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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case No. 2026-026100
In the matter between:
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN APPLICANT
and
S[...] M[...] L[...] FIRST RESPONDENT
N[...] M[...] SECOND RESPONDENT
L[...] M[...] THIRD RESPONDENT
LWAZI VAN STADEN FOURTH RESPONDENT
MVELISO KRAAI FIFTH RESPONDENT
ALL THOSE HOLDING TITLE UNDER THE
UNLAWFULLY OCCUPYING THE UNIVERSITY
OF CAPE TOWN UNDWER THE FIRST TO
FIFTH RESPONDENTS
SIXTH RESPONDENT
CORAM: ADHIKARI AJ
Heard: 9 March 2026
Delivered: 29 April 2026
ORDER
1. The application is dismissed.
2. There shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ELECTRONICALLY ON 24 APRIL 2026
ADHIKARI, AJ
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[1] This is an application for the enforcement of eviction order s granted by this
Court on 13 June 20251 against the respondents.2
[2] It appears from the judgment in University of Cape Town v Villo that the
applicant (‘UCT’) had made offers to UCT students for placement at the UCT
student accommodation known as the Phi lip Kgosana residence
(‘the PK residence’) in Mowbray for the 2024 academic year , subject to the
proviso that the PK residence would be decommissioned to address
maintenance issues. UCT expressly did not guarantee that the offerees would
be accommodated for the entirety of the 2024 academic year.
[3] The first respondent (‘Ms L[...]’) received a placement offer for the
PK residence for the 2024 academic year which was subsequently revoked
because she failed to register as a student for the 2024 academic year. The
second respondent (‘Ms M[...]’) also received a placement offer for the
PK residence for the 2024 academic year. The third respondent (‘Mr M[...]’) is
1 See University of Cape Town v Villo and Others (2025/037004) [2025] ZAWCHC 262 (13 June
2025).
2 The first, second, fourth and fifth respondents in the present application were the second, seventh,
twelfth and thirteenth respondents respectively in the matter of University of Cape Town v Villo.
The third respondent was not a named respondent in that matter but was one of the parties to
those proceedings.
the spouse of Ms M[...] and had occupied the PK residence with Ms M[...] and
their two minor children. The fourth respondent (‘Mr van Staden) was
temporarily placed at the PK residence at the end of 2024 because his
allocated residence was being deep cleaned. He subsequently refused to
vacate the PK residence. The fift h respondent (‘Mr Kraai’) was temporarily
placed in the PK residence after he failed to receive a n accommodation offer
for the 2024 academic year . He also subsequently refused to vacate the
PK residence.
[4] On 13 June 2025 this Court granted order s, inter alia, directing the
respondents to vacate the PK residence by 31 August 2025, and if they failed
to do so the Sheriff of the Court was authorised to evict the respondents from
the PK residence.
[5] After the eviction order was granted , the respondents applied for leave to
appeal and for an extension of the date of their eviction.
[6] On 6 August 2025 the parties to the eviction proceedings concluded a
settlement agreement which was made an order of court in terms of which,
inter alia, the date by which the respondents were to vacate the PK residence
was extended to 20 December 2025 and the respondents undertook to vacate
the PK residence by 20 December 2025.
[7] On 11 December 2025 certain of the respondents in the eviction proceedings
instituted proceedings to stay the execution of the eviction order which was
dismissed. On 17 December 2025 certain of the respondents in the eviction
proceedings instituted a second stay application which was also dismissed.
On 22 December 2025 the same respondents who had instituted the second
stay application unsuccessfully sought to approach th is Court for the same
relief.
[8] The respondents in the eviction proceedings did not vacate the PK residence
by 20 December 2025 and the Sheriff on 22 December 2025 executed the
eviction order. The Sheriff placed the respondents’ belongings in a parking lot
eviction order. The Sheriff placed the respondents’ belongings in a parking lot
owned by UCT and which is adjacent to the UCT hockey fields below the M3
highway, some distance away from the PK residence. The respondents
subsequently erected a tent in the parking lot , parked a vehicle next to the
tent, and took up occupation of the tent and the vehicle.
