IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 050181/26
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
30 Marc h 2026
DATE SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
DANGOR MEDICAL CENTRE (PTY) LTD
And
INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF
SOUTH AFRICA
THE CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER OF THE
INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF
SOUTH AFRICA
REVIVIAL GUEST HOUSE (PTY) LTD
THUNDER STRUCK INVESTMENTS 52 (PTY) LTD
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
SKG AFRICA (PTY) LTD Fifth Respondent
WESTON GOLD STAR INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Sixth Respondent
___________________________________________________________________
NEUKIRCHER J:
1] In this application, brought in terms of Rule 6(12), the applicant originally sought
relief in two parts:
a) in Part A the applicant sought to interdict the implementation of a tender
award to the fifth respondent (SKG); an interdict to prevent the first
respondent (the IEC) from vacating its premises; and an order
compelling the IEC to provide reasons for its a ward in terms of section
5(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 20001;
b) in Part B, the applicant seeks to review and set aside the award to SKG.
2] The answering affidavits of the IEC2 and SKG were filed on 14 March 2026 and
16 March 2026 respectively. The applicants’ replying affidavit was filed on 18 March
2026 and with it an amended notice of motion. According to this, the notice of motion
dated 4 March 2025 must be deleted and substituted with the following:
“1. …
2. That the period afforded to the first and second respondents to supply adequate
written reasons for its award or non-award of tender number IEC/NW-03/2024
be reduced in terms of section 9(1) of Act 3 of 2000 to a date of the order
granted in terms hereof.
1 PAJA
2 As well as the second respondent. In this judgment the first and second respondents are referred to as
“the IEC”
3. An order directing the First and Second Respondents, in terms of section 5(1)
of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 to furnish the Applicant
with adequate written reasons for the administrative action taken in respect of
the award of tender number IEX/NW-03/2024 within 15…days, from date of this
order.”
3] Part B of the amended notice of motion seeks similar review relief to that sought
in the original notice of motion, but what is important is (b) of Part B. It states:
“(b) The first and second respondents are further called upon to send, within 15
days after receipt of this amended notice of motion, to the Registrar….the
record of the proceedings and administrative process sought to be corrected,
reviewed and set aside together with such reasons as the first and second
respondents [are] in law […] required to give and to notify the applicant that
such reasons and record have been supplied.” (my emphasis)
4] Thus, in effect, the applicant seeks the IEC’s reasons via two mechanisms: the
first is via s5(1) of PAJA and the second is via the provisions of Rule 53(1). The
problem with this is that the two provisions have vastly different time periods:
a) s5(1) of PAJA provides:
“Any person whose right have been materially and adversely affected by
administrative action and who has not been given reasons for the action may,
within 90 days after the date on which that person became aware of the action
or might reasonably have been expected to have become aware of the action,
request that the administrator concerned furnish written reasons for the action.”
b) Rule 53(1) provides that the reasons must be provided, together with the
record of the proceedings within 15 days of receipt of the notice of
motion.
5] If one were to accept that the 15 days referred to in Rule 53(1) was to be
calculated from the date of the amended notice of motion, those 15 days would expire
on 8 April 2026. It was not contentious that the 90 -day period referred to in section
5(1) of PAJA would expire during mid-May 2026. It is for this reason that the applicant
then sought truncation of that time period to 15 days from date of this order. This would
mean that the s5(1) reasons would be due on approximately 22 April 2026, which is
after the 15 days period provided for in Rule 53(1).
6] Even had the applicant been successful on the date that the application was
argued on 24 March 2026, the 15 days would only have expired on 16 April 2026 which
is after the period provided for in Rule 53(1).
7] It is also not contentious that the decision -maker has yet to provide reasons.
The reason for that is not relevant to this decision. Suffice it to say that all that the
applicant has been told is that it was the third ranked bidder, that the first ranked bidder
was disqualified due to issues with its bid and that the second ranked bidder was the
one with which the IEC would conclude the service level agreement.
8] It is also common cause that the IEC notified the applicant on 28 January 2026
that it would vacate the applicant’s premises, that the new tender was advertised on
17 January 2025 and that on 13 February 2026, and again on 16 February 2026, the
applicant sought the outcome of the tender and the reasons for the award which it has
yet to be given. The IEC indicated in correspondence on 3 March 2026 that it would
provide the applicant with reasons in due course.
9] The point to all of this is that it is clear that at this stage, the applicant has yet
to receive reasons for the award. It is entitled to these reasons whether in terms of
section 5(1) of PAJA or in terms of Rule 53(1).
10] But the true issue, and the only one for this court to decide, is whether the 90 -
day time period provided for in PAJA should be reduced to 15 days. And, indeed,
whether this is so urgent that it should be entertained on the urgent roll.
11] The case made out by the applicant in its replying affidavit 3 is that, given the
content of the answering affidavit filed by the IEC, the inevitable conclusion is that the
IEC has entered into a service level agreement with SKG and that the procurement is
complete and “put into effect”. It therefore requires the truncation of the time period as,
“if the reasons are only produced within 90 days, the contract will have become fully
entrenched.” It is for this reason that it argues that the application is so urgent that it will
not obtain substantial redress in due course if Part A is not decided urgently.
