IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MTHATHA)
CASE NO.: 2515/2025
In the matter between:
LINDEKA NONGQAYI 1st Applicant
NONKUSELO MAZATU 2nd Applicant
and
KING SABATA DALINDYEBO MUNICIPALITY 1st Respondent
THE MUNICIPAL MANAGER: KSD LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY 2nd Respondent
EASTERN CAPE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 3rd Respondent
JUDGMENT
ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
ZONO AJ:
Introduction
[1] On 08th July 2025 the applicants lodged an application for leave to appeal
against the judgment delivered on 13 th June 2025. The application is
couched in the following terms:
“The application for leave to appeal is premised on the following grounds:
1. The court erred in finding that the correspondence seeking termination of
the supply did not constitute an administrative action within the
contemplation of PAJA and in finding that in its correspondence of 03
December 2024 the third respondent did no more than terminate the
contractual relationship that existed between it and the first respondent.
Another court would find that:
1.1 properly construed, the correspondence aforesaid sought
discontinuance of use of the supply in terms of clause 24 of
the King Sabata Dalindyebo Municipality, Electricity By-
Law.
1.2 in effect, the request for discontinuation;
1.2.1 was by Eastern Cape Development Corporation which
is a State Owned Company duly registered as such
in terms of the Companies Act (a juristic person),
1.2.2was in terms of clause 24 of the electricity bylaws (which
is an empowering provision), and
1.2.3adversely affected the rights of users and consumers to
the electricity supplied to Windsor Hotel.
1.3 as consumers to the supply, the applicants had rights and
legitimate expectations to the electricity supply recognizable in
terms of PAJA.
1.4 a proper construction to be accorded to the provisions of sec
1(b) of PAJA shows that an administrative action inter alia
includes a decision taken by a juristic person in terms of an
empowering provision and which has an external effect on the
empowering provision and which has an external effect on the
rights and legitimate expectations
.
1.5 the factual complex demonstrates that the request for
discontinuance of the supply was by a juristic person acting
within the parameters of an empowering provision (clause 24
of the bylaws) and had an external effect on the rights and
legitimate expectations of the occupiers of the premises who
are consumers and users to the supply. As such the
correspondence of 03 December 2024 constituted an
administrative action within the contemplation of PAJA.
1.6 the third respondent did not provide a countervailing version
as to why its decision could not be reviewed and set aside in
light of the prevailing factual matrix and on the basis of trite
legal principles the version of the applicants had to be
accepted. As a corollary, the decision fell to be reviewed and
set aside.
2. The court erred in finding that the applicants had no right to the
electricity supply. Intensely examining the facts before it, another court
would find that:
1.1 the evidence portrays that the respondents knew that the
premises were occupied not by the third respondent
but by the applicants and various other occupiers who
were using and consuming the supply, and
1.2 the applicants were consumers to the supply within the
contemplation of the Electricity By -Laws. As such they had a
right to the supply recognisable in terms of the by -laws. It was
accordingly incumbent upon the respondents to notify the
applicants of intention to terminate the supply and to further
afford them of their rights in light of the intended termination.
3. The court further misdirected itself in finding that the third respondent
did no more than termination of the agreement that existed between it
and the first respondent for the supply of electricity. On the same facts,
another court would find that:
3.1 there was no termination of the agreement that existed between
the first and third respondent for the supply of electricity .
Conversely, the third respondent sought discontinuance of the
supply in terms of clause 24 of the bylaws. The said clause does
not govern termination of the agreement for the supply of
electricity but discontinuance of use of the electricity supply.
3.3 even if the termination at issue was aimed at cancelling the
agreement aforesaid, the contract for the supply of
electricity between the first and third respondent was not
electricity between the first and third respondent was not
for the benefit of the third respondent but for that of the
occupiers of Windsor Hotel. As demonstrated above , third
respondent is not in occupation of the premises but the
applicants are . Without doubt , when the third respondent
sought electrification of the building it did so not for its
consumption and/or benefit but for that of the occupiers of the
building. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the third
respondent to afford the applicants their rights to be heard
prior the discontinuance and for failing to do so , its decision
was taken in a procedurally unfair manner and fell to be
reviewed and set aside.
