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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: A91/2025
In the matter between:
SINGH, RUSHIL Applicant
and
THE STATE Respondent
JUDGMENT
MALINDI J
Introduction
[1] This matter commenced with the applicant and his deceased sister being
charged with 2 counts of forgery, 2 counts of uttering and 1 count of fraud,
alternatively theft. The offences are alleged to have been committed during
(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
(3) REVISED: YES / NO
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DATE SIGNATURE
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January and April 2021 and in furtherance of a common purpose, with the
sentencing provisions of Section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105
of 1997 being applicable.1
[2] The applicant is therefore facing Schedule 5 offences.
[3] In August 2024 the applicant and his co -accused lodged a formal bail
application before th e Speciali zed Commercial Crime Court , held at Palm
Ridge, court which application was dismissed on the 28 August of the same
year. The proceedings were adjudicated on the strength of affidavits filed by
both the applicants and the prosecution. It was agreed between the parties that
the offences that the applicant ’s fell under Schedule 5 to the Act. Accordingly,
the applicant bore the onus at the bail hearing to satisfy the court that the
interests of justice permit his release on bail.
[4] This is a second application for bail on new facts. The applicant’s two previous
bail applications were unsuccessful before this court. Consequent upon
dismissal of the said bail applications, the applicant pursued appeal processes.
The appeal in respect of the first bail application failed in the High Court. The
appeal in respect of the second bail application, which was an application for
bail on new facts, suffered the same fate in the High Court. The applicant
instituted appeal processes in the Supreme Court of Appeal. For reasons that
are not altogether ver y clear, the application was either withdrawn or never
heard.
[5] An appeal against the dismissal of the first bail application was heard on the
19th of September 2024 and dismissed on the 25 September 2024 by Dosio J.
The applicant subsequently brought a second application based on new facts
and it suffered the same fate. On the 16th of March 2026 he appealed against
this decision, and it was dismissed by Kuny J on the 19th of March 2026.2
Bail application on new facts
1 CaseLines section 010-28, paragraph 8.
2 CaseLines section 010-26, paragraphs 1-4.
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[6] The appellant’s application is based on the grounds that Learned Magistrate
Kheswa misdirected herself by her failure to engage in all the factors set out in
section 60(4)(a) to (e) of the criminal procedure act 51 of 1977, and/or that she
paid lip service thereto.
[7] The alleged new facts are as follows:
7.1. Incomplete investigations;
7.2. The right to freedom and the right to be presumed innocent;
7.3. Personal circumstances and the minor child;
7.4. Strength of the State’s case;
7.5. That the appellant is not a flight risk;
7.6. The nature and gravity of punishment;
7.7. Lengthy trial;
7.8. That Investec is malicious and failed to conduct due diligence;
7.9. Previous legal representatives
[8] The refusal of bail by the Learned Magistrate was confirmed on appeal by Dosio
J who could not find that the Learned Magistrate was wrong in her judgment.
Kuny J held that what was argued to be new facts in a subsequent application
for bail before the Learned Magistrate was a regurgitation of the same facts
argued differently. The appellant failed therefore on appeal to this court in his
endeavour to be released on bail on this basis Kuny J held also that some
allegations of new facts were known to the ap plicant when he first applied for
bail and were admitted then. Alleged new facts should not have been known to
an accused when he or she first applied for bail.
[9] In buttressing the Learned Magistrate’s judgment, Dosio J said the following:
“the Constitution permits the denial of personal liberty in circumstances where the
interests of justice require that a person’s right to liberty be limited. Section 36 of the
Constitution relates to the limitation of the rights enshrined in the Constitution and
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allows such limitation. In the matter of S v Steyn 3, the Constitutional Court held that
section 12 of the Constitution guarantees everyone’s right to freedom and security of
the person, which includes the right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without
just cause. However, the Constitution does not create an unqualified right to personal
freedom”.4
[10] Furthermore, Kuny J stated that he would adjudicate the alleged new facts as
argued and concluded that they neither qualify the applicant for release on bail
nor are they new facts. He utilized the definition of “new facts” as meaning “the
facts discovered after the bail application”, or changed circumstances after the
unsuccessful bail application.
New facts in this Court
[11] The app licant alleges that new facts have come to light after the previous
refusals of bail, that is:
11.1. Contents of the deceased accused 1’s laptop which tend to exonerate
him.
11.2. Since the commencement of the trial:
11.2.1. A witness has conceded that the app licant was not the
perpetrator of the crimes.
11.2.2. The state is still to complete investigations as to how the applicant
was involved in engineering the crimes.
11.3. The applicant’s mother’s ill health has deteriorated.
[12] The a pplicant submits that this court can consider bail as the court of first
instance on these issues even if they do not constitute “new facts”.
3 S v Steyn 2001 (1) SACR 292 SA.
4 CaseLines section 009-109 at paragraph 53 of Dosio J’s bail appeal judgment.
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[13] Stringent bail conditions, it is submitted, including an increase in bail amounts
to ensure the appellants attendance of trial.
[14] Procedurally, the applicant ought to have gone back to the original court before
the Learned Magistrate for consideration of these newly emerged facts for her
to consider whether they impact her previous judgment. However, now that he
elected to come directly to the High Court, like Kuny J, I will entertain the
application.
[15] I must state therefor that I am bound by the judgments of Dosio J and Kuny J.
The question is therefore whether if these facts were placed before magistrate
Kheswa they would modify her views to the degree of her allowing bail she had
previously refused in its original form and after new facts were placed before
her.
[16] The “ new” facts set out in paragraph 12 above are not facts that can be
regarded as “new facts”. The truth or otherwise of the contents of the deceased
accused 1’s laptop are not new to the applicant. They are facts that have always
been in his head. They are not new by emerged facts. Mr Dean Prins’s alleged
concessions in his evidence remain subject to further investigation and other
evidence. What Mr Prins’s evidence amounts to will be decided at the end of
the trial. Lastly, his mother's ill health is not a new condition. It was anticipated
from the onset that his mother's condition would remain the same or worsened
as she is of advanced age. It is not a changed circumstance.
[17] I have come to the conclusion therefore that the judgments of Dosio J and Kuny
J are binding in as far as they upheld the Learned Magistrate’s judgments on
bail and new facts refusal of bail. For example, the new facts as presented
before me do not alter their findings that the applicant is a flight risk
[18] Therefore I make the following order:
1. The application is dismissed.
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G MALINDI, J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION
JOHANNESBURG
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant: Adv D Moodliyar
Instructed by: Moodliyar & Bedeshi Attorneys
For the Respondent: Adv FR Mhlongo
Instructed by: National Prosecuting Authority, JHB
Date of hearing: 27 January 2026
Date of order: 27 January 2026
Date of judgment: 31 March 2026