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• IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Not Reportable
Case no: CA 54/2022
In the matter between:
THABANG LOUIS MANYANE APPELLANT
and
THE STATE RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Manyane v The State (CA 54/2022) [2026] ZANWHC 21
April 2026.
Previous Coram: Laubscher AJ and Mamana AJ, 6 June 2025
Coram: Reddy J and Wessels AJ as constituted by the Judge President to expedite
the hearing of this backlog appeal.
Reserved: 19 March 2026
Delivered: This judgment was electronically circulated to the parties' legal
representatives by e-mail and released on SAFLII. The date and time of hand
down are deemed to be 21 April 2026 at 12h00.
Summary: Criminal appeal - contravening s 3 of the Prevention and
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PRECCA) -conviction by
regional court - whether State proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt - material
contradictions in State's evidence - cell register evidence supportive of
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appellant's version - conflict of interest affecting conduct of defence - appeal
upheld - conviction and sentence set aside.
On appeal from: Regional Court, Schweizer-Reneke (sitting as court of first
instance):
1 The appeal against conviction is upheld.
2 The conviction of the appellant in the Regional Court, Schweizer-Reneke
(Case No RC 43/15 A) is set aside.
3 The sentence of three years' direct imprisonment imposed on 26 April
2021 is set aside.
JUDGMENT
REDDY J (WESSELS AJ concurring):
Introduction
[1] This is an appeal from the Regional Court, Schweizer-Reneke (the trial
court), on conviction. The appellant, Mr. Thabang Louis Manyane, a former police
official, was charged with contravening s 3 of the Prevention and Combating of
Corrupt Activities Act 12 of2004 (PRECCA). The charge alleged that on or about
25 April 2015, the appellant unlawfully accepted a gratification of Rl 000 from
Mr Samuel Thibello Machekane (the complainant) to act in a manner amounting
to the illegal or biased exercise of his duties as a police officer, specifically to
avoid detaining the complainant.
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[2] The trial comt convicted the appellant on 29 January 2021 and, on 26 April
2021, sentenced him to three years' direct imprisonment. The appellant applied
for leave to appeal. The trial court granted leave to appeal against the conviction
but dismissed the application in respect of the sentence. Consequently, this appeal
proceeds only against the conviction.
Background facts
[3] The events leading to the charge took place on the night of 25 April 2015.
The complainant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. It is
common cause that the appellant, who was a police constable at the time, was on
duty together with Constable Seitshiro. The two arrested two suspects: the
complainant (arrested by the appellant) and a Mr. Sereho (arrested by Constable
Seitshiro ). They were taken to the Bloemhof Police Station and later to Christiana
Hospital for blood samples to be collected.
[4] The State's case, in essence, was that the appellant did not detain the
complainant as required. Instead, the appellant took the complainant to his home,
then to Mr. Pitso Borole's home to borrow R500, and later to the complainant's
own home, where the complainant collected a further R500 from his wife. The
following day, the complainant paid bail of R500. On 29 April 2015, the
complainant participated in a trap operation during which the appellant allegedly
accepted R500 in cash and was arrested.
[5] The appellant's version was that he never accepted a bribe. He testified that
on the night of the arrest, after returning from Christiana Hospital, the
complainant asked how much bail would be. The appellant informed him it was
R500. The complainant asked to stop at an ATM, but it was not working. At the
police station, the complainant asked the appellant to lend him R500 for bail. The
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appellant did so. The complainant was then handed over to the charge office
commander, Constable Mmusi. A few days later, the complainant called to ask
about repaying the R500. They met at Standard Bank, and as the complainant
handed over the money, the appellant was aITested.
Grounds of appeal
[ 6] The appellant appeals against his conviction on the following grounds:
(i) The trial court erred in failing properly to evaluate the evidence of
the State witnesses, which was inconsistent, contradictory, and
improbable.
(ii) The trial court failed to appreciate that the inconsistencies and low
evidential value of the State's case meant that the State had not
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
(iii) The trial court failed properly to consider a potential ethical conflict
that arose when it emerged that the appellant's former attorney, Mr.