4. The court further erred in finding that the procedural fair
requirements did not apply since the respondents terminated the
contractual relationship which does not equate to exercise of public
power in terms of an empowering provision . At the risk of repetition ,
the conduct at issue was not termination of a contractual relationship
but a decision for discontinuance of use of the supply in terms of an
empowering provision (clause 24 of the bylaws) and adversely affected
the rights and legitimate expecta tions of the consumers of the supply .
Even if it could be said that the termination was of a
contractual relationship that existed between the first and third
respondent, the said termination was by a juristic person performing a
public function in terms of an empowering provision (clause 24 of
the by-laws) and had an adverse effect and/or a direct external legal
effect on the rights of the applicants (the consumers) . As such the
termination fell within the realm of administrative action.
5. The court erred in finding that applicants did not plead the source of
their entitlement to the supply , no substantive rights were affected
and in finding that there was no reason for following of a fair
procedure in seeking discontinuance of use of the supply. The entirety
of the facts reveals that the applicants were consumers to the supply .
Clause 1 of the By -Laws defines a consumer as any occupier of the
premises. Undeniably, applicants were in occupation of the premises .
As occupiers they had entitlement to the supply and thus had rights
that were adversely affected by the discontinuance.
6. The court further erred in finding that the applicants did not make
application for them to be consumers of the supply in terms of clause
8(1) of the Municipal Policy . Properly evaluating the evidence at its
disposal, another court would find that in its letter of 16 April 2025 ,
the first respondent allowed no room for such application but made it
the first respondent allowed no room for such application but made it
clear that it would await correspondence from the third respondent
before the reconnection.
7. The court further misdirected itself in finding that it will be
enforcement of an illegal act if the first respondent is compelled to
provide services without an application for services . Another court
would find that a contract exists between first and third respondents
for the supply of the services and the third respondent has done no
more than seek discontinuance of use of the supply in terms of clause
24. The said discontinuance cannot translate to termination of the
contract that exists between the said respondents. Even if it does ,
upon setting aside of the instruction issued pursuant the provisions
of clause 24, the relationship between the first and third respondents
would be revived . As such the seeking of reconnection of the supply
cannot be labelled enforcement of an illegal act.
8. The court also erred in finding that the disconnection of the supply occurred
in a lawful and procedurally fair manner. Another court would have come to
the aid of the applicants and would set aside the respondents' decisions.
9. The court accordingly erred in finding that the municipality was not
exercising a public power when effecting the disconnection of the supply and
such termination was consequent a lawful instruction. On the given facts,
the disconnection was subsequent an unlawful instruction and fell to be set
aside.
10. Another significant factor worthy of consideration is the fact that there is a
compelling reason for the hearing of the appeal. This in light of the fact that;
10.1 the applicants had electricity and water disconnected from Windsor
Hotel (the premises).
10.2 additional to approaching the court for an order for reconnection of
the electricity supply, the applicants sought reconnection of the water
supply contending that as users and consumers of the supply they had
rights recognizable in law.
10.3 appreciating that users and consumers of the water supply have rights
recognizable in law, this Division held that the water supply was
provided for the benefit of the occupiers of the premises and as such
the applicants have a prima facie right to the supply1.
10.4 faced with an identical issue (namely whether or not the occupiers had
rights to electricity that were adversely affected), this court found that
the applicants had no rights and refused the relief.
9.5 there are accordingly conflicting judgments on the issue of whether the
occupiers of the premises have rights to the supply or not.
10. There are accordingly, reasonable prospects of success on the said grounds and
accordingly sufficient reason for the grant of leave to appeal.(sic)
Legal Principle
[2] An application for leave to appeal is governed by Section 17(1) of the
Superior Court Act which provides as follows:
Superior Court Act which provides as follows:
“(1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of
the opinion that—
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should
be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration;
(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section
16(2)(a); and
(c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of all the
issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and prompt
resolution of the real issues between the parties.”
