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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Not reportable
Case no: 6619/2024
In the matter between
ABSA BANK LIMITED APPLICANT
And
KING PRICE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED FIRST RESPONDENT
FREDERICK CHRISTIAAN JOUBERT SECOND RESPONDENT
[Identity number: 7[…]
Date of birth:19 October 1971
Married out of community of property,
with application of the accrual system,
To Jacoba Anneta Joubert
Identity number: 7[...]
Date of birth: 20 August 1970]
In re:
KING PRICE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED APPLICANT
And
FREDERICK CHRISTIAAN JOUBERT RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Absa Bank Ltd v King Price Insurance Company Ltd and Another In
Re King Price Insurance Company Ltd v Joubert (6619/2024) [2025] ZAFSHC 230 (7
2
April 2026)
Coram: NAIDOO J
Heard: 24 July 2025
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-
down is deemed to be 14h00 on 7 April 2026.
Summary: Law of i nsolvency – application to intervene as creditor in application
for sequestration brought by first respondent against second respondent – applicant
is a creditor o f second respondent who has failed to pay the amount due and
payable to the applicant – creditor may intervene at any stage – must make out a
case for sequestration and provide security – requirements satisfied – leave to
intervene and order for provisional sequestration granted.
ORDER
1. Leave is granted to the applicant to intervene, as a creditor, in the main
sequestration proceedings issued under case number 6619/2024;
2 The estate of the second respondent, Frederick Christiaan Joubert, be placed
under provisional sequestration in the hands of the Master of the Free State High Court,
Bloemfontein, at the instance of the applicant;
3 A rule nisi is hereby issued, calling upon the second respondent and any other
interested party to show cause, if any, on 7 May 2026, why a final order of sequestration
should not be granted and the costs of this application should not be costs in the
sequestration of the second respondent;
4 This order, together with a copy of the Notice of Motion and annexures thereto
must be served on the second respondent;
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5 A copy of the order must further be served on:
5.1 any registered trade union that, as far as the sheriff can reasonably
ascertain, from the employees of the second respondent by enquiring from them
whether they are represented by a trade union and whether there is a notice
board on the premises to which the employees have access.
5.2 the second respondent’s employees, if any, by affixing a copy of the order
and the application to any notice board, to which the employees have access,
inside the second respondent’s premises, or if there is no access to the premises
by the employees, by affixing a copy to the front gate, where applicable, failing
which, to the front door of the premises from which the second respondent
conducts any business; and
5.3 The South African Revenue Service.
6 The costs of this application shall be costs in the sequestration of the second
respondent.
JUDGMENT
Naidoo J
[1] The applicant , A bsa Bank Limited (Absa) seeks, inter alia , leave to intervene
(the intervention application) as a creditor in the main application, under case number
6619/24, and also seeks an order for the provisional sequestration of the second
respondent, Frederick Christiaan Joubert (Mr Joubert or the second respondent). Mr
Joubert opposed this application, and although it seems that the papers in this
application were served on the first respondent, King Price Insurance Company Limited
(King Price) at the offices of its attorneys, the first respondent did oppose or participate
in th e present application. Mr Joubert filed an application for condonation for the late
filing of his answering affidavit , which Absa did not oppose, although it set out reasons
why Mr Joubert did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court for
condonation to be granted. The court considered Absa’s submissions but decided that
the interests of justice dictate that the answering affidavit should be permitted.
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Condonation for such late filing, is granted to the extent that it may be necessary.
