IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
Case No.: CA&R 94/2025
In the matter between:
THE STATE Appellant
and
THURSHEUS EDIN FABIAN SNYDERS Respondent
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
RUSI J
[1] This appeal is brought by the State in terms of section 310A (1) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA), with leave of this Court. 1 The
State appeals against the sentence of correctional supervision and a wholly
suspended term of term of 5 years’ imprisonment which the Gqeberha Regional
Court imposed on the respondent on 06 May 20025 upon his conviction on the
offence of contravening section 10 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt
Activities Act 12 of 2004 (PRECCA).
1 Per the order of Lowe and Bloem JJ dated 24 June 2025.
[2] Section 10 of PRECCA prohibits corruption and corrupt activities
involving persons in an employment relationship and a nother person, by
providing that, any person–
‘(a) who is party to an employment relationship and who, directly or indirectly, accepts or
agrees or offers to accept from any other person any unauthorised gratification,
whether for the benefit of that person or for the benefit of another person; or
(b) who, directly or indirectly, gives or agrees or offers to give to any person who is party
to an employment relationship any unauthorised gratification, whether for the benefit
of that party or for the benefit of another person, in respect of that party doing any act
in relation to the exercise, carrying out or performance of that party’s powers, duties
or functions within the scope of that party’s employment relationship, is guilty of the
offence of receiving or offering an unauthorised gratification.’
[3] The prosecution had alleged in the proceedings before the court a quo that
during 2011 to 2014, the respondent, while in the employment of Kouga Local
Municipality (the Municipality), unlawfully and directly or indirectly accepted
unauthorized gratifications from a company controlled by one Werner Rust and
Dary Karel Rust in the sum of R48 400.00 for his own benefit. The respondent
was convicted of the above-mentioned offence on 06 March 2025 following his
plea of guilty in terms of section 112 of the CPA.
The grounds of appeal
[4] The state contends that the sentence induces a sense of shock in that it is
unreasonably lenient, and that the trial court misdirected itself in:
(i) Not adequately considering the extremely serious nature of the offence of
corruption, the interest of society, the relevant case law pertaining to
sentencing in corruption cases, and by overemphasizing the respondent’s
personal circumstances.
(ii) Failing to provide reasons for finding direct imprisonment not suitable as
a sentencing o ption and failing to provide the parties with the case law
she relied on in imposing the sentence appealed against.
The factual background
[5] The respondent is the former employee of the Municipality whose offices
are situated in Jeffreys Bay, Eastern Cap e. He was employed by the
Municipality as its Senior Administrative Officer, auxiliary services. His duties
entailed assisting the Municipality with the procurement of office equipment
such as landlines, cellular phones, copiers and fax machines, obtaining
quotations for goods and services and completing requisitions for payment of
invoices raised by suppliers of goods and services. As regards the
Municipality’s public procurement system, the respondent was also tasked with
preparing and presenting evaluati on reports for the Bid Evaluation Committee,
and the provision of secretariat services to the Bid Adjudication Committee.
[6] Where the value of the goods and services to be procured exceeded R10
000, the respondent’s task was to obtain three quotations f rom different service
providers who were registered on the Municipality’s supplier database.
[7] In so far as office equipment was concerned, the Municipality made use
of the Private Automatic Branch Exchange telephone system (PABX) and data
networks which were supplied to it by Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Gijima) in
terms of a contract that expired in 2012. Gijima installed the Municipality’s
PABX system on six towers (the high sites). Four of the six high sites were the
property of the Municipality while the other two belonged to a company called
Plan B Wireless CC (Plan B). The provision of maintenance services of the six
high sites was not part of the contract between the Municipality and Gijima.
[8] Mr Werner Rust (Rust) was Gijima’s employee who resi gned from his
employment thereat in 2011. When Rust resigned from Gijima, he went to
manage a telecommunications company called WOOA Telecom CC (WOOA)
whose sole director was his wife, Darry Karel Rust. He was WOOA’s sales
manager and his duties entailed, inter alia, the provision of quotations for
WOOA’s services. WOOA also made use of the two high sites owned by Plan B
in terms of a lease.
