SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Not Reportable
Case No: 278/2025
In the matter between:
FLG MG HOLDING (PTY) LTD FIRST APPLICANT
(Registration Number:2019/371087/07)
BATLAMEHI PRIMARY COOPERATIVE
LIMITED SECOND APPLICANT
(Registration Number: 2022/603190/24)
and
BAREND JACOBUS KANES FIRST RESPONDENT
(Identity Number: 6[...])
BG DIAMANTBOERDERY CC SECOND RESPONDENT
(Registration Number: 2007/096170/23)
BRANDEWYNSKUIL CC THIRD RESPONDENT
(Registration Number: 1999/018222/23)
AGRI CREDIT SOLUTIONS (PTY) LTD FOURTH RESPONDENT
(Registration Number: 1990/006879/07)
HELENA ALETTA LUBBE N.O. FIFTH RESPONDENT
(Identity Number: 5[...])
Coram: Masike AJ
Date Heard: 29 August 2025
Judgment is handed down electronically by distribution to the parties’ legal
representatives by e-mail, and released to SAFLII. The date that the judgment is
deemed to be handed down is 17 APRIL 2026 at 10h00.
Summary: Civil Procedure - Interlocutory inter dicts – whether requirements
for interlocutory interdict have been met – law of contract – requirement of
communication of acceptance – law of contract – right for seller to withdraw
offer before acceptance by purchaser – doctrine of notice – requirements thereof
– can party rely on doctrine of notice where sale agreement withdrawn by notice
– qui prior est tempore potior est jure maxim – does the maxim find application
where sale agreement withdrawn by notice – company law – non-compliance
with s 46(b)(iii ) and (iv) of the Close Corporations Act – costs legal principles
repeated.
JUDGMENT
MASIKE AJ
Introduction
[1] FLG MG Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Registration number: 2019/371087/07), a
company with limited liability and registered as such in accordance with the
Company Laws of the Republic of South Africa with its registered address
2[…] A[…] Road, Bryanston, Sandton (“the first applicant”) and Batlamehi
Primary Cooperative Limited (Registration number: 2022/603190/24), a close
corporation registered as such in accordance with the Company Laws of the
Republic of South Africa with its registered address 3 […] Extension 1 […],
T[…] Street, Wolmaransstad, North West (“the second applicant”) have
approached the court and seek orders against Barend Jacobus Kanes (“the first
respondent”), BG Diamantboerdery CC (“the second respondent”),
Brandewynskuil CC (“the third respo ndent”), Agri Credit Solutions (Pty) Ltd
(“the fourth respondent”) and Helena Aletta Lubbe N.O. (“the fifth respondent”)
as set out in the notice of motion in the following terms:
‘1. That the forms and service provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court be dispensed
with and that the Application be enrolled and heard as an Urgent Application in terms
of Rule 6(12)(a).
2. That, pending the finalisation of the action proceedings by the Applicants or eviction
proceedings instituted by the First, Second and Third Respondent against the
Applicants for the purpose of evicting the Applicants from the property, namely the
Remainder of Portion 12 (a Portion of Portion 14). Remainder of Portion 14 and
Remainder of Portion 11 (a Portion of Portion 10) of Farm B randewenskuil 102,
Registration Division HP, Maquassi -Hills Local Municipality (“ the Subject
Property”), the First and Second Respondents are ordered: -
2.1 not to interfere with the Applicants’ lawful, peaceful , and undisturbed
possession of the Subject Property;
2.2 to immediately restore the supply of electricity to the Subject Property;
2.3 not to insult, intimidate and threaten the Applicants’ employees at the Subject
Property.
3. Costs of suit, if opposed.
4. Further and/or alternative relief.’
[2] The first, second, and third respondents initially opposed the application .
The third respondent withdrew its opposition, and a notice to abide was filed on
its behalf. The application served before Reddy J on 14 February 2025. Reddy J
struck the application from the roll for lack of urgency and ordered the first and
second applicants to pay the costs jointly and severally, the one paying the other
to be absolved.
[3] On or about 26 August 2025, the first and second applicants filed an
amended notice of motion in terms of which the first and second applicants
sought relief in the following terms against the first, second , and third
respondents:
‘1. That, pending the finalisation of the action proceedings by the Applicants or eviction
proceedings instituted by the First, Second and Third Respondents against the
Applicants for the purpose of evicting the Applicants from the property, namely the
Remainder of Portion 12 (a portion of Portion 14), Remainder of Portion 12 and the
Remainder of Portion 11 (a Portion of Portion 10) of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102,
Registration Division HP, Maquassi – Hills Local Municipality (“the Subject
Property), the First and Second Respondents are ordered: -
1.1 not to interfere with the Applicants’ lawful, peaceful and Undisturbed possession
of the Subject Property;
1.2 not to insult, intimidate , and threaten the Applicants’ employees at the Subject
Property.
2. Costs of suit.
3. Further and/or alternative relief.’
[4] The issue of urgency has been dealt with by Reddy J, and the first and
second applicants have abandoned the relief sought in prayer 2.2 of the initial
notice of motion. The application serves before this Court for the determi nation
of the prayers set out in the amended notice of motion.
Factual Background
[5] On or about 10 June 2022, and at Klerksdorp, the third respondent,
purportedly represented by the fifth respondent, entered into a lease agreement
with the second app licant in terms of which the third respondent leased to the
second applicant the Farm 102 (Portion 14) of the Farm known as
Brandewynskuil Registration Division HP, measuring 200 hectares held by the
third respondent in terms of deed of transfer no. T[…] (‘the Farm’).
[6] It is the case of the first and second applicants, subsequent to the
conclusion of the lease agreement, the children of the late Mr Johannes Jacobus
Lubbe (‘the late Mr Lubbe’), attacked the validity of the lease agreement on the
basis that the fifth respondent did not have the authority to conclude the lease
agreement in respect of the farm on behalf of the third respondent. The first and
second applicants allege that the children of the late Mr Lubbe insisted that a
second lease a greement be entered into with the third respondent, but that the
third respondent be represented by one of the late Mr Lubbe's children.
