section
4(5) obligation is properly discharged on this basis, read together with the
Paramount Chief’s alternative land offer under section 4(6).
The absence of a valid defence
[43] The first judgment determined that the respondents offered no valid
defence. The respondents' supplementary answering affidavit does not
introduce any new substantive defence. Their three a rguments that the land
was allocated to an outsider (Lepholletse), that the applicants failed to
allocate alternative land, and that the applicants caused delays do not
constitute defences to the unlawfulness of the occupation. The respondents
admit to own ership, acknowledge they are under the authority of the
Paramount Chief, and three of their co -respondents have confirmed that the
occupation was unauthorised. The finding in the first judgment of no valid
defence therefore remains valid and binding. It fo llows that the applicants
have met the jurisdictional requirement outlined in section 4(7) of the PIE
Act.
The nature of the occupation
[44] The occupation began around 27 March 2021 and has continued for
over five years to date. It was initiated and persisted in clear disregard of
orders of court. Written vacation requests for October and November 2022
were ignored. The affidavits of the sixth, seventh, and eighth respondents
confirm a coordinated, unauthorised allocation scheme. The tim e spent in
contempt of court cannot improve the respondents' equitable position. Doing
so would conflict with and undermine the rule of law.
Rights and needs of vulnerable persons as evinced in section 4 (7) of the PIE
ACT
[45] The import of s4(7) of the PIE Act requires the Court to specifically
consider the rights and needs of older people, children, disabled persons, and
households headed by women. To the best of the Paramount Chief's
knowledge, the respondents are not elderly, there are no childre n or disabled
persons among them, and all are in good physical health. The seventh
respondent, Pholo Tumelo, is an adult female, as explicitly stated in the
founding affidavit. The respondents' supplementary papers claim that the
community includes familie s with young children, and some female headed
households, but no individual affidavits or details are provided.
[46] Unlike the confirmatory affidavits of the sixth, seventh and eighth
respondents, which contained specific, first -hand admissions capable of
independent verification, the claims regarding vulnerable persons are vague,
unverified, and unsupported by any identifying particulars. A court cannot
act on generalised assertions in PIE proceedings where the personal
circumstances of occupiers are a jurisdictional consideration under section
4(7). In the absence of any identified vulnerable persons and given the
availability of over 200 hectares of alternative land, along with the
structured, phased approach delineated below, the Court is satisfied th at any
vulnerable persons will be accommodated.
The homeless conundrum
[47] The key issue is whether executing the eviction order will leave the
occupiers homeless. The evidence clearly pertains to the named respondents.
The first respondent has a permanent residence at House No. 1[...], Matolong
Village. The second respondent resides at House No. 1[...]2, Matolong. The
fifth respondent lives at House No. 8[...], Maphoi tsile Village. Therefore,
these respondents will not become homeless. Importantly, they have not
demonstrated how they have attempted and failed to find alternative
accommodation within their means. Additionally, the occupiers' personal
preferences for the disputed land over other available land are irrelevant.
Availability of alternative land
[48] Section 4(7) of the PIE Act mandates that the Court consider whether
land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by a
Municipality, another organ of state, or another landowner. The Paramount
Chief is himself a "landowner" within the meaning of section 4(7) of the PIE
Act. To this end, the Paramount Chief has identified four villages for
reallocation; Takalaneng, Gasebusho, Qhoo and Vaa ltyn, with a combined
area exceeding 200 hectares. Moreover, the Paramount Chief has offered a
staggered relocation process, temporary accommodation with next of kin
during rebuilding, and has confirmed that non -cement materials can be
salvaged and reused. The s 4(7) jurisdictional criteria have been met.
[49] The respondents contend that the Paramount Chief’s offer is strategic.