[3] In Smith1 Plasket AJA (as he then was) held that:
“7. What the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a
dispassionate decision, based on the facts and the law, that a court of
appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the
trial court. In order to succeed, therefore, the appellant must convince
this court on proper grounds that he has prospects of success on
appeal and that those prospects are not remote but have a realistic
chance of succeeding. More is required to be established than that
there is a mere possibility of success, that the case is arguable on
appeal or that the case cannot be categorised as hopeless. There must,
in other words, be a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that there
are prospects of success on appeal.”2
[4] These sentiments were shared by Schippers AJA (as he then was) in
Mkhitha3 where the following was said:
“17. An applicant for leave to appeal must convince the court on proper
grounds that there is a reasonable prospect or realistic chance of
success on appeal. A mere possibility of success, an arguable case or
one that is not hopeless, is not enough. There must be a sound, rational
basis to conclude that there is a reasonable prospect of success on
appeal.”
[5] Ramakatsa 4 Dlodlo JA observed the following:
1 Smith v S 2012 (1) SACR 567 (SCA) Para 7.
2 S v Mabena & Another 2007 (1) SACR 482 (SCA) Para 22.
3 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha and another (1225) [2016] ZASCA 176 (25 November 2016) Para
17.
[10] Turning the focus to the relevant provisions of the Superior Courts Act (the
SC Act), leave to appeal may only be granted where the judges concerned are of
the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or there
are compelling reasons which exist why the appeal should be heard such as the
interests of justice. This Court in Caratco, concerning the provisions of s
17(1)(a)(ii) of (the SC Act) pointed out that if the court is unpersuaded that there
are prospects of success, it must still enquire into whether there is a compelling
reason to entertain the appeal. Compelling reason would of course include an
important question of law or a discreet issue of public importance that will have
an effect on future disputes. However, this Court correctly added that ‘but here
too the merits remain vitally important and are often decisive’. I am mindful of the
decisions at high court level debating whether the use of the word ‘would’ as
opposed to ‘could’ possibly means that the threshold for granting the appeal has
been raised. If a reasonable prospect of success is established, leave to appeal
should be granted. Similarly, if there are some other compelling reasons why the
appeal should be heard, leave to appeal should be granted. The test of
reasonable prospects of success postulates a dispassionate decision based on the facts and
the law that a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to
that of the trial court. In other words, the appellants in this matter need to convince
this Court on proper grounds that they have prospects of success on appeal.
Those prospects of success must not be remote, but there must exist a reasonable
chance of succeeding. A sound rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects
of success must be shown to exist.
[6] During argument of the application for leave to appeal the focus
was on the nature of the rights the applicants have to the supply of
was on the nature of the rights the applicants have to the supply of
the electricity. Mr Matoti’s argument focused on the constitutional as
well as statutory duties of the Municipality to provide services like
4 Ramakatsa and Others v African N ational Congress and Another (724/2021)[2021] ZASCA31 (31March
2021) Para 10.
electricity to the communities 5 in its jurisdictions. Electricity
reticulation is listed in Part B of Schedule 4.
[7] Of importance section 156 (2) of the Constitution provides thus:
“2 A municipality may make and administer by- laws for the
effective administration of the matters which it has the right to
administer.”
This section empowers the Municipality to make by -laws regulating
the supply and administration of basic services like the electricity.
Indeed, the Municipality published the relevant by -laws on 24 th
December 20106 in terms of section 162 of the constitution.
[8] Section 2 of the by -laws aforesaid caters for the supply of
electricity within its areas of jurisdiction with the exception of those
areas where electricity is supplied by Eskom. Section 3 thereof
provides for processing of requests for electricity supply as follows:
“Applications for the supply of electricity must be processed subject to
the relevant policies and/or bylaws of the Municipality relating to
customer care and the supply must be made available within the
periods stipulated in NRS 047”
[9] It is also important for purposes hereof to refer to section 24 of the
bylaws which provides thus:
“ In the event of a consumer desiring to discontinue using the electricity
supply, he must give at least four full working days notice in writing of such
5 Section 156(1) of the Constitution provides that a Municipality has executive authority in respect of, and has
the right to administer-
(a) local government matters listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of Schedule 5; and
(b) any other matter assigned to it by national or provincial legislation.
6 Provincial Gazette Extraordinary, 24 December 2010, No 2489, Local Authority Notice 138.
intended discontinuance to the municipality, failing which he remains liable
for all payments done in terms of the tariff for the supply of electricity until
the expiration of two full working days after such notice has been
given.”
