South African Legal Practice Council v Pretorius (1593/2025) [2026] ZANWHC 123 (21 April 2026)

55 Reportability
Legal Practice

Brief Summary

Legal Practice — Professional Discipline — Cessation of Practice — Application for suspension of attorney for failing to lodge audit reports, practice without Fidelity Fund Certificates, and non-payment of membership fees — Respondent disclosed cessation of practice in 2021 but failed to notify the LPC as required — Application withdrawn on terms including payment of outstanding fees and costs order — Importance of compliance with statutory obligations upon cessation of practice emphasized.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy


IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Not reportable
Case No: 1593/2025

In the matter between:

THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL Applicant

and

FREDERIK CHRISTOFFEL HENDRIK PRETORIUS Respondent

CORAM: PETERSEN ADJP et MNYOVU AJ
HEARD: 17 April 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically, circulated to
the parties’ representatives via email, uploaded to CaseLines, and released to
SAFLII. The date and time for the handing down of the judgment are deemed to
be 10h00 on 21 April 2026.

Summary: Legal Practice — Professional Discipline — Cessation of Practice
— Section 30(3) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 — Unopposed
application by the South African Legal Practice Council for suspension of an
attorney who failed to lodge audit reports for three consecutive financial years,
practised without Fidelity Fund Certificates, and failed to pay annual
membership fees — Respondent disclosed in opposing affidavit that he had
ceased to practise in 2021 but had failed to formally notify the LPC of cessation
as required by s 30(3) of the LPA and Rule 40.2 of the LPC Rules —
Consequences of non -notification: continued accrual of fee liability, ongoing

audit obligations, and exposure to discipl inary proceedings — Application
withdrawn on agreed terms including payment of outstanding membership fees
of R13 285.00 and a costs order on scale B. ________________
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
PETERSEN ADJP (MNYOVU AJ concurring):
Introduction
[1] This is an application brought by the South African Legal Practice
Council (“the LPC”) for the suspension of the Respondent, Mr Frederik
Christoffel Hendrik Pretorius, an attorney of this Court, from practice as a legal
practitioner, alternatively for the removal of his name from the roll of legal
practitioners. The application came before us on 17 April 2026 and was
ultimately resolved. This judgment records our reasons and places emphasis on
a matter that animated the proceedings, the Respondent’s failure to comply with
his statutory obligations upon ceasing to practice.
[2] The matter does not end in a disciplinary order of suspension or removal.
It ends, instead, with a withdrawal by the LPC of its application, conditional
upon payment of outstanding membership fees and an order for costs. But the
path by which it arrived at this resolution is itself instructive, and the legal
principles engaged are of broader application to legal practitioners in similar
circumstances.
Background
[3] The Respondent was admitted and enrolled as an attorney in the Gauteng
Division of the High Court on 12 February 1991, a period of practice spanning

over three decades. He practiced as a director under the name and style of Van
Velden-Duffey Attorneys, with offices at 6 […] B[...] Street, Rustenburg. His
name remains on the roll of legal practitioners of this Court.
[4] The founding affidavit, deposed to by Mr. Gabriel Itumeleng Pule, the
Chairperson of the LPC’s North -West Provincial Council, detailed a pattern of
non-compliance. The uncontroverted allegations in the founding papers were as
follows:
(a) The Respondent failed to cause his auditor to lodge unqualified audit
reports for the financial periods ending February 2022, February 2023,
and February 2024, as required by Rules 54.23, 54.24, and 54.29 of the
LPC Rules.1
(b) As a consequence of the outstanding audit reports, the Respondent
was not issue d with Fidelity Fund Certificates (“FFCs”) for the years
commencing January 2023, January 2024, and January 2025. He thereby
practiced, or was in a position to practice , in contravention of sections
84(1) and 84(2) of the LPA.2
(c) The Respondent failed to pay his annual membership fees to the LPC,
with arrears accumulating to R13 285.00.3
(d) The Respondent failed to respond timeously to correspondence from
the LPC and failed to comply with its directions, in contravention of
clauses 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3 of the Code of Conduct.4
[5] The Respondent also failed to attend two Disciplinary Committee
meetings convened to address these complaints. The application was served on
him personally on 12 August 2025.

1Rules 54.23, 54.24, and 54.29 of the LPC Rules (GN R1 of 2018, as amended).
2Section 84(1) and 84(2) of the LPA.
3Rules 4.1 and 6 of the LPC Rules read together with clause 3.16 of the Code of Conduct for all Legal
Practitioners.
4Clauses 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3 of the Code of Conduct for all Legal Practitioners.

