impermissible — Perfection of notarial bond — Concursus creditorum — Restoration
of possession — costs — even payable by party that abides
JUDGMENT
KUNY J:
INTRODUCTION
1 This is an urgent application for a mandament van spolie together with
interdictory and related relief. The issue is whether on 16 and 17 March 2026
the respondents had lawful authority to dispossess the applicants of property
and lock the warehouse premises at Jacob Street, Fountain Industrial Park,
Alrode (“the premises”).
2 It is common cause that on 16 and 17 March 2026 the applicants were locked
out and denied access to stock situated at the premises. The application was
initiated some four days after the alleged spoliation commenced. The first
applicant is alleged to be a trading entity whose stock consists of branded
sports goods sold through active online platforms. The continued deprivation of
its stock ordinarily results in the loss of sales, unfulfilled orders, and reputational
harm with platform operators. The second applicant is locked out of the
premises from which she conducts a warehousing and distribution business
serving a number of clients, including unrelated third parties whose goods are
also stored at the premises. It is self -evident that the harm is ongoing and not
adequately remediable by an award of damages alone. There was no
unreasonable delay in the bringing of the application. Substantial redress would
not be obtained at a hearing in due course because of the ongoing prejudice to
both applicants. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the matter is urgent and that it
is appropriate that it be dealt with on urgency.
3 The parties to these proceedings are:
3.1 t he first applicant, Dovecot Trading (Pty) Ltd, purports to carry on
business as an importer and supplier of branded sports goods which it
distributes through major online e- commerce platforms, including
Takealot, Makro, and Amazon.
3.2 t he second applicant, Mrs Dorothy Iris Wall, is an adult businesswoman
who, at the material time was in control of warehouse premises located
at B2 and C2, 22 Jacob Street, Fountain Industrial Park, Alrode, Gauteng
(“the premises ”). She operates a business from the premises for the
receiving, storage, and distribution of goods for various customers,
including the first applicant and unrelated third parties.
3.3 t he first respondent, Bidvest Bank Limited, is a registered bank and a
creditor of Sports Brands Direct (Pty) Ltd ( “Sports Brands”). It held a
general notarial covering bond over the movable assets of Sports
Brands. On 30 March 2026 the first respondent gave notice of its
intention to abide the decision of the court.
3.4 t he second respondent is the Sheriff of the High Court, Palm Ridge, (“the
Sheriff”) who attended the premises on 17 March 2026 and conducted
an inventory of the stock found there. He does not oppose this
application.
3.5 t he third and fourth respondents, Ms L Molingoane N.O. and Ms A Paula
de Oliveira N.O. (“ the Liquidators ”), are the duly appointed joint
provisional liquidators of Sports Brands Direct (Pty) Ltd (in Provisional
Liquidation). In their answering affidavit, the Liquidators advance the
primary statutory justification for the dispossession, claiming to have
acted in terms of section 19 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 ( “section
19”).
BACKGROUND
4 Sports Brands is one of three companies comprising what is referred to as the
“M5 Group” of companies. The other members are Direct Leisure Sports
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and M5 Sports Suppliers (Pty) Ltd (“M5 Sports”), the latter
being the holding company of the other two. The M5 Group was engaged in the
importation and distribution of branded sports goods in South Africa, including
international fitness and leisure brands.
5 On 20 January 2026 the first respondent obtained a court order from the
Gauteng Division authorising it to perfect the security it held by virtue of the
general notarial covering bond over the movable assets of Sports Brands (“the
perfection order”). The perfection order entitled the first respondent to attach
the movable assets as security for amounts owed to it. However, no steps were
taken to execute or give effect to it before the events described below.
6 On 5 February 2026, by order of the KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court,
Pietermaritzburg, Sports Brands, DLS and M5 Sports were placed into
provisional liquidation. Pursuant to the provisional liquidation order, the third
and fourth respondent s were appointed as joint provisional liquidators. The
return date of the provisional winding-up order is 21 April 2026.
APPLICANTS’ VERSION
7 The first applicant was incorporated in 2018 and later controlled by Mr Agar ,
the deponent to the founding affidavit. It alleges that it initially facilitated the
transfer of goods between DLS and certain retailers. Mr Agar concedes that he
had previously been employed as the financial manager of M5 Sports and the
first applicant. However, he disputes that the first applicant was a subsidiary of
M5 despite references to this in M5’s financial statements.