[9] In the course of 2011, Werner Rust formed a close relationship with the
respondent. The respondent would ensure placement of WOOA in the services
to be performed for the Municipality in exchange for gratifications. Those
gratifications took the form of bank deposits and others were paid in cash. In
February 2012, WOOA became registered with the Municipality as one o f its
service providers. Whenever the Municipality required quotations for goods and
services, the respondent abdicated his duty of obtaining those quotations to
Werner Rust. He permitted him to procure and submit quotations with higher
values from supplie rs so that WOOA’s quotations for the goods and services
would be the lowest and cheapest.
[10] In the course of 2012, the respondent gave advice to the Municipality’s
Accounting officer (the Municipal Manager), to conclude a 3-year contract with
WOOA for the maintenance of the six high sites. On 17 July 2012 the
respondent represented to the Municipal Manager that WOOA owned two of the
high sites even though in actual fact they were owned by Plan B. This
information was falsely presented in a letter which the Director of WOOA, Dary
Karel Rust, had written. It was further represented in the said letter that since
WOOA owned two of the high sites on which the Municipality’s telephone
system equipment was installed, access to those two high sites was restricte d.
On 20 July 2012, following a procurement process, the Municipality concluded
a three-year contract with WOOA for the provision of maintenance and support
services.
[11] Two tenders were advertised by the Municipality for the provision of
maintenance an d support services in respect of its wireless network
infrastructure and voice system. The one tender was Bid number 85/2012 and
the other was 58/2013. In relation to tender 85/2012, the respondent
recommended WOOA to the Bid Evaluation Committee as the su ccessful
tenderer. He made this recommendation despite the fact that WOOA’s tender
documents did not comply with the tendering specifications to the extent that
the company failed to submit a valid tax clearance certificate and the
verification of its Broa d-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B -BBEE)
status. The tender was subsequently re-advertised.
[12] When tender number 58/2013 was advertised, the respondent once again
recommended WOOA as the successful bidder. When the Municipality’s Bid
Evaluation Commi ttee made certain written queries on WOOA’s tender
documents, the respondent, with a view to affording WOOA an unfair
advantage, emailed the committee’s queries to Werner Rust and requested him
to write the requested report himself. The arrangement was tha t the respondent
would in turn submit this report to the Committee as his own. This tender was
ultimately canceled without the appointment of a service provider.
[13] As a further facet of his corrupt relationship with WOOA, the respondent,
between July 2012 and March 2014, took it upon himself to ensure that all the
invoices that WOOA submitted were paid promptly. In this connection, he
promptly completed all requisitions for payments of WOOA’s invoices which
amounted to R860 711.12. He further provided We rner and Dary Karel Rust
with updates on the status of the invoices submitted.
[14] A total of 29 gratifications amounting to R48 400.00 were paid by
WOOA to the respondent over a period between 2012 and 2014 as quid pro quo
for his assistance in ensuring the placement of the Municipality’s business with
this company as the Municipality’s service provider and to facilitate the prompt
payment of its invoices by the Municipality. Other payments could not be
quantified as they were made in cash. On 25 Februar y 2014, the Municipality
gave notice of termination of the contract it had with WOOA.
The sentencing proceedings
[15] The probation officer’s report and the correctional supervision report
were placed before the court a quo. It is not necessary to deal with their contents
in detail. A crucial point to make is that the two reports were obtained so that
the assertion that t he respondent was the primary care giver of his minor
grandson may be investigated. Ms Kiet, the probation officer who complied the
probation officer’s report was called to give evidence to clarify certain aspects
of her report. She conceded that the respo ndent is not the primary caregiver to
his grandson, a fact that the learned Regional Magistrate confirmed in the
finding she made on this issue.
[16] The respondent’s family background and his personal circumstances
were provided to Ms Kiet by the respon dent himself and his wife, as well as
certain members of the respondent’s church community. Both reports were
accepted by the prosecution and the defence as being factually correct on these
aspects.
Factors in mitigation and aggravation of sentence
[17] The respondent contented himself with submissions from the bar in
mitigation of sentence. He also relied on the information contained in the pre -
sentence reports. These were the respondent’s personal circumstances: he was
48 years old, married with two adu lt children, a male and a female. His wife
was working as a store cashier earning R3 600.00 per month. His son, who was
also employed, contributed R1 500.00 per month to the household. His daughter
had a minor child, a boy, and she looked after him since s he was not working.
After his dismissal from the Municipality, the respondent obtained employment
as a bricklayer where he earned R8 000.00 per month. With his salary he
maintained his household, including his grandchild. His grandchild was a
recipient of the child support grant. He assists his daughter in the upbringing of
her child. He enjoys good health. It also emerged that the respondent received
his pension benefit upon his dismissal by the Municipality.