Procedural History
[6] On 15 May 2025, the Respondent filed a notice of intention to oppose the
application. On 27 May 2025, he filed a notice in terms of Rule 35(14) seeking
documentary production. The LPC responded by email on 5 June 2025 and,
following the Respondent’s insistence, filed a formal reply to the Rule 35(14)
notice on 19 November 2025.
[7] The matter was set down for hearing on 17 April 2026. Notwithstanding
the notice of intention to oppose, the Respondent had, at the stage of the LPC’s
practice note filed on 31 March 2026, still not filed an answering affidavit. An
opposing affidavit was ultimately filed on 13 April 2026, effectively on the eve
of the hearing.
[8] The Respondent was represented by Van Velden -Duffey Incorporated,
Rustenburg (c/o Van Rooyen Tlhapi Wessels, Mahikeng). Ms Mari Moolman of
Damons Magardie Richardson Attorneys appeared for the LPC.
The applicable principles
[9] It is necessary to set out the legal framework applicable to an attorney
who ceases to practice. This is not merely of academic interest . It is of direct
relevance to why the Respondent found himself as a respondent in these
proceedings at all.
[10] Section 30(3) of the LPA5 provides that a legal practitioner who ceases to
practice must, within three months of so ceasing, give written notice to the LPC
indicating the date on which he or she ceased to practice . This obligation is
peremptory. It is not directory or aspirational. It places a firm and unambiguous
duty on the departing practitioner to communicate with the LPC promptly and
formally.

5Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014, s 30(3).

[11] The LPC Rules complement this statutory obligation. Rule 40.2 requires a
practitioner who ceases to practice to give written notice to the LPC, to return
the Fidelity Fund Certificate for the current year, and to ensure that a final audit
report in respect of the la st financial period is lodged. 6 These obligations are
structured to achieve a clean and orderly conclusion of the attorney’s regulatory
relationship with the LPC , ensuring that trust creditors are protected, that trust
accounts are properly wound up, and that the LPC’s roll accurately reflects who
is and who is not a practicing attorney.
[12] The rationale for these obligations is self -evident. The LPC cannot
regulate the profession if it does not know who is, and who is not, actively
practicing. A practit ioner who walks away from practice without notification
creates exactly the kind of regulatory blind spot that these provisions are
designed to prevent.
Discussion
The cessation disclosure and its significance
[13] The central and decisive development in this matter was the Respondent’s
revelation, in his opposing affidavit, that he had ceased to practice as a legal
practitioner during 2021. He furnished the LPC with proof of this. The LPC
accepted the proof. This fundamentally altered the character of the proceedings .
It meant that the conduct giving rise to the application was not the conduct of a
practicing attorney who was actively defying his regulatory obligations, but
rather the conduct of an attorney who had s topped practicing years earlier but
had failed to notify the LPC of that fact and to take the steps required of him by
the LPA upon cessation.

6Section 30(3) of the LPA; see also Rule 40.2 of the LPC Rules (GN R1 of 2018, as amended), which requires a
practitioner who ceases to practise to give written notice to the LPC, to return the Fidelity Fund Certificate for
the current year, and to ensure that a final audit report in respect of the last financial period is lodged.

[14] The LPC, acting responsibly as the custodian of the profession, took the
pragmatic and appropriate course of withdrawing the application, conditional
upon payment of the outstanding membership fees and a costs order in its favor.
The matter was resolved on those terms.
The consequences of regulatory silence
[15] The Respondent ceased to practice in 2021. That may have been a
personal or commercial decision that was entirely his to make. What was not his
to make unilaterally, however, was the decision not to notify the LPC of that
cessation. By remaining silent, the Respondent remained, for all regulatory
purposes, a practicing attorney.
[16] The consequences of that silence were both predictable and avoidable.
First, because the Respondent remained on the ro ll as a practicing attorney, the
LPC’s administrative systems continued to treat him as such. Annual
membership fees accrued. Audit reports remained due. When neither were
forthcoming, the LPC was obliged, in the discharge of its statutory mandate as
custos morum of the legal profession, to take steps. Those steps eventually
resulted in these proceedings.
[17] Second, the absence of audit reports for three consecutive financial years ,
2022, 2023, and 2024, was not, on the Respondent’s own version, attributable to
any defalcation or improper handling of trust monies. It was attributable to the
fact that he had a practice that was no longer operating, from which he was no
longer generating audit reports, because he had stopped. But the LPC did not
know this. From the LPC’s perspective, the non -submission of audit reports by
a practicing attorney is a matter of serious concern, as it means the integrity of
the trust account cannot be verified. The Respondent’s silence and his failure to
comply with his cessation obligations thus converted what should have been a
simple administrative matter of deregistration into a set of apparently serious
regulatory infractions warranting disciplinary proceedings.