8 On 21 January 2024 the first applicant was deregistered by the CIPC for non -
compliance with annual returns. The first applicant was re- registered on 2
February 2026, three days before Sports Brands was placed into provisional
liquidation. It thereafter commenced trading as an independent business
liquidation. It thereafter commenced trading as an independent business
importing branded sports goods directly and distributing them via online
platforms. Its new director, Mr Agar, was appointed on 19 February 2026.
9 The second applicant operates a logistics business from the premises,
allegedly pursuant to a written lease agreement at a monthly rental of R34 500.
The first applicant, pursuant to an agreement with the second applicant, had
unrestricted access to the premises for the purposes of placing and removing
its stock. The second applicant additionally stores goods for unrelated third
parties at the premises.
10 The first applicant’s stock stored at the premises consisted of branded sports
goods allegedly lawfully imported, cleared through customs, and paid for by the
first applicant. They are said to have formed part of shipments imported and
cleared in the middle of February 2026.
11 The applicants allege that on 16 March 2026 at approximately 5:00pm Messrs
Crafford and Glover, four members of the SAPS and a private investigator
attended at the premises. The following is alleged to have occurred:
11.1 upon being challenged by the second applicant ’s husband, Mr Crafford
stated that he was acting in terms of the perfection order granted on 20
January 2026, and that he had been authorised to perfect the first
respondent’s security over the goods of Sports Brands.
11.2 t he Sheriff was not present and Mr Crafford did not produce any court
order permitting the attachment.
11.3 t he group of persons directed that the warehouse be secured. Chains
were placed around the outer doors of the warehouse and locked. Mr
Crafford advised that they would return the following day to attach and
uplift the goods, alleging that they belonged to Sports Brands and were
subject to the general notarial bond. Photographs of the chained and
locked doors were taken by Mr Wall.
12 On 17 March 2026 the Sheriff and Mr Christophorou and a number of other
persons arrived at the premises. Mr Crafford directed them remotely via cell
phone. The second applicant was present.
13 The Sheriff presented the second applicant with a copy of the perfection order
as authority for gaining access to the premises. When the persons tried to enter
the premises, a tense standoff ensued. The second applicant was intimidated
and, fearing for her safety, did not resist entry.
14 The Sheriff proceeded to make an inventory of the stock in the warehouse. The
second applicant was not provided with a copy of the inventory. However, she
took photographs of it. When inventory was completed, the locks were
changed. This prevented the applicants from gaining access to the premises.
15 In their replying affidavit the applicants allege that the second applicant went to
the Sheriff’s offices on 27 March 2026. She spoke to “Jaco”, who acknowledged
that he was the sheriff who had attended the premises on the 17
th. She asked
for a copy of the order and inventory made by him and he gave her a copy of
the perfection order and said inventory.
LIQUIDATORS’ VERSION
16 The Liquidators contend that the events of 16 and 17 March 2026 arose from a
process they had initiated to preserve assets of the liquidated companies. Their
version of the sequence of events is set out below.
17 On 13 March 2026 the Liquidators , through their attorneys, instructed Africor
Auctioneers to attend the “place of business and warehouses ” to secure and
uplift the movable assets and books and records of the company in liquidation
and to attend a valuation. The letter does not identify the premises as the place
to be attended and does not refer to the Sheriff at all.
18 On 16 March 2026 the Liquidators received information that stock belonging to
Sports Brands at its Alrode warehouse had been removed and was being
hidden from the Liquidators . Steps were taken to safeguard the stock and
preserve the assets of the liquidated companies in the M5 Group.
19 The Liquidators state that they separately instructed the Sheriff to perform his
duties in terms of section 19, which he did. They also requested Mr Crafford to
get involved because of his knowledge of the situation. However, he did nothing
other than assist the Sheriff to implement section 19. The Liquidators dispute
that they relied on the perfection order obtained by the first respondent on 20
January 2026 as their authority to search and lock the premises.
20 The Liquidators do not provide a full account of what occurred at the premises
on the afternoon of 16 March 2026. Apart from denying that the persons present
on 16 March stormed the warehouse, the Liquidators neither confirm nor deny
the applicants’ account of what Mr Crafford said to Mr Wall when he arrived.
They state that Mr Crafford was not physically present when the persons arrived
at the premises on 16 March. However, they admit that he arrived later when
contacted by Christophorou and Glover. The Liquidators allege that the persons
who attended the premises on the 16
th were under their instructions to
implement section 19 and that there was no resistance to the Liquidators’
agents entering the premises.
