SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2024-106528
In the matter between:
P[…], L[…] M[…] Applicant
and
P[…], M[…] G[…] M[…] Respondent
This judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the applicant’s legal
representatives and the respondent’s legal representatives by email and by
publication on Case Lines. The date for the handing down is deemed 16 APRIL
2026.
JUDGMENT
LANGE, AJ
Introduction
[1] This is an opposed application in which the applicant seeks an order decla ring
the Respondent to be in contempt of a court order and the committal of the
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
(3) REVISED: YES / NO
______________ ______________________
DATE SIGNATURE
2
Respondent to imprisonment, which committal is to be suspended on condition
that the Respondent pays the arrears in terms of the consent order and
continues to comply with the terms of the consent order.
[2] On 26 May 2025, pursuant to the present application for the committal of the
Respondent to imprisonment for being in contempt of two orders granted by this
Honourable Court in terms of Rule 43 and 43(6) respectively, the Respondent
made a proposal (during the hearing of the application) to pay a reduced amount
of R1 000 000.00 (One Million Rand) in respect of the arrear interim maintenance
and contribution towards costs which was due to the Applicant in terms of the
two orders previously mentioned, which proposal was accepted by the Applicant.
Dlamini J granted an order by consent (“the consent order”) as follows:
a. for the payment of R1 000 000.00 (One million Rand) in instalments in the
terms proposed by the Respondent; and
b. the Applicant was authorised to approach this Honourable Court on
supplemented papers for the committal of the Respondent to imprisonment
in the event of the Respondent defaulting on any of the instalments.
Common Cause Facts
[3] The parties are involved in a bitter litigated divorce, which was instituted by the
applicant in 2019, and which proceedings are still pending in this court.
[4] During or about July 2021, the applicant brought an application in terms of Rule
43 against the respondent, which application the respondent opposed, pursuant
to which an order was granted in her favour against the respondent on 20
September 2021 to the effect that inter alia the Respondent had to pay
maintenance pendente lite to the Applicant in the amount of R37 000.00 (thirty
seven thousand rand) per month.
[5] The Respondent made payment of this amount from September 2021 until
June 2023, when he unilaterally stopped making the payments to the Applicant.
[6] On 23 July 2023 the respondent brought an application in terms of Rule 43(6)
[6] On 23 July 2023 the respondent brought an application in terms of Rule 43(6)
against the applicant, which application the applicant opposed, in which the
3
respondent sought an order reducing his maintenance obligations to
R20 676.21 per month. The applicant launched a counter application for a
contribution to her legal fees. On 31 May 2024, an order was granted in the
Rule 43(6) application by Malindi J, in terms whereof:
a. the Respondent's application in terms of Rule 43(6) was dismissed with
costs on the attorney and client scale, including costs of counsel on scale
B;
b. the Respondent was directed to pay a contribution towards the applicant’s
costs of the divorce action in the sum of R484 000,00.
[7] It is common cause that the respondent was aware of the two orders and that
as at the date of institution of the current application by the Applicant
a. the Respondent was in arrears with his maintenance payments in the sum
of R555 000,00 (five hundred and fifty-five thousand rand) in that
i. In June 2023, he paid an amount of R30 000,00 instead of R37
000,00, in consequence whereof he is in arrears in the amount of R7
000,00 for the month of June 2023.
ii. Since July 2023, the Respondent had failed to make any payment of
interim maintenance to the Applicant.
b. the Respondent had failed to pay the contribution towards the applicant’s
legal costs of R484 000,00 in terms of the Rule 43(6) order.
[8] As stated above, on 26 May 2025, Dlamini J granted an order by consent (“the
consent order”) as follows:
a. for the payment of R1 000 000.00 (One million Rand) in instalments in the
terms proposed by the Respondent;
b. for the payment of interim maintenance as set out in the Rule 43 order,
namely in the amount of R37 000.00 ( thirty-seven thousand rand) per
month, and
4
c. the Applicant was authorised to approach this Honourable Court on
supplemented papers for the committal of the Respondent to imprisonment
in the event of the Respondent defaulting on any of the instalments.
