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[2026] ZAGPPHC 298
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Trakman N.O v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (58927/21) [2026] ZAGPPHC 298 (25 March 2026)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 58927/21
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
(3)
REVISED:
YES
DATE
25 March 2026
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
SELWYN TRAKMAN N.O.
(
Nomine Officio
in his capacity as duly appointed receiver
for the creditors in terms of the Scheme of Arrangement sanctioned
by the court
in respect of SILVER LAKE TRADING 447 (PTY)
LIMITED)
PLAINTIFF
and
COMMISSIONER
FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE
DEFENDANT
ORDER
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicant is ordered to pay the costs
of the respondent, including costs of two counsel on scale C.
JUDGMENT
TOLMAY,
J
:
Introduction
[1]
The
plaintiff in this matter is Mr Trakman, who acts as the receiver for
creditors of Silver Lake Trading 447 (Pty) Limited (Silver
Lake). The
defendant is the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service
(SARS). The dispute centres on claims for diesel
refunds made by
Silver Lake. The parties have agreed that the principal issue to be
determined, by way of a stated case,
is whether the
registration of a diesel user, for the purpose of obtaining diesel
refunds as provided in the schedules to the Customs
and Excise Act
[1]
(CEA), entitles a registrant to claim refunds for a period of two
years preceding the date of registration.
Factual Background
[2]
Silver Lake was engaged in coal mining at
the Thutsi Mine Uitgevallen, Open Pit, operating under a mining right
granted by the Department
of Mineral Resources. In May 2016, Silver
Lake entered into a mining agreement with Stefanutti Stocks Mining
Services (SSMS) for
the provision of mining services. Silver Lake
faced financial challenges between April and September 2018, which
led to the commencement
of business rescue proceedings in April 2018.
A written post-commencement funding agreement was concluded between
Silver Lake and
SSMS on 14 November 2018. Mining operations by both
SSMS and Silver Lake ceased in November 2018, and Silver Lake was
placed under
provisional liquidation on 19 December 2018.
[3]
On 21 December 2018, Silver Lake registered
for a diesel refund in terms of section 75 of the CEA and rebate item
670.04 of Part
3 to Schedule 6 (rebate item 670.04), read with the
relevant provisions of Part 3 to Schedule 6 (Note 6) of the CEA.
Silver Lake
submitted claims totalling R29,751,201.63 for the period
January 2017 to October 2018, this amount was subsequently reduced to
R23,216,589.42.
[4]
SARS rejected Silver Lake's refund claims,
asserting that the company was not entitled to refunds for periods
before its registration
as a diesel refund user. SARS argued that
Silver Lake failed to comply with the provisions of Note 6 of the
CEA. Silver Lake
appealed SARS' decision
and sought an order to set aside and substitute SARS' determination,
maintaining that the diesel refunds
qualified under rebate item
670.04.
[5]
SARS rejected Silver Lake's administrative
appeal on 28 May 2021, determining that Silver Lake did not qualify
for the diesel refunds
claimed for January 2017 to October 2018. SARS
maintained that Silver Lake was not eligible to claim refunds for
periods prior
to its registration as a diesel refund user on 21
December 2018, and that the diesel claimed was non-eligible due to
non-compliance
with Note 6 of the CEA.
[6]
Silver
Lake then appealed to the High Court in terms of s47(9)(e) of the CEA
to set aside and substitute SARS' determination, seeking
an order
that its diesel refunds qualify under rebate item 670.04.
Simultaneously, Silver Lake filed a review under Section 6(2)(e),
Section 6(2)(e)(ii), (iii) and (iv), and Section 6(2) (f) (aa) to
(dd) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA)
[2]
and s172 of the Constitution, challenging the internal administrative
appeal committee's decision to dismiss its appeal. The case
was
referred to trial due to material disputes of fact, with both parties
submitting the necessary pleadings. The parties ultimately
agreed
that the issue before this Court be determined by way of a stated
case.
Silver Lake’s
argument
[7]
Silver
Lake contends that the CEA permits retrospective applications for
diesel rebates within two years of the purchase date, provided
the
claimant is registered for VAT in terms of the Value Added Tax Act
[3]
(the VAT Act) and diesel refund purposes at the time of
submitting the claim. They argue that the CEA does not require
registration
at the time of purchase or use of the fuel. Silver Lake
maintains that Section 75(4A) (b)(ii)
[4]
of the CEA allows diesel rebate claims to be submitted within two
years from the date of fuel purchase, and that their claims fall
within this period. They assert that the plain grammatical meaning of
the statute supports their position and that SARS' interpretation,
which imposes a registration requirement at the time of purchase or
use, improperly reads additional words into the statute, which
is
impermissible in taxation law.