[2] The main application was launched by King Price on 20 November 2024 and
was set down for hearing on 6 February 2025. In that application, King Price sought the
provisional sequestration of Mr Joubert. On 6 February 2025, the matter was postponed
to the unopposed motion court roll of 8 May 2025. Thi s application (the intervention
application) was launched o n 11 April 2025 and was set down for hearing on 8 May
2025. Mr Joubert indicated that on 8 May 2025, the main application was removed from
the roll, as a payment agreement had been concluded between him and King Price, in
terms whereof Mr Joubert would repay his debt to King Price in instalments On th e
same date it seems that the intervention application may have been enrolled for hearing
on 5 June 2025, an on the latter date it was pos tponed for hearing on 24 July 2025,
when this court heard this matter. Absa alleges that Mr Joubert’s indebtedness to it
arises from two events, namely , its granting to him a term loan, for which his
indebtedness stands at R17 073 089.26 and a mortgage loan granted to the Jacobus
Petrus Joubert Testamentary Trust (The Trust) , where the Trust failed to honour the
agreed repayments in terms of the mortgage loan agreement. Mr Joubert signed deeds
of suretyship, in terms of which he bound himself as surety for the debts of the Trust.
His indebtedness to Absa in respect of the Trust’s mortgage loan amounts to
R3 602 062.17. Mr Joubert’s total indebtedness to Absa amounts to R20 675 151.43.
Absa alleges that Mr Joubert failed to honour the terms of repayment contained in both
the term loan agreement and the deeds of suretyship, in spite of demand being made
upon him for payment. It, therefore, is entitled to seek the sequestration of Mr Joubert.
[3] Mr Joubert provided security to Absa in the form , inter alia, of cessions of any
[3] Mr Joubert provided security to Absa in the form , inter alia, of cessions of any
claim that he may have against the Trust, as contained in the three deeds of suretyship
which Mr Joubert signed. In addition, he registered various continuing covering
mortgage bonds over various immovable properties registered in Mr Joubert’s name.
Some of these mortgage bonds included cessions in favour of Absa of all rentals and
other income generated and received in respect of the relevant mortgaged property. Mr
Joubert ceded to Absa, two life insurance policies over his life, he concluded a general
cession in favour of Absa, in terms of which he ceded certain rights that he held, in
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terms of a schedule attached to the agreement. In addition, the Trust and Mr Joubert
registered a general notarial bond over certain of the Trust’s and Mr Joubert’s personal
movable assets, including but not limited to livestock on various farms . They had
defaulted in payment in terms of the acknowledgment of debt they had signed, which
was contained in the general notarial bond, despite demand for such payment by Absa.
Following this, Absa sought the perfection of the general notarial bond, as it was entitled
to in the event of the breach of the general notarial bond. The bond was perfected when
some of Mr Joubert’s movable assets , pointed out by Mr Joubert , were attached and
valued. Similarly, Mr Joubert’s immovable properties over which mortgage bonds in
favour of Absa were registered, were also valued.
[4] Mr Joubert’s movable assets yielded a value of R 3 996 400.00 and his
immovable properties were valued at R8 498 900.00. Absa therefore alleges that the
total fair market value of Mr Joubert’s assets amounts R12 495 300.00. Absa further
alleges that Mr Joubert , in his financial sta tements for the year ending February 2023,
reflected the value of his assets to be R29 304 149.00. Absa, therefore, concludes that
Mr Joubert either dissipated assets to the value of approximately R17 million, to the
prejudice of his creditors , or he did not provide a true and accurate reflection of his
financial position in the 2023 financial statements. The other possibility postulated by
Absa is that the value of Mr Joubert’s assets have, due to industry factors, been greatly
reduced. The nett result is that, in respect of Mr Joubert’s indebtedness to Absa alone,
he is factually insolvent in an amount of approximately R8 179 851.43.
