IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
Case No.: D12072/ 2024
In the matter between:
MANOR ESTATES HOMEOWNERS’
ASSOCIATION NPC FIRST APPLICANT
ROHAN JAMES EAGER SECOND APPLICANT
VICTOR CROWTHER THIRD APPLICANT
WILLIAM MURRAY FOURTH APPLICANT
and
SUNIL PRANPATH RESPONDENT
This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down
electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal representatives by email and by electronic distribution on
SAFLII. The date for hand down is deemed to be 30 April 2026.
________________________________________________________________
ORDER
________________________________________________________________
The following order is made:
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1. The respondent is interdicted and restrained from publishing or uttering any
false and defamatory statements, whether orally, in writing, or on social media
platforms (including WhatsApp and Facebook), imputing that:
(a) The Board members of the first applicant, its employees or agents , or the
second to fourth applicants are corrupt, dishonest or unethical;
(b) That the second applicant is a criminal or otherwise unethical; and
(c) That the Homeowners Association is or has been operated or managed
unlawfully, unethically or corruptly, or that units on the estate (to the
knowledge of the Homeowners Association) have been constructed in a
sub-standard or unsafe manner.
2. The respondent is interdicted and restrained from intimidating or in any way,
or through the agency of others, from harassing the second applicant.
3. The respondent is liable to pay the applicants’ costs on an attorney and
client scale on Scale B, including costs of counsel.
JUDGMENT
CHETTY J
[1] The first applicant, the Manor Estates Homeowners Association NPC ,
(which I refer to as ‘the Association’) represented in these proceedings by its
chairman (Mr Eager ), the estate manager (Mr Crowther) and the operations
manager of the estate (Mr Murray) , brought an application for an interdict and
declaratory order against the respondent (Mr Pranpath), whose wife is the
registered owner of a unit in Manor Estates, which comprises 314 units in total.
[2] The applicants seek an order interdicting and restraining Mr Pranpath from
publishing or uttering any words, including any postings on WhatsApp and
Facebook social media platforms, which impute or insinuate that the Association
and its board members are corrupt, dishonest and unethical, and have operated
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the affairs of the Association unlawfully or in a manner that is sub -standard. The
application is opposed by the respondent , who admits to the utterances but
disputes that they were made with any malice or any intention to defame the
applicants.
[3] In bringing these proceedings, t he applicants emphasise that this
application is not intended to stifle legitimate criticism that the respondent may
have of the Association. Their complaint is that allegations by the respondent are
devoid of any substance, are directed at the incorrect party and that there has been
no attempt by Mr Pranpath to withdraw the allegations.
[4] According to the applicants, Mr Pranpath’s campaign of defaming and
maligning them commenced in 2019 after his unit suffered extensive damage
following heavy rains in the region. The damage was caused as a result of water
ingress from the unit abo ve Mr Pranpath’s. He lodged a claim with his insurer in
respect of the costs of the repair, which claim was apparently resolved, and he was
compensated. Problems between the Association and Mr Pranpath arose when he
sought to recover compensation from the Associati on, which denied any liability
for the damages he sustained, especially since he had already been successfully
compensated by his insurer. In particular, Mr Pranpath alleged that the damages
were attributable to certain structural defects , in particular , the issues of damp
which manifested in his unit. The Association denied any liability, contending these
should be directed at the developer, who, it transpires, has been placed into
liquidation. In this regard, the Association contends that Mr Pranpath appears not
to recognise the distinction between the Association and the developer (from
whom the unit was purchased and who would be liable for structural defects).
[5] One of the grounds on which the respondent opposes the interdictory relief
is that the applicants appear to have been selective in singling him out as the only
is that the applicants appear to have been selective in singling him out as the only
person to have made utterances against them, when in reality the messages and
publications which constitute the grav amen of the compl aint were posted by a
group of four disgruntled owners at Manor Estates. I am not persuaded that the
applicants are obliged to pursue an action against all the persons who have made
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defamatory allegations against them. It is sufficient that they make out a case
against any of the persons who constitute part of the group. As the applicants point
out by reference to various articles and emails, which are not disputed by the
respondent, the allegations by him convey the impression that the applicants are
operating and managing the affairs of the estate in a dishonest manner. If proven,
that is sufficient to sustain their claim for the relief sought.