Simply put, it does not specify which government department will assist, and
the adequacy of water and services at the relocati on sites has not been
addressed. Undoubtedly, these are legitimate concerns. That being so, these
concerns are subsumed within the body of the order, which directs the
Paramount Chief to demarcate specific plots within thirty (30) days and
directs the Muni cipality to report on any household that may require
emergency relocation assistance. These safety nets ensure the purport of s
4(7) of the PIE Act is properly observed. What needs to be underscored is
that even a property owner with no constitutional obli gation to provide
housing cannot be expected to bear this burden indefinitely.
Meaningful engagement
[50] The respondents’ contention that the Paramount Chief failed to engage
meaningfully before litigating raises a well -founded and grounded concern,
as enunciated in Olivia Road. The Court accepts this. Notwithstanding, this
context is crucial. The occupation commenced and continued in defiance of
two court orders. Written vacation requests for October and November 2022
were disregarded. The respondents' own concession that they are under the
Paramount Chief’s authority and leadership further undermines the
suggestion that engagement was refused on their side. The failure to engage
more formally before litigation does not, in these circumstances, weigh
materially against the relief sought.
[51] While this Court accepts that more formal engagement was warranted
at the outset, the respondents’ sustained defiance of court orders and their
own acknowledgment of the Paramount Chief’s authority render any further
engagement obligation academic at this stage. The alternative land offer and
the demarcation obligation, below, provide the substantive protection that
meaningful engagement would otherwise have secured.
[52] The respondents’ fourth submission that the Paramount Chief owes
them a fiduciary duty under customary law to ensure they are not rendered
landless does not constitute a defence to this application and does not alter
the just and equitable outcome. Even accepting that a Traditional Leader
bears obligations of stewardship toward his community under customary law
and the Traditional Leadership and Governan ce Framework Act 41 of
200327, that duty cannot be invoked to immunise an unlawful occupation
from eviction.
[53] The PIE Act is the applicable statutory framework, and it makes no
provision for customary fiduciary obligations to override the just and
equitable inquiry. Moreover, the argument is self -defeating on the facts. The
Paramount Chief has identified over 200 hectares of land at four villages for
reallocation, demonstrating that the respondents will not be rendered
landless. The fiduciary duty, if it exists, is being discharged through the
alternative land offer, not abrogated by the eviction. This submission is
accordingly rejected.
The applicants ' competing communal rights
[54] The applicants' property rights are not private commercial rights. The
land is held for the benefit of one hundred and thirty -seven (137) registered
cooperative members and the broader Baphuduhucwana community. The
written authorisation of 23 January 2021 confirms the Cooperative's lawful
right of use, predating the invasion by two months. Rotational crops with an
eight-year lifespan have been disrupted. The balancing dam project has been
blocked. A traditional authority administering communal land, like a private
landowner, cannot be expected to indefinitely accommodate unlawful
residential occupation. It follows axiomatically that the communal
agricultural interest weighs substantially in favour of the eviction.
27 Op Cit fn 4.
The issue of municipal electricity and administrative recognition
[55] The respondents' proposition that the Municipality's provision of
electricity and census stand numbers constitutes recognition of their right to
occupy is ill-conceived. A municipality's constitutional obligation to provide
basic services applies irrespective of the lawfulness of occupation. It cannot
waive a landowner's proprietary rights or transform an unlawful occupation
into a lawful one. A census stand number records the existence of a
structure; it does not confer tenure. No legitimate expectation of tenure arises
on these facts. Given this reasoning, this proposition falls to be rejected.
A Structured, Phased Eviction Section 4(8)
[56] The Court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to grant the eviction
order. The second enquiry under Changing Tides concerns what justice and
equity demand regarding the date and conditions of implementation.
[57] Given the history of the matter, a single uniform vacation date for all
respondents would be unjust. The respondents are not a homogeneous group.