[9] The Respondent was ordered to pay the said sum of R1 000 000,00 (One
million rand) as follows:
a. R50 000,00 (fifty-thousand rand) on or before 30 June 2025;
b. R200 000,00 (two hundred thousand rand) on or before 21 August 2025;
c. R550 000,00 (five hundred and fifty thousand rand) on or before 25
November 2025;
d. R150 000,00 (one hundred and fifty thousand rand) on or before 15
December 2025;
e. R50 000,00 (fifty thousand rand) on or before 15 January 2025
However, he had not made any of these payments at the dat e of institution of
the present proceedings (“the supplementary application”), notwithstanding the
fact that he had tendered this schedule of payments.
[10] The Respondent paid R37 000.00 (thirty-seven thousand rand) to the Applicant
in June 2025 and July 2025 but has failed to make any further payments to the
applicant in accordance with the order.
[11] The applicant filed a supplementary notice of motion, and both parties filed
supplementary affidavits, and the matter was argued before me on 12 March
2026. The Respondent also sought leave to file two further supplementary
affidavits; the applicant’s legal representatives did not oppose the filing thereof
and I granted consent to the filing thereof.
[12] At the hearing of the matter, counsel for the Respondent handed up a sealed
envelope of documents which the Respondent had instructed him to provide to
the Court and the Applicant’s legal representatives which the Respondent
claimed were confidential. Counsel for the Respondent told the court that the
Respondent had instructed him to request the return of the documents due to
5
their highly sensitive nature. After perusing the documents, I gave a directive
that the documents were directly relevant to the proceedings and needed to
form part of the court record and as such the Respondent was directed to
upload them onto CaseLines. I did not see anything in the documents that
warranted the high drama created by the Respondent.
Applicable law and analysis
[13] Argument on the matter centred around whether or not the Respondent’s failure
to adhere to the terms of the consent order was mala fide or not. It was
accepted that the Respondent was aware of the orders and that he had failed
to make payment in terms of the various orders.
[14] It is trite law that civil contempt is the wilful and mala fide refusal to comply with
an order ad factum praestandum (an order calling upon a party to perform an
act/do something). An order for payment of maintenance and a contribution
towards costs of a pending divorce action which falls within the duty of support
between spouses is both a judgment ad factum praestandum; and ad pecuniam
solvendam (to pay an amount of money)
1.
[15] The Supreme Court of Appeal set out the elements which an applicant is
required to demonstrate to succeed in establishing that a respondent is in
contempt of court
2, namely:
“It is trite that an applicant who alleges contempt of court must establish that:
(a) an order was granted against the alleged contemnor;
(b) the alleged contemnor was served with the order or had knowledge of it;
and
(c) the alleged contemnor failed to comply with the order.
Once these elements are established, wilfulness and mala fides are presumed,
and the respondent bears an evidentiary burden to establish a reasonable
doubt. Should the respondent fail to discharge this burden, contempt will have
been established.”
1 Jeanes v Jeanes and Another 1977 (2) SA 703 (W) at 706
2 in Snowy Owl Properties 284 (Pty) Limited v Celliers & another [2023] ZASCA (31 March 2023) at
para 22
6
[16] The Constitutional Court in Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan
Municipality (No 2) stated:
“The rule of law, a foundational value of the Constitution, requires that the dignity and
authority of the courts be upheld. This is crucial, as the capacity of the courts to carry
out their functions depends upon it. As the Constitution commands, orders and
decisions issued by a court bind all persons to whom and organs of state to which they
apply, and no person or organ of state may interfere, in any manner, with the
functioning of the courts. It follows from this that disobedience towards court orders or
decisions risks rendering our courts impotent and judicial authority a mere mockery.
The effectiveness of court orders or decisions is substantially determined by the
assurance that they will be enforced. Courts have the power to ensure that their
decisions or orders are complied with by all and sundry, including organs of state. In
doing so, courts are not only giving effect to the rights of the successful litigant but also
and more importantly, by acting as guardians of the Constitution asserting their
authority in the public interest...”3
[17] In Fakie N O v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd , the Supreme Court of Appeal held that
in civil proceedings, for an application for contempt to succeed, an applicant
must prove the requisites beyond reasonable doubt (my emphasis).4
[18] In Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni City the Constitutional Court held that wilful
disobedience of a court order “is both contemptuous and a criminal offence.