[5] Absa alleges further that Mr Joubert committed several a cts of insolvency,
which strengthens its application for intervention in the main application and for the
which strengthens its application for intervention in the main application and for the
order of provisional sequestration that it seeks . I name just a few . After King Price
obtained judgment against Mr Joubert, it issued a writ of execution against him and
attempted to execute same, but Mr Joubert failed to satisfy the debt or to point out
disposable property sufficient to satisfy the debt , obliging the sheriff to render a nulla
bona return. This constitutes an act of insolvency in terms of s 8(b) of the Insolvency Act
24 of 1936 (the Act), which Absa is entitled to rely on. Absa points out a concern that Mr
Joubert’s advice to the sheriff was untrue, because it had perfected its general notarial
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bond and, in that process, Mr J oubert himself pointed out assets, which he owned, to
the value of R3 996 400.00. Another act of insolvency cited by Absa is that Mr Joubert
signed a written acknowledgement of debt , unconditionally acknowledging his
indebtedness to Absa, thus confirming that he was unable to pay the debt which was
due, owing and payable to Absa, and required a postponement to make payment in
instalments. This constituted an act of insolvency in terms of s 8(g). A further act of
insolvency alleged by Absa is the arrangement made by Mr Joubert to repay his
indebtedness to King Price in instalments of R140 000.00 per month, commencing on or
before 6 February 2025. This was clearly after the main app lication was launched by
King Price. The first payment was made on 4 F ebruary 2025, into the trust account of
King Price’s attorney. The payment arrangement with King Price constituted an act of
insolvency in terms of s 8(c) of the Act.
[6] With regard to the order it seeks , permitting it to intervene in the main
application, Absa argues that Mr Joubert is undisputedly indebted to it in an amount in
excess of R20 million . Being a sizeable creditor, it has a direct and substantial legal
interest in the outcome of these (sequestration) proceedings and is, by operation of law ,
entitled to an order granting it leave to intervene. It has a legally recognized interest in
the main sequestration proceedings , and its application is not frivolous because it has
made out a proper case for the relief it seeks . Its intervention in these proceedings is
convenient and necessary. Absa has, in addition, argued that it provided the court with
greater insight into Mr Joubert’s financial position, on the information available to it.
Absa also a lleges that it has no knowledge of whether King Price intends to prosecute
the main application, but it appears improbable if Mr Joubert honours the payment
the main application, but it appears improbable if Mr Joubert honours the payment
undertakings he has made to King Price, utilizing Absa’s secu rity. However, in view of
King Price’s failure to obtain the provisional order on 6 February 2025 and the
postponement of the matter on that date, ostensibly to monitor payment s by Mr Joubert,
justifies the inference that King Price is using the main sequestration proceedings as a
sword over Mr Joubert’s head to obtain payment of its debt.
[7] Mr Joubert, in answer, raised a number of technical defences, which I will deal
tabulate briefly. There were six such defences raised, where Mr Joubert alleges that:
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a) Absa’s application to intervene in the main application cannot succeed, as
the matter with King Price was resolved. Therefore, there is no application in
which Absa can intervene.
b) Absa makes mention of the Trust in various paragr aphs of the founding
affidavit, thus acknowledging t hat the Trust is material to the disputes in this
matter, and it has a material interest in this litigation. He is also entitled to rely on
any defences that may be raised by the Trust , but Absa has failed to join the
Trust as a party. Mr Joubert is ‘extremely’ prejudiced by the absence of the Trust.
The application is therefore, fatally defective and must fail.
c) He has lodged a complaint with the ‘National Credit Council’ against Absa
and the investigation of the complaint is pending. Mr Joubert attached email
correspondence from what appears to be the National Credit Regulator, and I
assume this is the entity he refers to as the ‘National Credit Council’ . I will deal
further with this correspondence in due course. Mr Joubert alleges that due to the
pending investigation, Absa’s application cannot proceed and must be dismissed
or stayed.
d) The parties had agreed that the debt owed to Absa would be suspended
and not payable, as the acknowledgement of debt stands to be rectified. He
proceeded to give extensive details and history regarding events and
occurrences which influenced the conclusion of the acknowledgement of debt .
