IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MBOMBELA MAIN SEAT
JUDGMENT
Case Number: 2436/24
(I) REPORTABLE: ~O
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: ~O
(3) REVISED ~O
DATE SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
MATHEBULA VUSI ALFRED PLAINTIFF
And
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
KEKANAAJ
INTRODUCTION
[I] This is the adjudication of the special plea raised by the defendant that the
plaintiff issued the summons pre-maturely and secondly that the claim in
respect of the loss of earnings and future medical expenses has prescribed.
BACKGROUND
[2] The plaintiff was involved in an accident which occurred on the 16th
September 2021. He lodged a claim against the RAF on the 18th July 2023 for
compensation arising from injuries sustained in the accident. He claimed
general damages. On the 281h May 2024 the plaintiffs attorneys issued
summons claiming general damages, future medical expenses and loss of
earnmgs.
FIRST SPECIAL PLEA - PRE-MATURE SUMMONS
[3] The first special plea raised by the defendant is that the summons was
issued pre-maturely.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
[4] Section 24(1) of the Act reqnires a fully completed claim form including
medical reports to be lodged before legal action can be taken. Further that
precise details in respect of each item under the heading compensation
claimed be given and be supported by vouchers where applicable.
[5] Section 24(6) of the Act provides as follows: "No claim shall be
enforceable by legal proceedings commenced by summons served on the
Road accident fund or an agent -
(a) before the expiry of a period of 120 days from the date on which the claim
was sent or delivered by hand to the fund or the agents as contemplated in
subsection 1; and
(b) before all requirements contemplated in section 19f have been complied
with:
Provided that if the fund or the agent repudiates in writing liability for the
claim before the expiry of the said period, the third party may at any time after
such repudiation serve summons on the fund or the agent, as the case may be".
SUBMISSIONS
[6] The defendant's submission is that the summons was issued prematurely
because the plaintiff issued summons before the lapse of the prerequisite 120
days in respect of the loss of earnings and future medical expenses claim. The
defendant contends that the plaintiff issued summons without complying with
the provisions of section 24(6) of the Road Accident Fnnd Act 56 of 1996 (the
Act) and therefore the plaintiffs claim is premature and/ or legally defective
and thus ought to be dismissed. The defendant argued that because the
plaintiff only complied with the requirements for the lodgment of the loss
earnings and medical expenses on the 11th September 2025, the summons
issued on the 28th May 2024 were premature in respect of the loss of earnings
and medical expenses. The defendant further contends that the 120-day period
is mandatory and the plaintiff failed to comply.
[7] The plaintiff submission is that a new RAF I form was not required
because the addition of new heads of damages did not introduce a new cause
of action.
ANALYSIS
[8] The defendant does not take issue with the initial claim form submitted by
the plaintiff in which the plaintiff claimed only general damages, impliedly
the form was compliant. In my view the defendant's contention that the
plaintiff ought to have submitted a new claim form in respect of the loss of
support and future medical expenses claim prior to issuing summons produces
untenable consequences. The effect of this contention is that plaintiffs must
restart the claims process every time they expand or refine their damages, even
when the original claim was already valid.
[9] On this approach, a plaintiff who only becomes aware of a further injury
after the expiry of the prescription period, or shortly before such expiry, would
be precluded from incorporating that claim into the summons until the
prescribed 120-day period has elapsed after submitting a new RAF I. Should
the plaintiff proceed to issue summons prior to the expiry of that period, the
RAF would be entitled to raise a special plea on the basis that the summons
was issued prematurely. Conversely, in case of a claim that is 120-day short
of prescribing, if the plaintiff was to await the lapse of the 120-day period, the
RAF would then be entitled to raise a special plea of prescription.
[I OJ This would result in a situation where a pai1icular head of damages would
be said to have prescribed while the underlying cause of action remains intact.
Such an outcome is unsustainable. A head of damages cannot be assessed in
isolation. Upon acceptance by the RAF that the plaintiff is entitled to
compensation arising from the injuries sustained in the accident, the
determination of the various heads of damages necessarily follow as pai1 of a
single, indivisible claim.
[II] In Nokwali v RAF 2009 (4) SA 333 (SCA) The court a quo upheld the
special plea on the basis that Ms Nokwali's claim form did not meet the
requirements of section 24 of the Act for failure to list the head injury
sustained which was discovered three years after the collisio~ after the claim
was lodged. Ms Nokwali had however amended her pleadings to include the
injury upon discovery. The high court further held that even if Ms Nokwali
had a valid claim, it had prescribed by reason of the provisions of section 23
of the Act.
[12] The Supreme Court of Appeal held that it was not necessary to amend
the claim form to include the additional injury and that ainending summons in
that regard sufficed. The SCA further held that the claim in respect of the
additional injury did not introduce a new cause of action and was merely an
additional item to her original cause of action.
[13] In Seboko v Road Accident Fund (1683/24) [2026] ZANWHC 48 (10
March 2026) the facts can be swnmarized as follows: Seboko lodged a claim
form that did not include past and future loss of earnings. Seboko later issued
summons and included loss of past and future earnings. The RAF defended
the action and raised a special plea taking issue with Seboko's loss of earnings
which had never been lodged with the RAF. The RAF's contention was that
the summons was therefore premature in respect of the claim for loss of
earnings. It was common cause that Seboko did not submit an amended RAF
1 setting out a claim for loss of earnings prior to issuing summons.
