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[2026] ZAGPJHC 385
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Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Soc Limited and Others (181079/2025) [2026] ZAGPJHC 385 (17 March 2026)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number: 181079/2025
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED: NO
24
March 2026
In
the matter between:
FIDELITY
SECURITY SERVICES (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
TRANSNET
SOC
LIMITED
First Respondent
SINQOBILE
EQUESTRIAN SECURITY SERVICES (PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
HLANGANANI
PROTECTION SERVICES (PTY) LTD
Third Respondent
TAKE
NOTE IT (PTY)
LTD
Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT
Mdalana-Mayisela
J
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for the judicial review of an administrative
action. The applicant, Fidelity Security Services (Pty)
Ltd
("Fidelity"), seeks to review and set aside a decision by
the first respondent, Transnet SOC Ltd ("Transnet"),
to
award Tender No. HOAC-HO-55168 ("the tender") to the second
respondent, Sinqobile Equestrian Security Services (Pty)
Ltd
("Sinqobile"). The tender, valued at over R300 million, was
for the provision of network security services for Transnet's
rail
infrastructure in the central corridor for a period of 12 months.
[2]
Fidelity, an unsuccessful bidder, contends that the tender process
was fatally flawed and unlawful. It argues that Transnet
breached
mandatory procurement regulations, irrationally disqualified
Fidelity's bid, and favoured Sinqobile despite material deficiencies
in its submission.
[3]
Transnet opposes the application, arguing that the process was
lawful, rational, and procedurally fair. It maintains that Fidelity
was disqualified for failing to meet the mandatory 80% technical
functionality threshold, achieving only 66.67%.
Factual
Background
[4]
On 12 August 2025, Transnet invited bids for a critical security
contract. The closing date for submissions was a mere three
days
later, on 15 August 2025. The bid validity period, however, was set
at 180 business days, expiring on 24 April 2026.
[5]
Four bids were received. At the administrative stage, Bidder 1 (Take
Note IT) was disqualified. Fidelity, Sinqobile (Bidder
2), and
Hlanganani Protection Services (Bidder 3) proceeded to the technical
evaluation stage. This stage carried a mandatory minimum
threshold of
80%.
[6]
The technical evaluation consisted of several criteria, with the
"Transitional Plan" and "Community Engagement
Plan"
each carrying a 20% weighting. Fidelity scored 66.67% overall and was
disqualified. The evaluators' notes stated, in
essence, that
Fidelity's plan did not address the 15-day takeover plan,
recruitment, and community engagement requirements adequately.
[7]
Sinqobile scored 90% (and 100% in other clusters) and was ultimately
recommended as the preferred bidder. Fidelity was notified
of its
disqualification on 1 September 2025 and launched these review
proceedings on 3 October 2025.
The
Grounds of Review
[8]
Fidelity's case for review rests on several pillars, which can be
summarised as follows:
[8.1]
Non-compliance with Treasury Regulations
: The three-day
advertisement period for a contract of this magnitude was a flagrant
breach of Treasury Regulation 16A6.3(c), which
mandates a minimum
21-day advertising period. Transnet failed to provide any evidence
that the accounting officer had determined
the matter to be urgent,
as required by the regulation.
[8.2]
Irrational
Disqualification of Fidelity's Bid
: The evaluators failed to
apply their minds to Fidelity's comprehensive bid. Fidelity's
"Transitional Plan" and "Community
Engagement Plan"
directly addressed all the criteria upon which it was marked down,
including a demonstrable ability to deploy
within 24 hours, well
within the 15-day requirement.
[8.3]
Unequal
Treatment and Failure to Consider Relevant Material
: Transnet
failed to consider material regulatory non-compliance by Sinqobile,
specifically an outstanding late-payment interest
of over R8.4
million owed to the Private Security Sector Provident Fund, as well
as non-compliance with FSCA Conduct Standard 1.