21 On 17 March 2026 the Sheriff attended at the premises together with
Christophorou allegedly as part of the section 19 process. Stock was identified
and attached. The Sheriff allegedly handed the second applicant a copy of the
liquidation order and advised her that he was there to implement section 19. To
safeguard the stock, the Sheriff locked the premises, with the stock inside. This
was justified on the basis that the Sheriff had to lawfully close the warehouse
to secure the stock.
22 The Liquidators accordingly deny the locking of the premises was spoliation.
They contend that the attachment and securing of the stock was justified by
section 19.
23 On 17 March 2026, the first applicant ’s attorneys, Grant and Swanepoel,
section 19.
23 On 17 March 2026, the first applicant ’s attorneys, Grant and Swanepoel,
addressed an urgent letter to Crafford Attorneys. The letter records their clients’
instructions that they had been spoliated and that Mr Crafford had relied on the
perfection order, and had secured the premises and asserted control over their
stock.
24 On 19 March 2026 the Liquidators ’ attorneys addressed a letter to the
applicants’ attorneys setting out the basis upon which the Liquidators justified
their conduct in relation to the disputed stock:
24.1 t hey deny they acted outside the scope of their statutory powers and
duties claiming that they had caused their appointed representatives and
agents to take steps to secure Sports Brand’s assets, books and records
in the interests of the insolvent estate and the general body of creditors.
24.2 t he Liquidators rely on competing and unsubstantiated claims to the
stock and uncertainty as to which entity paid for, imported or received
the goods. In those circumstances they state that they could not accept
at face value that the stock fell outside the insolvent estate and that they
were obliged to preserve the position pending proper investigation.
24.3 the letter makes no reference whatsoever to section 19 as the source of
authority for the conduct complained of. Nor does it suggest that the
Sheriff was acting pursuant to a statutory attachment in terms of that
provision. The case advanced in the letter is instead framed broadly in
terms of a general duty on the part of the Liquidators to preserve
disputed assets pending investigation, implemented through appointed
representatives and agents.
LIQUIDATORS’ DEFENCES
25 The Liquidators raise a variety of factual and legal defences. These can be
summarised as follows:
25.1 the applicants have failed to prove peaceful and undisturbed possession
of clearly identified stock.
25.2 the stock that was attached is believed to belong to Sports Brands. The
first applicant removed this stock unlawfully from the Alrode warehouse
and was hiding it from the Liquidators at the premises. The applicants
bear the onus to identify the goods and that they were in possession.
They failed to establish a clean and complete chain of title to the stock.
25.3 the Liquidators were duty -bound to secure disputed stock and the
records and infrastructure.
25.4 t he attachment arose as part of a preservation process that had been
initiated by the Liquidators acting in terms of section 19. They were
lawfully entitled to attach the goods in terms of this section.
25.5 t he Liquidators disavow any reliance on the perfection order. They
contend that they instructed the Sheriff to perform his duties in terms of
section 19, which is what he did. Mr Crafford assisted the Sheriff only
because he had prior knowledge of the matter.
25.6 t he Liquidators attack the bona fides of the first applicant ’s claim to
ownership. They rely in this regard on the fact that the first applicant had
been deregistered for two years and re- registered only days before the
liquidation of Sports Brands. Mr Agar had been the financial manager of
M5 Sports and M5 Group’ s financial statements referred to the first
applicant as a subsidiary. Further more, the y assert that the business
model adopted by the first applicant closely mirrored that of the
liquidated entities.
THE APPLICANTS’ CASE
26 The first applicant submitted that as a consequence of the spoliation it was
unable to sell its goods on e- commerce platforms and it suffered severe
financial prejudice. The second applicant was prevented from servicing other
customers and she was left entirely unable to use the premises for their
intended purpose.
27 The applicants were in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the premises
and the stock stored therein. Although the second applicant was in control of
the premises, the first applicant had unrestricted access and a contractual right
to its stock stored at this location. The mere fact that the first applicant ’s
directors are resident in KwaZulu- Natal did not negate its possession and
control over the goods. Possession of goods may be held through an agent or
bailee. The reference to “ Take Ease Fulfilment ” in the initial attorneys ’ letter
was an innocent error promptly corrected.
28 The facts demonstrated that dispossession of the first applicant’s goods by the
respondents was carried out under the authority of the perfection order and not
pursuant to section 19.