[7] On or about 18 May 2023, a second lease agreement was entered into
between the second applicant and the third resp ondent, duly represented by Mr
Johan Lubbe, one of the late Mr Lubbe’s children. Under this lease agreement
(‘the second lease agreement’), the third respondent leased the property, Portion
14 of the farm Brandewynskuil 102 (‘the property’), to the second applicant. It
is common cause that the Farm and the property are one and the same, and that
the second lease agreement replaced the lease agreement entered into on 10
June 2022. The agreed rental for the property was R30 000.00 per month until
30 June 2023 , after which the rental would escalate by 5% on 1 July 2023 and
by a further 5% each succeeding year in July, calculated on the rental of the
preceding year. The second lease agreement was valid until 30 June 2025. It
was a specific term of the second lea se agreement that the agreed rental amount
be paid into the trust account of the attorneys of the third respondent, Theron
Jordan & Smit Inc.
[8] The first and second applicants allege that, upon entering into the lease
agreement and the second lease agreement, they took lawful possession of and
occupied the Farm, also known as the property. The first and second applicants
allege that on or about 29 June 2023, the first and second applicants duly
represented, consulted with the attorney of the th ird respondent about the
possibility of concluding a sale agreement with the third respondent. In terms of
the proposed sale agreement, the first applicant would purchase the land known
as:
‘1. The Remainder of Portion 12 (a Portion of Portion 14) of the F arm Brandewynskuil,
102 Registration Division H.P Province North West Measuring: 890793 (Eighty Nine
Comma Zero Seven Nine Three) Hectares Held by Deed of Transfer Number T[…]
2. The Remainder of Portion 14 of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102, Registration Division
H.P Province North West Measuring: 179, 6719 (One Hundred Seventy Nine Comma
Six Seven One Nine) Hectares Held by Deed of Transfer Number T[…]
3. The Remainder of Portio n 11 (a Portion of Portion 10) of Farm Brandewynskuil 102,
Registration Division H.P. Province North West Measuring: 252, 4052 (Two Hundred
Fifty Two Comma Four Zero Five Two) Hectares Held by Deed of Transfer Number
T[…]’ (‘the Farm Brandewynskuil 102’)’
[9] The Farm Brandewynskuil 102, which the first applicant proposed to
purchase from the third respondent, comprises the Farm/the property, and other
portions of the land that did not form part of the lease agreement or the second
lease agreemen t. On 10 August 2023, a formal letter of demand from the
attorney of the third respondent was sent to the second applicant’s attorney,
demanding payment of the arrears in rental, amounting to R63 000.00. On 25
August 2023, the erstwhile attorney of the fir st and second applicants, a Mr
Surprise Raseasala (‘Mr Raseasala’), contacted the attorney of the third
respondent to discuss the proposed sale agreement. The first applicant proposed
to purchase the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 for R3 000 000.00.
[10] On 25 August 2023, the attorney for the third respondent confirmed in
writing the discussion she had with Mr Raseasala. Mr Raseasala was informed
that the members of the third respondent accepted the offer of R3 000 000.00 in
principle. Mr Raseasala was reminded that his client (the second applicant) was
in arrears of R63 000.00 in respect of the rental of the property, and that the
amount was demanded.
[11] On 2 October 2023, another letter of demand was forwarded to Mr
Raseasala, demanding payment of the arrea rs rental of the property in the
amount of R106 000.00. A meeting was held on 10 November 2023 between
the representatives of the first and second applicants and the third respondent.
At this meeting, the representatives of the first and second applicants requested
that a sale agreement be drafted for the purchase price of R3 000 000.00 of the
Farm Brandewynskuil 102. A pro forma sale agreement was provided to the
first applicant on 15 November 2023; the third respondent's members did not
sign it.
[12] On 23 November 2023, the attorney of the third respondent forwarded the
third respondent's signed sale agreement to Mr Raseasala. In the covering email,
it was specifically stated that, should the first applicant fail to provide the
attorneys of the third respondent with the signed copy of the sale agreement by
28 November 2023, the seller (third respondent) reserved the right to withdraw
the offer.
[13] The first and second applicants in their replying affidavit have not
disputed the contents of the email dated 23 November 2023. It is the contention
of the deponent to the affidavit of the first and second applicants, Mr Sipho
Frans Makgalamele (‘Mr Makgalamele’), that on 23 November 2023, he met
with Mr Johan Lubbe, a member of the third respondent. Mr Joh an Lubbe at
that meeting provided Mr Makgalamele with a hard copy of the sale agreement,
which the members of the seller, the third respondent, signed.
[14] Mr Makgalamele further alleges that he was advised by Mr Johan Lubbe
that the attorney of the thir d respondent would send the sale agreement to Mr
Makgalamele in due course via email and that the hard copy of the sale
agreement given to Mr Makgalamele should be dated, any date prior to the date
23 November 2023, to indicate that the offer was from the purchaser (the first
applicant) which was accepted by the seller (the third respondent) thereafter. Mr
Makgalamele alleges that he signed the sale agreement as per the discussion
with Mr Johan Lubbe. From the perusal of the email from the attorneys of the
third respondent, dated 23 November 2023, addressed to Mr Raseasala, it
appears that Mr Makgalamele was one of the recipients.
[15] On 28 November 2023, the erstwhile attorney of the first applicant, Mr
Raseasala, forwarded an email to the third respondent's attorneys stating that the
first applicant is awaiting payment from its source. In this email, no mention is
made that representatives of the first applicant have signed the sale agreement ,
nor was it forwarded to the attorney of the third responden t. On 7 December
2023, the attorney of the third respondent forwarded a letter to the erstwhile
attorney of the first applicant, Mr Raseasala, confirming the extension of the
payment of the purchase price and delivery of the signed sale agreement until
20 December 2023. On 11 January 2024, the attorney of the third respondent
forwarded an email to Mr Raseasala, the erstwhile attorney of the first applicant,
confirming that neither payment nor the signed sale agreement had been
received. In this email, Mr Makgalamele was one of the recipients of the email.