[18] It was further submitted that the responde nt had deposed to an affidavit
before a police officer and had indicated his willingness to testify against his co-
accused, and that by pleading guilty he took full responsibility for his unlawful
actions. If he were to be given a custodial sentence, his f amily would suffer
financially since he is their breadwinner.
[19] In aggravation of sentence Ms De Klerk emphasized the seriousness of
the offence, its prevalence and impact on society and the economy. She
highlighted the fact that the offence was committ ed over a long period of time
and that the respondent was on one occasion brazen to the extent of actively
seeking the gratification from Werner Rust. According to Ms De Klerk , even
though the available records show only 29 payments that were made to the
respondent from WOOA’s bank account, there were gratifications which were
made in cash and could thus not be quantified. While acknowledging that the
respondent’s plea of guilty and the affidavit he made to the police served to
mitigate sentence, Ms De Klerk took the view that the respondent failed to take
the court in confidence regarding what motivated his conduct. This, so the
submission went, ought to have been done in evidence under oath.
The findings of the court a quo on sentence
[20] In imposing the sentence appealed against, the learned Regional
Magistrate considered as a mitigating factor, the fact that the appellant lost his
employment. As an aggravating factor, she considered the fact that the
respondent’s corrupt relationship with WOOA and those who controlled it
continued for more than three years. The learned Regional Magistrate reasoned
that the respondent had an opportunity to reflect on his conduct and desist from
it when the two tenders collapsed because of his unlawful actions, and that in
the case of a serious offence such as the one of which the appellant stood
convicted, there was a need in to impose a sentence which reflects the
seriousness.
Counsel’ s submissions on appeal
[21] In arguments before us, Ms De Klerk persisted with the cont ention that
the sentence imposed by the court a quo was unreasonably lenient and induces a
sense of shock when regard is had to the seriousness and prevalence of the
offence. She further highlighted the fact that since the respondent gave no
evidence in mi tigation of sentence, what motivated his criminal conduct
remains unclear. Ms De Klerk contended for a direct term of imprisonment as
the appropriate sentence.
[22] On behalf of the respondent, Mr Sojada submitted that the penalty
provision in section 26 of PRECCA suggests that the trial court had a discretion
which, in the present case, was properly exercised. Mr Sojada conceded the
factors that aggravated the offence, but he was of the view that a custodial
sentence would not be appropriate. According to Mr Sojada, the suspended
sentence that was imposed with correctional supervision was an appropriate
deterrent to the respondent who took responsibility for his actions. He further
submitted that the amount involved in the corruption was small and this serv ed
to mitigate the offence.
The legal principles
[23] A court of appeal cannot, in the absence of material misdirection,
approach the question of sentence as if it were the trial court and then substitute
the sentence arrived at by it simply because it pr efers it.2 For the appellate court
to interfere with the sentence imposed by the trial court it must be satisfied that
the trial court committed a misdirection of such a nature, degree and seriousness
that shows that it did not exercise its sentencing dis cretion at all or exercised it
improperly or unreasonably when imposing sentence. 3 This principle applies to
the terms and conditions imposed by a sentencing court on how or when the
sentence is to be served.4
[24] A ‘striking’ or ‘startling’ or ‘disturbing’ disparity between the trial court’s
sentence and that which the appellate court would have imposed will be a
ground for the appellate court to disturb the findings of the trial court on
sentence.5
Discussion
[25] Far from being a means of self-enrichment, the Country’s Public
Procurement Regulatory Framework aims to achieve constitutional and socio -
economic objectives among which is promoting participation in the economy by
individuals who were previously disadvantaged by unfair discriminat ion, small
businesses, and black -owned enterprises. This is done by ensuring that
government spending contributes to correcting structural imbalances in
ownership and access to opportunities. It is unsurprising that the procurement
process must be founded on fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness, and
cost-effectiveness.
2 S v Malgas (117/2000) [2001] ZASCA 30; [2001] 3 All SA 220 (A); 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA); 2001 (1) SACR
469 (SCA) (19 March 2001) (Malgas), para 12.