[8]
Furthermore, Silver Lake highlights that
the diesel refund system was established to provide relief to primary
sectors such as farming,
forestry, fishing, and mining, thereby
enhancing their profitability and competitiveness. Their
interpretation, they argue, aligns
with both the legislative
intention and SARS' previous Diesel/Biodiesel Refund Guide. This
guideline stipulated in par 7:
“
If
a person registered for VAT becomes aware that he/she is entitled to
register for the diesel/biodiesel refund system as well,
may with
retrospective effect for two (2) years from the diesel/biodiesel
registration, claim back such diesel on condition that
he/she
complies with the conditions as set out in Note 6 to Rebate Item
670.04 of (Schedule No. 6 to the Act (i.e. diesel used
in primary
production. records, tax invoices, etc.) (Section 75(4A) (b)(ii) of
the Act stipulates that any refund claim of such
levies must be
submitted within 2 years from the date of purchase of the diesel
biodiesel.)”
[9]
Silver
Lake maintained that the later withdrawal of SARS' Diesel/Biodiesel
Refund Guide did not impact their claims, since their
interpretation
is based on the CEA itself instead of depending only on the
guideline. They noted that the guideline had explicitly
allowed for
retrospective claims within two years from the date of registration,
provided all conditions in Note 6 to Rebate Item
670.04 were met.
Silver Lake argued, citing
Commissioner,
South African Revenue Service v Formalito (Pty) Ltd
[5]
,
that the guidelines are binding.
It
is important to note that, in that situation, the guidelines remained
in effect during the relevant period and were not withdrawn
as they
were in this case.
[10]
Silver
Lake also relied on the
contra
fiscum
rule which was restated by the SCA in
Telkom
SA SOC v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service.
[6]
The existence of the
contra
fiscum
rule is uncontroversial, but the SCA made it clear that the rule
should only be invoked after an interpretational analysis results
in
an irresoluble ambiguity as to the meaning of the particular
provision in the fiscal statute.
[7]
SARS’ argument
[11]
SARS maintains that registration as a
diesel refund user is only prospective; thus, refunds can only be
claimed for purchases made
after registration. SARS contends that the
two-year period specified in the CEA pertains solely to the
submission of claims, not
to eligibility for refunds before
registration. SARS further asserts that the Diesel/Biodiesel Refund
Guide cited by Silver Lake
was withdrawn in 2013.
[12]
SARS
contends that Silver Lake’s registration alone does not qualify
its distillate fuel purchases for refunds. It is asserted
that the
user must buy and use the fuel for
qualifying
activities related to their own primary production. Eligible
purchases are defined in Note 6 Part 3 of Schedule 6, paragraph
(iii), as follows: “eligible purchases means purchases of
distillate fuel by a user for use and used as fuel as contemplated
in
paragraph (b).”
[8]
[13]
SARS maintains that a
legitimate diesel refund claim is contingent upon three essential
criteria: proper registration, verified
purchase of the diesel, and
compliant usage. Silver Lake must fulfil all these requirements prior
to submitting a claim for the
diesel refund.
SARS
noted:
a)
that the requirement of registration was
absent throughout the period of use.
b)
the CEA does not provide for either the
registration date or the liability date
to be backdated for a
period of 2 years from the date of registration as a diesel refund
user.
c)
section
75(1A)(b)(ii) read with Section 59A
[9]
of
the CEA and further read with Rule 59A.01A(a)(vi) and (viB)
[10]
as
well as Rule 75.25.03 39
[11]
of
the rules promulgated in the CEA properly interpreted, provides that
a person intending to engage in the activities regulated
by the CEA
must apply to register as a user first before becoming entitled to
claim such refund.
[14]
SARS argues that s75(4A) (b)(ii) of the CEA
properly construed, provides that any return for refund of such
levies shall be submitted
within two years from the date of purchase
of such fuel and this presupposes that a user was registered as such
during the two-year
period. The two-year period mentioned above, so
the argument goes, only applies to the submission of the return, but
it does not
deal with the user’s entitlement to claim a diesel
refund in respect of diesel purchased and used before such user was
registered
as such.
