SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, (MIDDELBURG LOCAL SEAT)
CASE NUMBER: 4108/2022
In the application between:
THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED APPLICANT
and
SPYGRASS INVESTMENTS 266 CC FIRST RESPONDENT
MARTIN WAYNE BROWN SECOND RESPONDENT
RENEE CLAUDELLE SAMUEL THIRD RESPONDENT
______________________________________________________________
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: YES
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED YES/NO
22 APRIL 2026 ____________________
DATE SIGNATURE
~ ,w
,r,;'"'"
JUDGMENT
FOURIE AJ
INTRODUCTION:
[1] In the current application , the Applicant seeks payment in respect of an
overdraft facility due to the First Respondent's breach thereof and,
subsequent thereto, to perfect the security held by the Applicant by
executing against certain immovable properties.
[2] The application again st the Second and Third Respondents is instituted
resultant from the fact that these Respondents are guarantors for the
outstanding debts of the First Respondent as towards the Applicant.
[3] The application has been opposed by all the respective Respondents , and
after a considerable delay in the finalisation of the matter due to events
described hereinafter, the matter was heard on 14 April 2026.
CRONOLOGY OF RELEVANT EVENTS:
[4] In what is to follow , I find it necessary to set out in a brief overview of the
material issues that have transpired since the inception of the application:
[4.1] On 20 June 2022 , the application was made by the Applicant in
which the Applicant sought payment in the sum of R 6 229 806.29
together with interest thereon at a rate of prime plus 7.75% per
annum, calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears from
25 April 2022 to date of payment , together with the declaration of
certain properties as specially executable.
[4.2] On 31 Aug ust 2022, a settlement agreement was entered into
between the Applicant and the Respondents reflecting certain
payments having been received by the Applicant from the
Respondents since the issuing of the application and
acknowledging an indebtedness by the Respondents to the
Applicant in the amount of R 5 977 864.42 together with certain
interests and costs. This settlement agreement afforded the
Respondents an opportunity to repay the agreed-upon debts in a
structured repayment plan.
[4.3] On 8 February 2024, the Respondents were placed on terms
stating that they have not kept to the arrangements in respect of the
settlement agreement and indicating that the Respondents are in
arrears in terms of their settlement agreement, and strictly on t he
repayment schedule thereof, they have fallen behind in an amount
of R 835 878.89.
[4.4] On 25 September 2024, after the breakdown of the settlement
agreement and after the Respondents had not strictly complied with
the same, the outstanding amount due and payable in terms of the
overdraft agreement was stated as R 4 203 018.45.
[4.5] On the day of hearing, being 14 April 2026, the Applicant alleges
that the amount due and payable , which remains outstanding and
which is as su ch being claimed from the Respondents, is an
amount of
R 1 422 676.90.
MATERIAL FACTS:
[5] It has never been the case for the Respondents that an indebtedness
towards the Applicant does not exist.
[6] It is also noteworthy that the Respondent has not, during the whole
existence of the dispute, absconded in totality from their obligation towards
the Applicant. Even though it is common cause between the parties that the
First Respondent has not strictly adhered to their financial obligations in
terms of the repayment of the overdraft facility towards the Applicant initially
and thereafter to strictl y comply with the repayment in terms of the
settlement agreement , the Respondents have significantly reduced the
amount due by them to the Applicant over the period since inception of the
application.
[7] The aspects that complicate the current matter are n ot necessarily the true
facts between the respective parties , but to a greater degree the manner in
which such facts were ultimately presented to the Court. After the initial
founding and answering papers were filed, the matter was , in essence ,
overtaken by events in that the parties reached a settlement. The settlement
reached on the exact amounts calculated by the Applicant can only be
indicative that, at the time the settlement was reached, the parties agreed
that such amounts were indeed th e outstanding amounts due and payable
by the Respondents to the Applicant.
[8] After non-compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement, the
Applicant elected to re-enrol the initial application and, by way of application,
presented a Supplementary Af fidavit to supplement the initial founding
papers filed by them. Condonation was sought for the filing of this affidavit ,
and as it was uncontested and the Respondents, in turn, filed their own
amended answering papers, the Court had no difficulty in acce pting it. The
logic of accepting the aforesaid affidavits is evident in that the initial papers
were overtaken by events, and those events required canvassing by the
filing of further papers.