[9] All the respondents, save for Mr M[...], have been in occupation of the parking
lot since their eviction from the PK residence on 22 December 2025. It is not
in dispute that the respondents’ occupatio n of the parking lot is unlawful as
they do not have the consent of UCT or any other right in law to occupy the
parking lot.
[10] As a consequence of the respondents’ unlawful occupation of the parking lot,
UCT instituted proceedings in this Court on 6 February 2026 for the following
relief:
[10.1] An order enforcing the eviction order granted on 13 June 2025, as
amended by the order granted by agreement on 6 August 2025
(‘the amended eviction order’) by declaring that the respondents are
in breach of their undertakings to vacate the PK residence by
unlawfully occupying the parking lot and directing the respondents to
vacate the parking lot and not to re -occupy any property of UCT
without its consent; or
[10.2] In the alternative , an order in terms of the common law directing the
respondents to vacate the parking lot and not to re -occupy any
property of UCT without its consent;
[10.3] In the event that the respondents do not vacate the parking lot , an
order authorising UCT’s Campus Protection Services assisted by the
South African Police Services to evict the respondents from the
parking lot, and to remove their possessions; and
[10.4] An order interdicting the respondents from unlawfully occupying or
residing in any of UCT’s properties without its prior consent.
[11] This application was initially set down for hearing in the urgent court on
20 February 2026. On that date the respondents appeared in person and
sought a postponement in order to oppose th e application. The application
was postponed for hearing on 9 March 2026, and the respondents were
directed to deliver their notices of intention to oppose by 24 February 2026
and their answering affidavits by 27 February 2026. In addition, the court
granted UCT leave to re-enrol the matter on the urgent roll on 24 hours’ notice
to the respondents in the event that the respondents failed to deliver
answering affidavits.
[12] UCT elected not to re -enrol the matter on the urgent roll and the application
was heard on 9 March 2026.
THE BASIS ON WHICH UCT SEEKS RELIEF
[13] In essence, UCT contends that the undertaking given by the respondents to
vacate the residence by 20 December 2025 as part of the settlement
agreement concluded on 6 August 2025 which resulted in the amendment of
the eviction order , must be interpreted to include an undertaking by the
respondents not to unlawfully re -occupy the PK residence and not to
unlawfully occupy any other UCT property.
[14] UCT argues that had it not been for the se undertakings by the respondents it
would not have consented to the extension of the date of the eviction, and that
the respondents’ conduct in taking occupation of the parking lot in the face of
the undertakings constitutes a deliberate and mala fide disregard for the
amended eviction order.
[15] UCT urged this Court to take into account that:
[15.1] Ms M[...] had confirmed on oath , in the first and second stay
applications, that she fully accept ed the eviction order, and that she
intended to secure private off campus accommodation;
[15.2] Mr van Staden, Mr Kraai, Ms M[...] and Ms L[...], in the second stay
application, had confirmed that they did not oppose the eviction order
and did not seek indefinite occupation of the PK residence; and
[15.3] Ms L[...], in the second stay application , confirmed that she would
vacate the PK residence by 31 January 2026 and move to alternative
accommodation.
[16] In addition, UCT submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal
in Stay At South Point Properties (Pty) Ltd v Mqulwana and others (UCT
intervening as amicus curiae) 3 is authority for the proposition that purpose
built student accommodation of limited duration does not constitute a ‘home’
for the purposes of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation
of Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘PIE’) and that as a consequence , the unlawful
occupation of a university -owned parking lot following the breach of an
undertaking embodied in a court order to vacate a university residence , also
cannot attract the protections of PIE.
[17] UCT further contends that PIE does not find application because the
respondents have homes elsewhere. In support of this contention UCT relies
on the residential addresses which were , inter alia , supplied by the
respondents when they first registered with UCT or the residential addresses
for the respondents which are noted in UCT’s records.
[18] Consequently, UCT argues that an order directing the respondents to vacate
the parking lot and author ising their eviction in the even t that they do not
vacate the parking lot , is in fact an order enforcing the amended eviction
order. In the alternative, UCT contends that it is entitled to an eviction order in
terms of the common law, that is the rei vindicatio, in that it is the lawful owner
3 Stay At South Point Properties (Pty) Ltd v Mqulwana and others (UCT intervening as amicus
curiae) [2023] ZASCA 108; 2024 (2) SA 640 (SCA).
of the parking lot, and the respondents have no consent or any other right in
law to occupy the parking lot.