[15]
SARS
pointed out that the diesel refund user is also required in terms of
Rule 75.2.07
[12]
to determine its monthly diesel refund application and this can only
happen after the claimant is registered as a user as envisaged
in the
CEA and VAT Act. It is undisputed that Silver Lake is a registered
vendor in terms of s23 of the VAT Act and was registered
for diesel
refund purposes on 21 December 2018. It is also common cause that
Silver Lake only became registered for diesel refund
purposes after
it had ceased its primary mining production activities.
Analysis
[16]
Resolving the issue
before this Court requires interpreting the CEA.
Section
75 and item 670.04 of Schedule 6 must be understood within the
framework of the CEA, applicable Schedules, Rules, and refund
policy.
[17]
The
interpretive process must follow established rules of interpretation.
In
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service v Langholm Farms (Pty) Ltd
[13]
,
relying
on
Endumeni
[14]
and
Bosch
[15]
the SCA explained that statutes must be interpreted in accordance
with the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax, considering their
context and purpose. The Court concluded by stating that this
approach is equally applicable to a taxing statute.
[18]
In
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service v Glencore Operations SA (Pty)
Ltd
[16]
the SCA considered what the Constitutional Court said in
Cool
Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another
[17]
in the context of statutory interpretation .The SCA emphasized that
the words in a statute must be given their ordinary grammatical
meaning, unless to do so would result in an absurdity. It was further
explained that three important interrelated riders should
be applied
to the above general principle, namely:
“
(a)
that statutory provisions should always be interpreted purposively;
(b) the relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised;
and (c) all statutes must be construed consistently with the
Constitution, that is, where reasonably possible, legislative
provisions
ought to be interpreted to preserve their constitutional
validity. This proviso to the general principle is closely related to
the purposive approach referred to in (a).”
[19]
What
is meant by contextual interpretation was explained in
AfriForum
and Another v University of the Free State
[18]
where the Constitutional Court said:
“
.
. . contextual interpretation requires that regard be had to the
setting of the word or provision to be interpreted with particular
reference to all the words, phrases or expressions around the word or
words sought to be interpreted. This exercise might even
require that
consideration be given to other subsections, sections or the chapter
in which the key word, provision or expression
to be interpreted is
located.”
[19]
[20]
Silver
Lake relies on section 75(4A) (b)(ii) of the CEA, but this section
must not be interpreted in isolation, a contextual and
purposive
approach is required. In
Independent
Institute of Education (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and
Others
[20]
,
the Constitutional Court outlined how to apply such an approach.
“
This
court has taken a broad approach to contextualising legislative
provisions, having regard to both the internal and external
context
in statutory interpretation. A contextual approach requires that
legislative provisions are interpreted in light of the
text of the
legislation as a whole (internal context). This court has also
recognised that context includes, amongst others, the
mischief which
the legislation aims to address, the social and historical background
of the legislation, and, most pertinently
for the purposes of this
case, other legislation (external context).”
[21]
[21]
The
context in which the CEA operates is significant, it is a taxing
statute and must be interpreted in that context. A claimant
seeking a
diesel refund must satisfy all the requirements of Section 75 and
Note 6 and must also comply with the Rules referenced
above. The
Constitutional Court in
Tholo
Energy Services CC v CSARS
[22]
confirmed that the refund of an excise duty or a fuel levy is a
privilege as was held by the SCA in
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service v Tunica Trading 59 (Pty)
Ltd
[23]
where the court explained:
“
Third,
in construing a taxing act, a court “will not presume in favour
of any special privilege of exemption from taxation”. On
the contrary, a rebate of excise duty is a privilege and strict
compliance with its conditions may be exacted from the claimant.”
As
was held by a Full Court in
BP v
Secretary for Customs and Excise
, approved
by this Court in Toyota South Africa:
“
[T]he
rebate of excise duty is a privilege enjoyed by those who receive it.
It has been stated that it is neither unjust nor inconvenient
to
exact a rigorous observance of the conditions as essential to the
acquisition of the privilege conferred and that it is probable
that
this was the intention of the Legislature . . .