3 S v Hewitt 2017 (1) SACR 309 (SCA) at para 8.
4 Mokela v S 2012 (1) SACR 431 (SCA) para 9.
5 Hewitt, para 8; S v Sadler 2000 (1) SACR 331 (SCA) para 8.
[26] Corruption is among the ‘while -collar’ crimes which continue unabated,
plaguing the society and the country’s socio -economic fabric. It the words of
Koen JA in Moremi Treasure v The State,6 ‘corruption and fraud are destroying
the fabric of our society and must be countered by effective deterrent
punishment, obviously with due regard to appropriate mitigatory and other
factors.’7
[27] It is against this background, over and above the factors that are
traditionally considered in passing sentence, as well as the known objects of
sentence that the trial court must exercise its sentencing discretion in matters
such as the present. This entails the crime, the personal circumstance s of the
offender and the interests of society; and the retributive, preventative, deterrent,
and rehabilitative objects of sentencing .8
The sentence of correctional supervision
[28] In both pre -sentencing reports the sentence of correctional supervision
was recommended. That being so, the recommendation did not mean that that
sentence was a suitable sentence. Hence, no matter the conviction with which
the recommendation is made, it remains the duty of the court to determine
whether, in the exercise of it s sentencing discretion, correctional supervision is
the appropriate sentence having considered the factual milieu before it.
[29] The learned Regional Magistrate accurately recited the principles of the
law regarding correctional supervision and how the higher courts have dealt
with corruption when it comes to sentencing. I need not repeat the cases she
cited for they are trite. Whil e the challenge of large volumes of work that the
lower courts are seized with is acknowledged, it behooved the Regional
6 Moremi Treasure v The State (881/2024) [2025] ZASCA 137 (25 September 2025).
7 Id, para 45.
8 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A); S v RO and Another 2010(2) SACR 248 para 30.
Magistrate to carefully embark on the application of the legal principles she
cited to the facts of the present case.
[30] It bears mentioning that section 26 of PRECCA provides for the sentence
of a fine or imprisonment for a maximum period of 18 years. I hold the view
that this penal provision is indicative of the serious light in which the legislature
intended to treat the offences c reated by the relevant parts of the said Act
including the offence of which the respondent was convicted. But it in no way
fetters the court’s discretion in sentencing.
[31] The learned Regional Magistrate correctly found the seriousness of the
offence and the fact that the respondent’s corrupt relationship with WOOA and
those who controlled it continued for more than three years, to be aggravating
factors.
[32] The totality of what the learned Regional Magistrate said about
correctional supervision as a sentencing option in the present case, is
encapsulated in the following excerpt of the record:
“In terms of section 276(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, that is correctional
supervision, correctional supervision is a sentence which may be pa ssed upon a person
convicted of an offence. It is trite that save for where there is a minimum sentence as
provided for in Act 105 of 1997 the option of correctional supervision is available to a court
in respect of any offence, even the so-called serious offences.” (sic)
[33] It does not appear from the judgment on sentence that the learned
Magistrate applied herself to the important question whether, in the specific
circumstances of the case of the respondent, correctional supervision was an
appropriate s entence. Her repetition of case law on corruption and on
correctional supervision as a sentencing option is regrettably hollow if those
legal principles are misapplied or not applied at all. It must inexorably follow
that the learned Magistrate did not exercise her sentencing discretion reasonably
or at all. This is a material misdirection, and it vitiates the court a quo’s decision
on sentence.
[34] An important question that follows is whether this Court must consider
the sentence afresh or whether the p roceedings are to be remitted to the
Regional Court for a proper consideration of sentence. The fundamental
consideration in this regard is that save for the issue regarding the respondent
being the primary care giver to his grandson in respect of which a finding was
correctly made he is not, none of the remaining facts which the Magistrate had
to consider in imposing sentence were in dispute. The abundance of the
information that was placed before the court a quo in mitigation and aggravation
of sentence whose summary I have provided, is part of the record before us. For
these reasons, it is not appropriate to remit the matter to the Regional Magistrate
for sentencing afresh.
What sentence is appropriate in the present case?
[35] As Friedman J once observed in S v Banda and Others ,9 finding the
balance between the competing interests entailed in sentencing is not an easy
task. The learned Judge said:
‘The elements of the triad contain an equilibrium and a tension. A court should, when
determining sentence, strive to accomplish and arrive at a judicious counterbalance between
these elements in order to ensure that one element is not unduly accentuated at the expense of
and to the exclusion of the others. This is not merely a formula , nor a judicial incantation, the
mere stating whereof satisfies the requirements. What is necessary is that the Court shall
consider, and try to balance evenly, the nature and circumstances of the offence, the
characteristics of the offender and his circu mstances and the impact of the crime on the
community, its welfare and concern.’10
9 1991 (2) SA 352 (B).
