IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 053255/2023
In the matter between:
NATSURE PROPERTY INVESTMENT Plaintiff / Applicant
HOLDING COMPANY (PTY) LTD
and
KHOMBO MIELLIANT MOTSEPE First Defendant / Respondent
SIKHUMBUZO VUMI DLAMINI Second Defendant / Respondent
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED.
Date: 08 April 2026 Signature:
_ _______ ___ ___
E S G
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JUDGMENT
NYATHI J
A. Introduction
[1] Before this Court is an opposed application for summary judgment brought by the
Plaintiff in terms of Rule 32 of the Uniform Rules of Court. The Plaintiff seeks judgment
against the First Defendant in her capacity as surety and co ‑principal debtor for alleged
arrear rental and charges arising from a lease agreement concluded between the Plaintiff
and Praetorian Group International (Pty) Ltd (“PGI”).
[2] The First Defendant opposes the application and advances several grounds of
defence in her plea and in her affidavit resisting summary judgment. These include two
special pleas—non‑joinder of PGI and no cause of action—as well as disputes concerning
the quantum, the validity of the certificate of balance, the effect of alleged lock ‑out and
rent remission, and certain alleged discrepancies in the statement of account.
[3] I summarise the relevant defences and assess whether they meet the threshold
for resisting summary judgment
B. Legal framework
[4] Rule 32 requires that a defendant resisting summary judgment must “disclose fully
the nature and grounds of the defence and the material facts relied upon therefor”. The
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Court is not tasked with determining probabilities or resolving disputes of fact at this stage,
but only whether the defence appears bona fide and raises triable issues.
[5] The principles have frequently been restated, notably in Joob Joob Investments
(Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA), Breitenbach v Fiat
SA (Edms) Bpk 1976 (2) SA 226 (T), and Tumileng Trading CC v National Security and
Fire (Pty) Ltd 2020 (6) SA 624 (WCC), emphasising that a defendant must meaningfully
engage with the claim and demonstrate a genuine defence in law.
C. Common Cause Facts
[6] The following facts are undisputed on the pleadings:
6.1 The Plaintiff and PGI concluded a written commercial lease
agreement on 8 September 2020.
6.2 The First Defendant was at all relevant times a director of PGI and
executed a written deed of suretyship, binding herself as surety and
co‑principal debtor for all PGI’s obligations under the lease.
6.3 The First Defendant renounced the benefits of excussion, division,
errors of calculation and others.
6.4 PGI fell into arrears with payment of rental and related charges.
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D. The Special Plea of Non-Joinder
[7] The First Defendant argues that PGI must be joined because a surety’s liability is
accessory in nature. Reliance is placed on Van Zyl v Auto Commodities (Pty) Ltd [2021]
ZASCA 67.
[8] The difficulty with this defence is twofold:
8.1 As surety and co ‑principal debtor who renounced excussion, the
First Defendant’s liability is co‑equal with that of PGI. A creditor may
sue any co‑principal debtor without joining the others (Consolidated
Textile Mills Ltd v Weiniger 1961 (3) SA 335 (O)).
8.2 The First Defendant herself pleads that PGI is “in the process of
deregistration” but does not plead that it no longer exists. Even if
deregistered, liabilities do not vest in the State; only assets do
(Miller v Nafcoc Investment Holding Co Ltd 2010 (6) SA 390 (SCA)).
[9] There is therefore no merit in the special plea. It does not raise a triable issue and
must be dismissed.
E. Special Plea: No Cause of Action (Absence of Certificate of Balance)
[10] The First Defendant argues that the Plaintiff was obliged to attach a certificate of
balance to the particulars of claim, failing which the Plaintiff has no cause of action.
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[11] Clause 11 of the suretyship and clause 16.4 of the lease deal with evidentiary
facilitation, not substantive validity of the claim. They create a mechanism for prima facie
proof of indebtedness—they do not create a jurisdictional prerequisite for the insti tution
of action.
[12] The Plaintiff attached a detailed statement of account (“Annexure C”), which the
First Defendant conspicuously avoids engaging with. In any event, a certificate of balance
was later furnished in the summary judgment application. It is trite law that a certificate of
balance may be produced at the summary judgment hearing (Rossouw v First Rand Bank
Ltd 2010 (6) SA 439 (SCA) para 47).