12] But in my view, the argument is artificial:
a) it was conceded during argument that the new contract was for a period
of over 9 years;
b) the section 5 PAJA reasons – i.e. the 90 days - would fall due in mid -
May 2026;
c) any truncated reasons would fall due on 22 April 2026;
d) the Rule 53 reasons are due on 8 April 2026.
3 Which sought to justify the amended notice of motion
13] In my view, there is little to be achieved by truncating the time periods. The
difference between a truncated time period and the 90-day time period would (at most)
be a month. It is common cause that the current lease expires by effluxion of time on
31 March 2026. It is difficult to conceive how “entrenched” the new lease would be
when the reasons are ultimately filed.
14] Both the IEC and SKG have also argued that the manner in which the applicant
filed its amended notice of motion is impermissible. It did not file a Rule 28 notice and
seek leave to amend its notice of motion – it simply filed an already amended notice
of m otion. This, they argue, deprives them of an opportunity to object to the
amendment. They further argue that that the applicant simply abandoned or withdrew
its original notice of motion without their consent or the consent of the court and failed
to tender any costs occasioned by the amendment.
15] In my view the latter argument has some merit. The case originally made out in
Part A was one in which the applicant sought to interdict the implementation of the
award and interdict the IEC from taking any steps to vacate its property. The fact that
reasons for the IEC’s decision were also sought, appears to have little impetus. The
relief in this regard read:
“3. An order compelling the first respondent to provide written reasons within a set
timeframe in terms of section 5 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
3 of 2000.”
16] The case met by the IEC and SKG was the one in respect of the interdicts
sought. The applicant’s entire case changed on 18 March 2026 with little warning and
no opportunity to the respondents to either object or f ile answering papers, and they
did not seek to do so before me – instead they argued on the papers already before
court.
17] It is clear to me that when this urgent application was conceived, the truncation
of PAJA time periods was not of any moment to the applicant despite the fact that it
already knew that the lease was at an end on 31 March 2026, that the IEC would be
moving on 31 March 2026 and that its bid had been unsuccessful. Its argument that
this relie f suddenly became urgent on 14 March 2026 when the IEC’s answering
affidavit was filed simply cannot pass muster for the reasons already stated.
18] Given all of the above, I am of the view that the manner in which the applicant
has chosen to litigate Part A does not render the relief sought urgent. Given that at
best the Rule 53 reasons are due on 8 April 2026 and, at worst the s5(1) PAJA reasons
are due mid -May 2026, the applicant will suffer no prejudice were the relief it seeks
not to be granted.
19] Given this, Part A of the application must fail both on the issue of urgency and
on its merits. There is no point in striking the matter from the urgent roll so that the
applicant can set it down in the ordinary course.
20] The respondents have sought a punitive costs order against the applicant for
the manner in which it has chosen to litigate Part A. They were dragged to court on
extremely truncated time periods, the applicant’s case suddenly changed a few days
prior to th e hearing and the case was made out in reply to which they had little
opportunity to answer. This is especially relevant to SKG – given that no interdict was
sought against it in the amended Part A and no costs were tendered for the last-minute
withdrawal of relief against it, it was put to the expense of briefing counsel and drafting
answering papers which turned out to be irrelevant and unnecessary at this stage.
21] Insofar as the IEC is concerned, it too has been put to the expense of filing an
answering affidavit on issues which have, for the most part, become irrelevant to the
issues to be decided by me.
22] The applicant argues that it would be misplaced for this court to make a costs
order at this stage as the court hearing the review application would be in a better
position to decide costs once Part B is adjudicated. It also argued that any costs order
may render some issues res judicata. I cannot agree. This court must decide whether
to grant Part A or not. Part A does not deal with the merits of Part B at all. This court is
therefore in the best position to decide the costs in respect of Part A.
23] Whilst I agree that the applicant’s conduct thus far has left much to be desired,
I am not of a mind to grant punitive costs against it. I am however of the view that,
given the issues, the papers that have been filed and the extent of the argument, costs
on Scale C are justified as are the costs consequent upon the employment of a senior
counsel and a junior counsel (where relevant).
ORDER
1. Part A of the Amended Notice of Motion filed on 18 March 2026 is dismissed.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the fifth respondent’s costs in respect of Part A
which costs are taxable in accordance with Scale C.
3. The applicant is ordered to pay the first and second respondent's costs of Part
A, which costs are taxable in accordance with Scale C and shall include the
costs consequent upon the employment of one senior counsel and one junior
counsel.
B NEUKIRCHER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA
This judgment was prepared and authored by the judge whose name is reflected and
is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties/their legal representatives
by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines . The
date for hand-down is deemed to be 30 March 2026.
For the applicant
Instructed by
For the first and second
respondents
Instructed by
For the fifth respondent
Instructed by
Matter heard on
Judgment date
Adv Jacobs SC, with him Adv Bowles
Lourens Bexuidenhout Mokhetle Inc
Adv Motau SC, with him Adv Sive
Barnard Incorporated Attorneys
Adv Pretorius
SIM Attorneys Inc
24 March 2026
30 March 2026