Reportable : YES / NO
Circulate to Judges: YES / NO
Circulate to Magistrates: YES / NO
Circulate to Reaional Magistrates : YES / NO
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)
CASE NO: 660/2025
In the matter between :
CAREL ARON VAN DER MERWE
and
JOHANNES ZACHARIAS HUMAN MULLER
DEON MARIUS BOTHA
PIETER HENDRIK STRYDOM
In re:
JOHANNES ZACHARIAS HUMAN MULLER
DEON MARIUS BOTHA
PIETER HENDRIK STRYDOM
and
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
First Applicant
Second Applicant
Third Applicant
CAREL ARON VAN DER MERWE First Respondent
SHANIE VAN DER MERWE Second Respondent
ERIC TORR Third Respondent
SKY TYLOR Fourth Respondent
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER (NORTHERN CAPE),
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE N.O. Fifth Respondent
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER (GAUTENG),
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE N.O. Sixth Respondent
Page 2
THE STATION COMMANDER, SOUTH AFRICAN
POLICE SERVICE, FRASERBURG N.O. Seventh Respondent
Neutral citation:
Coram:
Heard:
Delivered:
Summary:
Carel Van Der Merwe v Johannes Muller and 2 Others
(660/2025) 17 April 2026
ROACHAJ
20 November 2025
17 April 2026
Application for leave to appeal an interim order - When
leave to appeal should be granted - Interim interdicts
generally not appealable - Appeal also having no
reasonable prospects of success or compelling reason to
be heard - Application dismissed.
ORDER
1. THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH
COSTS ON ATTORNEY AND CLIENT SCALE; SUCH COSTS TO
INCLUDE COSTS OF TWO COUNSEL, ONE OF WHOM IS A SENIOR
COUNSEL, ON SCALE C.
ROACHAJ
INTRODUCTION:
JUDGMENT
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the order and decision
made by me on 04 April 2025 wherein I granted an interim order in terms
of Part A of an application brought in two parts, Part A being brought as
one of urgency. The reasons for the order were subsequently provided
on 07 April 2025.
[2] The Applicant is the First Respondent in the main application . The
appl ication for leave to appeal is opposed by the First, Second and Third
Applicants in the main application, whom I shall refer to in this
Page 3
application for leave to appeal as the First, Second and Third
Respondents. The relevant terms of the impugned order are the
following:
"5. Pending the final outcome of the application for the relief sought by
the Applicants in Part B and the First Respondent 's counter
application:
5.1 The First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents are
interdicted and restrained from making, posting or publishing
any false or defamatory statements or comments, or any
statements or comments which cause or which are designed to
cause harm to the reputation of the Applicants or the business
entities in which the First and Second Applicants are engaged
namely Tshwane Trust Co (Pty) Ltd and Corporate Liquidators
(Pty) Ltd ("the Corporate Entities''):
5.1.1 on any social media platform including the [Genoeg
is Genoeg] Facebook Page; and
5.1.2 on any other media platform including print media,
radio, television, You Tube or any other streaming
platform.
5.2 The First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents are ordered
to remove or ensure the removal of the statements, posts and
comments which are annexures NOMJ.J to NOMJ.4 to the
notice of motion delivered by the First and Second Applicants
and the Annexures SA16.J, SAJ7 .1, SAJ8.J, SAJ9 .J, SA20.1,
SA21.l, SA22, SA23, SA24, SA25, SA26 and SA27 to the
supplementary affidavit filed by the First and Second
Applicants ( "the Impugned Statements") from the [Genoeg is
Genoeg] Facebook Page within 24 hours of service on them of
an order granted by this Court, which service is authorised to
take place in terms of paragraph 3 above.
5.3 The First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents are ordered
to remove or ensure the removal of the statements , posts and
comments which are annexures PHSl to PHS8 ("the Further
Impugned Statements'') to the Notice of Motion delivered by
the Third Applicant from the Facebook Page within 24 hours
of service on them of an order granted by this Court, which
service is authorised to take place in terms of paragraph 3
service is authorised to take place in terms of paragraph 3
above.