[18] Third, the failure to notify cessation meant that the oblig ation to hold an
FFC, and the concomitant requirement to lodge audit reports in order to qualify
for one, continued, at least in the LPC’s records, to apply to the Respondent. 7
The LPC was entitled to commence and maintain proceedings based on the facts
as it understood them, which were that the Respondent was a practicing attorney
in material breach of his statutory obligations. It is only the Respondent’s
disclosure in his opposing affidavit that revealed the underlying reality, and
even then, only after the application had been served, opposed, and set down.
[19] Fourth, and most critically from the perspective of the outstanding
membership fees, the Respondent’s failure to formally notify cessation meant
that his fee liability to the LPC continued to accrue. Membership fees are levied
on all enrolled legal practitioners, whether or not they are actively in practice,
unless and until the LPC is formally notified of cessation and the practitioner’s
removal from the roll is effected. The outstanding members hip fees of
R13 285.00 are the direct product of the Respondent’s failure to regularise his
position. That amount remained due and owing , regardless of when he ceased
practicing. The LPC was entitled to insist on payment as a condition for
withdrawing the application.
Resolution of the application
[20] It is important to observe that the LPC’s position throughout these
proceedings was entirely consistent with its statutory mandate. It did not
proceed with the application in bad faith or without basis. When the Respondent
provided proof of cessation and the LPC accepted it, the LPC acted responsibly
in withdrawing the application. However, the circumstances that required the
LPC to bring the application in the first place are squarely attributable to the
Respondent’s own regulatory delinquency , not in the conventional sense of
misappropriation or dishonesty, but in the more pedestrian but no less important

misappropriation or dishonesty, but in the more pedestrian but no less important

7Section 84(1) read with section 93(8) of the LPA.

sense of failing to comply with the formal obligations that govern the
conclusion of a legal practice.
[21] The message that flows from this matter is a simple but important one for
the profession. An attorney who ceases to practice does not simply cease to
have regulatory obligations. The obligations follow the practitioner until they
are properly discharged . The failure to notify the LPC of cessation is not a
minor administrative omission . It is a breach of a statutory duty that has real
consequences, both for the practitioner and for the regulatory system.
Practitioners in this position are well advised to act promptly and in compliance
with section 30(3) of the LPA and the applicable LPC Rules.
Costs
[22] The LPC seeks its costs on scale B, including the costs of the hearing.
The Respondent does not resist this. The cost order is appropriate. The LPC was
compelled to bring and prosecute this application by reason of the Respondent’s
own failure to comply with his regulatory obligations. The costs are a
consequence of that failure and should lie where they were caused.
[23] It is trite that in proceedings of this nature , there is no lis in the
conventional adversarial sense. The LPC acts in its capacity as the profession’s
statutory regulator , placing facts before the Court for the exercise of its
disciplinary jurisdiction. 8 A costs order does not detract from that
characterisation. Where, as here, the application was necessitated by the
Respondent’s own conduct and the LPC was required to incur substantial legal
costs in the vindication of its statutory mandate, a costs orde r on scale B is fair
and justified.


8Prokureursorde van Transvaal v Kleynhans 1995 (1) SA 839 (T); The Law Society of the Northern Provinces v
Mogami and Others 2010 (1) SA 186 (SCA); see also Matsi and Another v South African Legal Practice
Council (Gauteng Province) (184/2024) [2026] ZASCA 12 (6 February 2026).

Order
[24] In the result, the following order, incorporating the draft order, is made an
order of the Court:
1. THAT the application against the Respondent is hereby withdrawn,
subject to the following:
1.1 THAT the Res pondent effects payment of all his outstanding
membership fees due to the Applicant, in the amount of R13 285.00, on
or before 31 May 2026;
1.2 THAT the Respondent pays the Applicant’s costs on scale B,
including the costs of today.


_________________________________
A H PETERSEN
ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG


I agree.

_________________________________
B F MNYOVU
ACTING JUDGE
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG

APPEARANCES
For the Applicant: Ms M Moolman
Instructed by: Damons Magardie Richardson Attorneys,
Pretoria

For the Respondent: Adv C Wessels
Instructed by: Van Velden-Duffey Incorporated,
Rustenburg
c/o Van Rooyen Tlhapi Wessels,
Mahikeng