The object of contempt proceedings is to impose a penalty that will vindicate
the court’s honour, consequent upon the disregard of its previous order, as well
as to compel performance in accordance with the previous order”.5
[19] In support of her contention that the respondent’s failure to adhere to the terms
of the consent order or indeed the Rule 43 order, the applicant alleges that t
he
of the consent order or indeed the Rule 43 order, the applicant alleges that t
he
Respondent is a businessman and a director and/or a shareholder and/or
member of inter alia:
3 Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality (No 2) [2015] ZACC 10; 2015 (5) SA 600
(CC); 2015 (6) BCLR 711 (CC) paras 1-2.
4 Fakie N O v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd [2006] ZASCA 52; 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) para 42
5 Ibid at paragraph [28]
7
a. I[…] P[… ] (Pty) Limited, the registered owner of a commercial property
situated at 1[ …] R[… ] Road, where S […] I[…] conducts a business of
selling ice;
b. F[...] CC:
i. which sold a business to V [… ] A[…] (Pty) Ltd (“V[… ”) in June 2020
for R17 000 000.00 (seventeen million rand) , which amount has
been paid to F[...] CC on a date which the Respondent has failed
to disclose;
ii. which sold two properties for the sum of R15 000 000.00 (fifteen
million rand).
[20] The Applicant in her supplementary founding affidavit, alleges that the
respondent omitted to disclose the sale of the said properties. In his answering
affidavit the Respondent simply notes the allegation relating to the sale of these
properties but does not take the court into his confidence as to what happened
to the proceeds of the sale or why he did not disclose the sale of these
properties.
[21] The respondent in his sworn reply in the Rule 43 application in July 2021 stated
that F[...] CC owed him R4 200 000,00 (four million two-hundred thousand rand)
and he was drawing R55 000,00 (fifty-five thousand rand) per month from F[...] CC
depending on its cash flow; and in the FDF completed by him in November 2023,
stated that F[...] CC allegedly owed him R6 545 500,00 (six million five-hundred
and forty-five thousand five hundred rand). No explanation is given by him as to
why his loan to F[...] CC increased by over two million rand during the period when
he was not complying with the Rule 43 order allegedly due to the unaffordability of
the order.
[22] The respondent does not deny that although the Applicant is a shareholder of I[… ]
P[… ] (Pty) Limited, she derives no income from this company, as the Respondent
conducts its business affairs to her exclusion and has changed the passwords and
pin numbers of its bank accounts to prevent her from gaining access thereto.
8
[23] The applicant alleges that the respondent is living a lavish lifestyle whilst
refusing to adhere to the terms of the consent order or indeed the Rule 43
order. The Respondent simply responds to state that the allegations cannot be
dealt with on affidavit and must be referred to oral evidence. No reason is
given by the respondent for this stance and with respect, it simply does not hold
up to scrutiny. The applicant sets out the reasons for her assertion, which are
capable of being dealt with on affidavit.
[24] The respondent in explanation for his failure to adhere to the terms of the
consent order states that at the time that the order was made, he was of the
view that he could pay the amounts tendered as he was expecting payment
from one T[...] P[...] in respect of monies due to him but that he was “misled” by
the company and these funds were never paid to him and therefore he could
not honour the terms of the court order. It is this transaction that then forms the
basis of the further supplementary affidavit filed by the respondent, the
annexures to which were handed up on the date of the hearing of the matter,
and which are referred to hereinabove.