His assertion i s that the acknowledgement stands to be rectified, in which case,
the debt would not be due, as the arrangements foreshadowed in the rectification
would ‘balance’ his financial position.
e) The valuations done by JP Hugo in January 2025 were incorrect and/or
unreliable as they do not reflect a fair increase in land value. Mr Joubert relied
instead on a valuation done by Myburgh Property Valuers in 2023, alleg ing that
the latter’s valuation was more reliable.
f) His financial statements for the year ending 28 February 2023, attached to
f) His financial statements for the year ending 28 February 2023, attached to
the founding papers , do not support Absa’s case, as it shows that his assets
exceeded his liabilities . Further , that Absa did not include the financial s of the
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Trust. Absa cannot claim the relief it seeks as the absence of the Trust’s
financials means that there cannot be a proper evaluation of the indebtedness
claimed by Absa.
[9] With regard to (e) above, I mention that Mr JP Hugo is a professional property
valuer and was appointed by Absa to undertake the valuation of Mr Joubert’s
immovable properties and other assets, Myburgh Property Valuers were engaged by Mr
Joubert. With regard to the rest of the answering affidavit, it is clear that Mr Joubert
does not seriously dispute that he is indebted to Absa for at least R8 million. I do not
intend to traverse the very long and detailed exposition that Mr Joubert renders in order
to support his case that while h e and the Trust did their part in terms of the agreements
between the parties, it was in fact Absa ’s conduct which placed him in the situation in
which he was, regarding payment of the debt owed to Absa. He, however denies that
the amount is due and payable, as it would only fall due at a later stage, as agreed
between the parties, flowing from which agreement, the acknowledgement of debt
stands to be rectified. Once the rectification takes place, there will be no grounds for
Absa to seek his sequestration . Needless to say, Absa not only denies the allegations
by Mr Joubert , but dealt in detail with the various points in limine to show why such
points lack merit and should be dismissed. I will mention Absa’s responses , to the
extent necessary, in the course of my evaluation of the evidence.
[10] The issues for this court to decide are whether:
a) the main application is still ‘live’ or whether it has been finally disposed of;
b) Absa has locus standi to intervene; and
c) Absa has met all the requirements for the grant of a provisional
sequestration order.
[11] As earlier indicated, t he main application was removed from the court roll on 8
May 2025, after an agreement was reached between King Price and Mr Joubert that the
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latter would repay the amounts due to King Price in instalments. Mr Joubert argued for
the dismissal of the intervention application on the basis that the main application has
been resolved and therefore there is no application in which Absa can intervene. The
relevant provisions of Uniform Rule 41 read thus:
‘(1)(a) A person instituting any proceedings may at any time before the matter has been
set down and thereafter by consent of the parties or leave of the court withdraw such
proceedings….
(4) Unless such proceedings have been withdrawn, any party to a settlement which has
been reduced to writing and signed by the parties or their legal representatives but which
has not been carried out, may apply for judgment in terms thereof on at least five days’
notice to all interested parties.’
[12] When a matter is postponed, removed from the roll or struck from the roll, the
effect is that the matter is not currently active or requires adjudication by the court. The
consequence of this is that the matter may be re- enrolled by either of the parties for
hearing before a court. Put differently, the matter has not been disposed of , such
disposal being achieved either by the withdrawal of the application or action, or upon
the court making a final order in the matter. The main application was neither withdrawn
nor finally pronounced upon by the court . It is not disputed that King P rice confirmed, in
writing, to Absa’s legal representative that it has not withdrawn the main application . In
my view that main application remains in force, albeit currently dormant. I am inclined to
agree with the submission on behalf of Absa that, in removing the matter from the roll,
King Price is holding the proverbial sword over Mr Joubert’s head to ensure he makes
payment in terms of the agreement between them . Inherent in that situation is the fact
that King Price has the right to re- enrol the main application for hearing or for judgment
that King Price has the right to re- enrol the main application for hearing or for judgment
in its favour, in the event of a breach of the agreement by Mr Joubert. This much is clear
from Rule 12(4) , fortifying the view that removal from the roll does not dispose of the
matter. The point raised in limine by Mr Joubert that the main application has been
resolved (which I interpret to mean finalized), therefore, lacks merit and must fail.