[16] On 2 February 2024, the attorney of the third respondent sent a letter to
the erstwhile attorney of the first applicant, Mr Raseasala. The letter stated that
the third respondent no longer intends to sell Farm Brandewynskuil 102 as per
the sale agreement provided to the first applicant, and that the sale agreement is
null and void . On the same date, the attorneys of the third respondent sent a
letter of demand to the erstwhile attorneys of the second applicant, Mr
Raseasala, demanding payment of the arrears of rental for the property in the
amount of R232 000.00 and confirming the cancellation of the second lease
agreement.
[17] On behalf of the first and second applicants, it is contended that the
reason the first applicant did not affect payment of the agreed sale amount for
the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 is because of the dispute between the fifth
respondent and the children of th e late Mr Lubbe. It is further contended that a
member of the third respondent, Mr Johan Lubbe, advised the first and second
applicants to pause with payment of the purchase price until such disputes were
resolved and finalised. It is contended on behalf o f the first and second
applicants that the dispute is still ongoing and that the third respondent has not
advised them that it has been resolved or that the purchase price can be paid.
[18] As it relates to the failure of the second applicant to pay the occupational
rental of the property, it is contended on behalf of the first and second
applicants that the failure to pay the rental was a consequence of the conclusion
of the sale agreement between the first applicant and the third respondent. The
first and second applicants rely on clauses 6.1 and 6.2 of the sale agreement,
which read as follows:
‘6.1 The Parties confirm that the Purchaser has already taken occupation and possession of
a portion of the property in terms of which the Purchaser is in arrea rs with the
monthly occupation rent in the amount of R137 500.00 calculated for the period June
2023 to November 2023.
6.2 The Seller hereby confirms that the Purchaser is exempt from paying the arrear rental
as well as any further rental on condition that the Purchaser is in compliance with the
terms and conditions of this agreement.’
[19] On or about 14 February 2024, the attorneys of the third respondent sent a
letter to Mr Raseasala, confirming that the third respondent does not intend to
proceed wi th the sale agreement with the first applicant due to the first
applicant's failure to sign it despite numerous requests. The first applicant was
further notified in that letter that the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 had been sold to
a third party and that no fu rther negotiations would be done with the first
applicant.
[20] It is the case of the first and second applicants that on 14 October 2024,
the attorneys of the first and second respondents, Taljaard, Niewoudt and Van
Tonder Attorneys forwarded a letter to the first applicant in which the attorneys
of the first and second respondent informed the first applicant that the Farm
Brandewynskuil 102 had been registered in the name of the second respondent
on 5 September 2024 and that the first applicant was reque sted to vacate the
Farm Brandewynskuil 102. A copy of the letter of demand from the attorneys of
the first and second respondents is attached to the founding affidavit of the first
and second applicants. On perusal of the letter, this Court observed that i t was
addressed to the second applicant, not the first. In addition thereto, a copy of the
deed of transfer was attached to the letter, and, from a cursory reading, it
appears that ownership of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 was indeed transferred
from the third respondent to the second respondent on 5 September 2024.
[21] On 18 October 2024, the current attorneys of the first and second
applicants, Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs (‘ENS’), forwarded a letter to the
attorneys of the first and second respondents, and copied the attorneys of the
third respondent. In its letter, ENS contended that the sale agreement between
the first applicant and the third respondent was validly concluded. That, based
on the doctrine of notice as well as the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est
jure, ownership of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 should be retransferred.
[22] The attorneys of the first, second , and third respondents , on 25 October
2024, replied separately to the letter from ENS. In their respective letters, the
attorneys of the first, second , and third respondents insisted that the first and
second applicants vacate the Farm Brandewynskuil 102. On 29 October 2024,
ENS replied to the letters dated 25 October 2024 from the attorneys of the first,
second, and third respondents. In their reply, ENS indicated that their clients
would not be vacating Farm Brandewynskuil 102.
[23] It is the case of the first and second applicants that, on 4 September 2024,
the first respondent attended at Farm Brandewynskuil 102 and cut off the supply
of electricity. The first respondent, in his answering affidavit, denies this
allegation and states that, at that time, the fifth respondent had obtained an
interim protection from harassment order in terms of the Protection from
Harassment Act 17 of 2011 (‘the Harassment Act’) against him, and that one of
the orders granted by the Magistrate's Court Wolmarantstadt under case number
PHA124/2024 prohibited the first respondent from visiting Farm
Brandewynskuil 102.
[24] The first and second applicants, in reply, allege that on 23 November
2024, when the first respondent visited Farm Brandewynskuil 102, electricity
was available. For the first time in reply, the first respondent is alleged to have
subsequently instructed Eskom to disconnect the electricity supply to Farm
Brandewynskuil 102, as the new owner of that farm.
[25] It is alleged that on 28 November 2024, the first respondent ar rived on
Farm Brandewynskuil 102 and again threatened the employees of the first and
second applicants to vacate Farm Brandewynskuil 102. The attorneys of the first
and second applicants issued a cease -and-desist letter, and the first respondent
failed to respond. The first respondent does not deny that the cease -and-desist
letter was written; he did not reply to it, but he denies its contents that he
attended the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 on 28 November 2024, or that he
threatened the employees of the first and second applicants.
[26] It is alleged on behalf of the first and second applicants that between 15
and 20 December 2024, the first respondent once more attended on the Farm
Brandewynskuil 102 and cut off the supply of electricity. The first responde nt
has denied this and insists that Eskom cut the electricity supply to Farm
Brandewynskuil 102 due to the second applicant's non-payment.
[27] It is further alleged that on 6 January 2025, the first respondent attended
on the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 and demanded that the employees of the first
and second applicants vacate the Farm Brandewynskuil 102. During this visit,
the first respondent is alleged to have threatened to burn any farming equipment
belonging to the first and second applicants and to destr oy their crops. The first
respondent has denied this in his answering affidavit and contends that he did
attend on the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 on 6 January 2025. On that day, he
informed Mr Lesego, an employee of the first and the second applicants, that
the second respondent is the new owner of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102. That
they are not entitled to plant any crops on the Farm Brandewynskuil 102. The
first respondent further stated that he would attach any crops they had planted.
The first respondent de nies having threatened to destroy the equipment of the
first and second applicants or having threatened the lives of the employees of
the first and second applicants.