[6] The applicants rely on the dissemination of messages amongst those
belonging to a WhatsApp social media group created to express the views of unit
owners concerning the operation of the ir estate. The respondent does not deny
the messages attributed to him but takes refuge in the fact that he was merely one
of several participants. Once the applicants establish publication of the defamatory
statements, wrongfulness and intention are presumed, and the onus falls onto the
respondent to rebut them on one of the recognised defences.1
[7] The test in determining whether statements or utterances are defamatory is
an objective test; in other words, it is whether a reasonable reader would attribute
to the words, having regard to the context in which they are used, a meaning that
is defamatory.2 Against this backdrop, I set out below a few extracts from the group
chat which record the contribution by the respondent suggesting impropriety on
the part of the applicants:
(a) 7/24/22: “Good morning. Great to join the group. I will request the necessary
documents from the HOA to follow the monies paid and the way it is
expended and the benefit to all the residents. The ultimate aim is to build our
asset and prevent the looting on the estate of our hard earned money . I
moved out of my unit due to poor building practices of HDR and this resulted
two major damage to my flat…”;
1 Khumalo and Others v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12; 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 18.
1 Khumalo and Others v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12; 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) para 18.
2 Le Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as
Amici Curiae) 2011 (3) SA 274 (CC) (Le Roux v Dey) para 89.
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(b) 7/24/22: “I have [it] taken up with the office and speak to lady as William
hide(s) when he see(s) me” (sic);
(c) 8/29/22: “These crooks are cleaning us out”;
(d) 9/4/22: “The water tenders also have huge profits from as we are paying full
for every drop we use. The free municipal units that are given arw profits for
their pockets.” (sic);
(e) 9/4/22: “They are running a monopoly like Telkom”;
(f) 9/4/22: “Well these guys seem to be a law on their own and do as they wish”;
(g) 9/4/22: “The developer so is the chair and his father -in-law the money man
of our estate and both don’t live there”;
(h) 9/4/22: “They are ducking the AGM; When I come to the estate all the staff in
the admin office run away”;
(i) 9/7/22: “They are a dishonest bunch… They hide when I come to the estate”;
(j) 10/8/22: “These guys are snakes”; and
(k) 10/17/22: “I think there is a serious level of dishonesty”. (My emphasis.)
[8] The respondent opposes the reliance on the WhatsApp messages as a basis
for the claim that it has infringed the applicants’ dignity and reputations . They
attribute sentiments of dishonesty to the applicants, using words such as “crooks”,
“snakes”, that the applicants are a “dishonest bunch”, that they “duck” meetings,
and are “looting” the estate. The respondent contends that these messages were
exchanged in a “private owners WhatsApp group” and that the messages were
somehow confidential in that access to them could only have been obtained with
the consent of the members of the group . This ground of opposition falls to be
dismissed on the grounds that publication means communication of the
defamatory matter to at least one person other than the plaintiff. The exchange of
messages and responses forming part of the papers clearly establishes the
conveyance of the utterances to third parties. The respondent does not deny the
exchange of messages attributed to his contact number, nor the content of those
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messages. The respondent seemingly takes the view that it is “unclear” to him why
the messages exchanged on WhatsApp are objectionable. The financial and
emotional turmoil that the respondent and his wife have endured because of the
defective nature of their unit is no justification for the utterances against the
applicants. I am satisfied that in relation to the WhatsApp messages, the
requirement of publication is met , and the statements, per se , ordinarily
interpreted, can only be construed to demean the reputation and integrity of the
applicants.
[9] The applicants also referred to articles in newspapers where the respondent
made statements, which they construed to be defamatory. One article dated 29
March 2023 titled ‘Ballito residents blame developer for “shoddy” houses’’
features the following extract:
‘Some residents said they had been unable to sell their properties due to cracks and mould
on their walls, while some had vacated their houses after they were advised that it was
unhealthy to occupy them. Sunil Pranpath, who owns a unit on the estate, said he moved
out three years ago because of the water leaks. Pranpath said his furniture got damaged
and he had to spend thousands of rand to fix the problems.