[14] The court in Seboko followed the principle in Nokwali, finding that
Seboko's cause of action arose from a single motor vehicle accident, the RAF
was notified of that accident and of the injuries sustained when the RAF I
form was lodged. The court reasoned that the RAF had an opportunity to
investigate the claim, including the potential for loss of earnings arising from
those injuries. The court concluded that Seboko was not required to lodge an
amended claim form before including the new head of damages in her
summons because it merely amplified an existing cause of action.
[15] Similarly in this matter, the newly included heads of damages merely
amplifies the existing cause of action by quantifying further heads of damages
arising from the same accident. The RAF had an opportunity to assess the
claim as it had been provided with the RAF I and supporting docwnents with
the details of the accident, injuries sustained by the plaintiff and heads of
damages albeit not all heads of damages. The plaintiff followed the
prerequisite pre-litigation steps including proper lodgment of the claim which
was done on the 18u' July 2023 before issuing summons.
[I 6] In my view the plaintiff was not required to lodge an amended claim form
before including the claim for loss of earnings and future medical expenses in
the summons because it merely amplified an existing cause of action.
Accordingly, the inclusion of loss of earnings and future medical expenses
does not introduce a new claim as it arises from the same accident. The
defendant's special plea in this regard ought to be dismissed.
SECOND SPECIAL PLEA: PRESCRIPTION
[17] In the second special plea the defendant contends that the plaintiff's claim
for future medical expenses and loss of earnings has prescribed since it was
lodged after the expiry of 3 years within which the plaintiff had to lodge his
claim. The basis of this contention is that, in the initially submitted RAF l,
the plaintiff did not include a claim for loss of earnings and future medical
expenses. The above was only included in the subsequent RAF 1 that was
submitted to the defendant on the J )'h September 2025.
[ 18] It is common cause that the accident occurred on the 16th September
2021. The plaintiff lodged a claim on the 18"' July 2023 claiming general
damages. The plaintiff lodged another RAFI form on the 03'd September 2025
claiming future medical expenses and loss of earnings. On the 19 January
2026 the plaintiff amended his particulars of claim introducing claims for past
and future loss of earnings and future medical expenses.
SUBMISSION
[19] Defendant contends that the plaintiffs claim for loss of earnings and
future medical expenses has prescribed because the plaiutiff failed to lodge
the claim within the requisite 3 years. In this regard the defendant refers to the
subsequent RAF I form that was lodged on the 03'd September 2025.
[20] The plaintiff submitted that the matter has not prescribed and that it was
timeously lodged in 2023. The plaintiff argued that the non-inclusion of the
loss of earnings and future medical expenses did not require the plaintiff to
lodge another RAF] form. Plaintiff further contends that the summons issued
and served in 2024 stayed prescription.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
[21] Section 10 (I) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 provides as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this Chapter and of Chapter IV, a debt shall be
extinguished by prescription after the lapse of the period which in terms of the
relevant law applies in respect of the prescription of such debt." The relevant
prescription period in respect of the plaintiffs claim is 3 years.
[22] It is trite that prescription runs against a debt, and not against each
individual head of damages. Where multiple heads of damages arise from
the same set of facts, they do not constitute separate debts.
[23] In this regard, the principle was stated in Evins v Shield Insurance Co
Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) at 835 C, a single wrongful act gives rise to one
debt, and all damages flowing from it must be claimed together.
[24] The Plaintiffs claim, including the subsequently introduced claim for
loss of earnings and medical expenses arises from a single motor vehicle
accident. The inclusion of loss of earnings and future medical expenses does
not introduce new factual avennents but flows from the same cause of action
already pleaded.
[25] The claims for medical expenses, general damages, and loss of earnings
are merely components of a single, indivisible debt, arising from the same
wrongful act.
[26] All damages suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the negligent driving
of the insured driver constitute one cause of action, and not separate causes
of action for each head of damages.
[27] In Nokwali v RAF the court held that a subsequently discovered injury
does not create a new cause of action. In this regard the Court reasoned that
the original cause of action remains intact and the discovery of a new injury
does not alter the fundamental basis of the claim.
[28] The subsequent inclusion of a claim for loss of earnings and medical
expenses does not create a new debt, but merely amplifies and completes the
relief already claimed by the plaintiff in his initial claim against the defendant.
CONCLUSION
[29] In the present matter, no new factual basis has been introduced; the claim
remains rooted in the same accident and the additional heads of damages are
a natural consequence of the injuries already pleaded. Accordingly, the
Defendant's special plea of prescription is without merit.
In the result I make the following order:
l. The defendant's special plea of pre-mature summons is dismissed.
2. The defendant's special plea of prescription is dismissed.
3. The defendant is ordered to pay the costs on a party and party scale B,
including costs of the 16th and 17th March 2026.
Date of hearing: 17 March 2026
Date of judgment: 30 April 2026
P DKekana
Acting Judge of the High Court
CoW1Sel for the Plaintiff: Adv D S Gianni
Instructed by: MahlalelaAttomeys Tnc
Email Address: advdsgi:mni(.f,r~nbar,com
in fb@mah lalel rn11 turnev .s_ <.: oJa
CoW1sel for the Defendant: Adv V Mukwevho
Instructed by: State Attorney
Email Address: gugum l @rafo2g,;,-5