[28] The first and second applicants allege that on 22 January 2025, the first
respondent attended at the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 and threatened the
employees of the first and second applicants. The first respondent admits
attending the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 but denies threatening the employees
of the first and second applicants. It is the case of the first respondent that on
that day, he attended at the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 with an employee of Tau
Pele Construction, Francois Prinsoloo, to establish why they were being denied
access to the Farm Brandewynskuil 102.
[29] It is alleged that on 24 January 2025, the first respondent attended on the
Farm Brandewynskuil 102, broke the chain and locks and entered Farm
Brandewynskuil 102, threatening to kill the employees of the first and second
applicants. It is alleged that during this visit, th e first respondent was
accompanied by some unknown persons. The first respondent admits attending
Farm Brandewynskuil 102 on 24 January 2025, but denies breaking the chains
and locks and denies that anyone was threatened. The first respondent contends
that on 24 January 2025, he was with Steven Marais to determine the reason for
the lock.
[30] The first and second respondents raised four points in limine in this
application. The first , no authority to act on behalf of the first and second
applicants by Mr Makgalamele. This is because Mr Makgalamele failed to
attach the resolutions of the first and second applicants to the founding affidavit
he deposed to on their behalf, confirming that the first and second applicants
have authorised the bringing of the application. The second , non-joinder of
Eskom. The first and second respondents contend that the order sought in this
Court directing that the electricity supply be restored to the Farm
Brandewynskuil 102 will indirectly be against Eskom, and Eskom has not been
given an opportunity to reply to such a potential order. The third , hearsay
evidence; this is based on the failure to attach the confirmatory affidavits of the
employees of the firs t and second applicants, who allege they were threatened
by the first respondent, and the fourth, lack of urgency.
[31] All the points in limine have been overtaken by events, and it becomes
unnecessary for this Court to consider any of them. In the reply ing affidavit of
the first and second applicants, Mr Makgalamele has attached the resolutions of
the first and second applicants authorising the bringing of the application. In the
heads of argument filed on behalf of the first and second respondents, it i s
submitted that the first and second respondents are not persisting with the point
in limine that Mr Makgalamele lacked authority to institute the application on
behalf of the first and second applicants. The amendment to the notice of
motion abandoning t he relief for an order directing the first, second and third
respondents to immediately restore the supply of electricity to the Farm
Brandewynskuil 102 renders it unnecessary to deal with the point in limine of
non-joinder of Eskom.
[32] In addition, it is submitted in the heads of argument filed on behalf of the
first and second applicants that the electricity supply to the Farm
Brandewynskuil 102 has been restored. In the replying affidavit deposed to by
Mr Makgalamele, the confirmatory affidavits of the employees of the first and
second applicants who were allegedly threatened by the first respondent have
been attached. The confirmatory affidavits of the fifth respondent, insofar as the
allegations of the dispute between herself and the children of the late Mr Lubbe,
have been attached. The confirmatory affidavits of the current attorney of record
of the first and second applicants, as to the allegations made in the founding
affidavit and the replying affidavit, have been attached. It is submitted in t he
heads of argument of the first and second respondents that they are not
persisting with the point in limine of hearsay. On the issue of urgency, Reddy J
dealt with it in limine on 14 February 2025, upholding it and striking the
application from the roll for lack of urgency.
Legal Principles
[33] The first and second applicants seek an interlocutory interdict against the
first, second and third respondents. An interlocutory interdict is one which is
granted pendente lite . There must be legal proceedings pending between the
parties.1 It is a provisional order designed to protect the rights of the
complainant party pending an action or application to be brought by him/her to
establish the respective rights of the parties 2. It does not involve a final
determination of the parties' rights and does not affect such a determination 3. Its
effect is to ‘freeze’ the position until the court decides where the right lies at
which point it ceases to operate 4. It is aimed at ensuring, as far as is reasonably
possible, that the party who is ulti mately successful will receive adequate and
effective relief5.
[34] The general rule is that the applicant must be a person having locus standi
to apply in that he/she has an interest in the subject matter of the interdict 6. A
party which cannot demonst rate an extant right in property could nonetheless
apply for an interdict to preserve the property concerned if it could make out a
prima facie case that it would receive relief in the future from which a right in
the property would flow7.
1 Pikoli v President of Republic of South Africa (Pikoli) 2010 (1) SA 400 (GNP) at 403H).
2 Pikoli at 403I; Airoadexpress (Pty) Ltd v Chairman, Local Road Transportation Board, Durban 1986 (2) SA
663 (A) at 681D–F.
3 Apleni v Minister of Law and Order 1989 (1) SA 195 (A) at 201B; Pikoli at 403I – 404A.
4 Jordan v Penmill Investments CC 1991 (2) SA 430 (E) at 436F.
5 Pikoli at 404A.
6Cabinet of the Transitional Government for the Territory of South West Africa v Eins 1988 (3) SA 369 (A) at
388A–I.
388A–I.
7 Antares International Ltd v Louw Coetzee & Malan Inc 2014 (1) SA 172 (WCC) at 188C –E, 188I and 190G –
H.
[35] The perso n against whom an interdict is sought must be the person
responsible, either as principal or as agent, for the wrong committed or
threatened; and in appropriate circumstances, third parties may have to be cited.
[36] In order for the first and second app licants to succeed with the relief that
they seek, they must satisfy this Court that they have: ‘(a) a prima facie right;
(b) a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not
granted and the ultimate relief is eventually grante d; (c) a balance of
convenience in favour of the granting of the interim relief; and (d) the absence
of any other satisfactory remedy.’8
[37] An interdict will be granted if the court is satisfied that the applicant has a
right established upon a balance of probabilities and that the respondent has
invaded it or threatens to do so9. The prima facie right, which the applicant must
first identify, is, of course, less stringent than that claimed in a final interdict.
This means that the applicant bears the onus to place sufficient evidence before
the court to show the existence of a right, even though, by reason of denials by
the respondent, some doubt is thrown on the existence of that right. If, on the
probabilities, there is great doubt, then the applicant will not be entitled to an
interdict, even temporarily.10
[38] A well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is
not granted. This is defined as the loss of property (including incorporeal
property and money) in circumstances where its recovery is impossible or
improbable. The harm must be anticipated or ongoing. 11 If the ap plicant can
8 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221 at 227 ; South African Informal Traders Forum and Others v City of
Johannesburg and Others; South African National Traders Retail Association v City of Johannesburg and
Others [2014] ZACC 8; 2014 (6) BCLR 726 (CC); 2014 (4) SA 371 (CC) 2014 (4) SA 371 (CC) para 24 .