The first and second respondents are the protagonists of the unlawful land
allocation scheme, who organized and directed it and have established
homes elsewhere. Similarly, the fifth respondent has an establish ed
alternative home. The sixth, seventh, and eighth respondents have fully
cooperated with the Court. The ninth and tenth respondents represent
approximately forty (40) or more independent households who, although
unlawful occupiers, have erected permanent structures, established social ties
and invested resources over four years. They are in a materially different
position from the identified protagonists and deserve special consideration in
the implementation phase.
[58] Section 4(8) of the PIE Act empowers this Court to determine a just
and equitable date having regard to all circumstances, including the period of
residence. Section 4(12) of the PIE Act allows this Court to attach
conditions. The Paramount Chief himself has proposed a six (6) month
staggered process with bi-monthly progress reports, recognizing the practical
realities of large -scale displacement. The Court accepts this approach in
principle and implements it through a phased order crafted to the different
circumstances of each catego ry of respondent, having regard to; (i) the
individual respondents' culpability; (ii) the availability of established
alternative residences; (iii) cooperation with the Court; (iv) the logistical
requirements of relocating over forty (40) households.
Phase 1: The Protagonists, the first and second respondents (vacate by 28
June 2026)
[59] The first respondent (Buti Sekamoeng) and the second respondent
(Kgololo Kgamanyane) are ordered to vacate by 28 June 2026, being two
months from the date of this judgment. They have established homes at
Matolong Village. This period is more than adequate. Should they fail to
vacate, the Sheriff is authorised to evict them from 28 July 2026.
Phase 2: Named respondents with alternative residences and cooperating
respondents (vacate by 28 August 2026)
[60] The fifth respondent, Gaobuse Aobakwe, with an alternative
residence at Maphoitsile Village, is ordered to vacate by 28 August 2026,
being four months from the date of this judgment. The sixth respond ent
(Maruping Eric), the seventh respondent (Pholo Tumelo), and the eighth
respondent (Chipeta James) are also ordered to vacate by 28 August 2026.
This period falls within the bi-monthly staggered framework proposed by the
Paramount Chief and accepted by this Court. The Paramount Chief is
directed to prioritise the allocation of land at Takalaneng, Gasebusho, Qhoo
or Vaaltyn to the sixth seventh and eighth respondents and their families, in
recognition of their cooperation with this Court. Should any Phase 2
respondent fail to vacate by 28 August 2026, the Sheriff is authorised to
evict them from 28 September 2026.
Phase 3 Unnamed occupiers: 9th and 10th Respondents (vacate by 28
October 2026)
[61] The ninth respondent, the unnamed unlawful occupiers of the land
next to the N18 Road, and the tenth respondent, the unnamed unlawful
occupiers at the corner of N8 and R372 Road, are ordered to vacate by 28
October 2026, being six months from the date of this judgment. This period
reflects the substantial numbe r of households involved in excess of forty
(40); the time required to dismantle structures and salvage building
materials; the need for the Municipality to complete its reporting obligation
and for the Paramount Chief to formally demarcate specific plots at the four
villages. The Court accepts the Paramount Chief’s proposal of six months
with bi-monthly progress reports as just and equitable. Progress reports are
to be filed with the Registrar of this Court on 28 June 2026, 28 August 2026
and 28 October 20 26. Should any unnamed occupier fail to vacate by 28
October 2026, the Sheriff is authorised to evict them from 28 November
2026, subject to the protective provisions in the order below.
Costs
[62] The applicants seek a punitive costs order on the attorney and own
client scale against the first, second, fifth, ninth and tenth respondents in
respect of both judgments, including the costs of employing counsel. The
Court's discretion in PIE applications must be exercised with care. A
punitive costs order against genuinely destitute occupiers may be oppressive.
[63] Nevertheless, the Court is satisfied that a punitive order is warranted
against the first, second and fifth respondents. The following cumulative
reasons underpin this cost order. First, th e occupation was carried out in
deliberate defiance of orders of court; second, written demands for vacation
in October and November 2022 were ignored; third, the confirmatory
affidavits of the sixth, seventh and eighth confirm this was a coordinated
unlawful scheme, not a desperate last resort; and fourth, the first, second and
fifth respondents have established alternative residences and are not
destitute.