Schoeman, had previously been consulted by the complainant.
The test on appeal
[7] On appeal from the trial court's findings of fact, this Court should bear in
mind that the trial court was in a better position than this Court to form a
judgment, having observed the witnesses and being steeped in the atmosphere of
the trial 1. This Court will normally accept the trial court's factual findings unless
there is some indication of error. 2
[8] In S v Hadebe and Others3 the Supreme Court of Appeal restated an
appellate court's discretion as follows:
1 See Schmidt and Rademeyer, Law of Evidence 3-40.
2 R v Dhlumayo 1948 (2) SA 677 (A) at 696 and 705.
3 1997 (2) SACR 641 (SCA) at 645e - f.
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"Before considering these submissions, it would be as well to recall yet again that there are
well-established principles governing the hearing of appeals against findings of fact. In short,
in the absence of demonstrable and material misdirection by the trial Court, its findings of fact
are presumed to be correct and will only be disregarded if the recorded evidence shows them
to be clearly wrong."
[9] This salutary principle was restated in S v Naidoo and Others4
' In the final analysis, a court of appeal does not overturn a trial court' s findings of fact unless
they are shown to be vitiated by material misdirection or are shown by the record to be wrong.'
Evaluation of the evidence
[ 1 OJ The assessment of the evidence must be measured against the universal
standard, namely, whether the guilt of an accused has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In S v T5 the burden of proof in a criminal trial is stated as
follows:
' The State is required, when it tries a person for allegedly conunitting an offence, to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. This high standard of proof - universally
required in civilized systems of criminal justic e - is a core component of the fundamental right
that every person enjoys under the Constitution , and under the common law prior to 1994, to a
fair trial. It is not part of a charter for criminals and neither is it a mere technicality. When a
court finds that the guilt of an accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, that
accused is entitled to an acquittal, even if there may be suspicions that he or she was, indeed,
the perpetrator of the crime in question. That is an inevitable consequence of living in a society
in which the freedom and the dignity of the individual are properly protected and are respected.
The inverse - convictions based on suspicion or speculation - is the hallmark of tyrannical
systems of law. South Africans have bitter experience of such a system and where it leads to.'
systems of law. South Africans have bitter experience of such a system and where it leads to.'
4 2003 (1) SACR 347 (SCA) in paragraph [26]
5 2005 (2) SACR 318 (E), at para 37.
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[ 11] The correct approach to the evaluation of evidence in a criminal trial was
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Appeal as follows in S v Chabala/a6
'The trial coUI1's approach to the case was, however, holistic and in this it was undoubtedly
right: S v Van Aswege n 2001 (2) SACR 97 (SCA). The correct approach is to weigh up all the
elements which point towards the guilt of lhe accused against all those which are indicative of
his innocence, taking prope r account of inherent strengths and weaknesses. probabiliti es and
improbabiliti es on both sides and, having done so, to decide whether the balance weighs so
heavily in favour of the State as to exclude any reasonable doubt about the accused's guilt. The
result may prove that one scrap of evidence or one defect in the case for either party (such as the failure
to call a material witness concerning an identity parade) was decisive but that can only be an ex post
fac to determination and a tria l court (and counsel) should avoid the temptation to latch on to one
(apparently) obvious aspect without assessing it in the context of the full picture presented in evidence
[ 12] We have carefully reviewed the record of the proceedings. The trial was
protracted , with witnesses testifying over several days between 2018 and 2020.
[ 13] The central issue is whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that the appellant accepted unlawful gratification as contemplated in s 3 of
PRECCA, rather than receiving repayment of a lawful loan. To reach this finding,
an assessment of the mosaic of proof presented in the trial court is required. To
this end, we assess the strands of evidence that constituted the state's case,
including a procedural irregularity that may have vitiated the appellant's right to
a fair trial. We now proceed to assess each of these within the prism of the
discretion we are clothed with, sitting as an appellate court.
6 2003( 1) SACR 134 (SCA) at para 15.