[9] It is in these papers that the breach of the settlement agreement was
highlighted, and the indebtedness at that stage of proceedings was claimed
in the amount of R 4 203 018.45. To substantiate this amount, a certificate of
in the amount of R 4 203 018.45. To substantiate this amount, a certificate of
balance and an updated statement of account were annexed.
[10] As from the date on which the supplementary papers were filed, it could
reasonably be expected of the Respondents to know in which amount their
indebtedness was called up, and if they felt disgruntled by the outstanding
amount as claimed, or if they wanted to rebut same , they, as Respondents,
could have and should have provided proof of any contrary position.
[11] If, for instance, the Respondents noted that they had made payments to the
Applicant, which payments did not reflect at that stage on the Applicant’s
statement of account, proof of such payments could have, and should have
been annexed to their opposing papers in order to reflect an alternative
position than the one presented by the Applicant. In their amended
answering papers , the Respondents , however, merely make the bold
averment that the calculation by the Applicant in respect of the outstanding
indebtedness is not correct, and that the Respondents seek discovery of
certain documents.
[12] A formal notice seeking discovery or an application for discovery of certai n
documents during motion proceedings was not filed by the Respondents.
[13] Since the filing of the amended affidavits, it is common cause that the
Respondents proceeded to make payments in respect of their indebtedness
towards the Applicant. It is further common cause that the indebtedness of
the Respondents continued to be significantly reduced by the payments
being made by the Respondents. At this junction, it is opportune to state
that the indebtedness of the Respondents was, throughout the proceedings ,
presented by the Applicant in two ways, firstly the rendering of a transaction
specific account for the whole period in question, and thereafter by the filing
of a certificate of balance drawn under the hand of an authorised
representative from within the office of the Applicant.
[14] Barring the bold statement in the Supplementary Answering Affidavit, the
Respondents had, until that stage, never taken issue with the statement of
account, nor the certificate of balance, nor did the Respondents ever indicate
account, nor the certificate of balance, nor did the Respondents ever indicate
that they had made certain payments that did not reflect on the statement of
account.
[15] Although not canvassed in the papers, during argument the Court requested
the respective legal representatives to address me on the fact that the
statement of account continually annexed to the papers seems to indicate
that the account was an account that was sent on a monthly basis by the
Applicant to the First Respondent via email in the manner in which a
financial institution ordinarily does with its clients. On the face value of the
statement of account, this seems to have been the case, and I have no
reason to believe that these statements of account were not rendered by the
Applicant to the Respondents on a monthly basis as indicated on the face
thereof. It has also never been the case for the Respondents in their papers
that the statements of accoun t were not presented by the Applicant or
received by the Respondents. The Respondents further do not allege that
they requested the statements or an amendment to the statements from the
Applicant, which request was denied.
[16] As a result of unfortunate ci rcumstances emanating from within the office of
the previous legal representatives of the Respondents, their Heads of
Argument could not be filed in time. It is accepted by the Applicant as well
as by the Court that the passing of the Respondent’s legal r epresentative
hindered the timeous delivery of their Heads of Argument.
[17] In support of the late filing of their Heads of Argument, the Respondents , on
9 April 2026, and two Court days before the hearing of the matter, filed a
condonation application in support of the late filing of their Heads of
Argument.
[18] The difficulty with the Affidavit as filed lies perhaps in its identification and
substance. The affidavit is identified as a “Respondents’ Supplementary
Affidavit” rather than the “Respondents’ Aff idavit in support of condonation
for the late filing of their Heads of Argument”. The affidavit further deals not
only with condonation in respect of the late filing of the Heads of Argument,
only with condonation in respect of the late filing of the Heads of Argument,
but venture into settlement proposals made by the Respondents, which were
not accepted by the Applicant, and an allegation that the outstanding capital
that is being claimed on the updated claim of the Applicant, in the amount of
R 1 422 679.90 is being disputed as being correct.
[19] On 13 April 2026, and one day befor e the matter was to be heard, the
Applicant filed what was phrased as an “Applicant’s Explanatory Affidavit”.