[13] In considering Absa’s right to intervene, I note that Mr Joubert has not taken
issue with Absa’s locus standi to intervene in the main application. Rule 12, which deal s
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with the intervention of persons as plaintiffs or defendants (which applies equally to
applications), provides that:
‘Any person entitled to join as a plaintiff or liable to be joined as a defendant in any
action may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of the proceedings apply for leave to
intervene as a plaintiff or a defendant. The court may upon such application make such
order, including any order as to costs, and give such directions as to further procedure in
the action as to it may seem meet.’
As I indicated earlier, ther e is no dispute that Absa is a creditor of Mr Joubert in
an amount in excess of R100.00 (as required by the Act) , which amount Absa
alleges is R20 675 151.43 exclusive of interest , and that such amount remains
unpaid. Although Mr Joubert disputes the amount or that it is currently due and
payable, this does not detract from the fact that the amount owed runs into
millions of Rands , on his own evidence. The position in our law regarding
intervention was clarified by the Constitut ional Court in SA Riding for the
Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims Commissioner:1
‘[10] If the applicant shows that it has some right which is affected by the order issued,
permission to intervene must be granted. For it is a basic principle of our law that no order
should be granted against a party without affording such party a predecision hearing. This is
so fundamental that an order is generally taken to be binding only on parties to the litigation.
[11] Once the applicant for intervention shows a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of
the case, the court ought to grant leave to intervene. In Greyvenouw CC this principle was formulated
in these terms:
“In addition, when, as in this matter, the applicants base their claim to intervene on a direct
and substantial interest in the subject matter of the dispute, the Court has no discretion: it must
allow them to intervene because it should not proceed in the absence of parties having such
allow them to intervene because it should not proceed in the absence of parties having such
legally recognised interests.”’
1 SA Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims Commissioner [2017] ZACC 4; 2017(5) SA 1
(CC). See also DE van Loggerenberg Erasmus, Superior Court Practice, RS 28, 2025 D1 Rule 12-2 and 12-3.
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[14] With regard to the intervention of third parties in insolvency matters, there is in our law
a well- established and unique practice, which differs from conventional intervention. The
learned author Erasmus sets the position out as follows:
‘(a) a creditor can intervene at any stage
(i) to have a provisional sequestration order set aside, or
(ii) where the applicant does not proceed with the case, or drags his feet, to obtain a fresh
sequestration order in his own right and name.
(b) Where the applicant does not proceed the existing sequestration order cannot be
confirmed at the instance of any intervening creditor as applicant, who then becomes dominus
litis and the original applicant drops out altogether’
(c) The intervening creditor must make out a case for sequestration and furnish security as
though he had originally been the applicant.’
2
There can be no doubt , based on what I have set out above and the legal position in
respect of intervention in insolvency matters, that Absa has the right to intervene in the
main applicat ion, and I am satisfied that the application for intervention should be
allowed.
[15] I turn now to consider if Absa has made out a case for sequestration. In order to obtain
an order for the provisional sequestration of Mr Joubert, Absa is required to establish, prima
facie, that:
a) it has a liquidated claim of not less than R100 against the debtor;
b) the debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent; and
c) There is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors if the
debtor’s estate is sequestrated.
I have already mentioned that ther e is no dispute that Absa is a creditor of Mr
Joubert who has a liquidated claim of not less than R100.00. Mr Joubert,
according to Absa, committed six acts of insolvency . I have mentioned some of
those earlier (in para 6), and note that Mr Joubert has not meaningfully grappled
those earlier (in para 6), and note that Mr Joubert has not meaningfully grappled
with these acts of insolvency set out by Absa, save to say, for instance, that Absa
cannot rely on the sheriff’s nulla bona return rendered to King Price, when it
issued a writ of execution against Mr Joubert. He did not elaborate on why he
2 At Rule 12-2 to 12-3
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says that Absa could not rely on that return . It should be borne in mind that Absa
seeks to intervene as a creditor in the main application, which is based on such
an act of insolvency on Mr Joubert’s part , which King Price listed as one of the
grounds for requesting a provisional order of sequestration.