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The trap operation and the recording device
[14] Warrant Officer Mosala of the Hawks testified about the trap operation on
29 April 2015. He provided the complainant with a recording device, shaped like
a key holder, and instructed him to use it. Notably, the complainant did not activate
the device because, he said, he was scared. Therefore, the evidence of the
conversation during the trap transaction relied entirely on the complainant's
account. Consequently, the State's case regarding what transpired during the
meeting rests entirely on the complainant's account, without any independent or
objective corroboration.
The credibility of the complainant
[15] The complainant's evidence was beset with improbabilities. He initially
denied being drunk on the night of his arrest, despite the medical report (Exhibit
D) indicating he was under the influence. He eventually conceded he had
consumed alcohol but insisted he was not drunk. More significantly, he conceded
during cross-examination that he was willing to pay a bribe to avoid spending the
night in the cells. He stated: 'I was willing to pay corruption to save myself ...
from spending a night in the cells.' He also conceded that he did not know that
paying a bribe was unlawful. This admission goes to the very heart of his motive
and reliability.
Contradictions relating to the alleged gratification
[16] There were material contradictions regarding the amount allegedly
demanded and paid. The complainant's wife, Ms. Makwathle, testified that the
complainant arrived at their home in the early hours of the morning, asking for
Rl 000. She gave him R500 and his bank card. Mr. Borole testified that the
complainant borrowed R500 from him for 'bribery' . The complainant initially
testified that the bribe was Rl 000, but later suggested that the R500 from his
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wife and the R500 from Mr. Borole made up the Rl 000. When the trap was set,
the complainant was given R500 by the police. The inconsistency between Rl
000 and R500, and whether the money was for a bribe or a loan, was never
satisfactorily resolved.
The cell register evidence
[17] One of the most compelling pieces of evidence in the appellant's favour is
the cell register (Exhibit B).The register shows that the complainant was recorded
as a detainee on the night of 25 April 2015, under entry number 206. Constable
Mmusi, the charge office commander, testified that he recorded the complainant
in the cell register. He further testified that after the suspects returned from
Christiana, he handed the cell keys to the appellant to take the suspects to the
cells. The appellant returned the keys, and Constable Mmusi confirmed that the
complainant was supposed to be in the cells. The occurrence book (Exhibit A)
records that the cells were visited hourly and that 31 detainees were present.
Notably, there is no record that the complainant was ever signed out of the cells.
The fact that the complainant's details remained in the cell register without any
'signed out' entry strongly supports the appellant's version that the complainant
was, in fact, placed in the cells.
The issue of the cell keys
[ 18] Constable Mmusi testified that he gave the cell keys to the appellant. If the
appellant intended to release the complainant unlawfully, it would have been a
remarkably bold act, especially in the presence of other officers. More
importantly, Constable Mmusi confirmed that the appellant returned the keys.
There is no evidence that the appellant had access to the cells after that point. This
undermines the State's case that the appellant removed the complainant from
custody.
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The conflict of interest
[19] The appellant's former attorney, Mr. Schoeman, withdrew from the
proceedings on 16 July 2020, after it emerged during the trial that the complainant
had consulted Mr. Schoeman' s firm regarding a civil claim against the police
stemming from the drunken driving arrest, and also regarding the bribery
complaint. The complainant confirmed this consultation. Mr. Schoeman
acknowledged that he should have withdrawn earlier, stating that he 'made an
error of judgment at that stage by not withdrawing'. This is a serious irregularity.
While the trial court was not at fault, the fact that the appellant's own attorney
had a prior professional relationship with the complainant, even if not a full
retainer, created a potential conflict of interest that could have affected the
conduct of the defence.
[20] Section 35(3) of the Constitution failsafe every accused the right to a fair
trial, including the right to legal representation. Subsumed within this right is the
right to legal representation free from conflicting interests. Ex facie the record, it
cannot be conclusively found that this irregularity, standing alone, would have
vitiated the proceedings, and it is superfluous to decide this question. What it
simply does is reinforce our concern about the fairness of the trial and lend further
credence to the conclusion we reach from the evidence.
Inconsistencies in the State's case
[21] The State witnesses' evidence was inconsistent on several key points.