[10] It is common cause that on 03 rd December 2024 the ECDC penned a four
days’ written notice to the Municipality indicating its intention to
discontinue using the electricity supply, and such notice was in terms of
section 24 of the electricity by -laws. The effect of this notice was to
terminate the agreement between the parties in terms of which the
electricity was supplied by the Municipality to the ECDC properties
including the one in question. It is therefore not clear from the papers and
from the argument why the ECDC’s letter of termination of the electricity
supply to its property forming the subject matter of these proceedings is
sought to be held unlawfully. The applicants are unclear as to why they
seek to impugn the notice/ letter penned by the ECDC to the Municipality
as it was a legal notice in terms of section 24 of the Municipality’s
electricity by -laws. It is not in dispute that it is the Municipality who
terminated the electricity supply to the property in question. No case is
made out against the ECDC.
[11] Consistent with the Municipality’s version that the applicants should
have approached the Municipality for an agreement to be supplied with
the electricity, section 25(1) of the electricity by-laws provides:
“2 Any person taking over occupation of the premises who wants to continue
using the electricity supply must, within ten working days of taking the
occupation thereof, apply in accordance with the provisions of the by-law or policy
relating to customer care.”
[12] It is not gainsaid that the municipality is not in physical occupation of the
premises in question. It is also a common cause that the applicants are in
occupation of the premises, hence they regard themselves as customers,
occupiers, and consumers of the electricity supply. It is also not in dispute
that the applicants did not apply to the Municipality in terms of the
relevant provision of the credit control and debt collection policy 7 on the
one hand and electricity by-laws8 on the other .
[13] The most compelling and instructive provision of the electricity by -
laws is section 25(3) which incisively provides that:
“3 unless the application contemplated in subsection 2 is made, the
municipality must disconnect the supply of electricity and the person taking over
occupation of the premises is liable to the municipality for the electricity supply
from the date of occupation until such time as the supply is so disconnected.
[14] Conjunctive and cumulative reading of the electricity by -laws and credit
control and debt collection policy conduce to an interpretation that a
consumer may only have a right to the electricity supply by the
Municipality if an agreement to that effect is entered into between the
consumer and the Municipality. In Casu, no such agreement was entered
into between the applicants and the Municipality. The important question
is whether the applicants, prior to the termination of electricity supply to
the premises, had substantive rights to the electricity supply. The answer
is in the negative.
[15] Whilst it is correct that the Municipality is constitutionally enjoined to
provide basic services to the communities within their jurisdiction, it
7 Para 23 and 24 of the main judgment.
8 Section 3 and 25(2) of the Municipality’s Electricity by-laws.
remains a constitutional and or statutory obligation for the members of
the communities to discharge their statutory responsibilities to create and/
or access rights. It proves true on the facts of this case that, for a right to
be effectively accessed there is a corresponding obligation to be
discharged. Some rights are not readily available to be exercised; they are
subject or contigent upon the discharge of some responsibilities by their
subjects. In Casu, applicants’ rights to the supply of electricity was
subject and contigent upon them making an application to the
Municipality and complying with section 9 and 10 of the credit control
and debt collection policy of the Municipality, which the applicants did
not do. For as long as the applicants refused, neglected or failed to make
the necessary applications and payments, they were not entitled to the
electricity supply. Therefore, they had no right that was susceptible to be
adversely affected9 by the termination of electricity supply. I therefore do
not agree with Mr Matoti that the applicants had a right to the electricity
supply enforceable against the Municipality. For them to have a right to
the electricity supply enforceable against the Municipality, they were
enjoined to make the necessary applications and payments, which they
did not make. The application for the electricity supply is a sine qua non
and an indispensable requirement for the existence of an enforceable right
to the electricity supply. It is a precondition without which the electricity
cannot be supplied and extended to the prospective consumer.
[16] However, Mr Matoti did not despair. He strongly contended that the
applicants were entitled to be given notices prior to the termination of the
electricity supply. He further submitted that they were entitled to be given
an opportunity to make representations regarding the proposed
9 Section 3(1) of PAJA provides: (1) administrative action which materially and adversely affects the rights or
legitimate expectations of any person must be procedurally fair.
termination of the electricity supply. He then concluded that those
procedural rights were never afforded to the applicants. He relied for this
proposition on section 3(2) of PAJA, which applies only if there are
substantive rights to be adversely affected. In this case there were none
demonstrated. Existence of substantive rights to be adversely affected is a
precondition for the notice to be given to the bearer of the rights. If a
person does not have a right to be adversely affected, he/she is not
entitled to notice in terms of section 3(2) of PAJA. Section 3(1) and 3(2)
of PAJA must be read together to mean that a notice is only available
when rights to be materially and adversely affected do exist10.