Moreover, the provision is obviously
designed
to prevent abuse of the privilege and evasion of the conditions
giving rise to such privilege and again this supports the
view that a
strict compliance with the requirements laid down is necessary.”
[24]
[22]
The appropriate starting point is to
determine the intended purpose of the diesel rebate scheme in the
context of the CEA. In
Glencore
,
this was explained as follows:
“
In
order to promote international competitiveness of, amongst others,
businesses engaged in mining, the government introduced a
diesel fuel
concession for own primary production in various sectors, including
mining (this is Part 3 of
Schedule
6
)
subject to strict compliance with an administrative regime aimed at
minimising the risk of fraud whilst, at the same time, ensuring
that
the scheme was affordable from the perspective of the fiscus within
its broader fiscal objectives and framework. To be eligible
for this
concession, the enterprise concerned is required to be registered as
a vendor for value-added tax under the Value-Added
Tax Act
89
of 1991
(the
“VAT Act”). In addition, the claimant of a diesel levy
refund must comply with the requirements as determined by
the
Commissioner.”
[25]
[23]
The registration as a vendor for VAT is not
a stand-alone requirement. The fiscal objectives and framework demand
strict compliance
with the requirements set by the Commissioner which
can be gleaned from the applicable Schedules, Notes thereto and
Rules, read
with the CEA.
[24]
Section
75(1)(d)
[26]
of the CEA provides for refunds of the fuel levy and Road Accident
Fund levy on distillate fuel, including diesel, subject to compliance
with the conditions set out in item 670.04. To qualify for such
refunds, the user must be registered for diesel refund purposes
and
must have purchased and used the diesel for eligible activities, such
as primary production in agriculture, mining, or forestry.
[25]
Section 75(1A) specifies when refunds on
levies for distillate fuel may be approved. Section 75(1C) (b)
defines 'user' as:
“
For
the purposes of this section and the said item of Schedule No. 6—
a.
“
user”
shall
mean, according to the context and subject to any note in the
said
Schedule No. 6, the person registered for a diesel refund as
contemplated in subsection (1A)”
[26]
Section 75(4A)
(b)(ii) of the CEA, when correctly construed, provides that any
application for a refund of levies must be submitted
within two years
from the date of fuel purchase.
This
requirement assumes that the claimant was registered as a diesel
refund user during that two-year period. Importantly, the
two-year
timeframe relates solely to the submission of the refund return. It
does not address whether a user may claim a diesel
refund for diesel
bought and used before registration as a diesel refund user.
[27]
Note 6(a)(vii) defines a 'user' - as
referenced in section 75(1C)(b)(i) - to mean, depending on the
context and subject to any notes
to item 670.04: a person who is
registered for value-added tax under the Value-Added Tax Act, 1991
(Act No. 89 of 1991), and who
is also registered for diesel refund
purposes as contemplated in section 75(1A) and (4A), which pertain to
the eligibility criteria
for diesel refunds.
This
indicates that, beyond simply registering as a VAT vendor and
submitting your claim within two years of purchase, additional
requirements must be met to qualify for a refund.
[28]
In
Glencore
[27]
it was explained that a refund is a special concession for own
primary production activities in certain sectors.
The
Rules require users to register before participating in the diesel
refund scheme. Applications for diesel refunds must be made
monthly,
and registration for diesel refund purposes cannot be retroactively
applied, as the CEA does not contain any provision
allowing
backdating.
To
qualify for a refund of fuel levies there must be compliance with
both procedural and substantive requirements of the CEA, including
applicable Regulations and Rules. Item 670.04 inter alia require
record-keeping and reporting requirements. The refund is a privilege
within ringfenced sectors and subject to strict compliance with the
requirements. It follows that a narrow and strict interpretation
is
justified.
[28]
[29]
Silver Lake
registered for diesel refund purposes on December 21, 2018, effective
from January 1, 2017. According to section 75(1A)
(b)(ii), s59A, Rule
59A.01A(a)(vi) (viB), and Rule 75.25.03, registration is required
before claiming a diesel refund. This interpretation
relies on a
contextual reading of the statute, not an impermissible reading in as
suggested by Silver Lake.
[30]
The requirements demand of the user to
register if it intends to participate in the diesel refund scheme.
The application for diesel
refund must be determined monthly and
registration as a user for diesel refund cannot be backdated in terms
of the CEA. Silver
Lake cannot claim diesel refunds for periods
before it was registered as a user.