[16] Absa’s contention that Mr Joubert is factually insolvent, even if his indebtedness
to Absa alone is considered, is not misplaced, nor is its contention that it has proved
that Mr Joubert’s liabilities, which were fairly estimated, exceeded his assets , which
were fairly valued. Mr Joubert disputes the valuations placed on his immovable
properties by JP Hugo, which valuations were undertaken in January 2025 , and relies
instead on the higher valuations done in 2023 by Myburgh Property V aluers. Mr JP
Hugo filed a confirmatory affidavit, in whi ch his valuations and consequent report, were
confirmed. Myburgh Property Valuers did not f ile such an affidavit . In addition, it is
apparent that Myburgh’s valuation included property belonging to the Trust, which is not
permissible as only Mr Joubert’s assets are relevant in these insolvency proceedings. I
am therefore more inclined to accept Mr H ugo’s valuations as being more accurate and
reliable, considering that Myburgh’s valuations were done in 2023, such valuations are
unconfirmed, and thus amount to hearsay evidence. Save to say that hearsay evidence
is inadmissible and has no probative value, I do not deem it necessary to embark on an
exposition of the legal position in respect of the admission of hearsay evidence. That
said, I accept Absa’s assertion that Mr Joubert’s fairly estimated liabilities exceed his
fairly valued assets. Further, the signing of the acknowledgement of debt by Mr Joubert
is an act of insolvency in terms of s8(e) of the Act, in that it constituted, either expressly
or impliedly, an acknowledgement that he was unable to pay, in full, the debt owed to
Absa.
or impliedly, an acknowledgement that he was unable to pay, in full, the debt owed to
Absa.
[17] With regard to whether there is an advantage to creditors in granting a
sequestration order, it has been reiterated in a number of cases that the test at the
provisional stage is whether the court is of the opinion that prima facie, there is reason
to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors , not necessarily that an advant age
will accrue.
3 The facts placed before the court must satisfy it that there is a rea sonable
3 Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd v Burger and Another, In Re Industrial Development
Corporation of South Africa Ltd v Burger and Another [2014] ZAWCHC 23.
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prospect, which is not too remote, that some pecuniary benefit will result to creditors.4 In
the present application, given the various acts of insolvency committed by and not fully
dealt with or expl ained by Mr Joubert, there is reason to believe that upon granting of
the provisional sequestration order sought by Absa, a trustee would be appointed, who
would be eminently placed in a position to investigate various transactions and dealings
to ascertain if there have been void or voidable transactions or dissipation of assets to
the detriment of Absa and other creditors of Mr Joubert. The trustee would be able to
claim repayment of funds dissipated and/ or recover y of assets so alienated. The
trustee, acting in accordance with his statutory powers may well be able to discover
additional assets of the insolvent estate.
[18] Absa has intimated that the arrangement to pay King Price may well be a
transaction that should be set aside and funds distributed fairly to all creditors. This can
only be achieved by the trustee who is authorized by the Act to do so. The trustee’ s
investigations may also uncover why in February 2023, the value of Mr Joubert’s assets
in his financial statements for that year were reflected as R17 million more than the
value placed on those properties by Mr Hugo in 2025. If indeed Mr Joubert is not
insolvent, as he claims he is, then the provisional order can be uplifted. In the interim,
the interests of creditors, pending the investigations of the trustee, must be protected. I
note that the statutory requirement s for the furnishing of security and service of the
application, have been complied with.