[17] However, Mr Matoti sought to persuade the court and strongly submitted
that the occupiers of the immovable property, even though when they
were occupying the property they had no right, over time they accrued
some rights. The longer they stayed in the property the more they
gathered and accrued some rights. No authority was provided for that
proposition.
[18] Mr Matoti, in developing his argument, relied on the definition of the
consumer as set out in the electricity by -laws. Municipality by -laws
defines the consumer in relation to the premises to mean-
“(a) any occupier thereof or any other person with whom the Municipality has
contracted to supply or is actually supplying electricity thereat;
(b) If such premises are not occupied, any person who has a valid existing
agreement with the Municipality for the supply of electricity to such premises;
or
(c) If there is no such person or occupier, the owner of the premises.”
10 In addition to section 3(1), section 3(2)(b) provides:
“(b) In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, an administrator,
subject to subsection (4), must give a person referred to in subsection (l)—
(i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action;
(i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action;
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representation…. ”
It merges from this definition that the consumer is an occupier of the
premises.
[19] Credit control and debt collection policy defines the occupier to mean:
“the person who controls and resides on or controls and otherwise uses
immovable property, provided that-
(a) the husband or wife of the owner of immovable property
which is at any time used by such owner and husband or wife
as a dwelling shall be deemed to be the occupier thereof;
(b) where a husband and wife both reside on immovable
property and one of them is an occupier thereof; the other
shall also be deemed to be an occupier thereof.”
It also arises from this definition that an occupier is the one who inter
alia controls the immovable property. There is no allegation that the
applicants are in control or they control the immovable property in
question.
[20] Mr Matoti submitted that the definition of consumer and occupier do not
exclude an unlawful occupier or consumer as the definitions do not say
anything about unlawful occupier and consumer. Municipality electricity
by-laws defines the occupier in relation to the premises to mean:
“(a) Any person in actual occupation of such premises;
(b) Any person legally entitled to occupy such person…”
An interpretation that does not lead to absurdity is that the definition in
(b) qualifies the one in (a). Legal occupation is a necessary precondition
for an occupation. Interpretation maxim “ Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius” should apply. Express mention of the word legally in (b) of the
definition is an exclusion of the opposite. It is doubtful that the law would
legitimise an unlawful act and create some rights around unlawful
occupation or activities. That would be against a fundamental principle of
our law that courts should not lend its aid to the enforcement of an illegal
act.11 Nothing sheds light in the papers about the source of applicants’
occupation of the property. Nothing suggests that they lawfully occupy
the property and or that their occupation attracts some rights.
[21] Against applicants’ assertion that they were not given notice and that an
opportunity to make representations was not afforded to them, the
Municipality avers as follows:
“ 18. Before the disconnection, in January 2025 affected parties were informed
that the third respondent had terminated the agreement for the supply of
electricity to the property and that a new agreement for the supply of electricity to
the property would be concluded with an interested party in accordance with the
provisions of the policy and the by -law. And that any interested party in this
regard would have to approach the Municipality at its premises in Munitata
Building, Mthatha on any day from Monday to Friday, between 25 th January and
10th February 2025 between 09h00 and 15h00. Nothing of this nature happened”
(sic).
Applicants, as affected parties, were advised of the termination of
agreement between the Municipality and the ECDC and its consequences.
They were further invited in the offices of the Municipality to enter into a
contractual arrangement in terms of which the electricity would be
provided and be paid for. It is plain herefrom that the applicants as part of
the affected parties were given notice. They did not grab the opportunity
to make representation notwithstanding that invitation was extended for
them to visit Municipal offices.
11 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and another 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC) Para 77; Schierhout v Minister of
Justice 1926 AD 99 at 109.
[22] The Municipality made these allegations in full understanding of the
provisions of section 19(2) of credit control and debt collection policy of
the Municipality which provided as follows:
“19 Disconnection or Discontinuation of Supply
(2) The Municipality must permit the customer to make representations
prior to the disconnection or discontinuation of the supply of electricity,
unless-
(a) other users will be prejudice
(b) there is an emergency situation, or
(c) the customer has interfered with a limited, disconnected or
discontinued electricity supply.”