[64] As regards the fifth respondent specifically, Gaobuse Aobakwe
maintained active opposition to the application throughout these
proceedings, notwithstanding having an established residence at Maphoitsile
Village, making no attempt to demonstrate genuine housing need, and
persisting in opposition to an eviction sought from land to which no lawful
right existed . This conduct, though not that of a principal organiser, was
nonetheless contumacious in the sense that it prolonged litigation over
compliance with an eminently reasonable eviction. A punitive costs order
against is accordingly warranted.
[65] In respect of the ninth and tenth respondents, costs on a party -and-
party scale are appropriate, as their individual means are unknown and some
may be genuinely vulnerable. Notwithstanding the vulnerability of some
among the ninth and tenth respondents, a costs order on a party -and-party
scale is nonetheless warranted. The occupation was unlawful, persisted for
over five years, and these respondents maintained opposition throughout the
litigation. A party-and-party order, being considerably less onerous t han the
punitive scale imposed on the protagonists, strikes the appropriate balance
between holding the respondents accountable for prolonged unlawful
opposition and recognizing that their individual means are unknown and that
some households may be genuin ely vulnerable. The protective provisions in
the order below provide a further safeguard for those who may be rendered
homeless.
[66] The costs reserved in the first judgment as costs in the cause are now
determined. Those costs follow the result on the s ame scale as the costs of
this judgment. No order as to costs is made against the third respondent
(Mxolisi Gotyana) and the fourth respondent (Olebile Gaokumelwe), against
whom the application was dismissed in the first judgment and who took no
further pa rt in these proceedings. No costs are awarded against the sixth,
seventh and eighth in respect of either judgment, in recognition of their
cooperation. No costs are awarded against the eleventh respondent.
Order
[67] As a result, the following order is made:
1. The dismissal of the application against the 3 rd respondent (Mxolisi
Gotyana) and the 4 th respondent (Olebile Gaokumelwe), effected in
the first judgment ([2025] ZANWHC 118), is confirmed. No eviction
order is granted against those respondents. No order as to costs is
made against the 3rd and 4th respondents.
2. The 11 th respondent (Greater Taung Local Municipality) is directed,
within 30 days of the date of this order, to file a report with the
Registrar of this Court addressing the following: (a ) what municipal
housing programmes or emergency housing facilities exist within its
jurisdiction to which households evicted from the disputed land may
apply; (b) whether the Municipality, in its capacity as the services
authority for the area, is able to provide or facilitate the provision of
water, sanitation, and electricity services at the relocation villages of
Takalaneng, Gasebusho, Qhoo and Vaaltyn identified by the
Paramount Chief under paragraph 3 of this order, and if so, on what
timeline; and (c) what steps, if any, the Municipality proposes to take
within its lawful jurisdiction to assist displaced households to access
available municipal housing programmes. For the avoidance of doubt,
this order does not require or empower the Municipality to a llocate,
demarcate, or administer communal land held under the custodianship
of the Baphuduhucwana Traditional Council, which function vests
exclusively in the 1st applicant (the Paramount Chief) under paragraph
3 of this order.
3. The 1st applicant (the Paramount Chief) is directed, within 30 days of
this order, to: (a) identify and formally demarcate specific portions of
land in Takalaneng, Gasebusho, Qhoo and Vaaltyn available for
reallocation to the respondents and their families ; (b) prioritise the
allocation of specific plots to the 6 th, 7 th and 8 th respondents; and (c)
provide written confirmation of such demarcation to the respondents'
attorneys of record and to the Registrar of this Court.
4. Phase 1 - The 1st respondent (Buti Sekamoeng) and the 2 nd respondent
(Kgololo Kgamanyane) are ordered to vacate the immovable property
described as the Rethuse Re Dire Primary Agricultural Land,
Mahikeng, held under the custodianship of the Baphuduhucwana
Traditional Council, on or befor e 28 June 2026. Should either
respondent fail to vacate by that date, the Sheriff of this Court is
authorised and directed to evict that respondent with effect from 28
July 2026.