Simultaneously, it
disqualified Fidelity on what Fidelity argues are spurious grounds.
[8.4]
Procedural
Unfairness:
The initial reasons provided for Fidelity's
disqualification were inadequate. The subsequent, unexplained
adjustment of Fidelity's
score from 66.67% to 71.67% following a
request for information only served to highlight the arbitrariness of
the original evaluation.
The
Legal Framework
[9]
It is trite that Transnet, as an organ of state, is bound by section
217 of the Constitution, which mandates that its procurement
system
must be "fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and
cost-effective." This constitutional command is given effect
by
the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA), the Treasury
Regulations issued thereunder, and the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). The decision to award a tender
constitutes administrative action and is therefore subject to review
under PAJA.
[10]
The Constitutional Court in
AllPay
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer
of the South African Social Security Agency
[1]
made it clear that the fairness of the process cannot be severed from
the outcome. Once a ground of review under PAJA is
established, the
decision must be declared unlawful. The purpose of procedural
requirements is to ensure even treatment of all
bidders and to guard
against a process skewed by wrongdoing.
[11]
Furthermore, Treasury Regulation 16A6.3(c) is not a mere guideline;
it has binding force. Compliance with it is a jurisdictional
prerequisite for a lawful tender process. The regulation provides
that bids must be advertised for a minimum of 21 days, "
except
in urgent cases when bids may be advertised for such shorter period
as the accounting officer or accounting authority may
determine.
"
The onus rests on the organ of state to demonstrate that the
requirements for such an exception have been met.
Evaluation
The
Advertisement Period
[12]
The most fundamental irregularity in this case is Transnet's failure
to comply with Treasury Regulation 16A6.3(c). The tender,
valued at
well over R300 million and requiring complex operational plans, was
advertised for only three days. This is patently
unreasonable and
falls far short of the constitutionally mandated standard of
transparency and competitiveness.
[13]
Transnet's attempt to justify this by reference to its internal
"
Procurement Manual for Activities Directed at Revenue
Generation
" must be rejected. In its answering affidavit,
Transnet argued that the procurement was conducted as a "
limited
bidders' mechanism
" in terms of clause 8.9 of this manual,
which permits a shorter response period.
[14]
This defence is unavailing for several reasons.
First
, an
internal policy manual cannot override a binding Treasury Regulation.
The regulation sets a minimum standard of 21 days; an
internal policy
cannot authorise a departure from it.
Second
, even if clause
8.9 could be invoked, Transnet failed to comply with its own
preconditions. The manual requires a "
reasonable period,
being not less than 48 hours
," and for periods shorter than
48 hours, requires prior written approval from the Chief Procurement
Officer. The record contains
no such approval, no justification for
the compressed timeline, and no evidence that the accounting officer
made a determination
of urgency as required by the Treasury
Regulation itself.
[15]
The absence of urgency is demonstrated by the tender's own terms. The
RFP stipulated a bid validity period of 180 days, ending
on 24 April
2026. This is wholly inconsistent with a genuine emergency requiring
an expedited process. If the situation were truly
urgent, one would
expect a much shorter validity period to ensure a swift handover. The
eight-month validity period reveals that
Transnet anticipated a
lengthy evaluation process, fatally undermining its belated attempt
to invoke urgency.
[16]
Transnet's supplementary answering affidavit sought to introduce a
new justification, claiming the previous service provider
was
terminated for poor performance. Even if true, the termination of a
contract does not, without more, justify a deviation from
mandatory
procurement timeframes. It points to a need for planning, not to an
emergency that would make a 21-day advertising period
impossible. The
record contains no decision demonstrating that Transnet weighed the
constitutional imperatives of fairness against
any operational
considerations before truncating the process. The three-day window
was not a response to an emergency; it was a
design feature that, on
the probabilities, served to limit competition. The process was
therefore constitutionally defective from
its inception.
