Pienaar v Engineering Council of South Africa and Others (Leave to Appeal) (2024/070316) [2026] ZAGPJHC 382 (30 March 2026)

70 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Administrative Law — Leave to appeal — Interpretation of statutory provisions — Applicant seeking leave to appeal against judgment regarding the interpretation of 'investigation' in section 20(3) of the Engineering Profession Act 46 of 2000 — Court finding compelling reasons for appeal based on important questions of statutory interpretation and the limits of public power exercised by regulatory bodies — Leave to appeal granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal.

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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

CASE NUMBER: 2024-070316



In the matter between:

RYNARD PIENAAR APPLICANT

And

ENGINEERING COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA FIRST RESPONDENT
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INVESTIGATING SECOND RESPONDENT
COMMITTEE OF THE ENGINEERING COUNCIL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL THIRD RESPONDENT
OF THE ENGINEERING COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA


(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES / NO
(3) REVISED: YES / NO

30 March 2026 __________________________
DATE SIGNATURE

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LEAVE TO APPEAL JUDGMENT

WINDELL J:
Introduction
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against the whole of the judgment and
order of this Court dated 17 February 2026.
[2] The test in section 17(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 requires the
applicant to demonstrate either that the appeal would have reasonable prospects of
success or that there exists some other compelling reason why the appeal should be
heard.
[3] The dispute between the parties turned on whether the term “investigation” in
section 20(3) of the Engineering Profession Act 46 of 2000 (“the Act”) , is confined to the
preliminary investigative phase or extends to the entire disciplinary process. That
interpretive question was central and dispositive of the outcome. The conclusion reached
did not involve any impermissible reading-in of words into the section, but rather a proper
interpretation of the provision within its textual, contextual and purposive setting.
[4] The grounds upon which the self -review was granted were, in substance, not in
issue. In light of the conclusion reached on section 20(3), it was not necessary to
determine the proper interpretation or effect of section 39(3) of the Act.

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[5] In the present matter, I am satisfied that there exists a compelling reason why the
appeal should be heard. The application raises important and discrete questions of
statutory interpretation concerning the proper meaning and scope of section 20(3) of the
Act, as well as the extent of the disciplinary jurisdiction of a statutory regulator over former
registrants. 1
[6] These issues are not confined to the facts of this case. They bear directly on the
limits of public power exercised by statutory bodies, the proper application of established
principles of statutory interpretation, and the interface between administrative law and
regulatory discipline. They are of general importance and warrant consideration by an
appellate court.
[7] In addition, the matter raises questions concerning the requirements for legality
self-review by an organ of state and the lawful sequencing of disciplinary proceedings
under the Act. These issues further underscore the need for authoritative appellate
guidance.
[8] In these circumstances, leave to appeal ought to be granted on the basis of
compelling reasons as contemplated in section 17(1)(a)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act.
The appeal is directed to the Supreme Court of Appeal, as the issues raised are of general
importance and require authoritative determination.
[9] In the result the following order is made:

1 See Body Corporate of Marine Sands v Extra Dimensions 121 (Pty) Ltd and Another 2020 (2) SA 61
(SCA) and Liberty Group Ltd v Moosa 2023 (5) SA 126 (SCA).

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1. Leave to appeal is granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
2. Costs of the application for leave to appeal are costs in the appeal.


L. WINDELL
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

Delivered: This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 30 March 2026.

APPEARANCES
For the Applicant: L Seegels-Ncube and KK Gwaza
Instructed by: Eversheds Sutherland (South Africa) Inc.
For the Respondent: B Lekokotla
Instructed by: Malatji & Co Attorneys
Date of hearing: 30 March 2026
Date of judgment: 30 March 2026

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