Even
though it was registered later, that does not change the fact that it
was not registered as a user when it bought and used
the fuel.
Section 74(4A) (b)(ii)’s
significance is merely that it requires a diesel refund to be
submitted within two years of purchase
by a user. The purpose of the
section is to regulate the period within which a diesel rebate user
can claim a diesel refund.
[31]
Silver Lake’s reliance on the
withdrawn Diesel/Biodiesel Guideline is equally unsustainable.
The
guideline was withdrawn in 2013, long before the present dispute or
any claim for a refund arose.
Granting
indefinite applicability to a guideline that no longer exists and is
now only of historical significance is not legally
justifiable.
[32]
The
contra
fiscum
rule does not apply to this case, as clarified in
Glencore
,
which made the following statement regarding the rule:
“……
.
The effect of this is that the fact that we are here dealing with a
fiscal provision matters not except to the limited extent
that there
may be ambiguity in which event the contra fiscum rule would be
triggered. In this regard, what this Court said in
NST
Ferrochrome (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue
2000 (3) SA 1040
(SCA) [also reported at
[2000] JOL 7036
(A) –
Ed] ("NST Ferrochrome") bears repeating. It was there said
(at paragraph [17]):
". . .
Where there is doubt as to the meaning of a statutory provision which
imposes a burden, it is well established
that the doubt is to be
resolved by construing the provision in a way which is more
favourable to the subject, provided of course
the provision is
reasonably capable of that construction. (See for e.g.
Fundstrust
(Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Van Deventer
1997
(1) SA 710
(A) at 735G–H;
Willis
Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another
[1991]
ZASCA 163
;
1992 (4) SA 202
(A) at 216C.) But where any uncertainty in
a statutory provision can be resolved by an examination of the
language used in its
context, there is no rule of interpretation
which requires that effect be given to a construction which is found
not to be the
correct one merely because that construction would be
less onerous on the subject . . ."
[29]
And also:
“
Most
recently, in
Telkom
SA SOC Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service
[2020] ZASCA 19
,
2020 (4) SA 480
(SCA)
[also reported at
[2020] JOL 46811
(SCA),
[2020] 2 All SA 763
(SCA) –
Ed] this Court affirmed its earlier decision in NST Ferrochrome and
reiterated that resort can be had to the contra
fiscum rule to
resolve an "irresoluble ambiguity" only if all other
conventional methods of contextual and purposive
construction still
yield two equally plausible interpretations.
Differently
put, one only invokes the rule when, despite all other ordinary
approach to interpretation, one is still left with "irresoluble
ambiguity".
[30]
Here, there is no
ambiguity if the legislation is properly interpreted and the
contra
fiscum
rule does not apply. The application stands to be
dismissed.
The following order is
made:
1.
The application is dismissed.
2.
The applicant is ordered to pay the costs
of the respondent, including costs for two counsel on scale C.
____________________________
RG TOLMAY
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
This judgment was
prepared and authored by the judge whose name is reflected and is
handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties/their legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on CaseLines.
The date for hand-down is deemed
to be 25 March 2026.
APPEARANCES:
For
the Plaintiff
:
Adv
AP Joubert SC with Adv L Franck
Instructed
by
:
Webber
Wentzel Attorneys
For
the Respondent
:
Adv P
Ellis SC with Adv L Kalipa
Instructed
by
:
Maponya
Attorneys
Matter
heard on
:
24
November 2025
Judgment
date
: 25
March 2026
[1]
91 of 1964.
[2]
3 of 2000.
[3]
89 of 1991.
[4]
Section 75(4A) (b)(ii) reads as follows:
“
Any
return for refund of such levies shall be submitted within two years
from the date of purchase of such fuel.”
[5]
Commissioner
of the South African Revenue Service v Formalito (Pty)Ltd
2005 (5) SA 526 (SCA).
[6]
Telkom
SA SOC v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service
2020(4) SA 480 (SCA).
[7]
Id at para 20.
[8]
Note 6 Part 3 of Schedule 6, para (iii).
[9]
“
59A.
Registration of persons participating in activities regulated by
this Act. —
(1) (a)
Notwithstanding any
registration
prescribed in terms of any other provision of this Act, the
Commissioner may require all persons or
any class of persons
participating in any activities regulated by this Act, to register
in terms of this section and its
rules.”