10 Id, at 355A-C
[36] The sentiments of the courts on ‘white -collar’ crime reverberate across
the country’s higher courts’ jurisprudence. In South African Association of
Personal Injury Law yers v Heath and Others, 11 Chaskalson P said the
following:
‘Corruption and maladministration are inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental
values of our Constitution. They undermine the constitutional commitment to human dignity,
the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. They are the
antithesis of the open, accountable, democratic government required by the Constitution. If
allowed to go unchecked and unpunished they will pose a serious threat to our democra tic
State. . .’12
[37] In setting aside the non -custodial sentence that was imposed by the trial
court, Marais JA, in S v Sadler,13 said the following:
‘. . .So called “white -collar” crime has, I regret to have to say, often been visited in South
African courts with penalties which are calculated to make the game seem worth the candle.
Justifications often advanced for such inadequate penalties are the classification of “white -
collar’ crimes as non-violent crime and its perpetrators (where they are first offenders) as not
truly being “criminals” or “prison material” by reason of their often ostensibly respectable
histories and background. Empty generalisations of that kind are of no help in assessing
appropriate sentences for “white collar” crime. Their premise is that prison is only a place for
those who commit crimes of violence and that it is not a place for people from “respectable”
backgrounds even if their dishonesty has caused substantial loss, was resorted to for no other
reason than self enrichment , and entailed gross breaches of trust. . .These are heresies.
Nothing will be gained by lending credence to them. Quite the contrary. The impression that
crime of that kind is not regarded by the courts as seriously beyond the pale and will probably
11 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC).
12 Id, para 4.
11 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC).
12 Id, para 4.
13 Supra, footnote 5.
not be visited with rigorous punishment will be fostered and more will be tempted to indulge
in it.’14
[38] In Sadler, the appellant, a Senior Bank Manager, had been convicted of
13 counts, involving corruption, forgery and fraud committed against the Bank.
The trial court sentenced him to correctional supervision and to wholly
suspended sentences of a fine or imprisonment. On appeal, these sentences were
set aside and replaced with a term of 4 years’ imprisonment with the respective
counts taken as one for the purposes of sentence.
[39] As held in Moremi,15 imprisonment is only appropriate if the offender’s
blameworthiness requires the imposition of such a sentence. It was further held
in that case, that the seriousness of the crime; and whether the offender is a first
offender or not, are uppermost in the determination as to the appropriateness of
a custodial sentence, and that other factors are of secondary importance. 16 The
court emphasized, however, that, the fact that an accused is a first offender does
not mean that imprisonment may not be imposed, or that he is entitled to a
suspended sentence, or, if he is suitable for a sentence of correctional
supervision, that correctional supervision should be imposed. Each case must be
determined on its own merits and facts.17
[40] In the context of the matter before us, it must be highlighted that t he
respondent played a pivotal role in the Municipality’s Supply Chain
Management Process. He was in an advisory role, and at the coalface of the
procurement office. He was the key role player with regards to the collation of
information that would be plac ed before the Municipality’s procurement
committees. He used the power of the position he held to advance his interests
and those of the controlling individuals behind WOOA. In so doing, he
14 Id, paras 11 to 12; see also S v Phillips 2017 (1) SACR 373 (SCA), para 14; Mahlangu and Another v S (2011
(2) SACR 164 (SCA)) [2011] ZASCA 64; 497/10 (1 April 2011), para 26 (Mahlangu).
(2) SACR 164 (SCA)) [2011] ZASCA 64; 497/10 (1 April 2011), para 26 (Mahlangu).
15 Supra, footnote 6.
16 Para 33.
17 Id at para 41.
undermined the transparent and fair procurement procedure so as to give an
unfair advantage to WOOA.
[41] Disquietingly, he continuously supressed other service providers and
suppliers of goods so that WOOA from whom he received the gratifications was
not displaced as a service provider and supplier of goods to the Municipality.
His criminal conduct went beyond the realm of his corrupt relationship with
WOOA and the Rusts – it resulted in the concentration of access to business
opportunities on one business entity, and this undermined the spirit and purport
of the public procurement system.