THE RESPONDENTS’ CIRCUMSTANCES
[19] The respondents delivered a notice of intention to oppose but did not deliver
answering affidavits. When the matter came before me on 9 March 2026,
Mr M[...] and Ms M[...] appeared in person. None of the other respondents
appeared at the hearing.
The M[...] family
[20] Mr and Ms M[...] addressed the court on their personal circumstances. It
appears from their oral submissions that Ms M[...] was previously employed
with the South African Police Services (‘SAPS’) and is now doing her articles
with the State Attorney. She submitted that she does not receive a salary but
that she is paid by means of a stipend from a SETA and that there are
significant challenges with receiving payment of the stipend . It appears that
she therefore does not have a reliable, regular source of income at this stage.
[21] It appear s from UCT’s papers that Mr M[...] has been accepted to study at
UCT for the 2026 academic year and has been allocated self -catering
accommodation for an individual at the UCT residence known as Obz Square
residence. The Obz Square residence does not accommodate families .
Consequently, Ms M[...] and the two minor children are not permitted to reside
at Obz Square residence with Mr M[...]. UCT contended that Ms M[...] and the
two minor children at times reside with Mr M[...] at the Obz Square residence,
but this was denied by both Mr and Ms M[...] who indicated that Ms M[...] and
the two minor children visit with Mr M[...] during the visitor hour s permitted in
terms of the rules of the Obz Square residence. UCT also alleged that the
M[...] family had at times spent the night in the Kramer law library.
[22] It appears from the oral submissions made by Mr M[...] that prior to taking up
residence at PK residence the M[...] family lived in a SAPS residence as
residence at PK residence the M[...] family lived in a SAPS residence as
Ms M[...] was, at the time , employed by the SAPS. This corresponds with
what is stated in UCT’s founding affidavit . In the founding affidavit UCT states
that according to its records for 2025 both Mr and Ms M[...] had their
residential addresses at SAPS HRD Centre, Eersterivier.
[23] In response to questioning by the court, Ms M[...] stated that she and her
minor children no longer reside in the parking lot as she does not feel safe
there since Mr M[...] is not with them , and she does not know the two male
respondents who reside there, (that is Mr van Staden and Mr Kraai). She
further submitted that she was trying to secure alternative accommodation for
herself and her children but that she has been unsuccessful so far.
[24] In the affidavit filed by Ms M[...] in the first stay application she stated that she
and her family were at risk of temporary homelessness if they were to be
evicted. In the affidavit filed by Ms M[...] in the second stay application she
stated that if she and her family were to be evicted on 20 December 2025,
they would have no alternative accommodation and would face the real threat
of homelessness.
[25] From the facts before me it is clear that Ms M[...] and her minor children do not
have a permanent place of abode, but also that she and her minor children do
not reside in the parking lot any longer. It is not in dispute that Mr M[...]
resides at the Obz Square residence, and not in the parking lot.
Ms L[...]
[26] Given that Ms L[...] failed to deliver an answering affidavit and did not appear
at the hearing, the on ly information before the court relating to her
circumstances appear s from UCT’s affidavits and the affidavits filed by
Ms L[...] in the first and second stay applications.
[27] UCT states in its founding affidavit that the residential address given to UCT
by Ms L[...] in 2021 was Samora Machel , Phillippi, and that at the time of her
registration in 2016 Ms L[...]’s residential address was in the Eastern Cape .
According to UCT after she was evicted from PK residence , Ms L[...] took up
According to UCT after she was evicted from PK residence , Ms L[...] took up
residence in the parking lot with her minor children. It is not clear from UCT’s
affidavits how many minor children Ms L[...] has. It appears from the affidavits
filed by M s L[...] in the first and second stay applications that she had given
birth by caesarean section to a premature baby in December 2025.
[28] According to UCT, Ms L[...] was last present in the parking lot at an inspection
conducted on 26 January 2026, but she was not residing at the parking lot at a
subsequent inspection conducted in early February 2026, nor when the
application papers were served at the parking lot on 6 February 2026. In her
affidavit filed in the second stay application Ms L[...] stated that she intended
to vacate PK residence by 31 January 2026 as this would allow her to relocate
in a safe manner ensuring the well-being of her child.