I have made numerous attempts to have either the developer or homeowners’ association
repair the leaks, with no success. I recently checked with the Council for the certificates I
should have received when I purchased the property and they could not find the land
surveyor report or the NHBRC (National Home Builders Registration Council) enrolment
certificate.’
The above article, as pointed out by the respondent, also referred to a comment
by Ms M Reddy, an owner of a unit, who stated that she has been unable to attract
tenants to her unit because of the mould inside.
[10] A second article in the Sunday Tribune relied on by the applicants titled ‘All
manor of allegations about Ba llito estat e’, concerns accusations and counter -
manor of allegations about Ba llito estat e’, concerns accusations and counter -
accusations of mismanagement and fraud at the estate. The article features
comments ascribed to one of the unit owners, Mr Keeran Singh, who accuses the
second applicant (Mr Eager) of “hiding” the estate’s true financial position.
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[11] It is evident from the WhatsApp exchanges referred to earlier that Mr Singh
is part of the group of owners who, together with the respondent, have expressed
their misgivings regarding the state of affairs at the estate, including the alleged
overcharging by the Homeowners’ Association for water and electricity. Insofar as
the newspaper articles refer to the respondent, it records his unhappiness at how
the Association runs the estate and his complaint that defects to his unit have not
been attended to. In response to these allegations, an opportunity to respond was
accorded to Mr Eager on behalf of the Association. Mr Eager is recorded as saying
that Mr Pranpath’s tenants failed to look after his unit and that he had already been
compensated by the insurance for damages to the unit, and further that he doubted
that Mr Pranpath used the proceeds from the payout to attend to the repairs.
[12] Bearing in mind that defamation is the intentional infringement of another’s
good name or reputation, or the wrongful, intentional publication of words which
has the effect of undermining another’s reputation, I am respectfully unable to find
anything objectionable in th is article that would lead a reasonable reader to
conclude that the respondent’s comment s lowered the self-esteem in which the
applicants are held in the minds of ‘right -thinking’ or reasonable readers of the
newspaper. The respondent’s c omments are purely factual and in no way
defamatory to the applicants. It also bears noting that the respondent may have
been equally offended by Mr Eager's comments that he (Mr Pranpath) did not use
the proceeds recovered from the insurer to repair his unit. The comment may be
construed by a reasonable reader as implying an element of deviousness on the
part of Pranpath and that he is seeking to take advantage of his predicament. The
respondent did not pursue this point, and it is not necessary to say anything more
in that regard.
in that regard.
[13] The dissemination of the article in the Sunday Tribune on the respondent’s
Facebook page does not alter the essence of my finding that there is nothing
defamatory in those articles. The same applies to the publication of these articles
in other media platforms in the Ballito area. The applicants further contend that the
allegations in the newspaper articles are untrue and inflammatory. These are bald
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allegations which are not substantiated . I am unable to conclude that they have
been made with an intention to defame the applicants or to lower their standing
and reputation amongst reasonable readers.
[14] The position is somewhat different when one has regard to the posting in
the Ballito Classifieds (appearing as annexure “FA 6(c)”) where Mr Pranpath is
quoted as saying:
‘Potential buyers for Manor Estates please be aware of the following
1. The estate is non-compliant with CSOS as the rules are not registered;
2. The directors of the HOA had failed to comply with an enforcement order to make
the financial records available;
3. No dispute process followed;
4. The estate manager is not registered with the EAAB.
I don’t see how banks will finance buyers.’
[15] The comments by the respondent related to a dispute between the
Association and Mr and Mrs Duffieds, who are the owners of a unit on the estate.
The Duffieds lodged a complaint against the Association in terms of s 39 of the
Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the ‘CSOS Act’) and sought
disclosure of the Association’s financial statements for the period February 2022
to February 2023. This dispute has nothing whatsoever to do with the respondent’s
grievance against the Association , stemming from the water damage to his unit.