A customer is defined in the policy to mean-
“the occupier of any premises to which the Municipality has agreed to supply
or is actually supplying municipal services, or If no occupier can be identified
or located, then the owner of the premises and includes any debtor of the
Municipality.”
The Municipality was supplying electricity to the premises when the
applicants were occupying them.
[23] However, the turning point is reached when the provision of section 19(3)
of the Credit Control and Debt Collection Policy are taken into account,
which provides thus:
“3. If the customer fails to pay any account within a period of fourteen (14) days
after expiry of the due date, then-
(a) without further notice, the Municipality may disconnect
or discontinue the supply of electricity to the immovable
property in question…” (my emphasis)
It is not in dispute that the applicants did not enter into a contractual
arrangement with the Municipality in terms of which the electricity would
continue to be supplied and that payment arrangement therefore would be
concluded. No undertaking by the applicants was made to pay the
Municipal accounts. It means that, from the fourth day after the letter or
notice of termination of electricity supply to the premises dated 03 rd
December 2024 to the date of termination of electricity supply on 05 th
May 2025, Municipal account was not paid by the applicants. It is clear
from the termination notice that the ECDC was not liable beyond the
fourth day of the notice. During the hearing of the matter, Mr Matoti was
unable to answer the questions about who is or would be responsible for
the payment of municipal services, including electricity supply.
[24] It is common cause that Mrs Lunika and Vikilahle of the Municipality
advised the applicants’ delegation, including Mr Potwana on 13 th May
2025 that the property concerned owes an account in respect of rates 12 in
the amount of R1 968 988-25 and they were, according to the
applicants, advised to pay the Municipality amount of R 139 774.00 for
the electricity supply to be reconnected. That did not happen. That
simply means that the customer failed to pay an account. Section 19(3) of
the Policy provides that customers’ failure to pay any account will result
in the disconnection or discontinuation of the electricity supply without
further notice. Section 9 (5) of the Policy pertinently provides that:
“5. All accounts are payable as above, regardless of the fact that the customer
has not received the account, the onus being on the customer to obtain a copy of
the account before the due date.”
In the light of the fact that there was an account owing in respect of the
property in question, the applicants were not entitled to further notice.
They were equally not entitled to the electricity supply.
[25] In any event it is Municipality’s case that on January 2025, prior to the
disconnection or discontinuation of the electricity supply, the affected
12 Section 9 and 10 of the Credit Control and debt collection policy; main judgment para 26.
parties, including the applicants were informed of the terminated
agreement between the Municipality and the ECDC and were further
invited in the Municipality’s offices between 25 th January 2025 to 10
February 2025, between 09h00 and 15h00 and they did not honour that
invitation. They sent their delegation after the termination of the
electricity supply into the property 13. It is alleged on behalf of the
Municipality that Siyabulela Nkwampa attended at the premises on 25
January 2025 to inform the occupants thereof of the termination of the
agreement for electricity supply and further invited the interested parties
to approach the Municipality to enter into a new agreement for a
continued, uninterrupted supply of electricity to the property. Mr
Nkwampa allegedly left notices and also posted them on both pillars of
the main entrance or on either side of the entrance to the main building
and also on the walls of the property along Sutherland Street14.
[26] In the amalgam of all this I find that there are not reasonable prospects of
success on the appeal and that there is no court that might come to a
different conclusion. There are no compelling reasons for this application
to be granted, or that this matter to be heard on appeal.
[27] In the result I make the following order:
1. Application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
_________________________________
A.S ZONO
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT (ACTING)
APPEARANCES:
13 Plascon Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623-5.
14 Main Judgment Para 28.
For the Applicant : Adv Matoti
Instructed by : SR Mhlawuli & Associates
No. 58 Wesley Drive
Mthatha
078 7233 799
For the Respondent : Adv Bodlani SC
Instructed by : TL Luzipho Attorneys
No.26 Victoria Street Madeira Street
1st Floor Steve Motors Building
Mthatha
083 535 7960
Matter heard on : 20 April 2026
Delivered on : 07 May 2026