[29] The facts before the court therefore indicate that Ms L[...] and her minor
children are no longer residing in the parking lot. On the probabilities it
appears that she ha d indeed taken up alternative accommodation by
31 January 2026 as she stated in her affidavit filed in the second stay
application.
Mr van Staden
[30] In his affidavit filed in the first s tay application, Mr van Staden stated that his
mother had passed away in 2023 leaving him and his sister homeless and that
this was the reason that he had moved into the PK residence. He further
stated that his situated remained the same as at 2 December 2025. In his
affidavit filed in the second stay application Mr van Staden stated that he was
dependent on university accommodation and that if he were to be evicted, he
would face the immediate risk of homelessness.
Mr Kraai
[31] In his affidavit filed in the first stay application , Mr Kraai stated that he had
nowhere to go other than the PK residence and that he could not go back
home as both his parents had passed away. In his affidavit filed in the second
stay application, Mr Kraai stated that the PK residence was his sole place of
residence and that he did not have another home to return to if he was
required to vacate the PK residence . He further stated that if he was to be
evicted he would have nowhere to stay and would face homelessness.
DOES PIE FIND APPLICATION IN THIS MATTER?
[32] Section 26(3) of the Constitution provides that no one may be evicted from
their home, or have their home demolished without an order of court made
after considering all the relevant circumstances . The right not to be evicted
without an order of court is given effect to by the provisions of PIE ,4 which was
adopted with the objective of overcoming the abuses perpetrated under the
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 which was used to prevent and
control what was referred to as ‘squatting’ on public or private land by
criminalising such conduct and providing for a simplified eviction process.5
[33] As the Constitu tional Court noted in Port Elizabeth Municipality , ‘… it was
against this background, and to deal with these injustices, that s 26(3) of the
Constitution was adopted and new statutory arrangements made . [PIE] was
adopted with the manifest objective of overcoming the above abuses to
ensure that evictions, in future, took place in a manner consistent with the
values of the new constitutional dispensation. Its provisions have to be
interpreted against this background.’6
4 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers [2004] ZACC 7; 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 2004 (12)
BCLR 1268 (CC), para 11 and 24. See also Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Northern Cape v
Thubelisha Homes and Others [2009] ZACC 16; 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC); 2 010 (3) SA 454 (CC),
para 62 – 64 (per Yacoob J), para 142 (per Moseneke DCJ), and para 233 (per Ngcobo J).
5 Joe Slovo (above) para 230.
6 Port Elizabeth Municipality (above), para 10 and 11.
[34] It is well settled that the provisions of PIE only apply to the eviction of persons
from buildings or structures that are their homes. 7 The term ‘home’ is,
however, not defined in PIE, and as a consequence the question of what
constitutes a ‘home’ for the purposes of PIE has received attention from our
courts over time.
[35] In Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 8 the Supreme Court of
Appeal interpreted PIE in light of its roots in s 26(3) of the Constitution which is
concerned with rights to on e's home, the preamble to PIE which emphasises
the right to one's home and the interests of vulnerable persons, the buildings
listed in PIE, and the fact that one is ultimately concerned with 'any other form
of temporary or permanent dwelling or shelter' ,9 and concluded in the context
of the unlawful occupation of commercial properties by juristic persons that
buildings or structures that do not perform the function of a form of dwelling or
shelter for humans do not fall under PIE.10
[36] In Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers,
Newtown Urban Village 11 the Court in considering the definition of
homelessness referred with approval to the decision of Makama and Others
v Administrator, Transvaal 12 where the Court in con sidering the definition of
the term ‘homeless’ in the context of s 6 of PISA stated that ‘[i]ts ordinary
meaning is lacking a home and, though the concept of home is of wide and
varied nature when applied to persons, it does connote a shelter against the
7 Barnett and Others v Minister of Land Affairs and Others [2007] ZASCA 95; 2007 (6) SA 313
(SCA); 2007 (11) BCLR 1214 (SCA), para 37. See also Stay at South Point (above), para 9.
8 Ndlovu v Ngcobo, Bekker and Another v Jika [2002] ZASCA 87; [2002] 4 All SA 384 (SCA); 2003
(1) SA 113 (SCA).