5. Phase 2 - The 5 th respondent (Gaobuse Aobakwe), 6 th respondent
(Maruping Eric), 7 th respondent (Pholo Tumelo), and 8 th respondent
(Chipeta James) are ordered to vacate the same property on or before
28 August 2026. Should any of them fail to vacate by that date, the
Sheriff is authorised and directed to evict the non -compliant
respondent with effect from 28 September 2026.
6. Phase 3 -The 9 th respondent (the unnamed unlawful occupiers of the
land next to the N18 Road from the entrance of the Taung
Experimental Farm to Itireleng Village) and the 10 th respondent (the
unnamed unlawful occupiers at the corner of N8 and R372 Road) are
ordered to vacate the same property on or before 28 October 2026.
Progress reports are to be filed with the Registrar of this Court by the
Paramount Chief on 28 June 2026, 28 August 2026 and 2 8 October
2026, detailing the steps taken to prepare and demarcate alternative
land at the four villages and the number of households that have
vacated during each period. Should any unnamed occupier fail to
vacate by 28 October 2026, the Sheriff is author ised and directed to
evict that person with effect from 28 November 2026, subject to
paragraph 7 below.
7. Where the 1st applicant (the Paramount Chief) has not, within 30 days
of this order, filed written confirmation of demarcation in terms of
paragraph 3(c) above in respect of the specific relocation plots to be
allocated to the 9 th and 10 th respondents, the applicants shall not
proceed with enforcement of the Phase 3 eviction order against any
household of the 9 th or 10 th respondents pending further di rections
from this Court on notice to all parties and the Municipality.
Furthermore, where the Municipality’s report filed in terms of
paragraph 2 above discloses that basic services, water and sanitation
cannot be provided at the relocation villages withi n a reasonable time,
the applicants shall not proceed with enforcement of the Phase 3
eviction order pending further directions from this Court. In either
event, any party may approach this Court on the same papers, duly
supplemented, for such further relief as may be just and equitable.
8. All eviction orders are to be executed on days that are not a Sunday or
public holiday, between 05h00 and 21h00, in accordance with section
4(9) of the PIE Act. The Sheriff is authorised to obtain the assistance
of members of the South African Police Service if required to execute
any eviction order made in terms of this judgment.
9. The 1 st respondent (Buti Sekamoeng), the 2nd respondent (Kgololo
Kgamanyane) and the 5 th respondent (Gaobuse Aobakwe) are ordered
to pay t he costs of both the first judgment and this judgment on the
attorney and own client scale, including the costs of employing
counsel, jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be
absolved.
10. The 9 th and 10 th respondents are ordered to pay the costs of both the
first judgment and this judgment on a party -and-party scale, jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
11. No order as to costs is made against the 6 th respondent (Maruping
Eric), 7 th respondent (Pholo Tumelo) and 8 th respondent (Chipeta
James) in respect of either the first judgment or this judgment.
12. No order as to costs is made against the 11 th respondent (Greater
Taung Local Municipality).
____________________________
A REDDY
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Date of first hearing: 25 September 2024
Date of first judgment: 15 July 2025
Date of final hearing: 14 October 2025
Date of this judgment: 28 April 2026
Appearances:
For the Applicants: Advocate M Mpya
Attorney for Applicants: Mabapa Attorneys Inc
c/o Sifumba Attorneys,
Mahikeng
For the First Respondent: No appearance
For Second, Fifth and Ninth Respondents: Advocate De Bruin
Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents: Confirmatory affidavits filed (No
active opposition)
Third and Fourth Respondents: No appearance, application dismissed in first
judgment
Tenth Respondent: No appearance
Eleventh Respondent: No appearance