IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION , PRETORIA
CASE NO: 2025/014993
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / .WO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/.WO
(3) REVISED: -¥e$,£NO
16 March 2026
DATE -SIGNATURE
In the matter between :
CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
And
MARTHINUS CHRISTOFFEL VORSTER
In re:
MARTHINUS CHRISTOFFEL VORSTER
and
CITY OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
JUDGMENT
Applicant
Respondent
Plaintiff
Defendant
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MODISA AJ
[1] This is an opposed applicati on in terms of Uniform Rule 30 (1) of the
Uniform Rules of Court, for the setting a side of a notice of bar delivered
by the Respondent as an alleged irregular step.
[2] The Respondent (as Plaintiff) served a Combined Summons on the
Municipality on 12 Februar y 2025 and the action was defended on 17
February 2025.
[3] On 17 February 2025 the authority of Hurter Spies Incorporated to act
for the Respondent was challenged.
[4] Still on the same day, 27 February 2025, a notice was received from
Hurter Spies Incorporated showing the written Power of Attorney signed
by the Respondent in their favour. The Applicant indicated that it was
not satisfied and thereafter Hurter Spies Incorporated also provided
another separate Special Power of Attorney.
[5] On 20 March 2025 the Respondent (as Plaintiff) served a Notice of Bar.
[6] This caused the Applicant to complain on 26 March 2025. The Applicant
eventually proceeded under Rule 30, demanding removal of the Notice
of Bar. When the step was not removed, this culminated in the curren t
application.
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[7] The Respondent is a litigant in his personal capacity. There is nothing
technical about a natural person giving a mandate.
[8] The Applicant points out that the starting point for Rule 7 is that there
should at last be some form of suspicion t hat the attorneys are not
authorized. No basis for such suspicion is provided in the founding
papers.
[9] On 18 February 2025, Hurter Spies Incorporated provided the
Applicant’s attorneys with a Special Power of Attorney that addressed
their queries. On 20 March 2025 the Notice of Bar was filed.
[10] The Respondent also commented on the peculiar nature of the Notice in
terms of Rule 30.
[11] Paragraph 3 thereof reads:
“While the said attorneys did furnish copies of some documents
purporting to satisfy the Defendan ts of their authority to act for the
Plaintiff, the Rule requires that the attorney may no longer so act until
they have satisfied a Court of their authority to so act.”
[12] The Respondent’s attorneys attempted to resolve the matter amicably
and even tendered ten extra days to file the Plea to the Applicant’s
attorneys in an attempt to resolve the matter. The only response to this
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correspondence was the current application.
[13] I agree with Counsel for the Respondent that any reasonable attorney or
litigant would, after receipt of any version of the Power of Attorney, have
known that the litigation is properly mandated. This does, however, not
suit the delaying tactics of the Applicant.
[14] The Respondent states that the Applicant is an abuse of process. The
Applicant and its attorneys ought to know better. This type of conduct
and deliberate delay in litigation should be avoided at all cost.
[15] It is improper for any attorney to assist clients in pursuing delaying
tactics.
[16] In reply for the first time the Applicant (incorrectly) claims that the
admission certificates of the attorneys and the Fidelity Fund certificates
must also have been provided.
[17] For the first time in the reply it is also claimed that the certified copy of
the identity document of the Plaintiff (Respondent) and evidence of the
mandate should have been provided.
[18] The rationale for the existence of Rule 7 is simple. The Rule is on the
one hand at avoiding the cluttering of pleadings unnecessarily with
Resolutions and Power of Attorneys being annex ed thereto, and on the
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other hand, it provides a safeguard to prevent a cited person from
repudiating the process and denying his or her authority for issuing the
process.1
[19] There is no prescribed method within which a mandate has to be
shown.2
[20] It is tr ite that the Rules exist for the Court and not the Courts for the
Rules. 3
[21] In Kobusch & Others v. Whitehead, 4 the unanimous Supreme Court of
Appeal, inter alia, held that:
“… We are inclined to the view that the rules of court must be
understood in a pra ctical way to advance the process of litigation, and
not to have the rules become an obstacle course without purpose …”.
[22] It is malicious for the Municipality to have persisted in its stance after
receipt of the Power of Attorney. Any reasonable attorney or litigant
would read the Power of Attorneys and know that the litigation is
mandated by the natural person. To then try and hide behind the Rules
and to seek extension of the dies to file a Plea on every occasion when
1 See: Rural Maintenance (Pty) Ltd & Others v. Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd & Another [2023]
ZAGPJHC 354, paragraph [21]
2 See: Gainsford NNO v. Hiab AB, 2000 (3) SA 635 (W) at 639 J to 640 A
3 See: Arendsnes Sweefspoor CC v. Botha, 2013 (5) SA 399 (SCA) at paragraph [18]
4 2025 (3) SA 403 (SCA) at paragraph [18]
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invoking the tactics, is deliberate and cannot be justified.
[23] It is unsurprising that the Courts have under similar circumstances found
that a Notice of Bar is not irregular.
[24] In Shosholoza Auctioneers CC v. Ngqura Harbour Contractors, 5 the
High Court in Natal held:
“Indeed, it would appear that the applicant’s challenge was nothing but a
tactical and dilatory device aimed at stalling the respondent’s suit against
the applicant in terms of the main action. It also seems to me that the
strategy was somewhat opportunistic in that the app licant came up with
the challenged for the first time only a day after receiving the notice of
bar and, notably, after some nine weeks of its receipt of the respondent’s
reply in relation to the power of attorney issued. The applicant’s
response, in turn, were the Rule 30A(1) and 30(2)(b) notices which it
served on the respondent. In the circumstances, I can safely infer that
were it not for the notice of bar, the Rule 30 notices aforesaid would
most probably not have been issued.”