[25] I pause to mention that the respondent filed no less than three affidavits; he
filed his supplementary answering affidavit on 10 November 2025, an additional
supplementary answering affidavit on 6 February 2026, and a second additional
answering affidavit on 7 March 2026. The additional supplementary answering
affidavit is deposed to by the respondent in order to place before the court
“highly confidential” documents in support of his contention in the
supplementary answering affidavit regarding T[...] P[...] and the sole purpose of
the second additional answering affidavit is to place before this court proof that
Fintron is in voluntary liquidation. The importance of this is that in her heads of
argument, which were filed in December 2025, counsel for the applicant points
argument, which were filed in December 2025, counsel for the applicant points
out that the allegations made by the respondent in his supplementary
answering affidavit with regard to T[...] P[...] are not dealt with in sufficient detail
and there is information missing from the affidavit relating to the entity , and
further that it is not supported by any proof of the alleged transaction which is
the cause of the respondent’s failure to adhere to the terms of the consent
order. As the respondent’s additional supplementary answering affidavit w as
9
filed on 6 February 2026, it would seem that this was an attempt by the
respondent to remedy the deficiencies in his supplementary answering affidavit.
I deemed it appropriate however to allow the filing of the further affidavits as the
information provided was directly relevant to the issues in this application.
[26] Counsel for the applicant indicated that they had no issue with the admission of
the two further supplementary affidavits however this is not a satisfactory
manner in which to litigate- the answering affidavit should have contained all
the information set out in the two supplementary affidavits , which information
was already in the respondent’s possession at the date he deposed to his
supplementary answering affidavit – Fintron was already in liquidation from July
2025 and the T[...] P[...] deal fell through in July 2025; the explanation tendered
by the respondent is that Mr Kunene was not in Johannesburg at the time he
deposed to his answering affidavit and did not initially want to get involved
however the Respondent could, and should, have taken this court into his
confidence by saying as much in his supplementary answering affidavit.
[27] The main thrust of the respondent’s defence is that he did not act mala fide in
not adhering to the terms of the consent order or the Rule 43 order as he was
not in a financial position to do so as a result of issues with S […] I[..], the fact
that Fincon was placed into voluntary sequestration and the fact that he was
not paid the funds he was expecting from T[...] P[...]. I will deal with the T[...]
P[...] issue shortly however what is apposite to note is that when I asked
counsel for the respondent at the hearing of the matt er to point me to where in
the three answering affidavits file by the respondent, the respondent shows any
attempt to advise the applicant of his alleged change in circumstances , he
conceded that this is not contained in any of the affidavits. He further conceded
conceded that this is not contained in any of the affidavits. He further conceded
that the respondent has failed to explain, why, when he allegedly found out that
the T[...] P[...] deal was not going to materialise in or about July 2025, he took
no steps to deal with his breach of the court order.
[28] It is clear to this court that the respondent has adopted a “catch me if you can”
approach; on his own version he was aware as early as July 2025 that he
would allegedly not be in a position to comply with the terms of the court order
and yet he sits back and does nothing. When the applicant then files her
10
supplementary notice of motion and supplementary founding affidavit, the
respondent’s response is wholly insufficient in that he fails to provide sufficient
proof of the alleged reasons for his inability to comply with the order. The
respondent seems to take the attitude that this court should absolve him of his
responsibility just because he says that he cannot comply. There is a complete
lack of transparency in his affidavit as to his actual financial situation, what, if
any, attempts he has made to meet his obligations in terms of the consent
order and he merely asks that the application be dismissed with costs.
[29] As counsel for the applicant so succinctly states in her heads of argument, in
his answering affidavit to the supplementary founding affidavit (which was
delivered on 1 December 2025), the Respondent made the vague and
unsubstantiated allegation that he is allegedly unable to comply with the
consent order, in that on 26 May 2025 when he agreed to the consent order:
a. he allegedly had a source of income (which source of income he had
failed to disclose previously) namely he was “involved with Tshwane
Petroleum.” However, the Respondent has failed to:
i. identify Tshwane Petroleum or to furnish its address;
ii. furnish details of the nature his alleged “involvement” with Tshwane
Petroleum;
iii. state whether the agreement between him and Tshwane Petroleum
is oral or in writing and if in writing, to annex a copy thereof to his
affidavit;
iv. allege who represented him and who represented Tshwane
Petroleum in entering into their agreement;
v. furnish the date on which he entered into an agreement with
Tshwane Petroleum;
vi. furnish the terms of the agreement between him and Tshwane
Petroleum, the amount owed to him by Tshwane Petroleum, the date
upon which payment was due and payable by Tshwane Petroleum to
11
the Respondent or the amount payable by Tshwane Petroleum to
the Respondent;
vii. obtain an affidavit from a representative of Tshwane Petroleum
confirming that it is indebted to him but has been unable to pay him.