Following a ruling by the CSOS Ombud in favour of the Duffieds on 27 October
2023, the respondent has sought to opportunistically seize on the ruling to bolster
his own grievance with the Association. This is the only reasonable inference to be
drawn from the facts. The applicants point out that following the ruling, the Duffieds
were invited to inspect the financial records at the offices of the Association’s
attorneys, but for reasons unknown, th e inspection did not take p lace. There is
nothing to gainsay their version.
[16] The respondent contends that the publication in the Ballito Classifieds was
[16] The respondent contends that the publication in the Ballito Classifieds was
done with the intention to “seek advice on this subject matter”. It is wholly unclear
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from whom the respondent was hoping to obtain advice and on what subject
matter. He denies that the publication is defamatory and contends that it is a
“personal expression on the matter” after receiving a letter of demand from Mr
Crowther, the estate manager, in respect of unpaid levies and restricted access to
the estate. Again, the respondent’s reply is conspicuously vague.
[17] If Mr Pranpath wanted to express his views on the matter, the logical avenue
would have been to write directly to the Association and the estate manager.
Alternatively, he could have placed his grievances on the agenda for discussion
and called a vote at a meeting of the Association’s members. Perhaps, fearing that
he might not be able to win the day at a special general meeting, he chose instead,
perhaps as a strategy, to air his views on a public platform , weaponising his right
to freedom of expression . His use of words implying that the estate was “non -
compliant”, “not registered”, failed to comply with orders and the “non-registration”
of the estate manager, Mr Crowther, is in my view an intentional and calculated
attempt to cast aspersions on the propriety of those responsible for the
management of the estate. His defence amounts to none at all – his right to freely
express his views are confined within constitutionally permissible bounds,
otherwise it amounts to an abuse.3 There is no public interest in his utterances. As
the applicants point out , Mr Crowther is not an estate agent , and there is no
requirement for him to be a registered estate agent for the purposes of the position
he occupies in the Association . The utterances by the re spondent, in my view,
could only have been made in order to create the impression in the mind of a
reasonable reader that the Association was non -compliant with certain regulatory
prescripts and prospective buyers ought to be on their guard.
[18] As the Constitutional Court in Le Roux clarified,4 once the plaintiff
[18] As the Constitutional Court in Le Roux clarified,4 once the plaintiff
establishes the wrongful and intentional publication of a defamatory statement
concerning the plaintiff , a presumption of wrongfulness and intent then arises ,
3 The Citizen 1978 (Pty) Ltd and Others v McBride (Johnstone and Others, Amici Curiae) [2011]
ZACC 11; 2011 (4) SA 191 (CC) paras 105; 222-231.
4 Le Roux v Dey para 85.
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which can be rebutted by the defendant by proving a ground of justification . This
onus can be discharged on a preponderance of probabilities. Where a plaintiff (or
in this case the applicants) wish to point out the inuendo or ‘sting’ in the utterances
of Mr Pranpath, and that the utterances are defamatory, the applicants must satisfy
a two-stage enquiry : first, the ordinary meaning of the utterances, objectively
assessed, in the mind of a reasonable observer or reader in the case where the
statement has bee n printed and published. 5 The second enquiry is whether it is
likely to injure the good esteem in which the plaintiff is held by the reasonable or
average person to whom it had been published or conveyed.6
[19] I agree with the applicants’ contention that the respondent’s statements are
reckless and intentional (despite his denial) and could have only been made to
create the impression in the mind of reasonable readers that the estate was not a
property worth investing in. If there was any doubt as to the respondent’s intention,
the concluding statement that he “ does not see how banks will finance buyers”
unequivocally casts a shadow over any prospective buyer or investor looking to
purchase property in the Ballito area. The intention could only have been to frighten
off any prospective buyers from Manor Estates. It conveys the impression that the
estate is not managed in accordance with statutory requirements, that there is
some nefarious motive in not disclosing the estate’s financial records and that the
estate is managed by someone without the necessary “qualifications”. When
viewed collectively, and in the context of the statements being accompanied by the
publication of the letter of demand issued by Mr Crowther for unpaid levies (albeit
in pursuance of a legitimate function of the Association), the clear intention is to
ward off potential buyers and tarnish the reputation of the Association and at least
Mr Crowther.