9 Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W) at 1188.
10 Msunduzi Municipality v Natal Joint Municipal Pension/Provident Fund 2007 (1) SA 142 (N) at 152E–G.
11 National Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at 231D; Tshwane City v
Afriforum 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC) at 300B.
establish a clear right, his/her apprehension of irreparable harm need not be
established.12
[39] If the infringement complained of prima facie appears to have occurred
once and for all and is finished and done with, the applicant should al lege facts
justifying a reasonable apprehension that the harm is likely to be repeated.13
[40] A balance of convenience in favour of the granting of the interim relief.
This Court must weigh the prejudice to the first and second applicants if the
interlocutory interdict is refused against the prejudice to the first, second and
third respondents if it is granted. 14 This is determined by consideration of the
prospects of success in the main action and the balance of convenience. The
stronger the pros pects of success, the less need for the balance of convenience
to favour the first and second applicants; the weaker the prospects of success,
the greater the need for the balance of convenience to favour the first and
second applicants.15
[41] The absenc e of another adequate ordinary remedy. Being a drastic
remedy from the respondent’s point of view and (probably largely for that
reason) in the court’s discretion, the court will not, in general, grant an interdict
when the applicant can obtain adequate re dress in some other form of ordinary
relief. The courts will not, in general, grant an interdict when the applicant can
obtain adequate redress by an award of damages.16
12 Ndauti v Kgami 1948 (3) SA 27 (W) (Ndauti) at 36.
13 National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Openshaw 2008 (5) SA 339 (SCA) at
347E–F.
14 Ndauti at 36 – 37.
15 Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Warrenton 1973 (3) SA 685 (A) at 691F –G; Simon NO v Air
Operations of Europe AB 1999 (1) SA 217 (SCA) at 231G–I.
16 UDC Bank Ltd v Seacat Leasing and Finance Co (Pty) Ltd 1979 (4) SA 682 (T) at 695D–696C.
[42] The requirement of the absence of another adequate remedy is closely
linked to that of irreparable harm. If there is some other satisfactory remedy, it
follows that the injury cannot be described as irreparable.17
[43] The court enjoys the discretion whether or not to grant an interdict. 18 No
comprehensive rule can be laid down for the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting or refusing interdicts, but the court must decide each case on its own
circumstances.
[44] Where the facts are disputed in motion proceedings, the court must, as a
general rule, decide the matter on the respondent’s version of the facts, unless
that version is so far -fetched or clearly untenable that it falls to be rejected on
the papers.19 This rule applies throughout the analysis that follows, in respect of
each disputed factual allegation.
Analysis
[45] The first and second applicants rely on the doctrine of notice. The first
and second applicants contend that, based on this doctrine, they are entitled to
claim that the transfer of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 from the third
respondent to the second respondent should be set aside so that such ownership
can be transferred to the first applicant. The first and second applicants have
referred to the decisions of Le Roux v Nel and Another20 (Le Roux) and Bowring
17 Strarfield-Ward v Suluhisho Africa (Pty) Ltd (unreported, GJ case no 2024/104051 dated 3 October 2024) at
paragraph 38; Desert Oil (Pty) Ltd v OP Bathlaro Filling Station (Pty) Ltd (unreported, NCK case no 2161/2024
dated 18 September 2024) at paragraph [37]; Erasmus: Superior Court Practice Vol 2 at RS 26, 2025, D6-32.
18 Knox D’Arcy Ltd v Jamieson 1996 (4) SA 348 (A) at 361H–362C.
19 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634H–635C.
20 (246/2013) [2013] ZASCA 109 (16 September 2013).
NO v Vrededorp Properties CC21. In Le Roux, Brand JA, writing for the court at
paragraph 4, said the following on the doctrine of notice:
‘In support of their claim for tra nsfer the appellants relied on principles embodied in
what has become well known in our law as the doctrine of notice. The operation of
this doctrine in the sphere of successive sales has been described in previous cases
along the following lines. The star ting point is the basic principle of our law that a
real right generally prevails over a personal right, even if the personal right is prior in
time, when they come into competition with one another. Accordingly, in the ordinary
course, if a seller, A, sel ls a thing – be it movable or immovable – to B and
subsequently sells the same thing to C, ownership is acquired, not by the earlier
purchaser, but by the purchaser who first obtains transfer of the thing sold. If the first
purchaser, B, is also the first transferee, his or her right is unassailable. If the second
purchaser, C, is the first transferee, his or her right of ownership is equally
unassailable if he or she had purchased without knowledge of the prior sale to B. But,
if C had purchased with such prior knowledge, B is entitled to claim that the transfer
to C be set aside so that ownership of the thing sold can be transferred by A to B. In
exceptional circumstances B may be allowed to claim transfer directly from the
purchaser with knowledge, C.’ (own emphasis)
[46] In order for the first applicant to succeed with its claim based on the
doctrine of notice, the first applicant must allege and prove that when the third
respondent entered into the sale agreement with the second respondent for the
Farm Brandewynskuil 102, the second respondent or its members or its agents
knew of the sale agreement between the third respondent and the first applicant
(‘the first sale agreement’) and despite such knowledge, entered into the sale
agreement with the third respondent.
agreement with the third respondent.