5. 4 The First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents are directed
to deliver affidavits to the First and Second Applicants '
attorney of record and the Third Applicant 's attorney of record
within 7 days of service of this order in terms of paragraph 4
above, in which they confirm that they have complied fully with
Page4
the provisions of paragraphs 5. 2 and 5. 3 above and have
removed or ensured the removal of the Impugned Statements
and the Further Impugned Statement s from the Facebook
Page .
5. 5 The Applicants are granted leave to make appli cation to the
urgent motion court, on the same papers duly supplemented,
for an order declaring the First, Second, Third and Fourth
Respondents to be in contempt of court and imposing such
sanction s in respect of such persons found to be in contempt
of court (including incarceration for as long as the contempt
is not purged) as the court may deem appropria te.
6. The costs of Part A of the application , including the costs of the
intervention application and the costs of the First Respond ent 's
counter application , are reserved for determination in Part B. "
GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
(3] The grounds of appeal are set out in a notice of application for leave to
appeal dated 22 April 2025. In the notice , the Applicant indicated that
he awaits the transcript and reasons for the order, requested on 12 to
15 April 2025, to substantiate the grounds of appeal ; and to supplement
the notice and the further affidavit as required. After obtaining same, he
set out, on 24 July 2025, the amended grounds of appeal which are
summarised below :
3.1 The interim order is final in effect; inflicts grave constitutional
harm/injustices as it imposes a definitive restriction of rights; and
causes irreparable harm to the Applicant and the public . The
constitutional injustices include the violation of the right to
freedom of expression; the fair hearing rights; and the right to
equality before the law. The order is therefore appealable.
3.2. The interim order was granted in the face of procedural
irregularities. The Court failed to enforce Rule 35(12)(b) of the
Uniform Rules of Court which prohibits reliance on unproduced
documents and without leave of the Court. Further, the Court
conducted an ex-parte pre-hearing consultation between the
Pages
Court and the Respondents' counsel to the Applicant's
exclusion , thus infringing judicia l impartiality .
3.3. The Court erred in permitting hearing the application on an
urgent basis; failing to ventilate all facts , particularly the Third
Respondent's admission under oath; failing to apply the rules in
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Ply) Ltd1
("Plascon-Evans»); and misdirecting itself by applying the
objective test for defamation.
3.4. The Court erred in law by granting an interdict without a prima
facie right being established , and extending the granting of such
relief to entities that are not parties in the application , e.g .
Tshwane Trust Co (Pty) Ltd.
3. 5. The Court erred in law by issuing an order with vague terms that
definitively restrict Section 16(1 )(b) and (c) rights through the
prohibition of publication of posts on 'Genoeg is Genoeg ',
without a return date .
3.6. The order facilitated the SLAPP nature of the lawsuit. 2 The
Court erred by issuing an order that shields the Respondents'
fiduciary duties , conflict of interest , misconduct and
accountabil ity. The Court also erred in not acknowledging public
interest , and in undermining public discourse and transparency
in insolvency processes .
3.7. The App licant has a reasonable prospect of success on appeal.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES:
(4) Section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 3 provides as follows :
1 1984 (3) SA 623 A at 634H to 635C
2 Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation as described in Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) LUI and
Others v Reddell and Others 2023 (2) SA 68 (CC) para 2
3 10of20 13
Page 6
"17 Leave to appeal
(]) Leave to appeal may only be given where the Judge or Judges
concerned are of the opinion that-
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of
success ; or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal
should be heard, including conflicting judgments on
the matter under consideration;
(b) the decision sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of
Section 16(2)(a); and
(c) where the decision sought to be appealed does not dispose of
all the issues in the case, the appeal would lead to a just and
prompt resolution of the real issues between the parties. "
[5] The Superior Courts Act has raised the bar for granting leave to appeal.
In Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen and Others4 , Bertelsmann J held
as follows :
"It is clear that the threshold for granting leave to appeal against a judgment
of a High Court has been raised in the new Act. The former test whether leave
to appeal should be granted was a reasonable prospect that another Court
might come to a different conclusion , see Van Heerden v Cronwright and
Others 1985 (2) SA 342 (T) at 343H. The use of the word "would " in the new
statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will differ from the
court whose judgment is sought to be appealed against." ,
[6] In Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and
Others, 5 the Full Court held the following :
" ... Leave to Appeal is not simply for the taking. A balance between the rights
of the party which was successful before the court a quo and the rights of the
losing party seeking leave to appeal needs to be established so that the absence
of a realistic chance of succeeding on appeal dictates that a balance must be
struck in favour of the party which was initially successful. "
[7] Leave to appeal can also be granted where the interests of justice so
demand, . as this may constitute a compelling reason for the appeal to
4 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC)
demand, . as this may constitute a compelling reason for the appeal to
4 2014 JDR 2325 (LCC)
5 (21424/ 2020) [2020] ZAGPPHC 326 (29 July 2020) para 5
Page 7
be heard.6 Directly linked to this is the fact that the impugned order in
casu is an interim interdict. In this regard, Khampepe ADCJ in
Economic Freedom Fighters v Gordhan and Others 7 , said the following:
"Turning to the present matter, it should be borne in mind that both Applicants
seek urgently to appeal an interim interdict, which is purely interlocutory in
nature. An interim interdict is a temporary order that aims to protect the
rights of an Applicant, pending the outcome of a main application or action.
It attempts to preserve or restore the status quo until a final decision relating
to the rights of the parties can be made by the review court in the main
application. As a result it is not a final determination of the rights of the
parties. It bears stressing that the grant of an interim interdict does not, and
should not, affect the review court's decision when making its final decision
and should not have an effect on the determination of the rights in the main
application. The purpose of an interdict is to provide an Applicant with
adequate and effective temporary relief
The law concerning the appealability of interim interdicts is settled. Interim
interdicts are generally not appealable. This is because interim interdicts are
not.final in nature; they are not determinative of the rights of the parties and
do not have the effect of disposing of a substantial portion of the relief claimed.
However, these reasons are not exhaustive. There are various other sound
policy reasons for the general non-appealahility of interim interdicts. One of
these is that appeals are not entertained in a piecemeal fashion, as that would
prolong the litigation, resulting in the wasteful use of judicial resources and
incurrence of legal costs.
However, an interim order may be appealed if the interests of justice so
dictate. Accordingly, the paramount test/or the appealability of a particular
interim interdict is whether it would be in the interests of justice for that
interim interdict is whether it would be in the interests of justice for that
interim interdict to be appealed in the light of the facts of its specific case.
As stated in South Cape Corporation, a court has a wide general discretion in
granting leave to appeal in relation to interim interdicts. The appropriate test
for the appealability of an interim interdict was perspicuously laid out by
Moseneke DJC in OUTA where he affirmed that-
't/his Court has granted leave to appeal in relation to interim orders before.
It has made it clear that the operative standard is the interests of justice. To
that end, it must have regard to and weigh carefully all germane circumstances.
Whether an interim order has a final effect or disposes of a substantial portion
of the relief sought in a pending review is a relevant and important
consideration. Yet, it is not the only or always decisive consideration. It is
just as important to assess whether the temporary restraining order has an
immediate and substantial effect, including wheLher the harm that flows from
it is serious, immediate, ongoing and irreparable. '6
6 Ramakatsa a1td Others v African National Congress and Anotller (724/2019) (2021] ZASCA 31 (31 March
2021) para 10
7 (2020) ZACC 10; 2020 (8) BCLR 916 (CC); 2020 (6) SA 325 (CC) paras 47 to 51
8 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Allia11ce and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC);
2012 (11) BCLR ll48 para 25
Page 8
Accordingly, in determining what the interests of justice demand, a court must
have regard to, and carefully weigh, all relevant circumstances and factors.
Undoubtedly, the relevant factors will differ based on the facts of each case.
These non-exhaustive factors include:
(a) the kind and importance of the constitutional issue raised,·
(b) the potential for irreparable harm (f leave is not granted;
(c) whether the interim order has a final effect or disposes of a substantial
portion of the relief sought in a pending review;
(d) whether there are prospects of success in the pending review;
(e) whether, in deciding an appeal against an interim order, the appellate
court would usurp the role of the review court;
(f) whether interim relief would unduly trespass on the exclusive terrain of
the other branches of government, before the final determination of the
review grounds; and
(g) whether allowing the appeal would lead to piecemeal adjudication and
prolong the litigation or lead to the wasteful use of judicial resources or
legal costs. " (My emphasis)
[8] Thus, the test for the appealability of an interim order is whether it would
be in the interests of justice to hear the appeal. A Court deciding such
an application for leave to appeal must weigh the factors set out in the
judgment of Moseneke DCJ in OUTA and the circumstances and facts of
the specific matter.