9 Id. para 20.
10 Id.
11 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village [2012]
ZAGPJHC 230; 2013 (1) SA 583 (GSJ); [2013] 1 All SA 192 (GSJ); 2013 (3) BCLR 337 (GSJ) ,
para 81.
12 Makama and Others v Administrator, Transvaal 1992 (2) SA 278 (T).
elements providing some of the comforts of life with some degree of
permanence.’13
[37] In Barnett the question arose whether cottages erected on a site for holiday
purposes could be said to be homes in the context of PIE . T he Supreme
Court of Appeal grappled with the question of what constitutes a home for the
purposes of PIE and concluded that although the concept ‘home' is not easy to
define and bearing in mind the fact that one can conceivably have more than
one home , the term require s an element of regular occupation coupled with
some degree of permanence.14
[38] In Stay at South Point , the Supreme Court of Appeal was called on to
determine whether the provision of student accommodation by a university to
its students constitutes a home, so as to render PIE of application. The
Supreme Court of Appeal found that the student accommodation in question
did not constitute a home for purposes of PIE because of three factors. 15
First, the students came from homes in order to study at the university , and as
a consequence the students logically had homes other than the student
residence.16 Second, the provision of student accommodation is for a finite
period of time and for the limited and defined purpose of accommodating
students for the duration of the academic year and thereby assisting them to
study at the university. 17 Third, equity required that those students who had
the benefit of accommodation shou ld yield to the new students coming to the
university who legitimately sought student accommodation which forms part of
the larger policy framework of higher education.18
13 Id. at 285I-J.
14 Barnett, para 38.
15 Stay at South Point (above), para 17 and 18.
16 Id. para 12.
17 Id. para 13.
18 Id. para 16.
[39] Stay at South Point properly interpreted does not establish a hard and fast
principle that the eviction of a person from student accommodation provided
by a university is never subject to PIE because the key issue in determining
whether PIE finds application is whether the accommodation provided is a
home which is always a fact specific enquiry. This much is clear from Stay at
South Point where the Supreme Court of Appeal made it clear that ‘[u]nless
otherwise demonstrated ’,19 student accommodation does not displace or
replace the homes from which students come , and that there was no basis to
invoke the protection of PIE as a consequence of the fact that the students in
question had homes other than the university accommodation.20 It follows that
where it is demonstrated that the student has no other home or that the
student accommodation has as a fact replaced the home from which the
student c ame, the university accommodation may indeed be their home, in
which case they are entitled to the protection afforded by PIE.
[40] Contrary to UCT’s contention , Stay at South Point cannot be interpreted as
establishing an immutable principle that the unlawful occupation of a university
parking lot following the breach of an undertaking embodied in a court order to
vacate a university residence deprives a student of the protection of PIE. Any
such principle would impermissibly operate to prevent a court from considering
the facts of each matter so as to determine whether the parking lot in question
has as a fact become the home of the student in question . Put differently,
where the facts establish that a university parking lot or any other university
property is the home of an unlawful occupier, PIE finds application and the
unlawful occupiers is entitled to the procedural and substantive protections
afforded by PIE.
19 Id. para 12.
20 Id.
[41] The Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasised that the application of
PIE is not discretionary .21 In applying PIE, courts must probe and investigate
the relevant surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether having
regard to all the relevant circumstances it would be just and equitable to grant
an eviction order, and if so, what conditions must be attached to that order .22
The fact that the unlawful occupation took place in the face of a court order is
one of the factors that would go into the just and equitable enquiry that a court
seized with an application for eviction in terms of PIE must engage in.
[42] Insofar as the respondents’ respective undertakings are concerned, they
undertook to vacate the PK residence by 20 December 2025, and this is what
was embodied in the amended court order . However, there is nothing in the
text or context of their undertakings that can reasonably be interpreted as
them having also undertaken not to occupy any other property belonging to
UCT whether expressly or by necessary implication.23 But even if the
respondents had given such undertakings as UCT argues, and they
subsequently established homes on the parking lot in breach of those
undertakings, the breach of their undertakings cannot for the reasons already
addressed deprive them of the protection of PIE if the facts nonetheless
demonstrate that they have established homes on the parking lot, that they do
not have homes elsewhere and that they would be rendered homeless as a
consequence of an eviction.