[19] For the sake of completeness, I will mention the rest of the points in limine
raised by Mr Joubert. As is apparent, I have already dealt with the point that the main
application has been resolved a s well as that relating to the valuation of Mr Joubert’s
immovable properties and assets. In my view, the remaining points in limine appear to
immovable properties and assets. In my view, the remaining points in limine appear to
have been raised merely to create disputes on the papers, do not have merit and
cannot be sustained. With regard to t he non-joinder of the Trust , the mere mention of
the Trust by Absa in several paragraphs of its founding affi davit, does not clothe the
Trust with a dir ect and substantial interest in these proceedings to justify its joinder
herein. Simply making a bald statement that Mr Joubert will be ‘extremely’ prejudiced by
4 Stratford and Others v Investec Bank Limited and Others [2014] ZACC 38; 2015 (3) SA 1 (CC), where the
Constitutional Court cited with approval Friedman Meskin & Co v Friedman 1948 (2) SA 555 (W) at 559.
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such non-joinder, does not avail him , without an explanation of what prejudice he will
suffer. The point about the complaint against Absa being lodged with the National Credit
Regulator is a red herring. No evidence whatsoever has been provided of the complaint
actually having been lodged. This point requires no further attention from this Court.
When a creditor has alleged that the debtor is factually or actually insolvent and puts up
evidence in support thereof , the debtor bears an evidentiary burden to disprove that
allegation. In this case, Mr Joubert has done nothing to give details or proof of his
financial standing since 2023. Absa attached Mr Joubert’s 2023 financial statements
because that is all the information they had. He impermissibly relies on those
statements to say that his assets exceeded his liabilities . He also does not explain why
the failure to include the financials of the Trust has a bearing on an application for his
provisional sequestrat ion. Simply making a further bald statement that , without the
financial statements of the Trust, a proper assessment of his indebtedness to Absa was
not done, does not avail him.
[20] In the circumstances, I make the following orders:
1 Leave is granted to the applicant to intervene, as a creditor, in the main
sequestration proceedings issued under case number 6619/2024;
2 The estate of the second respondent , Frederick Christiaan Joubert, be
placed under provisional sequestration in the hands of the Master of the Free
State High Court, Bloemfontein, at the instance of the applicant;
3 A rule nisi is hereby issued, calling upon the second respondent and any
other interested party to show cause, if any, on 7 May 2026, why a final order of
sequestration should not be granted and the costs of this application should not
be costs in the sequestration of the second respondent;
4 This order, together with a copy of the Notice of Motion and annexures
thereto must be served on the second respondent;
thereto must be served on the second respondent;
5 A copy of the order must further be served on:
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5.1 any registered trade union that, as far as the sheriff can reasonably
ascertain, represents the employees of the second respondent . The
Sheriff is directed to ascertain from the employees of the second
respondent whether they are represented by a trade union and whether
there is a notice board on the premises to which the employees have
access.
5.2 the second respondent’s employees, if any, by affixing a copy of
the order and the application to any notice board, to which the employees
have access , inside the second respondent’s premises , or if there is no
access to the premises by the employee s, by affixing a copy to the front
gate, where applicable, failing which, to the front door of the premises
from which the second respondent conducts any business; and
5.3 The South African Revenue Service.
6 The costs of this application shall be paid by the estate of the second
respondent.
S NAIDOO
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For the Applicant: Adv S Tsangarakis
Instructed by: Symington De Kok Attorneys
169B Nelson Mandela Avenue
Westdene
Bloemfontein
(Ref: D Möller/FMJ0079/MG)
For the First Respondent: No appearance
Attorneys: Weavind & Weavind Inc
c/o MM Hattingh Attorneys Inc
1A Goodale Street
16
Waverley
Bloemfontein
For the Second Respondent: Adv DH Wijnbeek
Instructed by: Andreas Peens Attorneys
Van Wyk Prokureurs Inc
Ground Floor, Linde Building
7 Collins Road
Arboretum
Bloemfontein
(Ref: DVW/TBC)