ANALYSIS:
[9] In the notice of application for leave to appeal , with regard to the
appealability of the interim order, the Applicant stated that:
"The interim order is appealable under Sections 17(1), 17(2)(a), 17(5) and
17(6) of the Superior Courts Act, JO of 2013, as it inflicts grave constitutional
harm, meeting stringent legal thresholds for appellate review. Its final effect,
definitive restriction of rights, and irreparable harm to the {Applicant] and the
public engage three foundational principles from South African jurisprudence,
each grounding this appeal. "
each grounding this appeal. "
Reliance is then placed on Zweni v Minister of Law and OrderB for an
averment to the effect that the order is final in effect and causes
irreversible harm on Section 9(1 ), 16, and 34 rights. Reference is made
9 1993 (I) SA 523 (A)
Page 9
to City of Tshwane v Afriforum 10 to substant iate the avermen t that the
standard of "interest of ju stice" broaden the appeala bility of interim
orders, espec ially where constitutiona l issues are implicated or whe re
there is irrepa rable harm. The Applica nt concl udes the section by
reinsta ting the alleged SLAPP nature of the order which is said to vio late
Section 33 of the Constituti on.
[1 O] The Section on the appealabi lity of the order was therefore framed in
the most general ised and broad terms. In submissions made befo re
me, it was argued on behalf of the Applicant that:
10.1. There are exceptions to the rule that interim orders are not
appealable;
10.2. Interim orders can be appealed in exceptional cases and this
case is an except ional case ; and
10.3. There were mater ial disputes of fact and the test articulated by
Corbett AJ in Plascon-Evans should have been applied , and I
should have dismissed the Respondent's urgent application
subject to their replying affidavit and the Applicant's counter
application .
[1 O] It is imperative to note that the Applican t is once again unrepresented
and indeed , it is difficult to follow the reasoning for the grounds of
appeal. Needless to say, the Respondents also seem to find difficulty
in following the reasoning of the Applicant.
[11] A matter came before the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) with perhaps
similar issues, in Harman v Strydom , 11 (to which the First Respondent
relied on during argument) , which in fact deals with the Third
Respondent in this matter. In the aforementioned case, Mothle JA,
10 20 16 (6) SA 279 (CC)
11 (285/2024) (2025) ZASCA 108 (18 July 2025)
Page 10
when expla ining that the right to be heard (Section 34 of the
Constitution ) was not violated in that case, emphasised the following:
"Secon d, there is no law or authority which excludes the jurisdiction of a high
court, seized with an urgent ex-parte applicat ion, to adj udicate issues raised
in such application. Where an urgent court considers and grants relief in an
ex-parte application, any person whose rights are affected by such an order
may apply for its reconsideration. This would entail the delivery of a notice of
set down in the same urgent court that granted the order, f or an expedited
hearing to reconsider the order. This unique protection, provide d for in Rule
6(12)(c), serves to cure any possible breach of the s 34 constitutional right to
be heard. The Rule provides:
'A person against whom an order was granted in such pers on 's absence in an
urgent appli cation may by notice to set down the matter for reconsidera tion of
the order '.
It is an in-built urgent reconside ration, for which no timeframes are prescri bed
and no prior leave fro m the court is required. It also protects a Respondent
against having to comply with the order, at least not before the Respon dent,
against whom the order is granted, is heard. "12
[12) The Appli cant did not avail himself for this simple remedy in Rule
6(12) (c), in casu. Instead , he instituted an appl ication for leave to
appea l. Adopting the latter approach is the Applicant's rightful choice ,
however, he must satisfy the legal require ments and make out a case
based on the approach he adopted. It is so that the Applicant seeks
leave to appeal, without dealing with the reasons for the order being
granted . I find this disingenuous and in the same breat h, to assert that
the Respondents were abusing Court processes .