21 Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet N.O. and Another [2017] ZACC 18; 2017 (8) BCLR
1015 (CC); 2017 (5) SA 346 (CC), para 43. See also Machele v Mailula [2009] ZACC 7; 2010 (2)
SA 257 (CC) ; 2009 (8) BCLR 767 (CC), para 26.
22 Id. para 43 – 46.
23 University of Johannesburg v Auckland Theological Seminary and another [2021] ZACC 13; 2021
(8) BCLR 807 (CC) ; 2021 (6) SA 1 (CC).
HAS UCT MADE OUT A CASE FOR EVICTION?
[43] On the facts before me, it is clear that whatever the circumstances of the
respondents may have been prior to their eviction from the PK residence on
20 December 2025, after their eviction they took up residence and established
homes in the parking lot.
[44] UCT’s reliance in the founding affidavit on the addresses that it has on record
for Mr Kraai and Mr van Staden is misplaced in that both Mr Kraai and
Mr van Staden filed affidavits in December 2025 stat ing that they are no
longer able to return to their parental homes for various reasons . UCT has
placed no evidence before me to gainsay these contentions . It bears
emphasis that UCT sought to place reliance on the statements made by the
respondents i n the affidavits filed in the various stay applications where the
respondents had stated that they accepted or acquiesced to the eviction order.
In so doing UCT placed those affidavits in issue in these proceedings.
Moreover, in circumstances where there is a potential risk of homelessness if
an eviction order is granted, it is incumbent on a court to take into account all
of the information before it, which in this matter includes the averments made
by the respondents in the affidavits in the stay applications in particular
because those averments shed light on the key iss ues of whether the
respondents have other homes to which they can return which in turn bears on
the question as to whether the respondents had established homes on the
parking lot.
[45] On a balance of probabilities, the addresses that UCT relies on in the founding
affidavit are no longer the homes of Mr Kraai and Mr van Staden and those
addresses were no longer their homes at least from December 2025 and
neither Mr Kraai nor Mr van Staden have other homes to which they can
return if they are evicted from the parking lot. Consequently, the parking lot is
on a balance of probabilities the home of Mr Kraai and Mr van Staden and
on a balance of probabilities the home of Mr Kraai and Mr van Staden and
there is a real risk that they will be rendered homeless if they are evicted from
the parking lot . It follows that Mr Kraai and Mr van Staden are entitled to the
protections of PIE and any application for their eviction must be sought in
terms of PIE . Given that this is not an application brought in terms of PIE ,
UCT is as a matter of law not entitled to an eviction order against Mr Kraai or
Mr van Staden in these proceedings.
[46] Insofar as Ms M[...] and her minor children are concerned, it is apparent from
the oral submissions made by Ms M[...] and Mr M[...] that the residential
address that UCT seeks to rely on in the founding affidavit , ceased to be their
home when they commenced living at the PK residence. This is clear from the
fact that prior to taking up residence at the PK residence the M[...] family lived
in a SAPS residence as a consequence of Ms M[...] having been employed by
the SAPS at the time . Consequently the address on which UCT seeks to
place reliance , that is the SAPS residence, ceased to be their home when
Ms M[...]’s employment with SAPS ceased and the family moved into the
PK residence. Further, it appears that at some stage after they were evicted
from PK residence Ms M[...] and the two minor children established their home
in the parking lot . However, in her oral submissions to the court Ms M[...]
indicated that she and her children no longer reside in the parking lot. This
was not disputed by UCT. Given that Ms M[...] and the two minor children are
no longer resident in the parking lot , there is no basis on which an order
evicting them from the parking lot can be granted.
[47] Both Mr M[...] and Ms L[...] are no longer residing in the parking lot. It is not in
dispute that Mr M[...] is temporarily resident at the Obz Square residence and
UCT made it clear that no eviction order was s ought against Mr M[...] because
he is resident at the Obz Square residence. Ms L[...] appears to have found
alternative accommodation as she had stated that she would do in her affidavit
filed in the second stay application which is corroborated by the fact that she
was last present in the parking lot on 26 January 2026 and was no longer
present in the parking lot in February 2026. Given that Ms L[...] is no lo nger
present in the parking lot in February 2026. Given that Ms L[...] is no lo nger
resident in the parking lot there is also no basis on which an order evicting her
from the parking lot can be granted.