The
Disqualification of Fidelity
[17]
Even if the advertisement period were not fatal (which it is), the
evaluation of Fidelity's bid was itself irrational and procedurally
unfair. The test for rationality is whether there is a rational
connection between the decision and the purpose for which the power
was conferred. The decision to disqualify Fidelity fails this test.
[18]
The evaluators marked Fidelity down for failing to address the 15-day
takeover plan. However, Fidelity's "
Business Continuity and
Transitional Plan
," attached to its supplementary founding
affidavit as "SA1," explicitly and repeatedly states that
it can deploy
within 24 hours. It sets out a detailed, hour-by-hour
"
Start-up Execution
" plan achieving full operational
readiness within 24 hours. The plan addresses recruitment,
deployment, and employee takeover.
In the face of this explicit and
detailed evidence, the evaluators' note that "
Transitional
plan did not address recruitment within 15 days"
is
demonstrably false. It indicates a clear failure to consider relevant
material, a ground of review under section 6(2)(e)(iii)
of PAJA.
[19]
Transnet's response in its answering affidavit is a bare denial,
insisting that the plan was "
materially deficient
."
It fails to point to a single aspect of Fidelity's 24-hour plan that
does not meet the 15-day requirement. This is not a
case of a court
second-guessing a technical evaluation; it is a case in which the
record shows that the evaluators ignored the
very evidence before
them.
[20]
This conclusion is reinforced by Transnet's admission that, after
Fidelity requested a roundtable meeting, it re-evaluated
the
applicant's bid, wherein the applicant's score increased from 66.67%
to 71.67%. This unexplained revision is telling. It demonstrates
that
the original scoring was neither fixed nor unimpeachable and that the
bid contained material that, upon a second (still non-transparent)
look, warranted a higher score. This further supports the inference
that the initial evaluation was not a proper application of
the mind.
[21]
Fidelity’s contention that it was entitled to an additional
20%, which would have propelled it over the 80% threshold,
is
compelling. Transnet has offered no substantive rebuttal to the
detailed evidence Fidelity provided to support this claim. The
failure to meaningfully engage with this central point is fatal to
its defence.
The
Award to Sinqobile
[22]
The process's irrationality is compounded by Transnet's treatment of
Sinqobile. The second respondent's bid included a "
Private
Security Sector Provident Fund Employer Status Confirmation Letter.
"
This letter recorded an outstanding late-payment interest amount of R
8,487,666.13 and a failure to submit contribution schedules,
warning
of a resulting non-compliant status.
[23]
This is a material fact. It goes directly to the financial
discipline, regulatory compliance, and operational sustainability
of
a bidder for a labour-intensive, multi-million-rand security
contract. Transnet was duty-bound to consider this as part of its
risk and functionality assessment. The record is silent on any such
consideration. By ignoring this red flag while rigidly applying
a
technical disqualification to Fidelity, Transnet acted in a manner
that was neither equal, nor fair, nor rational.
Conclusion
on Review
[24]
The cumulative effect of these irregularities is profound. The
process was unlawful from the outset due to the breach of Treasury
Regulation 16A6.3(c). It was rendered substantively irrational by the
failure to consider Fidelity's compliant bid and by the unequal
treatment of Sinqobile. The applicant has clearly established
multiple grounds of review under section 6(2) of PAJA. In terms of
section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, the impugned decisions must be
declared unlawful and set aside.
[25]
Having considered the voluminous papers, including the Rule 53
record, the comprehensive heads of argument, and the oral
submissions,
I conclude that the application must succeed. The tender
process was indeed tainted by several material irregularities that
render
the decision to award the tender to Sinqobile unlawful and
constitutionally invalid.
Remedy
[26]
Having found that the decision to award the tender is unlawful, this
court must now craft a just and equitable remedy in terms
of section
8 of PAJA and section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution.