[13] This special plea is thus also without merit.
F. The Defence of Incorrect Quantum
[14] The First Defendant alleges:
14.1 The Plaintiff “concealed” a payment of R93 655.31.
14.2 There is a contradiction between the amount in the letter of demand
(R448 492.01) and the amount later claimed (R364 013.41).
14.3 Annexure “C” is not a true reflection of the account; and the Plaintiff
applied VAT incorrectly.
[15] The Plaintiff explains that the amount of R93 655.31 reflects a deposit and first
month’s rental; the deposit portion (R70 512.25 including VAT) is reflected in the final
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credit line of Annexure C. The First Defendant does not engage with this explanation nor
identify which entries are wrong.
[16] A defendant must do more than raise unparticularised suspicions (Saglo Auto v
Black Shades Investments 2021 (2) SA 587 (GP)).
[17] The defence concerning VAT revolves around an amount of approximately R9
197.25. Even if such a defence were competent (which is doubtful), it concerns only a
minute portion of the claim and does not defeat summary judgment for the undisputed
balance (Brandhouse Ltd v Sasfin Bank Ltd [2009] 1 All SA 22 (SCA)).
[18] The Court finds that no genuine dispute of quantum has been raised.
G. Alleged Lock-Out and Rent Remission
[19] The First Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff locked PGI out of the premises,
entitling PGI to full remission of rent.
[20] However, the First Defendant simultaneously pleads:
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20.1 PGI vacated the premises;
20.2 PGI was locked out;
20.3 The premises were re‑let to another tenant; and
20.4 PGI continued to make payments after the alleged lock‑out.
These versions are mutually destructive and not pleaded in the alternative.
[21] Furthermore, the First Defendant fails to plead:
21.1 dates of the alleged lock‑out;
21.2 duration;
21.3 the periods for which remission is claimed;
21.4 how the lock‑out rendered performance objectively impossible.
[22] A defendant must meaningfully engage with the allegations and set out facts, not
mere conclusions (Tumileng Trading, supra).
[23] As rent in this lease was payable in advance, the defence of remission (which
usually applies where obligations are reciprocal) is in any event doubtful (Thompson v
Scholtz 1999 (1) SA 232 (SCA)).
[24] This defence therefore does not raise a triable issue.
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H. Applicability of the National Credit Act
[25] The First Defendant baldly denies that the NCA applies. Section 8(2)(b) of the Act
expressly excludes leases of immovable property. This defence is legally
unsustainable.
I. Assessment
[26] The First Defendant’s affidavit does not disclose:
26.1 a defence good in law;
26.2 facts supporting any alleged defence;
26.3 nor any triable issue requiring ventilation at trial.
[27] The opposing affidavit is replete with contradictions, vague allegations, and legal
misconceptions. The overall impression is not of a defendant with a bona fide defence,
but of one seeking to delay the inevitable.
J. Conclusion
[28] The Plaintiff has made out a proper case for summary judgment. The defences
raised—whether procedural or substantive —do not meet the requirements of Rule
32(3)(b) and do not constitute bona fide defences.
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[29] The Plaintiff is accordingly entitled to judgment.
K. Order
It is ordered that:
1. Summary judgment is granted against the First Defendant in the amount of R364
013.41.
2. The First Defendant shall pay interest on the aforesaid amount at the prescribed
rate of 10.75% per annum from 7 March 2023 to date of final payment, both days
inclusive.
3. The First Defendant shall pay the costs of suit on the attorney‑and‑client scale, as
provided for in the lease and suretyship agreements.
J.S. NYATHI
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
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Date of Judgment: 08 April 2026
On behalf of the Plaintiff: Adv. H. Scholtz
Instructed by: Wessel Immink Botha Inc.
On behalf of the Defendants: Adv. R.E. Radama
Instructed by: Mabasa C.L. Attorneys.
Delivery: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties' legal
representatives by email and uploaded on the CaseLines electronic platform. The date for hand-
down is deemed to be 08 April 2026.