[47] It is submitted in the written heads of argument filed on behalf of the first
and second applicants, that based on the first respondent’s averments in the
21 (271/2006) [2007] ZASCA 80; 2007 (5) SA 391 (SCA) (31 May 2007).
answering affidavit, it is confirmed that he was aware of the first sale agreement
and the circumstances surrounding such agreement. In my view, the contention
on behalf of the first and second applicants on this point is speculative and
overlooks two crucial issues under contract law. As a general rule, a contract is
not concluded until the purchaser h as not only decided to accept the offer, but
has communicated that acceptance to the seller. There can be no contract until
the seller knows that he/she and the purchaser are ad idem . The seller may
prescribe the method of acceptance.22
[48] The doctrine of notice operates only where there is a prior valid personal
right arising from a concluded contract. Where no contract has been concluded
because the purchaser's acceptance was never communicated to the seller, there
is no prior persona l right to which the doctrine can attach. On the facts of this
matter, even on the first and second applicants’ own version, no acceptance was
ever communicated to the attorney of the third respondent. The alleged signing
of the hard copy of the sale agree ment by Mr Makgalamele at the direction of
Mr Johan Lubbe, with back-dating and without forwarding the signed document
to the third respondent’s attorney, cannot constitute a valid communication of
acceptance. Communication of acceptance requires that it b e brought to the
notice of the seller23. No such communication was made on or before 28
November 2023, on 20 December 2023, or at any time before the offer was
withdrawn on 2 February 2024. The first applicant , therefore, acquired no
personal right under t he first sale agreement. In the absence of a prior personal
right, the doctrine of notice cannot assist the first applicant.
[49] On the issue of the purchase price, the contention by Mr Makgalamele,
that Mr Johan Lubbe told him not to pay the purchase price until the dispute
22 Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa, 7 th Edition at Pages 82 to 83.
22 Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa, 7 th Edition at Pages 82 to 83.
23 Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa, 7 th Edition at Pages 82–83
between the children of the late Mr Lubbe and the fifth respondent is resolved,
and he has not been told that the dispute is resolved and payment should be
made of the purchase price. There is no merit in this contention, a nd it is
nullified by the letters from the attorneys of the third respondent dated 7
December 2023 and 11 January 2024. In these letters, demand was made for the
signed sale agreement and purchase price of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102.
Despite the demand th at was made for the signed sale agreement and purchase
price of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102, the first applicant failed to comply with
the demand.
[50] On 2 February 2024, the attorney of the third respondent addressed a
letter to the erstwhile attorney o f the first applicant, confirming that the third
respondent is no longer intending to sell the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 to the
first applicant. This brings me to the second crucial issue that the first applicant
has overlooked in contract law. The seller ma y withdraw the offer at any time
before it has been accepted. 24 The withdrawal becomes effective only from the
time it comes to the notice of the purchaser.25
[51] It is not disputed in the replying affidavit deposed to by Mr Makgalamele
on behalf of the first and second applicants that the letter dated 2 February 2024
was forwarded to the erstwhile attorney of the first applicant, and that in that
letter the third respondent withdrew the offer to sell the farm Brandewynskuil
102 to the first applicant. Q uiescence is not necessarily acquiescence; a party
who does not make a firm repudiation of an allegation when bound to do so
incurs the risk of an adverse inference being drawn against him/her.26
24 Robarts v Antonie NO [2014] 3 All SA 160 (SCA) para [21].
25 Yates v Dalton 1938 EDL 177.
26 McWilliams v First Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (2) SA 1 (A) at 10D – H.
[52] Mr Makgalamele was in a position to deny that the let ters dated 2
February 2024 had been forwarded to the erstwhile attorney of the first and
second applicant. If the information was not within his knowledge, he could
have stated as much in his replying affidavit. The primary purpose of the
replying affidavit is to present evidence that refutes the case made out by the
respondent in his answering affidavit. 27 If the first and second applicants’
replying affidavit fails to admit, deny or confess and avoid allegations contained
in the first and second responden ts' answering affidavit, the court is entitled to
accept that such allegations were not in dispute and were therefore correct.28
[53] This Court is of the view that the attorney of the third respondent
properly gave notice of the withdrawal of the sale agreement of the farm
Brandewynskuil 102 to the erstwhile attorney of the first applicant, Mr
Raseasala, on 2 February 2024. From the consideration of the contents of the
letter from the attorneys of the third respondent, to the erstwhile attorney of the
first and second applicants dated 14 February 2024, and having considered the
deed of transfer of the farm Brandewynskuil 102 from the third respondent to
the second respondent, it appears the third respondent sold the farm
Brandewynskuil 102 to the se cond respondent after 2 February 2024 and the
deed of transfer reads that the farm Brandewynskuil 102 was sold by the third
respondent to the second respondent on 26 March 2024, which was clearly after
the withdrawal of the sale agreement between the third respondent and the first
applicant.
[54] The qui prior est tempore potior est jure maxim equally does not find
application in the application before this Court. In Gugu and Another v
27 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sewpersadh and Another - 2005 (4) SA 148 (C) at Page159 G–H.
28 Minister of Social Development and Another v Mpayipheli (CA135/16) [2018] ZAECMHC 31 (26 June 2018)
Para [15].
Zongwana and Others, Van Zyl ADJP, writing for the full court at parag raph
32, said the following:
‘In other words, the existence of an agreement for the sale of a specific thing does not prevent
the creation of a competing personal right ex-contractu for the delivery or the transfer of the
same moveable or immovable thing. Consequently, ownership is ge nerally not acquired by
the purchaser whose contract was the earlier one, but by the purchaser who was the first to
obtain delivery or transfer without knowledge of the existence of the prior right of another. ’
(own emphasis)
[55] The maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure requires, as a
precondition, the existence of two competing personal rights arising from
concluded contracts. Where the first “contract” was never brought into
existence because the putative purchaser never communicated ac ceptance to the
seller, there is no prior personal right from which the maxim can operate. In the
present matter, for the reasons set out above, no contract was ever concluded
between the first applicant and the third respondent. The first applicant
consequently cannot invoke the maxim. This is, separately and independently, a
further reason why the first applicant cannot succeed with this ground of its
claim. Even if a first sale agreement had been concluded, the first applicant
would also have had to establish that the second respondent had knowledge of it
when the sale between the second and third respondents was entered into on 26
March 2024, an evidentiary burden it has failed to discharge on the papers
before this Court.
[56] The second lease agree ment was validly cancelled by the third
respondent based on the second applicant’s persistent failure to pay the agreed
monthly rental. The letters of demand dated 10 August 2023 (R63 000.00), 2
October 2023 (R106 000.00) , and 2 February 2024 (R232 000.00) evidence a
sustained and uncontested failure to meet the contractual payment obligation.