b. Tshwane Petroleum “expected income from another [unidentified] entity
which went into liquidation.” In addition to the fact that the Respondent
has failed to take this Honourable Court into his confidence, as he has
failed to identify the entity which was allegedly indebted to Tshwane
Petroleum, nor has he furnished proof that the unidentified entity is
indebted to Tshwane Petroleum or that Tshwane Petroleum is indebted to
the Respondent, the allegation pertaining to the unidentified entity
constitutes inadmissible, hearsay evidence and should accordingly be
disregarded.
[30] I turn now to consider the documents handed up by counsel for the respondent.
These were:
a. A wholesale license certificate issued to T[...] P[...] (company registration
number 2017/661433/07);
b. An affidavit of indebtedness between T[...] P[...] (company registration
number 2016/234705/07) and the respondent signed by Mr Kunene as the
chairperson of the board of T[...] P[...] acknowledging that T[...] P[...] is
indebted to the respondent in the amount of R 5 457 000.00 (five million
four-hundred and fifty -seven thousand rand) . Mr Kunene deposed to a
confirmatory affidavit to the respondent’s February 2026 additional
supplementary answering affidavit;
c. A non-disclosure and non-compete agreement entered into between the
respondent and T[...] P[...]
d. Share certificate which states that the respondent holds 50% of the issued
shares in T[...] P[...] (company registration number 2016/234705/07)
12
e. A formal notice of material impairment dated 23 June 2025 addressed to
the shareholders of T[...] P[...] (the respondent holds 50% shareholding in
the company) by the board of directors of T[...] P[...] which states that the
company’s legal representative had concluded that the debt of
R11 000 000.00 ( eleven million rand) owed to them by Kenenao
Petroleum (Pty) Ltd with Registration Number: K2015/406932 was not
recoverable and should be written off the financial statements for the
2024/2025 financial year.
[31] There are some fundamental issues with these documents:
a. Firstly, the company registration numbers on the share certificate and
affidavit of indebtedness differ to the company registration number of the
license certificate issued by the Department of mineral resources and
energy.
b. Secondly, the formal notice of material impairment, which is dated 23
June 2025 states that the loan advanced by T[...] P[...] (no date is given
for the alleged transaction) to Kenenao Petroleum (Pty) Ltd, is non
recoverable but the affidavit of indebtedness, which is dated 18 July 2025,
signed by the respondent , refers to repayment of the loan advanced to
T[...] P[...] by the respondent on payment to T[...] P[...] of the funds due
from Kenenao. It is nonsensical for the respondent and T[...] P[...] to
agree to payment terms contingent on an event whic h all parties know is
not going to materialise.
c. Thirdly the formal notice of material impairment states that T[...] P[...]
remains able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course
of business and the company’s assets fairly valued exceed its liabilities
fairly valued. No explanation is given as to why then the affidavit of
indebtedness ties the repayment of the respondent’s loan to T[...] P[...] to
the repayment by Kenenao of their debt to T[...] P[...] , which is never
going to happen, rather than setting out clear terms of repayment.
going to happen, rather than setting out clear terms of repayment.
d. Fourthly, from the structure of the affidavit of indebtedness, it is clear that
the loan made by the respondent to T[...] P[...] was a shareholder’s loan,
13
but no details of the loan itself are provided and this court has no details
as to the timing of the loan or the reason therefore.
[32] Counsel for the respondent submitted that the court could only test the
allegation of mala fides if the respondent was given an opportunity to give oral
evidence as there was a genuine dispute of fact in the papers. Having regard to
the papers, the dispute of fact, if there is one, which I do not accept, arises due
to the respondent’s failure to deal comprehensively with the applicant’s
allegations. He deals with the allegations in a very perfunctory manner and fails
to provide any objective proof for any of his denials; for example, when the
applicant alleges that the respondent is living a lavish lifestyle, he answers with
a bare denial and the statement that the issue must be referred to oral
evidence. These allegations however could, and should, be dealt with on
affidavit with confirmatory affidavits and independent evidence.