In this affidavit, the Applicants indicated that they took no issue with the late
filing and the condonation sought in respect of the Respondent’ s Heads of
Argument, but the application then proceeds to deal with the allegation that
falls outside the ambit of what would ordinarily be dealt with in a condonation
application, specifically, the calculation of the outstanding indebtedness.
The Applica nt then proceeds to annex to the Explanatory Affidavit an
updated statement of account and updated certificates of balance , all
indicating the amount due and payable at the date of the hearing of the
matter as
R 1 422 676.90.
[20] During the argument, the Respondents’ defence developed into the
crystallised position that the Respondents dispute the calculated amount of
R 1 422 676.90 and, as they presented their matter, they required time to
evaluate the updated statement in order for an eval uation to be made into
the validity of the updated amount. I immediately state that the Respondents
did not seek a postponement of the application, and no postponement
application was presented to me when the matter was ultimately heard.
When the matter was called, this issue became apparent to be the only issue
outstanding between the respective parties, and as such , the matter was
stood down till later in the afternoon to afford the Respondents the
opportunity, if they so wished, to evaluate the stateme nts and to indicate
whether any payments had been made by them which did not reflect on the
statement. If the Respondent could present any payments made that did not
reflect on the statement of account, the Applicant and the Court would have
been necessitated to accept that the statement of account, and consequently
the certificate of balance, could not be accepted on face value, and a
the certificate of balance, could not be accepted on face value, and a
recalculation of the indebtedness would have been needed to occur.
[21] When the matter was recalled several hours later, the Respondents’ legal
representatives indicated that instructions could not be obtained from their
client, in respect of the enquiry as raised by the Court.
[22] As such, when the matter was heard, the Court was confronted with the
updated information received from the Applicant and a request by the
Respondent that the application either be dismissed, or alternatively that the
Court grant a statement and debatement order for the reconsideration of the
accounts.
[23] The statement and debatement request by the Respondents did not reach
the Court by way of formal application, but rather via informal request and
through the Respondents’ Heads of Argument.
[24] I have no difficulty in refusing such a statement and deba tement under those
circumstances. The making up of one’s case as you go along has long been
held not to be an appropriate manner in which parties are to litigate.[1]
[25] In this judgment, I am accordingly confined to evaluate whether the Applicant
has sufficiently made out a case for the relief it seeks and , in doing so ,
whether the evidence presented specifically by the Applicant in their
Explanatory Affidavit ought to be accepted.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES:
[26] Ordinarily, three sets of affidavits are filed in motion proceedings, being:
[26.1] Applicant’s Founding Affidavit
[26.2] Respondents’ Answering Affidavit, and
[26.3] Applicant’s Replying Affidavit. [2]
[27] I am, however, mindful that the South African legal spectrum is flexible , and
the rigid application of Rules might not always bring matters to a just and
equitable conclusion. It was eloquently put by Gutsche, J., in the matter of
HERMAN [3] that:
“I am of the opinion that the Court should accept affidavits if they
contain matters that is material to the issue and should not reject them
merely because they were not timeously filed when the explanation is
that knowledge of the matter in question reached the party after he ha d
filed his affidavits. If I was satisfied that this information reached the
defendants after they filed their affidavits, I would admit it.”
[28] I am mindful, however of the sentiments of the Court in STANDARD BANK
OF SA LTD v SEWPERSADH [4] where the Court held that:
“The Applicant cannot simply be allowed in Law to take it upon himself
and file an additional affidavit and put same on record without even
serving the other party with the said affidavit….. Clearly a litigant who
wishes to fi le a further affidavit must make a formal application for
leave to do so. It cannot simply slip the affidavit into the Court file.”
[29] In the current matter, I cannot accept that the Applicant has fallen foul of
what was the position in Sewpersadh supra. T he Applicant did not, of their
own accord , file a further application. The Applicant received a disguised
condonation application in which the Respondents raised certain new
averments, specifically regarding the amount of indebtedness. The
Applicant could have proceeded with the filing of a Rule 30A notice for the
actions of the Respondents to be regarded as an irregular step, or could
easily have applied in terms of Rule 6(15) of the Uniform Rules for the
striking of the unnecessary averments from the co ndonation affidavit. The
Applicants elected, however, to respond to those averments.