[10]
Rule
59A.01A of the Customs Rules provides that
:
(a) Persons intending
to engage in the following activities regulated by the Act must
apply for registration—
(vi) utilising rebate
items under Schedules No. 3, 4 and rebate - and refund items under
Schedule 6;
(viB) applying for
diesel refunds under the diesel refund scheme, as prescribed in rule
75.25.03
[11]
Rule
75.25.03 Registration of the diesel refund user [DAR/230]
(
b
) Every person
who intends to apply for diesel refunds under the diesel refund
scheme on or after the date on
which rules 75.25 come
into operation must apply for registration in accordance with rule
59A.01A (
b
) (i) (
aa
).
[12]
Rule
75.25.07 (
a
)
Every diesel refund user must determine its monthly diesel refund
application according to the prescriptions of Note 6 in Part
3 of
Schedule No. 6 by—
(i) limiting the diesel
refund application to the eligible purchases of that diesel refund
user which were purchased and used
in qualifying activities in the
Republic by such diesel refund user;
(ii) excluding any
non-eligible purchases of that diesel refund user from the diesel
refund application; and
(iii) verifying the
diesel refund application through the required substantiating source
documentation of that diesel refund user.
[13]
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service v Langholm Farms (Pty) Ltd
82
SATC 135
(SCA)
82 SATC 135
(SCA);
[2019] JOL 46353
(SCA);
[2019]
ZASCA 163
(SCA) at para 11.
[14]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2012] ZASCA
13
;
[2012] 2 All SA 262
(SCA);
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) [also reported at
[2012] JOL 28621] (SCA).
[15]
Commissioner,
South African Revenue Services v Bosch and another
[2014] ZASCA 171
;
2015 (2) SA 174
(SCA) para [9] [also reported at
[2015] 1 All SA 1 (SCA); 77 SATC 61 (SCA).
[16]
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service v Glencore Operations SA (Pty)
Ltd
[2021] ZASCA 111
;
[2021] 4 All SA 14
(SCA) at paras 20, 21 and
22.
[17]
Cool
Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and another
[2014] ZACC 16
;
2014 (4) SA 474
(CC);
2014 (8) BCLR 869
(CC) at para
28.
[18]
AfriForum
and Another v University of the Free State
[2017] ZACC 48; 2018 (2) SA 185 (CC); 2018 (4) BCLR 387 (CC).
[19]
Id at para 43.
[20]
Independent
Institute of Education (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and
Others
[2019]
ZACC 47.
[21]
Id at para 42.
[22]
Tholo
Energy Services CC v CSARS
CCT252/24
[2026] ZACC 1
at para 66.
[23]
Commissioner
for the South African Revenue Service v Tunica Trading 59 (Pty) Ltd
[2024] 4 All SA 1 (SCA).
[24]
Id at para 53.
[25]
Id at para 7.
[26]
The section reads as follows:
(1)
Subject to the provisions of this Act and to any conditions which
the Commissioner may impose-
(d)
in
respect of any excisable goods or fuel levy goods manufactured in
the Republic described in Schedule 6, a
rebate of the excise duty
specified in Part 2 of Schedule 1 or of the fuel levy and of the
Road Accident Fund levy specified
respectively in Part 5A and Part
5B of Schedule 1 in respect of such goods at the time of entry for
home consumption thereof,
or if duly entered for export and exported
in accordance with such entry, or a refund of the excise duty, fuel
levy or Road Accident
Fund levy actually paid at the time of entry
for home consumption shall be granted to the extent and in the
circumstances stated
in the item of Schedule 6 in which such goods
are specified, subject to compliance with the provisions of the said
item and any
refund under this paragraph may be paid to the person
who paid the duty or any person indicated in the notes to the said
Schedule
6:
Provided that any
rebate, drawback or refund of Road Accident Fund levy as
contemplated in paragraph
(b)
,
(c)
or
(d)
,
shall only be granted as expressly provided in Schedule 4, 5 or 6 in
respect of any item of such Schedule.
[27]
Id at para 7.
[28]
See
also
Umbhaba
Estates (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for South African Revenue Service
84 SATC 172
at para 65 and
Kepu
Trading (Pty) Ltd v CSARS
(3516/18) [2022] ZAGPPHC 1026 (28 December 2022).
[29]
Id at para 17.
[30]
Id at para 18.