The third respondent was accordingly entitled to cancel the second lease
agreement and did so by the letter of 2 February 2024 addressed to the erstwhile
attorney of the second applicant. The reliance by the first and second applicants
on clauses 6.1 and 6.2 of the first sale agreement cannot avail the second
applicant. Those clauses expressly refer to “the Purchaser”, that is, the first
applicant in its capacity as pu rchaser under the sale agreement, and not to the
second applicant in its capacity as lessee under the second lease agreement.
Moreover, even if the second applicant could have relied on clause 6.2, that
provision was conditioned on the purchaser’s complian ce with all the terms and
conditions of the sale agreement. The first applicant failed to comply with the
sale agreement. The clause , therefore, afforded no protection to the second
applicant, and the cancellation of the second lease agreement was legally
effective.
[57] It is contended in the heads of argument filed on behalf of the first and
second applicants that, in terms of ss 46(b)(iii) and 46(b)(iv) of the Close
Corporations Act (‘CC Act’), a special resolution of the members of the third
respondent was required before the third respondent could enter the sale
agreement with the second respondent. It is further contended that the fifth
respondent is the surviving spouse of the late Mr Lubbe and the sole beneficiary
and the executrix of the Estate of the late Mr Lubbe. It is submitted that the late
Mr Lubbe had a member interest in the third respondent . Upon his passing, the
member's interest fell into the Estate of the late Mr Lubbe and was under the
authority and power of the fifth respondent. It is further submitted that the fifth
respondent has not approved of the sale agreement between the third respondent
and the second respondent. As a result, the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 could not
be disposed of without the fifth respondent’s consent.
[58] Section 46(b)(iii) and s 46(b)(iv) of the CC Act reads as follows:
‘46. Variable rules regarding internal relations
The following rules in respect of internal relations in a corporation shall apply , so far
as this Act or an association agreement in respect of the corporation does not provide
otherwise:
(a) ….
(b) subject to the provision of section 47, members shall have equal rights
regarding the management of the business of the corporation and in regard to the
power to represent the corporation in the carrying on of its business: Provided that the
consent in writing of a member holding a member’s interest of at least 75 per cent, or
of members holding together at least that percentage of the members’ interests, in the
corporation, shall be required for—
(i) ….
(ii) ….
(iii) a disposal of all, or the greater portion of, the assets of the corporation; and
(iv) any acquisition or disposal of immovable property by the corporation;’
[59] The reliance on ss 46(b)(iii) and (iv) of the CC Act by the first and
second applicants was raised for the first time in t heir heads of argument. This
point was not raised in the founding affidavits of the first and second applicants.
In Biyela v Minister of Police 29, Musi AJA, writing for the court, said the
following:
‘It goes without saying that a trial by ambush is unfair; courts should be very slow to allow a
party to mount a case at trial other than the one that the party has pleaded. In Minister of
Safety and Security v Slabbert, it was stated that:
‘The purpose of pleadings is to define the issues for the other party and the court. A party has
a duty to allege in the pleadings the material facts upon which it relies. It is impermissible for
29 (1017/2020) [2022] ZASCA 36; 2023 (1) SACR 235 (SCA) (1 April 2022) para [8]
a plaintiff to plead a particular case and seek to establish a different cas e at trial.’ (footnotes
omitted)
[60] In my view, there was a duty on the first and second applicants to have
given notice of their intention to raise their reliance on ss 46(b)(iii) and (iv) of
the CC Act in their founding affidavit. The procedures followed by the first and
second applicants should not be encouraged, as they amount to litigation by
ambush. The first and second respondents were, in my view, prejudiced by the
point being raised for the first time in the heads of argument of the first and
second applicants. The first and second respondents met the challenge in their
heads of argument.
[61] It is submitted on behalf of the first and second respondents in their heads
of argument that non -compliance with ss 46(b)(iii) and (iv) of the CC Act does
not render the particular transaction void but merely renders the transaction
unenforceable. The first and second respondents rely on the decision of Farren
v Sun Service SA Photo Trip Management (Pty) Ltd 30. The contention raised in
the heads of argument of the first and second respondents on this issue further
reads that non-compliance with the provisions of s 228 of the Companies Act 61
of 1973 (‘Old Companies Act’) and s 112 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008
(‘New Companies Act’) render s the particular transaction merely
unenforceable, and not void. I refrain from expressing my view on the
correctness or otherwise of this submission. In my view, the decision of
Badenhorst NO v Manyatta Properties Close Corporation and Others 31
(Badenhorst) makes it unnecessary to address the submission of the first and
second respondents.
30 2004 (2) SA 146 (C) para [11], [13]
31 (049/2024) [2025] ZASCA 194 (17 December 2025)
[62] In Badenhorst at paragraphs 51 to 53, Keightley JA, writing for the court,
said the following:
‘[51] To succeed in establishing this ground for special leave to appeal, the applicant
must demonstrate that the sale and transfer of the property to Nikifon wa s not simply
arguably invalid, but patently so. He relies on the common-cause fact that Mr. de Witt
signed the sale and transfer documents as the holder of 50 percent of the member’s
interest in Manyatta without the written authority of Ms Metzer as the ho lder, in her
representative capacity, of the remaining 50 percent. The applicant’s case is that the
inevitable consequence of this contravention of s 46(b)(iv) of the CC Act is that Mr de
Witt had no power to bind Manyatta to the transaction. This absence of authority
rendered the real agreement fatally defective . Consequently, he contends, the full
court patently erred in concluding that the transfer of the property to Nikifon was
valid.
[52] The difficulty for the applicant is that s 46(b)(iv), which fo rms the cornerstone of
his case, cannot be considered in isolation. It is a provision regulating the internal
relations of close corporations. Other provisions of the CC Act regulate close
corporations in their transactional relationships with third partie s. Central to this
matter is s 54(2), which provides:
“Any act of a member shall bind a corporation whether or not such act is performed
for the carrying on of the business of the corporation unless the member so acting has
in fact no power to act for the corporation in the particular matter and the person with
whom the member deals has, or ought reasonably to have, knowledge of the fact that
the member has no such power.” (My emphasis.)