[42] It may very well be that over and above his other personal circumstances
as outlined above, the respondent was a first offender. However, his conduct in
perpetuating the corrupt relationship between himself and Werner Rust of
WOOA was a carefully planned course which had far reaching implications for
other businesses and suppliers of services which were excluded from the
procurement process by means of his subversive conduct. On at least two
occasions, the procurement process f or tenders 85/2012 and 58/2013 collapsed
at the behest of the respondent whose intent was set on securing business for
WOOA. All of this must accordingly diminish the mitigating effect of his being
a first offender.
[43] I am acutely alive to the fact tha t no two cases will be the same and that
consistency in sentencing remains subservient to discretion. That discretion,
however, is not exercised in abstract – the facts of each case are at the heart of
the proper exercise of the court’s discretion. It bear s mentioning that in
confirming the effective sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment imposed by the trial
court on two police officers against their conviction on a charge of corruptly
receiving or obtaining R650.00 from another person in exchange of ‘their
withdrawal of a criminal case, the court, in Mahlangu,18 held:
‘. . .Corruption has plagued the moral fibre of our society to an extent that to some it is a way
of life. There is a very loud outcry from all corners of society against corruption which
nowadays seems fashionable. Some even go as far as stating that corruption is rendering the
state dysfunctional. It is the courts that must implement the penalties imposed by the
legislature. It is also the courts that must ensure that justice is not only done but also seen to
be done. . .’19
[44] In S v Phillips,20 the appellant, a police officer, solicited and accepted a
bribe of R900.00. Upon conviction by the trial court, he was sentenced to seven
years’ imprisonment, two years of which were suspended for five years on
specified conditions. On appeal this sentence was set aside and replaced with a
sentence of four years’ imprisonment antedated to the date of sentencing in the
trial court.
[45] The fact that some among these cases involved convictions under
different statutes dealing with corruption does not detract from the fact that the
sentences imposed in them convey judicial censure as far as corruption and
other white-collar crimes are concerned.
[46] I am not unmindful of the loss that the respondent has suffered in the
form of loss of his employment and reputation. It is not being insensitive,
however, to state that all of this was self -inflicted especially since the
respondent gave no evidence in which he explained his conduct in earnest. He
contended himself with submissions made on his behalf from the bar to which
we have given consideration in this appeal.
18 Supra, para 10.
19 Id, para 26.
20 Supra footnote 10.
[47] A miscarriage of justice would ensue if, in every case where the accused
is a first offender who pleaded guilty and who has a family, and the like, would
be spared from a custodial sentence. On the facts of the present case, there was
no comprehensible basis for the court a quo to avoid a custodial sentence. The
seriousness of the offence, the moral blameworthiness of the respondent and the
interests of society demanded such a sentence.
[48] With that said, the loss that the respondent suffered cannot be ignored in
the determination of the length of such custodial sentence. Similarly, whatever
period of the correctional supervision the resp ondent may have already served
when the Director of Public Prosecution sought and was granted leave to appeal
against the sentence in June 2025, must also be considered.
[49] It is perhaps beneficial to re -state the warning that was sounded in S v
Sonday & another21 when Thring J said that ‘a sentence which is shockingly or
strikingly or disturbingly too light is as much a miscarriage of justice as one
which is shockingly or strikingly or disturbingly too heavy’. For all the fore
going reasons, the appeal must succeed.
Order
[48] In the result, I would make the following order:
1. The appeal succeeds.
2. The sentence imposed by the Regional Magistrate, Gqeberha, is set aside
and substituted for the sentence set out below:
‘2.1 The accused is sentenced to undergo four years’ imprisonment.’
3. The respondent is ordered to present himself to the South African Police
Service Jeffreys Bay, Eastern Cape, within seven (7) calendar days from
the date of this order, for the Station Commander or other officer in
21 S v Sonday & another 1994 (2) SACR 810 (C) at 820d-e.
charge thereat, to ensure that he is immediately delivered to the St.
Albans Correctional Centre, Gqeberha, to commence serving the sentence
imposed in paragraph 2.
____________________
L. RUSI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
MTSHABE AJ:
I agree.
__________________
NR MTSHABE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
(ACTING)
Appearances:
Counsel for the appellant : U L De Klerk
Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions, Makhanda
Counsel for the respondent : VM Sojada
Legal Aid South Africa
Makhanda Justice Centre
Date heard: 15 October 2025
Date delivered: 10 March 2026