29 The perfection order was rendered void by operation of section 359(1)(b) of the
Companies Act. Upon the provisional liquidation of Sports Brands on 5
February 2026, a concursus creditorum was established. Any attempt to perfect
the notarial bond after the commencement of liquidation was void ab initio and
incapable of conferring lawful authority for dispossession.
30 The Liquidators’ section 19 defence is contradicted by all the contemporaneous
evidence. Section 19(1)(a) vests its powers exclusively in the Sheriff and is
limited to property of the insolvent estate. It does not apply to property in the
possession of a third party who claims to be entitled to exercise ownership and
control and it does not permit the summary attachment of such property.
31 The Sheriff was required to hand the custodian a notice referencing the
sequestration order. This was not done.
32 Where a dispute arises as to the ownership of property , the Liquidators were
required to take formal legal steps before laying claim to such property. They
could do this in terms of section 69(3) of the Insolvency Act by way of an
application to a magistrate for a search warrant. The Liquidators by-passed this
application to a magistrate for a search warrant. The Liquidators by-passed this
mechanism entirely and simply resorted to self-help. The applicants rely in this
regard on Cothill et Uxor v Cornelius 2000 (4) SA 163 (T).
33 The ownership of the goods is irrelevant in spoliation proceedings. The
mandament van spolie is a possessory remedy. The court must restore the
status quo ante first, and the ownership dispute should be resolved in separate
proceedings. The first respondent and the Liquidators are not without remedies
if they have a legitimate claim to the goods.
THE MANDAMENT VAN SPOLIE
34 The mandament van spolie is one of the oldest and most robust remedies
known to South African law. In Nino Bonino v De Lange 1906 TS 120, it was
authoritatively established that no person is permitted to take the law into his
own hands. If a person is unlawfully deprived of possession of property, the
court will summarily restore possession before anything else is decided
(spoliatus ante omnia restituendus est). The remedy is not concerned with the
question of ownership. It rests exclusively on the fact of prior possession and
the unlawfulness of the dispossession.
35 To succeed, an applicant must establish that it was in peaceful and undisturbed
possession of the property at the time of the alleged spoliation and that it was
unlawfully deprived of that possession. If these elements are established, the
court is obliged to restore possession summarily, leaving any title or ownership
dispute to separate proceedings. Whether the respondent’s title is good in law
is irrelevant at this stage. It is settled law that even a person who has obtained
possession through dubious means is entitled to the protection of the
mandament van spolie.
1
36 Section 359(1)(b) of the Companies Act provides that any attachment or
execution put in force against the estate or assets of a company after the
commencement of the winding-up shall be void. See also Walker v Syfret N.O
1 Ivanov v North West Gambling Board & Others 2012 (6) SA 67 (SCA)
1911 AD 141 (at p152) where the court held that the liquidation of a c ompany
establishes a concursus creditorum and thereafter no creditor can alter his
relative position to the detriment of the other creditors of the estate. The
provision operates automatically and without any need for a formal court order
setting aside the impugned attachment. An attachment put in force post -
liquidation is void ab initio.
37 Section 19 imposes a mandatory duty upon the Sheriff to attach and make an
inventory of the movable property of the insolvent estate as soon as a
sequestration or winding- up order is received. The provision applies only to
property of the insolvent estate. It does not apply to property in the possession
of a person who claims to be entitled to retain it under a right of pledge or a
right of retention.
38 Section 19(1)(c) provides that once the Sheriff has made an attachment:
19(1)(c) he shall hand to the person so appointed a copy of the
inventory, with a notice that the property has been
attached by virtue of a sequestration order. That
notice shall contain a statement of the offence
constituted by section one hundred and forty-two and
the penalty provided therefor;
39 The above subsection is explicit in its terms. The Liquidators do not allege that
this requirement was complied with.
40 Section 69(1) of the Insolvency Act provides that a trustee or liquidator shall,
as soon as possible after appointment, take possession of all movable property,
books, and documents belonging to the estate. However, the liquidator may not
do so before the sheriff has completed the section 19 inventory.
41 In terms of sections 69(2) and 69(3) where a trustee has reason to believe that
estate property is concealed or otherwise unlawfully withheld from him he may
make application to a magistrate, supported by a statement on oath, for a
search warrant. The magistrate may issue such a warrant if satisfied there are
search warrant. The magistrate may issue such a warrant if satisfied there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that estate property is being withheld. That
warrant is executed in the manner of a warrant to search for stolen goods. The
above section provides a mechanism to a liquidator who suspects a third party
of concealing estate assets.