THE INTERDICTORY RELIEF
[48] UCT sought a final interdict against all of the respondents. In the heads of
argument delivered on behalf o f UCT the interdictory relief is characterised as
an order restraining all of the respondents from further unlawful occupation of
the parking lot or any other UCT property , together with an order against
Mr M[...] restraining him from unlawfully occupying the parking lot or any other
University property without the written consent of UCT, in the event that he
vacates or is no longer entitled to occupy the Obz Square residence.
[49] The three requirements for a final inte rdict are a clear right, a threat to breach
such right (in the case of a prohibitory interdict), and no other remedy.24
[50] As the registered owner of the property in respect of which the interdictory
relief is sought, there can be no question that UCT has a clear right to prevent
the unlawful occupation if its property. As to the second requirement, UCT
contends that it has suffered and continues to suffer harm as a consequence
of the unlawful occupation of its property by the respondents.
[51] It is not in di spute that Mr M[...] is not and has never been in unlawful
occupation of the parking lot. Ms M[...] submitted that that she and her minor
children no longer reside in the parking lot as she does not feel safe there
since Mr M[...] is not with them . These assertions were not gainsaid by UCT.
Consequently, there is no factual basis on which I can find that Mr M[...] or
Ms M[...] are likely to unlawfully occupy the parking lot in future . Ms L[...] too
is no longer in occupation of the property and appears to have obtained
alternative accommodation by 31 January 2026 as she had indicated she
would do in her affidavit in the second stay application. In addition there was
no evidence before me that she is likely to unlawfully occupy the parking lot or
any other UCT property in future. Consequently UCT cannot establish that it
any other UCT property in future. Consequently UCT cannot establish that it
24 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221.
is likely to suffer irreparable harm as a consequence of Mr M[...], Ms M[...] or
Ms L[...] unlawfully occupying the parking lot or any other UCT property in
future.
[52] Given that an interdict is not a remedy for past invasion of rights but is
concerned with present or future infringements, and is appropriate only where
future injury is feared ,25 UCT cannot establish the requirements necessary for
an interdict in respect of Mr M[...], Ms M[...] or Ms L[...].
[53] For the reasons already addressed Mr van Staden and Mr Kraai are entitled to
the protections of PIE and UCT will need to seek their eviction in fresh
proceedings brought in terms of PIE . The court seized that application would
have to determine whether on all the facts it is just and equitable to grant an
order evicting Mr Kraai and Mr van Staden from the parking lot. An interdict
restraining Mr Kraai and Mr van Staden from unlawfully occupying the parking
lot in future would serve little if any purpose at this stage as UCT could not
utilise that order to remove Mr Kraai and Mr van Staden from the parking lot
as an interdict cannot be used as an eviction order. Moreover, facts may
emerge in th e just and equitable enquiry before the court seized with any
eviction application that UCT may elect to institute in respect of Mr Kraai and
Mr van Staden which are relevant to whether an interdict against them is
warranted. Consequently, I am of the view that it would not be appropriate in
these proceedings to grant the interdictory relief sought by UCT against
Mr van Staden and Mr Kraai and that such relief ought to be sought in any
eviction proceedings in terms of PIE which UCT may elect to institute against
them.
In the result I make the following order:
25 National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Openshaw 2008 (5) SA 339
(SCA), [2008] ZASCA 78; [2008] 4 All SA 225 (SCA); 2008 (5) SA 339 (SCA), para 20; See also
(SCA), [2008] ZASCA 78; [2008] 4 All SA 225 (SCA); 2008 (5) SA 339 (SCA), para 20; See also
Phillip Morris Inc v Marlboro Trust Co SA 1991 (2) SA 720 (A) at 735B.
1. The application is dismissed.
2. There shall be no order as to costs.
___________________________
M. ADHIKARI
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
For the applicant: M O’Sullivan SC with U Mahilall
Instructed by: Fairbridges Wertheim Bekker
Second and Third Respondents: In person
First and Fourth Respondents: No appearance