[13) The Applica nt was present during the ex-parte application and
submitted a counter applica tion which was received on the day of the
submitted a counter applica tion which was received on the day of the
urgent ex-parte application. In fact , the record would reflect that the
Court granted the Applicant sufficient time to address the Court despite
the fact that the Respondents were well with in their rights to approach
the Court on an ex-p arte urgent basis.
12 Jbidpara 15(b)
Page 11
[14] There is no merit in the Applicant's contention that the order granted by
this Court has a final effect. It cannot be said that the order disposed of
a substantial part of the main application. The impugned order and the
subsequent reasons make it clear that a final determination of the rights
of the parties shall be made in Part b of the main application . Pending
that determination, the Respondents are entitled to an interim order,
their right to dignity and reputation as professionals certain ly has been
infringed on face value. I fail to see how posting the statement
"Liquidators are the same as paedophiles in an orphanage (sic)", on the
Facebook page- "Genoeg is Genoeg ", is not prima facie defamatory in
nature and not directed at the Respondents in this matter . In the
reasons for the impugned order, I detailed the exercise of balancing
competing constitutional rights in such cases , and I shall not burden this
judgment with a repetition of that analysis. Ultimately, it is not in the
interests of justice to allow an appeal under the circumstances.
Consequently , the impugned order is not appealable.
[15) The Applicant did not set out in the notice or during argument before
me, the grounds on which I did not exercise a discretion judicially . The
argument was focused primari ly on the merits of the case and in regard
to the appealability of the interim order in the most vague and
generalised terms.
[16} I accordingly find that the weighing of all the facts and circumstances of
this matter renders the interim order not appealable .
[17} The Applicant's grounds of appeal in the notice of motion were noth ing
more than a duplication of the arguments made before me previously
and which arguments I had dealt with in the reasons . In T&M Canteen
CC v Charlotte Maxeke Academic Hospital and Another 13, Adams J held
as follows:
"Not muclt needs to be said about these overly technical defences, which, in
as follows:
"Not muclt needs to be said about these overly technical defences, which, in
my view, are without merit. For starters, these are all issues which have
13 (36830/2021) [2021] ZAGPJHC 519 (14 October 2021) para 8
Page 12
already been decided in the main application. It does not behove the
Respondents to rehash the same defences, which this court has already found
to be without merit . " (My emphas is)
[18] The Appl icant also raised some arguments from the bar. In M.S.H v
J. S.H - Appli cation for Leave to Appea/14 , the Court held:
"The question arises as to the extent a party is bound to the grounds set out in
an application for leave to appeal when regard is had to Rule 49(l)(b)? An
Appli cant seeking leave to appeal is required in peremptory terms to stipulat e
the grounds of appeal in succinct and unambiguou s terms. This enables the
Court and the Respondent to assess and consider the merits of the applica tion.
The latter is then in a posi tion to prepare and counter the Respondent's case
or, if there is merit, choose not to oppose the applicat ion. As the Respondent
was taken by surprise, there was clearly prejudice to the Respondent as this
was not the case she was called upon to meet when oppos ing the applica tion
for leave to appeal.
The failure to specify clearly in unambiguous terms exactly what case the
Respondent must be prepared to meet meant that the applicat ion did not comply
with Rule 49(1)(b). An application for leave to appeal may be dismissed on
the basis of non-compliance with Rule 49(1).
In Phiri v Phiri and Others, Mavundla J held that 'fi)t does not help the
Applicant to marshal grounds of appeal from the bar which have not been
set out clearly and succinctly in the notice of leave to appeal, no matter how
meritorious these might be, . .. . otherwise, there is no need/or the Rules."
This is a view with which I find myself in respectful agreement, and this view
is eclioed in several judgments.