[25] At paragraph [26] of t hat matter, the Court also expressed its
dissatisfaction with only raising the grounds of objection in reply. This is
also what the Applicant tried to do by claiming that Fidelity Fund
5 2008 JDR 1310 (N) at paragraph [22]
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certificates and other documents not mentioned anywhere in the Rule 7
should also have been provided to it.
[26] The Court remarked as follows:
“[26] The first time that the applicant let the world know of the specific
grounds of its challenge, was in its replying affidavit. This step was
tantamount to the applicant making out its case in reply which was
generally not permissible. In this regard I recall the decision in Bowman
NO v De Souza Roldao 1988 (4) SA 326 (T) at 327C -G where the Court
stated:
“Generally speaking, an applicant must stand or fall by his founding
affidavit; he is not allowed to make out his case or rely upon new
grounds in the replying affidavit. See, for example, Director of Hospital
Services v Mistry 1979 (1) SA 626 (A) at 635 in fin -636 where Diemont
JA said the following:
‘When, as in this case, the proceedings are launched by way of notice of
motion, it is to the founding affidavit which a Judge will look to determine
what the complaint is. As was pointed out by Krause J in Pountas’
Trustee v Lahanas 1924 WLD 67 at 68 and as has been said in many
other cases
‘… an applicant must stand or fall by his petition and the facts alleged
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therein and that, although sometimes it is permissible to supplement the
allegations contained in the petition, still the main foundation of the
application is the allegation of facts stated therein, because those are
the facts which the respondent is called upon either to affirm or deny’.
Since it is clear that the applicant stands or falls by his petition and the
facts therein alleged
‘it is not permissible to make out new grounds for the application in the
replying affidavit.’”
[27] This matter is distinguishable from the facts of the case in the matter of
South African Broadcasting C orporation and Another v Thabang
Solomon Lesia and Others6 in that Moroka attorneys dispatche d a
copy of the power of attorney which did not belong the Plaintiff in the
main action. In casu the general signed power of attorney and a special
power of attorney which were both signed belong to the Plaintiff in the
main action.
[28] Upon receipt of the ge neral signed power of attorney and a signed
special power of attorney delivered by Hurter Spies Inc acting on behalf
of the Respondent, Engelbrech attorneys Inc acting on behalf of the
Applicant should have simply withdrawn the dispute which was raised in
terms of Rule 7(1). It was proper for Hurter Spies Inc to continue to act
6 (6544/2024) [2025] ZAFSHC401 (12 December 2025) at para [11]
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on behalf of the Respondent by delivering a notice of bar after
responding the Rule 7(1) notice which was served upon them. It was
improper for the Applicant to complain in writing b y means of a notice in
terms of Rule 30(2) (b) that the notice of bar constituted an irregular
step. I am of the view that the notice of bar which was delivered by the
Respondent does not constitute an irregulars step.
[29] The Respondent properly complied wit h the Rule 7(1) notice which was
served on them and it was not necessary for the Applicant to bring this
application. It is not necessary for this Court to make appropriate
directives about the dies for purposes of Rule 22 of the Uniform Rules of
Court.
[30] I will refrain to deal with the respondent’s Rule 7(1) notice due to the fact
that there is no counter application in respect of such notice.
[31] It is common cause that the Respondent is a natural person represented
by Hurter Spies Inc and furnished the App licant with a power of attorney
in response to the notice in terms of Rule 7 (1) dated 17 February 2025.
[32] I am of the view that regardless of what procedure is followed in
challenging the authority of a person acting for a party, the challenge
should be bona fide.
[33] Furthermore, the grounds on which the challenge is based should be
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stated clearly and unambiguously and with sufficient detail in order for
both such person and the party as well as the Court to fully understand
challenge and for such person and /or party to satisfy the Court that such
person is authorised to act. A bare denial of authority would not suffice.
[34] It is clear that the Applicant simply made a bare denial of the authority of
the Respondent’s attorneys to act and there are no grounds up on which
the challenge is based and the challenge lacked sufficient particularity
and/or detail in order for this Court to fully understand the challenge.
[35] In order to illustrate the lack of bona fides on the part of the Applicant, it
is clear on the noti ce in terms of Rule 7 (1) that a power of attor ney was
sought to be delivered by the Respondent’s attorneys, which power of
attorney was delivered as requested, but surprisingly, the Applicant
sought further documents namely, the certificate of admission a s an
attorney as well as a valid fidelity fund certificate. These further
documents were not sought from the outset at the time when the Rule
7(1) notice was issued. If the Courts will allow a Rule 7(1) notice to be
issued each and every time when proceedi ngs are instituted, then the
Courts will open floodgates of unnecessary expenses to be incurred in
litigation, waste of time and a delay in finalising litigation. This is exactly
what this application is all about.
[36] In the premises, the following order is made:
1. The application is dismissed.
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2. The Applicant is ordered to pay the costs on attorney and own
client scale
For the Applicant:
Adv A.S. Myburgh
Instructed by:
Engelbrecht attorneys Inc
For the Respondents:
Adv J.GC Hamman
Instructed by:
Hunter Spies Inc
MODISAAJ
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
PRETORIA