[27]
Fidelity seeks two main forms of relief. Primarily, it seeks an order
setting aside the award
ab initio
and directing Sinqobile to
repay all profits earned under the unlawful contract. Alternatively,
it seeks an order remitting the
matter to Transnet for a
de novo
evaluation.
[28]
The primary remedy sought, disgorgement of profits, is severe. The
Constitutional Court in
AllPay
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer
,
SASSA
(
AllPay
II
)
[2]
, held that such an order may be just and equitable to ensure that
illegality does not pay and to deter future malfeasance. However,
the
court also cautioned that it is not an automatic consequence of
setting a contract aside. It requires a careful consideration
of all
circumstances, including the public interest, the contractor's
blameworthiness, and the disruption to public services.
[29]
In this case, the tender was for essential security services for 12
months. The contract is likely nearing completion or may
already be
completed. Ordering a disgorgement of profits at this stage would be
highly disruptive and potentially penalise Sinqobile
for Transnet's
failures. While Sinqobile's own non-compliance with provident fund
regulations is a relevant factor, there is no
evidence in the papers
that Sinqobile was complicit in Transnet's unlawful conduct. It
simply submitted a bid. The primary fault
lies with Transnet.
[30]
Fidelity’s alternative remedy, a
de novo
tender process,
is the more appropriate course. Setting the award aside and remitting
the matter for reconsideration best serves
the constitutional
imperative of a fair, transparent, and competitive process. It allows
for a fresh start, untainted by the procedural
and substantive
irregularities that plagued this procurement. It would require
Transnet to re-advertise the tender in compliance
with the 21-day
minimum period, allowing for full market participation. All bidders,
including Fidelity and Sinqobile, would then
be evaluated fairly and
equally against the published criteria.
[31]
The argument that this would be futile because the contract has
almost run its course is not a bar to granting this relief.
The
principle of legality demands that unlawful conduct be declared as
such. Furthermore, a
de novo
process would govern the
procurement of future services, ensuring that they are provided under
a lawful contract. It would vindicate
the constitutional standards
that Transnet failed to uphold.
Costs
[32]
Fidelity has been substantially successful in these proceedings. The
general rule is that costs follow the result. Furthermore,
this is a
matter of significant public importance concerning the integrity of
public procurement. In line with the principle in
Biowatch
Trust v Registrar, Genetic Resources
[3]
,
a constitutional litigant who succeeds against the state should
generally be awarded costs.
[33]
I see no reason to depart from this principle. Transnet must pay
Fidelity's costs.
ORDER
[34]
In the result, I make the following order:
1.
The applicant's non-compliance with the forms and service
requirements is condoned, and the application
is heard as one of
urgency in terms of Uniform Rule 6(12).
2.
The first respondent's decision to disqualify the applicant's bid and
to award Tender No. HOAC-HO-55168
to the second respondent is
reviewed and set aside.
3.
It is declared that the process adopted by the first respondent in
advertising and adjudicating Tender
No. HOAC-HO-55168, in
contravention of Treasury Regulation 16A6.3(c) issued under the
Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999
, was unlawful and invalid.
4.
The matter is remitted to the first respondent to conduct the tender
process for the services which were
the subject of Tender No.
HOAC-HO-55168
de novo
, in accordance with the Constitution,
the
Public Finance Management Act, and
all applicable Treasury
Regulations.
5.
The first respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application,
including the costs of senior counsel.
MMP
Mdalana-Mayisela
Judge
of the High Court Division
(Electronically
delivered by uploading on Caselines and emailing to the parties)
Date
of hearing:
9 March 2026
Date
of Judgment:
24 March 2026
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv K Tsatsawane SC
Instructed
by:
Dirk Kotze Attorneys
Counsel
for the First Respondent:
Adv K Ramolefe SC
Instructed
by:
Motsoeneng Bill Attorneys Inc
[1]
[2013]
ZACC 42
par 42.
[2]
[2014]
ZACC 12
par 32.
[3]
[2009]
ZACC 14
par 43.