Mr Crowther.
[20] In respect of the impact of the respondent’s conduct for the Association, the
applicants aver that before April 2024 , when the respondent commenced his
campaign to defame and malign the Association and its Board of Directors,
5 Ibid paras 88-90.
6 Ibid para 91.
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approximately three to four units were sold at the estate each month. In the four to
five months following the publications by the respondent, there has not been a
single sale. The only inference to be drawn is that the respondent’s campaign had
prejudiced the estate, its marketability and has frightened away potential buyers.
[21] While the respondent may have a gripe with the developer, the latter is a
different entity from the Association, who are not responsible for any defects in the
structure of the unit. If the respondent has a legitimate claim of the existence of
mould in his unit, he is entit led to pursue all avenues to seek redress against the
party who is liable for the shoddy construction. He is not entitled to malign the
reputation of the Association and its directors and impugn their dignity and
reputation by making unfounded allegations.
[22] I digress to consider one aspect which was not canvassed either in the
papers nor in argument – whether the Association has a claim for defamat ion.
Although the Association is not a natural person, it has a right at common law to
its reputation and to protect its good name. In Reddell and Others v Mineral Sands
Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others,7 which considered the dicta in Media 24 Ltd and
Others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd (Avusa Media Ltd and Others as Amici
Curiae),8 the Constitutional Court resolved the issue of whether corporations have
a right to sue for defamation. Ju stice Majiedt writing for the majority , summed up
the position as follows:
‘[87] In sum, the majority judgment in SA Taxi is wrong in its reasoning that undergirds
the finding that a trading corporation has a claim for general damages in defamation,
based on the constitutional right to dignity. I unreservedly accept that a trading corporation
has a right at common law to its good name and reputation, and that right is enforceable
through a common-law claim for defamation. And, as I see it, there can be no legitimate
through a common-law claim for defamation. And, as I see it, there can be no legitimate
objection to such a claim also being recognised constitutionally, particularly in view of the
equality protection contained in the provisions of ss 8(4) and 9 of the Constitution. More
7 Reddell and Others v Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others [2022] ZACC 38; 2023 (2)
SA 404 (CC).
8 Media 24 Ltd and Others v SA Taxi Securitisation (Pty) Ltd (Avusa Media Ltd and Others as Amici
Curiae) [2011] ZASCA 117; 2011 (5) SA 329 (SCA).
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about that later. Where I part ways with the majority reasoning in SA Taxi is, for the
reasons advanced, its finding that a trading corporation has a defamation claim based on
the constitutional right to dignity. The second leg of that finding, the question whether the
remedies available to it include a claim for general damages, will be considered presently.’
[23] In any event, neither the applicants or respondent raised the issue of the
distinction between the Association as a juristic entity, being distinct from the
second to fourth applicants who have a right to dignity and protection from
defamation because of their hurt fe elings as a result of certain utterances. Both
may be impacted by the respondent’s defamatory statements, but the ir basis in
law for relief may differ. My comments in this regard are purely obiter as these
issues were not part of the case before me but arose in preparation of this
judgment.9
[24] In light of the conclusion I reach regarding the utterances made by the
respondent directed at the Association and its directors, which were published in
the print and electronic media as well as the WhatsApp group chats, I do not find
it necessary to make any determination regarding the allegations that the
Association has overcharged its members for water and electricity (although these
alone are sufficiently serious to warrant interdictory relief) as well as the claims of
harassment and intimidation of having some person impersonate a police off icer
who threatened to arrest Mr Eager, the chairman of the Association, at the instance
of the respondent. Whether or not the words had the intended effect by the
respondent, is not the test. It is sufficient to show that the words were calculated
or had the tendency or propensity to defame the applicants. While these
allegations are refuted by the respondent and in respect of which I am unable to
reach any conclusion based on the disputes of fact, such conduct has no place in
reach any conclusion based on the disputes of fact, such conduct has no place in
9 See Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO
and Others [2000] ZACC 12; 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC); Tulip Diamonds FZE v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development and Others [2013] ZACC 19; 2013 (2) SACR 443 (CC).