As the Applicant's applica tion for leave to appeal does not meet the peremptory
requirements of Rule 49(1)(b), the argument raised from the bar ought, as the
current law stands , to be discounted for lack of its inclusion as a ground in the
current law stands , to be discounted for lack of its inclusion as a ground in the
Notice of Applicati on fo r Leave to Appeal. It follows, as a matter of course ,
that this additional point is not a valid ground upon which I may, or ought to,
grant leave to appeal and falls to be dismissed. " (My emphasis )
[19] In Maboho and Others v Minister of Home Affairs, 15 the following was
said:
"The Responden t 's heads of argument namely paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 raise a
point of law which should have been raised in the notice in terms of Rule
6(5)(d)(iii) and not for the first time in the heads of argument served on the
Applicants before the court started and to the court during the hearing .
14 (8470/2021) (2023) ZAWCHC 345 (14 September2023) paras 28 to 3 1
15 (833/2007, I 128/2007) [201 l ] ZALMPHC 4 (28 November 2011) paras 12 and 13
Page 13
Argument is not evidence and it is not given under oath. It is merely a
persuasive comment made by the parties or legal representatives with regard
to questions offact or law. Argument does not constitute evidence, and cannot
replace evidence. "
[20] In relation to the prospects of success, the Applicant made the following
averments in the notice:
'The interim order of 4 April 2025 is a constitutional travesty, silencing
whistle-blowers and shielding misconduct. An Appellate Court will reverse it
due to top five fatal flaws, restoring the [Applicant's J rights under Sections 16,
34, 9(1) and 33;
8.1. SLAPP abuse
The [Respondents'] unlawful collusion and ongoing warfare, jail
threats (SA28, par 7.3) and reliance on vague terms like "further
impugned statements " (Court Order, par 5.4), weaponise the courts to
gag Genoeg is Genoeg 's exposes , mocking Section 3 3 and Section 1 ( d)
(Reddell [2022} ZACC 37, par 47-48).
8. 2. Unfair process
Unlawful partnership between the liquidators and the Intervening
party as the attorney for a major creditor in insolvent estates
weaponising the legal system against interested parties of estates,
secret meetings between the [Respondents} and the Judiciary prior to
court hearings, late filings (1 April 2025, 23:01) and abuse of court
the urgent proceedings and court procedures and denied responses,
crushed Section 34 rights (Benert v Absa Bank Ltd [2010] ZACC 28,
para 28).
8.3. Baseless Claims
Unverified harm (Founding Affidavit, p 019. par 67) and
unchallenged SA26 and SA627 evidence collapse the [Respondents']
case (Setlogelo v Setlogo 1914 AD 221).
8. 4. Overreach and Harm
Vague bans (Court Order, paras 5.1, 5.4) and non-party protections
shield misconduct, irreparably harming creditors and Section l(d)
(National Treasury v OUTA [2012] ZACC 19, para 43).
8. 5. Intimidation Tactics
The [Respondents '} jail threats (SA28 para 7. 3) and demands for
unpleaded removals exploit the order 's vague contempt sanctions
unpleaded removals exploit the order 's vague contempt sanctions
(Court Order, para 5.5), chilling lawful speech, deprive Section 16
rights to the [Applicant] and thousand public participants (S v
Mamabolo [2001] ZACC 17, paras 29-30). "
[21] As already alluded to, the Applicant either raises issues that have been
fully canvassed in the reasons, or issues that are raised for the first time
Page 14
on the application for leave to appeal , or issues that are simply
unmeritorious.
[22) Accordingly , in addition to finding that the order made by me is not
appealable , I have considered the further arguments raised before me.
I am not persuaded that another Court will come to a conclusion different
from my conclusion. The application has no prospects of success.
ORDER:
[23] In the result, I make the following order:
1. THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH
COSTS ON ATTORNEY AND CLIENT SCALE; SUCH COSTS TO
INCLUDE COSTS OF TWO COUNSEL, ONE OF WHOM IS A SENIOR
COUNSEL, ON SCALE C.
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
For the 1st and 2nd Respondents:
Instructed By:
For the 3ro Respondent:
Instructed By: •
ROACH AJ
HIGH COU OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORT CAPE DIVISION
----st""r BERLEY
IN PERSON
ADV CHJ .BADENHORST SC
Vanessa Femihough & Associates
Sandton
c/o PGMO Attorneys
Kimberley
ADV AJ SCHOEMAN
Strydom Bredenkamp Inc.
Pretoria •
c/o Majiedt & Swart Inc.
Kimberley