[30] These statements and allegations pertaining to the indebtedness all
strangely found themselves as part and parcel of a condonation application
for the late filing of the Respondents’ Heads of Argument. In essence, I see
no reason why the Respondents could not have filed a Replying Affidavit,
had they so wished , to the affidavit of the Applicant in respect of this
interlocutory process. The unfortunate reality of the matter is that the
interlocutory process. The unfortunate reality of the matter is that the
Respondents elected to bring their condonation application only on the 9th of
April 2026, and the curtailed timeframes within which the Applicant took
subsequent steps followed therefrom.
[31] It has become an acceptable notion and in certain divisions the norm for
Courts to expect, on the day of trial, for a litigant to present to the Court an
updated statement of account or an updated certificate of balance, indicating
to the Court the exact indebtedness of a Respondent at the date on which
the matter is to be heard. In the matter of ROSSOUW AND ANOTHER [5]
the Court stated that:
“The certificate of balance, also handed up to the Court a quo stands
however on a different footing. The Court a quo refused to have regard
to the certificate. That approach was not correct. The certificate did
not, as the Court a quo considered, amount to new evidence, which
would be inadmissible under Rule 32(4). To the extent that the
certificate reflects the balance due as at date of hearing, it is merely a n
arithmetical calculation based on the facts already before the Court,
which the Court would otherwise have to perform itself. Such
calculations are better performed by a qualified person in the employ of
a financial institution and to the extent that such a certificate may
reflect additional payments by the Defendant after the issue of
summons, or payments not taken into account when Summons was
issued, this constitutes and admission against interest by the bank, and
the bank is entitled to abandon part of the relief it seeks. Certificates of
balance handed in at the hearing (whether a qu o or on appeal) perform
a useful function, and are not hit by the provisions of Rule 32(4).”
[32] In the same matter the Court correctly emphasized that, Rule 35(11) of the
Uniform Rules of Court allow the Court, during the cause of any proceedings
to order the production by any party thereto under oath of such documents
or tape recordings in its power or control relating to any matter in question in
such proceedings as the Court may think meet, and the Court may deal with
such documents or tape recordings when produced as it deems meet.
such documents or tape recordings when produced as it deems meet.
[33] It is for the aforesaid reasons that I believe Courts generally accept and , in
certain instances, request updated statements of account and certificates of
balance in order to ultimately come to a just conclusion.
[34] Absent the updated statement of account and certificates of balance, th is
Court would have be en confronted with an outdated statement of account
and certificates of balance of 25 September 2024, on which an indebtedness
of
R 4 203 018.45 was indicated.
[35] Since receiving the statements and certificate of balance on at least
25 September 2024, th e Respondents have not challenged the amount of
R 4 204 018.45 by providing any sort of proof indicating that such amount
was, as at 25 September 2024, incorrect. If the Court had disregarded the
updated statements and certificate of balance, as the Resp ondents now
seek the Court to do, the undisputed evidence would need to lead the Court
to grant an Order in the amount as stated on 25 September 2024. To do so
would be wholly unjust under circumstances where the parties are in
agreement that certain payments have been received by the Applicant since
that date. It follows accordingly that the Respondents, even more than the
Applicants, need the statement of account and certificate of balance to be
updated prior to the hearing of the matter, to ensure that an excessive
Judgment is not granted against the Respondents.
[36] As stated previously, the manner in which the Applicants had proven their
claim has always remained the same, and prior to the Respondents’ address
in Court has never been challenged. The Co urt is also not in any way
convinced that the statements of account and the indebtedness from time to
time of the Respondents towards the Applicant were not continually known
by the Respondents resultant from the statements being received from the
Applicant on a monthly basis.
[37] For the same reason, the Court would be inclined to accept amended
statements to reflect payments received up until Judgment is granted . I find
no reason why the Court would not similarly afford a Respondent the exact
same indulgence by accepting proof that certain payments have been made
same indulgence by accepting proof that certain payments have been made
by the Respondents which do not reflect on the Applicant’s accounts. The
acceptance of these documents cannot delay matters; they are subject to
immediate evaluation and incorporation into the proceedings.