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the resolution of disputes in the affairs of persons living in a communal residential
environment.
[25] I am satisfied that the applicants have made out a case for final relief as set
out in the notice of motion. The applicants have established a clear right to their
good names and reputations, and that the utterances and statements attributed to
the respondent have resulted in injury actually committed or reasonably
apprehended. The respondent has not sought to tender an apology for his
utterances and contends that he has a right to freedom of expression. It is trite that
rights, even though entrenched, are not un restrained, nor do they extend to the
infringement of the rights of others to their dignity and good reputation. I am also
satisfied that any alternative remedy for damages would be ineffective in the
circumstances. The harm complained of is a continuing violation of the applicants’
interests and can only be restrained by the grant of a final interdict.
[26] Mr Shapiro SC, for the applicants, submitted that the respondent should be
liable for costs on an attorney and client scale. Mr Chetty, who appeared for the
respondent, submitted that the respondent had attempted to resolve the matter
with the applicants’ attorney to prevent the escalation of costs. Accordingly, it was
submitted that if the court was disposed to grant final relief against the respondent,
in the context of the matter, costs should be ordered on a party and party scale.
[27] It is trite that the issue of costs is one which lies in the discretion of the
court, such discretion to be exercised in a judicious manner. The applicants were
obliged to bring this application for an interdict to halt the defamatory allegations
made against them by the respondent, who waged a concerted effort without any
proof that the applicants were those responsible for the uninhabitable unit he owns
on the estate. Despite the applicants’ drawing to the respondent’s attention that
on the estate. Despite the applicants’ drawing to the respondent’s attention that
they were not resp onsible for the defects found in his unit, the latter continued in
his relentless campaign to malign their reputations. As pointed out in the founding
affidavit, the campaign resulted in sales of units being brought to a hal t. This, I
have no doubt, was attributable to the respondent’s conduct. He offered not a dint
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of evidence to bolster his claims that the applicants were conducting themselves
in a dishonest manner and to the overall detriment of the members of the
Association. I see no reason why the applicants should be out of pocket when they
were obliged to turn to the court to defend their reputations against a sustained
campaign trumpeted by the respondent and his cohorts. His conduct justifies an
award of costs on an attorney and client scale.10
Order
[28] I accordingly make the following order:
1. The respondent is interdicted and restrained from publishing or uttering any
false and defamatory statements, whether orally, in writing, or on social media
platforms (including WhatsApp and Facebook), imputing that:
(a) The Board members of the first applicant, its employees or agents or the
second to fourth applicants are corrupt, dishonest or unethical;
(b) That the second applicant is a criminal or otherwise unethical; and
(c) That the Homeowners Association is or has been operated or managed
unlawfully, unethically or corruptly, or that units on the estate (to the
knowledge of the Homeowners Association) have been constructed in a
sub-standard or unsafe manner.
2. The respondent is interdicted and restrained from intimidating or in any way,
or through the agency of others, from harassing the second applicant.
3. The respondent is liable to pay the applicants' costs on an attorney and
client scale on Scale 8, including costs of counsel.
CHETTY J
10 See Hartland Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd and Another v APC Marketing {Pty) Ltd and Another
[2023] ZAWCHC 150; Barloworld South Africa {Pty) Ltd v Not in My Name International NPC and
Others [2026] ZAGPJHC 73.
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Appearances
For the applicant : WN Shapiro SC
Instructed by: Wiesinger O’Dwyer Inc
c/o Milar & Reardon
Address: 8 Pencarrow, Pencarrow Crescent
La Lucia Ridge
Umhlanga Rocks
Tel : 031 - 3042931
Email: keagan@millar-reardon.co.za
For the respondent: D Chetty
Instructed by: DC Attorneys
c/o Mervyn Gounden & Associates
Address 21 Swapo Road
Durban North
Tel 0718089454
Email: dc@dc-attorneys.co.za
Date reserved: 13 February 2026
Date of delivery: 30 April 2026