[33] In Whitman trading as JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and
Another
6, purported disputes of fact were raised by the Respondent and the
Court held that a real genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only
where the court is satisfied that the party who purports to raise the dispute has
in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be
disputed.7 The Court further held that when the facts averred are such that the
disputing party must necessarily possess knowledge of them and be able to
provide an answer (or countervailing evidence) if they be not true or accurate
but, instead of doing so, rests his case on a bare or ambiguous denial, the
Court will generally have difficulty in finding that the test is satisfied.
[34] In the current application, the respondent’s version lacks sufficient particularity
to prove that a dispute of fact exists; furthermore, his evidence in fact supports
the applicant’s contention that he deliberately refused to comply with the
the applicant’s contention that he deliberately refused to comply with the
consent order. On his own version he was aware as early as June 2025 that
T[...] P[...] would not be in a position to pay him the funds on which he had
allegedly relied to satisfy the consent order, but he took no further steps to
remedy the situation or even bring it to the applicant’s attention. The
6 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA).
7 See par [13]
14
respondent also does not state if he took any steps to realise any other funds;
he readily admits to having advanced considerable loans to companies which
appear to be unsecured and not recoverable but does not adequately set out
why he prioritised these loans over satisfying the terms of the court orders
ordered against him.
[35] The respondent has therefore failed to establish reasonable doubt that his non-
compliance with the consent order is mala fide. On the Respondent’s own
version, he intentionally failed to pay maintenance to the Applicant since June
2023 in that:
a. he lent a further amount of money of R2 345 500,00 (two million three -
hundred-and forty-five thousand five hundred rand) to F[...] CC between
July 2021 and November 2023, yet he failed to comply with the Rule 43
order from June 2023;
b. he caused F[...] CC to lend money to Khumhold instead of causing it to
repay the loan amount due to him, to enable him to comply with the Rule
43 and 43(6) orders;
c. he has been able to effect maintenance, repairs and renovations and
acquire furniture for the former matrimonial home where he resides;
d. he was able to borrow money to pay his own expenses but did not borrow
money to comply with the Rule 43 and 43(6) orders;
e. the payment terms of the consent order comprised the offer made by him,
yet he failed to comply with the consent order;
f. sometime between August 2022 and July 2025 the respondent loaned
T[...] P[...] R6 000 000.00 (six million rand) and was repaid R 543 000.00
(five hundred and forty-three thousand rand), as evidenced by the affidavit
of indebtedness he provided, but he failed to abide by the terms of the
various court orders in place at the time. He also fails to take this court
into his confidence as to the timing of these transactions.
15
[36] From the respondent’s own version, it is clear that he acted deliberately and in
this court’s view, mala fide in his failure to comply with the terms of the court
orders and he is therefore in contempt of the court orders.
Costs
[37] The Applicant sought an order that the costs of this application be granted in
her favour on the attorney client scale. She does not specify which schedule
should be applied.
[38] Whilst in the supplementary answering affidavit the respondent prays for the
matter to be dismissed with costs, at the hearing of the matter c ounsel for the
respondent however argued that the matter should be dismissed and no order
made as to the costs of the application.
[39] The respondent’s conduct is so egregious that in my view it warrants a punitive
costs order and as such, the respondent will pay the costs of the application on
the attorney client scale.