[38] The question is whether the evidence advanced, whether under affidavit or
handed in from the Bar, materially alters the case presented by a litigant or
whether such evidence merely updates a position to reflect the position as at
the day of hearing. If the evidence presented merely updates the position
between the respective parties, the Court should accept the same, and such
evidence will not fall foul of Rule 32(4) of the Uniform Rules of C ourt. If the
evidence, however, alters the claim or defence of a party and does not
merely serve to update the position between the litigants for purposes of
coming to a just calculation, such updated information ought not to be
accepted without following the proper processes.
[39] In the matter at hand, the Applicant claims that the Respondents have
defaulted on their contractual obligations in respect of an overdraft facility
that is due and payable to the Applicant. The Defendant does not deny the
default in respect of the overdraft facility nor the initial settlement agreement.
The updated statements of account and the updated certificates of balance
do not alter the Applicant’s claim in any way, they merely reflect the correct
position at the time when the matter is heard. If the Respondents intended
to advance facts to the Court indicating that the statements have omitted
certain payments, they could have easily done so. Such a process would
not be a difficult one to undertake. The reasoning by the Respondents that,
upon receiving an updated certificate of balance and statement of claim, the
Court should allow the Respondents a right to a statement and debatement
is one that would, if implemented as such, lead to matters never being
finalised as, on every day of trial once an updated statement or certificate of
balance is received, a Respondent would merely claim a right of statement
and debatement which would thr ow the matter into a never -ending loop
and debatement which would thr ow the matter into a never -ending loop
without the matter coming to finality. Litigants deserve their matters to be
finalised, and where bona fide disputes do not exist between the respective
parties, a practical and sensible approach to the resolution of the matter
ought to be taken.
[40] Having regard to the nature of the matter, the defences that have been
raised by the Respondent throughout and the evidence that has been
presented to me, I have no difficulty in accepting the Respondent’s
indebtedness as at the date of hearing to amount to R 1 422 676.90.
MEDIATION:
[41] During the argument, counsel for the Respondents suggested that this
matter ought not to serve on the court roll, and is a classic example of a
matter that ought to be dispensed with by way of mediation.
[42] Courts generally encourage parties to enter mediation to resolve issues that
are capable of informal resolution. Issues of the current nature, no doubt,
form part of the types of matters that would be capable of resolution by way
of mediation.
[43] The difficulty in respect of the current matter is simply that the first Letter of
Demand indicating a breach by the First Respondent was sent on 15
September 2020, which is approx imately five and a half years prior to this
Judgment. Subsequently to that, the rec ord is replete with the parties
engaging one another both formally, as with the Settlement Agreement, and
informally by way of correspondence to resolve the matter and to restructure
the indebtedness of the Respondents in such a way as to make the
repayment thereof manageable.
[44] It was suggested by the Respondents that, by not again indulging the
Respondents by attending a form of mediation, the Applicants were acting
maliciously. This Court cannot accept that notion. The fact that the
Applicant accepted payments that deviate from the initial payment structure
agreed to by the respective parties, and has continued to do so for several
years, indicates nothing but bona fides on the part of the Applicant to attempt
to come to the aid of the Respondents to settle their ultimate debt towards
the Applicant. The initial Settlement Agreement restructured the
Respondents’ debt to allow for repayment in a specific manner. This was
achieved through a form of mediation. At this juncture, the Applicant is
confronted with a Respondent that again attempts to shift the proverbial
confronted with a Respondent that again attempts to shift the proverbial
goalposts regarding how the remaining outstanding debt is to be paid. To
order such a process at this juncture would be neither just nor conducive to
the speedy finalisation of the matter.
[45] The Court cannot, however, turn a blind eye to the Respondents' attempts to
settle their indebtedness and their continued efforts over several years to
reduce the outstanding debt. It is evident that the Respondents consciously
and as far as possible attempt to settle the indebtedness owed.
[46] It is for this reason that, although the Court is satisfied that an order is
warranted in respect of the indebtedness of the Respond ents, and although
the Court is inclined to grant an Order ordering that the immovable property
as stated ought to be declared executable, under the circumstances of the
matter, it would be just if such an Order for executionability be suspended for
a spec ified period to allow the Respondents a last attempt to resolve the
payment of their outstanding debt. If the Respondents, within the time as
stipulated, settle their indebtedness, the Order in respect of the immovable
property being declared executable will accordingly have no effect.