Constable Seitshiro testified that he did not see what happened to the complainant
after they returned from Christiana. He said the appellant left with the
complainant and did not return. Constable Mmusi, however, testified that the
appellant returned the cell keys and that the complainant was not with him at that
time, meaning the complainant was already in the cells. These two versions are
irreconcilable. If the appellant left the police station with the complainant, as
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Constable Seitshiro suggested, then the complainant could not have been in the
cells. If, as Constable Mmusi said, the appellant returned the keys after locking
the complainant in the cells, then the complainant was in the cells.
The State's failure to prove the gratification
[22] The State was required to prove that the appellant accepted a gratification
in order to act in a manner that amounted to the illegal exercise of powers, duties,
or functions arising out of a statutory obligation. In other words, the State had to
prove a corrupt agreement. The complainant's evidence was that the appellant
demanded Rl 000 to make his 'problems go away'. The appellant's evidence was
that he lent the complainant R500 for bail. The State's case was almost entirely
dependent on the complainant 's word, which was undermined by his own
admissions of willingness to pay a bribe and the absence of any independent
corroboration , such as the recording device. The fact that the complainant
remained registered in the cell register without being signed out provides strong
objective support for the appellant 's version that the complainant was detained.
Assessment of the State case
[23] The State's case was predicated almost entirely on the uncorroborated
evidence of the complainant, whose credibility was seriously impugned. On
certain aspects, the complainant was a single witness. Section 208 of the CPA
empowers a court to convict an accused person on the evidence of a single
competent witness.
[24] It has been authoritatively decided that '[t]he absence of the word
"credible" [in the section] is of no significance ; the single witness must still be
credible ... '.7 When evaluating evidence of a single witness, the trial court is
7 S v Sauls and Others 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) at 180D.
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obliged to exercise caution. In Sv Rugnanan,8 the Supreme Court of Appeal made
the following remarks :
' ... The cautionary rule does not require that the evidence of a single witness must be free of
all conceivable criticism. The requirement is merely that it should be substantially satisfactory
in relation to material aspects or be corroborated. '
[25] The complainant's evidence failed to meet the cautionary threshold. The
objective evidence, particularly the cell register, supports the appellant's version
and is inconsistent with the State's case. What appears to be fatal to the State's
case is the lack of proof that the money changed hands without proof that it
constituted unlawful gratification linked to an abuse of authority; this is
insufficient to sustain a conviction under s 3 of PRECCA.
[26] The trial court appears to have accepted the complainant's evidence largely
on the basis that he was a credible witness. However, given the contradictions in
his evidence, his own admission of willingness to engage in corruption, and the
objective evidence from the cell register, this finding is, in my view, misplaced.
The court misdirected itself in failing properly to evaluate the inherent
improbabilities in the State's case and in not giving sufficient weight to the
evidence favourab le to the appellant.
Conclusion
[27] Having considered the totality of the evidence, we are not satisfied that the
State proved the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We accept the
appellant's version as reasonably possibly true and reject the complainant 's
evidence as unreliable . What is more, the trial court failed to resolve the mutually
8 [2020] ZASCA 166 para 23.
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destructive versions of Constable Seitshiro and Constab le Mmusi, a misdirection
that, independently, impugns the conviction9.
[28] The complainant's own admission that he was willing to pay a bribe, the
material contradictions regarding the amounts allegedly demanded and paid, and
the objective cell register evidence, none of which was satisfactorily explained by
the State, all point irresistibly to that conclusion.
[29] The appeal against conviction must therefore succeed. The conviction is
set aside, and the sentence falls away.
A REDDY
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
I, agree
MWESSELS
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
9 Stellenbosch Farmers ' Winery Group Ltd. and Another v Martell & Cie SA and Others
(427/01) [2002) ZASCA 98; 2003 (1) SA 11 (SCA) at para 5.
Appearances:
For the appellant:
Instructed by:
For the respondent:
Instructed by:
MRE Setumo
Legal Aid Board
Mahikeng
Adv K.E Mampo
Director of Public Prosecutions
Mmabatho
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