Order
[40] For the reasons set out above, I make the following order:
IT IS ORDERED THAT: -
1. The Respondent is declared to be in contempt of the order granted by consent
by the above Honourable Court on 26 May 2025, a copy whereof is annexed
to the Applicant’s supplementary founding affidavit, marked “SP1”;
2. The Respondent is directed to pay forthwith the arrear maintenance and
contribution towards the Applicant’s costs due and payable to the Applicant
under the court order, Annexure “SP1” annexed hereto, namely:
2.1. R50 000,00 which was due and payable on or before 30 June 2025;
16
2.2. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R50 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,75% per annum from 1 July
2025 to date of payment;
2.3. R200 000,00 which was due and payable on or before 21 August
2025;
2.4. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R200 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,75% per annum from 22
August 2025 to date of payment;
2.5. R500 000,00 which was due and payable on or before 25 November
2025;
2.6. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R500 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,5% per annum from 26
November 2025 to date of payment;
2.7. R150 000,00 which was due and payable on or before 15 December
2025;
2.8. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R150 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,5% per annum from 16
December 2025 to date of payment;
2.9. R50 000,00 which was due and payable on or before 15 January 2026;
2.10. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R50 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,5% per annum from 16 January
2026 to date of payment;
2.11. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
17
and payable on 7 August 2025;
2.12. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,75% per annum from 8
August 2025 to date of payment;
2.13. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
and payable on 7 September 2025;
2.14. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,75% per annum from 8
September 2025 to date of payment;
2.15. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
and payable on 7 October 2025;
2.16. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,75% per annum from 8
October 2025 to date of payment;
2.17. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
and payable on 7 November 2025;
2.18. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,5% per annum from 8 November
2025 to date of payment;
2.19. R550 000,00 which was due and payable on or before 25 November
2025;
2.20. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
and payable on 7 December 2025;
2.21. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,5% per annum from 8 December
2025 to date of payment;
18
2.22. R150 000,00 which was due and payable on or before 15 December
2025;
2.23. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R150 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,5% per annum from 16
December 2025 to date of payment;
2.24. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
and payable on 7 January 2026;
2.25. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,5% per annum from 8 January
2026 to date of payment;
2.26. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
and payable on 7 February 2026;
2.27. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,5% per annum from 8
February 2026 to date of payment;
2.28. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
and payable on 7 March 2026;
2.29. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,25% per annum from 8 March
2026 to date of payment;
2.30. R37 000,00 in respect of maintenance pendente lite which was due
and payable on 7 April 2026; and
2.31. Interest on the aforesaid amount of R37 000,00 at the prescribed rate
of interest a tempore morae, being 10,25% per annum from 8 March
2026 to date of payment.
3. The Applicant’s attorney of record shall, within five court days of the date of
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this order, prepare a reconciliation of the total amount due to her and send it
to the Respondent’s attorney of record and/or the Respondent himself by way
of e-mail.
4. The Respondent shall have seven court days within which to make payment in
full to the Applicant of the amount due to her. Should the Respondent fail to
make payment as aforesaid, he shall be committed to imprisonment for a
period of 30 (thirty) days.
5. The payments referred to in paragraph 2 above are to be paid into the trust
account of the Applicant’s attorneys of record, namely Houghton Harper Inc,
Nedbank Trust Account, Account No. 1[ … ],
Branch: W[… ], Branch Code:
1[…] , payment reference P[… ];
6. The Respondent is committed to imprisonment for a period of 30 days ,
which committal will be suspended until the date of the granting of a decree
of divorce between the parties on condition that the Respondent complies
with:
6.1. paragraph 2 above; and
6.2. the court orders annexure:
6.2.1. “LP1” to the founding affidavit; and
6.2.2. “SP1” to the supplementary founding affidavit;
7. In the event of the Respondent failing to comply with paragraph 2 above, the
sheriff is authorised and directed to arrest the Respondent and to deliver him
to the relevant authorities to serve the aforesaid period of imprisonment;
8. The Respondent shall pay costs of the application on the attorney and client
scale as per Scale C.
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__________________
R LANGE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
For the applicant:
Adv S Georgiou
Cell: 083 777 2559
E-mail: sgeorgiou@law.co.za
Instructed by:
Houghton Harper
TEL: 011 648 1066
E-MAIL:
duncan@houghtonharper
.co.za
tshumane@houghtonharp
er.co.za
For the respondent: -
Adv FAG Swart
Cell: 082 903 7172
Email: frik@cpma.cc
Instructed by:
Jan Kriel Attorneys
TEL: 082 324 7260
067 901 5168
EMAIL: jan@jankrielattorneys.co.za
nadia@jurgensbekker.co.za