[47] This Court believes that, although a Court cannot have a discretion in
ordering whether an indebtedness by one party towards the other exists, the
Court hold a discretion, having regard to the facts of the matter and the
history of the actions of the respective parties specifically the attempts
pertaining to settlement and the manner and total with which the
indebtedness has over the cause of the litigation been reduced, to stay
ultimate execution for a period of time if justice so dictates.
[48] In the current matter, I am satisfied that it does.
COSTS:
[49] Although the litigation has been drawn out over several years, I accept that
the Applicant has, throughout, been protected by their claim in respect of
interest, and I am further mindful that the Respondent has, as stated
previously, genuinely attempted to resolve its indebtedness by making
ongoing payments to the Applicant. The Respondents' default has, however,
necessitated that the Applicants institute and persist with the Litigation . This
is an issue that the Respondent cannot deny and that the Court cannot
overlook. I am satisfied under the circumstances that a cost order is
warranted against the Respondents.
[50] I am, however, not satisfied that the actions of the Respondents warrant a
punitive cost order to be ordered against them. I am similarly of the view
that the matter was in no way complex or consisted of an extraordinary
volume of documents. As such, a n ormal order of party and party costs is
appropriate under the circumstances.
ORDER:
[51] For all the aforesaid reasons, the following Order is made:
[51.1] Leave is granted to the Applicant to file a Supplementary Founding
Affidavit, for the Respondents to file a Supplementary Answering
Affidavit, and for the Applicant to file a Consequential Replying
Affidavit after the breach in the settlement agreement by the
Respondent.
[51.2] The late filing of the Respondents’ Heads of Argument is condoned.
[51.3] Judgment is granted against the Respondents, jointly and severally,
the one paying the other to be absolved for:
[51.3.1.] Payment in the sum of R 1 422 676.90 together with
interest thereon on a rate of prime plus 5% per annum,
calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears from
25 March 2026 to date of final payment.
[51.3.2] The following immovable properties are declared to be
specially executable:
[51.3.2.1] Erf 1 […], Witbank Extension 8 Township,
Registration Division J.S Province of
Mpumalanga, measuring 991 (nine hundred
and ninety one) square meters, held by
Deed of Transfer: T […], subject to the
conditions therein contained; and
[51.3.2.2.] Erf 4 […] Witbank, Extension 25 Township,
Registration Division J.S. Province of
Mpumalanga, measuring 1378 (one
thousand three hundred and seventy -eight)
square meters, held by Deed of Transfer:
T[…], subject to the conditions therein
contained.
[51.4] The Registrar of the above Honourable Court is authorised to issue a
Warrant of Execution against the aforementioned immovable
properties of the First Respondent.
[51.5] The Warrants of Execution shall be held over for a period of six
months from the date of Judgment, during which period the Applicant
shall not be allowed to execute the said warrants of Execution to
allow the Respondents the opportunity of settling their indebtedness
towards the Applicant prior to such execution steps being taken.
[51.6] The Respondents are to pay the costs of the application on a party
and party scale.
________________________
H F FOURIE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF HIGH COURT, MIDDELBURG
Counsel for the Applicant: Adv M Henning
Instructed by: Jason Michael Smith Incorporated Attorneys
Tel : 011 447 8188
Email Address kerry@jmsainc.com / wade@jmsainc.com
Counsel for the Respondents: Adv J Bhima
Instructed by: Tracey Lomax Attorneys
Tel : 083 556 9644
Email Address
Judgment reserved on: 14 April 2026
Date of delivery: 22 April 2026
______________________________________________________________
[1] Skosana v RAF 3257/23 [2026] ZAMPMHC 5 ; 1 All SA 588 (MM) at
paragraph 48, 49 and 50
[2] See amongst others Transvaal Racing Club v Jocky Club of South Africa
1959 (3) SA 599 (W) at B602
[3] Herman v Jacobsz Brothers 1931 E.D.L 284 at P 286
[4] Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Sewpersadh & Another 2005 (4) SA
149 (C) at 12 - 13
[5] Rossouw and Another v First Rand Bank Ltd t/a FNB Home Loans (Formally
First Rand Bank of SA Ltd) [2011] 2 All SA 56 (SCA)