[53]Section 54(2) is significant because it recognises that not all transactions lacking
authority will be invalid. Its purpose is to protect third parties who bona fide transact
authority will be invalid. Its purpose is to protect third parties who bona fide transact
with a close corporation in the reasonable belief that a member is authorised to act on
its behalf, even if that authority de facto is absent. The effect is that where the third
party satisfies the section’s requirements , the close corporation will be bound ex lege
to comply with its obligations. The question is whether Nikifon satisfied thes e
requirements.’
[63] The first and second respondents did not have the opportunity to explain
why they believed that the members of the third respondent, who represented
the third respondent when the sale agreement was entered into with the second
respondent, could act on behalf of the third respondent. The answering
affidavits of the first and second respondents met the case pleaded by the first
and second applicants. In my view, the alleged issue of non -compliance with ss
46(b)(iii) and (iv) of the CC Act does not assist the case of the first and second
applicants. This issue should be raised by the fifth respondent in a separate
application, should she so wish, under s 49 of the CC Act. It has not been
contended by any of the parties that the fifth respondent has instituted
proceedings to set aside the sale agreement between the second respondent and
the third respondent for the Farm Brandewynskuil 102.
[64] In my view, the first and second applicants have failed to make out a
case that they have a prima facie right because a serious doubt is cast on their
claim. The first lease agreement was superseded by the second lease agreement.
The second lease agreement was validly cancelled. The sale agreement between
the first applicant and the third respondent was validly withdrawn before the
first applicant could accept the seller's offer. As a result, no sale agreement was
concluded. In my view, the first and second applicants do not have the right to
possess or occupy Farm Brandewynskuil 102. The failure of the first and second
applicants to establish a prima facie right is, in itself, fatal to the application and
sufficient to dismiss it. Nevertheless, in the interests of completeness and if this
Court’s conclusion on the prima facie right is wrong, this Court proceeds to
consider the remaining requirements.
[65] The application was struck from the roll by Reddy J on 14 February 2025
for lack of urgency. From the time that the application was struck from the roll
to the date when it was heard by this Court, on 29 August 2025, the first and
second applicants ha ve not filed a supplementary affidavit setting out further
conduct on the part of the first respondent, the first and second applicants have
failed to allege facts justifying a reasonable apprehension that the harm is likely
to be repeated.
[66] The balan ce of convenience does not favour the granting of the relief
sought by the first and second applicants. The sale agreement between the first
applicant and the third respondent was withdrawn before the first applicant
accepted the offer and communicated suc h acceptance to the third respondent,
and affected payment of the purchase price of the Farm Brandewynskuil 102; as
a result, no sale agreement came into existence between the first applicant and
the third respondent. The lease agreement between the second applicant and the
third respondent was validly cancelled for non -payment of the agreed rental.
The farming activities on the Farm Brandewynskuil 102 are without the consent
of the second respondent or the third respondent and are, as a result, unlawful.
[67] The employees of the first and second applicants could have approached
the Magistrate’s Court for an order in terms of the Harassment Act, just like the
fifth respondent obtained an order against the first respondent; there was
nothing precluding the employees of the first and second applicants and the first
and second applicants from obtaining such an order against the first respondent.
Having considered the facts of the case of the first and second applicants, the
applicants' application should consequently fail.
Costs
[68] It is a trite principle in our jurisprudence that costs follow the cause, and I
have not found any reason to deviate from this principle. The first and second
applicants failed to disclose material facts in their founding affidavit. The
following documents, all of which were known to the first and second
applicants or Mr Makgalemele or their erstwhile attorneys, were not disclosed:
(a) the email of 23 November 2023 from the attorneys of the third respondent to
the erstwhile attorney of the first applicant and to Mr Makgalemele , which
contained the signed sale agreement and expressly required written acceptance
by 28 November 2023, failing which the third respondent reserved the right to
withdraw the offer; (b) the letter of 7 December 2023 to the erstwhile attorney
of the first applicant extending the deadline for the signed sale agreement and
payment of the purchase price to 20 December 2023; (c) the letter of 11 January
2024 to the erstwhile attorney of the first applicant and Mr Makgalemele
confirming that neither the signed sale agreement nor payment of the purchase
price had been received; (d) the letter of 2 February 2024 to the erstwhile
attorney of the first and second applicants in which the third respondent
withdrew the offer to sell Farm Brandewynskuil 102 to the first applicant and
confirmed the cancellation of the second lease agreement with the second
applicant; and (e) the letter of 14 February 2024 to the erstwhile attorney of the
first and second applicants confirming that Farm Brandewynskuil 102 had been
sold to a third party and that no further negotiations would be entertained. The
non-disclosure of these documents was material. Had they been disclosed, it
would have been apparent on the face of the founding papers that neither the
first applicant had a valid sale agreement nor the second applicant an extant
lease agreement. The application, on any view, should never have been brought.
[69] The purpose of an award of costs is to indemnify a successful party who
has incurred expenses in instituting or defending an action 32. The first and
second respondents should not incur any out-of-pocket expenses in opposing the
application. The first and second applicants, at the time they brought this
application, knew or must have known that the offer to purchase Farm
Brandewynskuil 102 had been withdrawn and that the second lease agreement
had been validly cancelled. They had received, through their erstwhile attorneys
or Mr Makgalemele, the letters referred to above a nd were fully apprised of the
position. Notwithstanding this, they launched an application in which they
persisted with a claim to the rights of a purchaser under a sale agreement that
was never concluded and the rights of a lessee under a lease that had b een
lawfully cancelled. This Court disapproves of the manner in which the first and
second applicants litigated this application. The bringing of litigation with
knowledge that the underlying right no longer exists, and with deliberate non -
disclosure of th e documents that would have made that plain, justifies a
description of the application as vexatious and warrants a costs order on the
attorney and client scale.
Order
[70] Resultantly, the following order is made.
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The first and second applicants are ordered to pay the costs of the
application jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved, on the attorney and client scale.
32Texas Co (SA) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1926 AD 467 at 488
_______________________
T MASIKE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
APPEARANCES
For the applicants: Mr. D M Molapo
Instructed by: Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc.
c/o Minchin & Kelly Inc.
For the first and second
respondents: Adv L Hollander
Instructed by: Theron Jordaan & Smit Inc.
C/O CJP Oelofse Attorneys