DISCUSSION
42 The answering affidavit does not include a confirmatory affidavit from Mr
Crafford, nor one from the Sheriff or Christophorou. The Liquidators’ version of
the events of 16 and 17 March 2026 therefore rests solely on the affidavit of the
third respondent, whose account of the events of 16 March in particular is
derived largely from information conveyed to her by others, including Mr
Crafford, rather than from her own direct observation.
43 The Liquidators’ challenge is directed at both applicants. It is contended, first,
that the first applicant lacked any physical presence in Gauteng and could not
therefore exercise possession of the stock, and secondly, that the second
applicant was not the true operator of the premises, reliance being placed in
this regard on the reference in the applicants’ attorneys’ letter of 17 March 2026
to “Take Ease Fulfilment (Pty) Ltd”.
44 On the applicants’ version, the second applicant conducts a warehousing and
distribution business from the premises pursuant to a lease agreement. The
premises are used for the storage and distribution of goods on behalf of multiple
clients, including the first applicant and unrelated third parties. The first
applicant, in turn, stores its goods at the premises and enjoys an unrestricted
right of access for purposes of placing and removing stock.
45 The Liquidators dispute aspects of the above arrangement, including the
validity of the lease and the identity of the true operator of the premises.
However, these disputes are not supported by direct evidence establishing that
the second applicant was not, as a matter of fact, in control of or operating from
the premises at the relevant time. The reference to “ Take Ease Fulfilment” in
the premises at the relevant time. The reference to “ Take Ease Fulfilment” in
the initial letter is explained in reply as an error, and that explanation cannot be
rejected on the papers.
46 The evidence further establishes that the second applicant was physically
present at the premises on both 16 and 17 March 2026, when the Liquidators ’
representatives attended, asserted authority, and proceeded to secure the
warehouse and conduct an inventory. While the level of detail provided in the
founding papers is not extensive, and is conveyed primarily through Mr Agar ’s
affidavit, the fact of her presence and her assertion of control is not meaningfully
disputed. Even if the lease were defective or informal, that would not negate
factual possession. For purposes of the mandament van spolie, the enquiry is
directed at de facto possession, not the validity of the underlying right.
47 In these circumstances and applying the approach to disputes of fact in motion
proceedings, I am satisfied that the second applicant established that,
immediately prior to the events in question she was in factual possession of the
premises as operator of a warehousing business. It cannot be seriously
disputed that t he first applicant, through its arrangement with the second
applicant to store its goods at the premises, exercised possession of its stock
in a custodial sense. The requirement of peaceful and undisturbed possession
has therefore been established.
48 The central issue in this application is whether the Liquidators had lawful
authority for their conduct. The Liquidators advance two mutually inconsistent
justifications. The first respondent, through its attorney Mr Crafford, relied on
the perfection order. The Liquidators relied on section 19 of the Insolvency Act.
The evidence establishes that on:
48.1 16 March 2026, Mr Crafford expressly told Mr Wall that he was acting in
terms of the perfection order.
48.2 17 March 2026, the Sheriff presented the perfection order to the second
applicant as authority for the steps he was taking.
48.3 27 March 2026, when asked directly, the Sheriff confirmed he had acted
on the perfection order.
49 The legal position under section 359(1)(b) of the Companies Act is decisive.
Sports Brands was placed into provisional liquidation on 5 February 2026. From
that date, a concursus creditorum was established and the estate was frozen
as against individual creditors. The perfection order, although validly obtained
on 20 January 2026, had never been executed before the liquidation. Any
reliance on the perfection order after the liquidation of Sports Brands was not
sanctioned by law and was misplaced.
THE SECTION 19 DEFENCE
50 The Liquidators’ reliance on section 19 as a justification for the dispossession
fails on multiple independent grounds, each of which is sufficient to dispose of
the defence. The most fundamental difficulty is that the section 19 defence is
factually contradicted by the contemporaneous evidence which points to the
perfection order as the operative authority.
51 The Liquidators’ letter of 19 March 2026 contains no reference to the Sheriff,
nor to section 19 as the source of their authority. Instead, the Liquidators’ case
is repeatedly framed on the basis that ownership of the stock was disputed and
that the measures implemented were directed at preserving the assets pending
investigation. This contemporaneous characterisation sits uncomfortably with
and indeed contradicts the Liquidators’ subsequent reliance on section 19.
52 If the Sheriff was truly acting under section 19, one would have expected:
52.1 a notice to be handed to the second applicant referring to the Sports
Brands liquidation order.
52.2 the letter sent by the Liquidator’s attorney on 19 March 2026 to have
made specific mention that the persons who attended at the premises
on 16 and 17 March acted in terms of section 19.
52.3 the Sheriff to confirm, when visited by the second applicant, that he was
acting in terms of section 19.
53 None of the above expectations were met. The factual position was that the first
applicant challenged the authority of the Liquidators’ representatives to attach
goods and lock the premises when they attended on the 16
th. This occurred
again on 17 March 2026. The evidence points to the fact that the section 19
defence was formulated after the event, once the prospect of a spoliation
application became a reality.
54 S ection 19 applies only to property of the insolvent estate. The goods in
question are claimed by the first applicant as its own. Whether that claim is
ultimately well- founded is not for determination in these proceedings. For
present purposes, it suffices that a third- party claim to ownership and
possession was asserted. Section 19 does not provide a mechanism for the
summary resolution of such disputes, nor does it authorise dispossession in the
face of them.
CONCLUSION
55 I conclude as follows:
55.1 the applicants were in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the
premises and the stock at the time of the events of 16 and 17 March
2026. In this regard, the first applicant exercised possession of the
stock by virtue of its contractual arrangement with the second applicant.
55.1 The attachment of the stock and locking of the premises on 16 and 17
March 2026 was not lawfully carried out in accordance with the
prescripts of section 19.
55.2 to the extent that the perfection order was executed after the liquidation
of Sports Brands, it was void by operation of section 359(1)(b) of the
Companies Act.
55.3 i n any event , section 19 did not justify the dispossession because the
property was claimed by a third party, the statutory notice was not given
and the procedures prescribed in section 69(3) were bypassed.
55.4 t he Liquidators were therefore not entitled to dispossess the applicants
of the premises or the stock and their conduct constituted unlawful
spoliation.
55.5 t he question of ownership of the goods is not before the court and is to
be resolved in separate proceedings.
COSTS
56 The applicants seek a costs order on the punitive attorney and own client scale.
They submit that the Liquidators ’ conduct was deliberate, contumacious, and
constituted a blatant disregard for the legal process.
57 The correspondence reflects that Mr Glover, an associate at the firm of
attorneys acting for the first respondent, was included in and party to
communications concerning the identification and control of the disputed stock.
The Liquidators do not dispute the allegation that Messrs Crafford and Glover
were in attendance when goods were attached and the premises were locked.
The first respondent, on 26 March 2026, gave notice of its intention to oppose
the application. Its stance changed on 30 March 2026 when it filed a notice to
abide. Notwithstanding this, the steps taken by the respondents formed part of
a coordinated process in which the first respondent’s legal representatives were
actively involved. Ordinarily this court may have been inclined to order costs
against the first respondent on a punitive scale. However, it has narrowly
avoided this withdrawing its opposition and abiding the decision of the court.
58 As far as the third and fourth respondent s are concerned I am not persuaded
that their conduct rises to the level of contumacity such as would justify punitive
costs. I cannot find that any of the Liquidators acted mala fide and their conduct,
though unlawful, may have arisen from a misunderstanding of their powers.
Accordingly, it is appropriate that they pay the costs on the ordinary scale.
ORDER
59 In the result, the following order is made:
1. The first, third, and fourth respondents (and/or any party acting
on their instructions) to immediately restore undisturbed
possession to the applicants of the premises situated at B2 and
C2, 22 Jacob Street, Fountain Industrial Park, Alrode, Gauteng
("the p remises"), together with the stock and goods located
therein ("the stock"), identified and itemised in the schedule
annexed to the applicants’ notice of motion marked “RA19”.
2. The stock identified in annexure “RA19” is released from judicial
attachment.
3. The applicants are permitted to remove the locks placed on the
premises by the respondents.
4. The first, third and fourth respondents and any party instructed by
them or deriving any permission from them, are interdicted and
restrained from:
4.1. interfering with or entering the premises; and
4.2. dealing with, attempting to remove, realise, or dispose of
any of the stock located on or stored at the premises,
without the prior written consent of the first applicant or unless
otherwise permitted in terms of a valid Court order.
5. The first, third and fourth respondent s are ordered to pay the
costs of this application jointly and severally on the party and party