IN THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(HELD AT JOHANNESBURG)
Reportable
CASE NUMBER: 2026-049344
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN:
POPCRU OBO WARRANT OFFICER PA ZONDI Applicant
AND
THE MINISTER OF POLICE Respondent
Heard: 24 March 2026
Delivered: 08 April 2026
Summary: Urgency – Economic hardship as a ground of urgency – exceptional
circumstances is required to depart from the general principle that economic
hardship is not a basis for arguing urgency – unreasonable delay of 6 months in
launching in bringing application and no exceptional circumstances present.
Practice and Procedure – Rule 3(1) of the Labour Court Rules – Entire dispute
arose in KwaZulu- Natal, despite prescripts of Rule 3(1) application launched in
Johannesburg – Initiating proceedings in the incorrect seat of the is a
consideration in respect of costs.
____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
____________________________________________________________________
STEENKAMP, AJ
(1) Reportable: Yes/No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised
____________ ______________
Signature Date
2
Introduction
[1] This matter came before this Court as an opposed urgent application, wherein
the Applicant sought, in addition to the customary relief pertinent to the abridged
timelines for enrollment, service, and other procedural elements inherent to
urgent proceedings, an order: (i) declaring the Respondent’s alleged withholding
of the Applicant’s salary to be unlawful and in violation of Sections 32(3)(a) -(b)
and 34(1) of the B asic Conditions of Employment Act
1 (‘BCEA’) ; (ii) directing the
Respondent to restore the Applicant’s salary; (iii) directing the Respondent to
remit all salaries purportedly unlawfully withheld from the Applicant since
September 2025, together with an order regarding costs.
[2] The Respondent took issue with the exigency with which this application has
been brought before the court, in circumstances where the alleged wrong
occurred on 09 September 2025. For the purposes of this judgment, Popcru will
be referred to as ‘the trade union’ and the employee will be referred to as the
‘Applicant’.
Background facts
[3] The Applicant is employed by the Presidential Protection Services (‘PPS’) of the
South African Police Service (‘SAPS’) and she is stationed in Durban, KwaZulu-
Natal in the Physical Protection Team (‘PTT’). The team based in KwaZulu-Natal
has two commanders at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, of which Lieutenant
Colonel Ngcobo is the second in command.
[4] There is a well -documented history of tension between the Applicant and
Lieutenant Colonel Ngcobo. The exact detail s of the skirmishes between the
Applicant and Lieutenant Colonel Ngcobo are not relevant for present purposes .
Pursuant to the reciprocal complaints and even criminal cases opened by both
Colonel Ngcobo and the Applicant, an internal investigation took place, and
Colonel Moodley was appointed to investigate the matter. Colonel Moodley
rendered a report on 15 November 2024 wherein he recommended that the
rendered a report on 15 November 2024 wherein he recommended that the
Applicant be re- deployed as an interim measure while the issue of her firearm
was being resolved. At this juncture, the Applicant already had her firearm
removed on two occasions. Once because she allegedly threatened Colonel
Ngcobo, and a second time when she threatened self -harm. In his report,
1 Act 75 of 1997, as amended
3
Colonel Moodley recorded that in respect of the latter incident, too many
instances of members harming themselves or others are occurring, and the
employer must “err on the side of caution” in this regard.
[5] On 21 January 2025, the Applicant was permanently re-deployed with immediate
effect to the Information Management Centre (‘IMC’): Presidential Protection
Services. The Applicant acknowledged receipt of the re-deployment letter on 29
January 2025. The Respondent alleges that 21 January 2025 was the last
occasion upon which the Applicant reported for duty. In this regard, the
Respondent appended a copy of the Occurrence Book dated 03 February 2025
as proof that the Applicant did not report for duty at IMC as instructed. In reply,
the Applicant provided copies of her own pocketbook and extracts from an
overtime register wherein she recorded her intermittent attendance, presumably
at PTT, and importantly, alleged attendance on 04 August 2025 – 09 September
2025 and on 18 December 2025.
[6] The Applicant alleges that her re- deployment was effected in contravention of
SSSBC Agreement 5 of 1995, specifically insofar as it was allegedly effected in
contravention of the prescribed process and considerations in the collective
agreement.
[7] Allegedly confused about what she describes as “contradictory” information
between the recommendation in the investigation report and the re- deployment
letter, the Applicant notified the trade union on an undisclosed date to raise her
concerns. Consequently, on 30 January 2025, the trade union directed
correspondence to the Head of PPS in the office of the National Commissioner,
raising concern with the Applicant’s re- deployment and further requesting a
meeting to discuss the issue.
[8] Despite being notified of her immediate and permanent re- deployment on 21
January 2025, the Applicant alleges that she continued to attend and perform her
duties at PPT in Cato Manor . Conversely, t he Respondent alleges that the
duties at PPT in Cato Manor . Conversely, t he Respondent alleges that the
Applicant ceased reporting for duty from 21 January 2025. On this score, it is
common cause that the Applicant continued to be remunerated between the time
she was re-deployed, and the time that her salary was stopped in August 2025.
4
[9] On 11 March 2025, Major General Rhoode advised the trade union that it was
important for the Applicant to comply with her re- deployment, and that the
Applicant could follow “due process” in the case of any dissatisfaction.
[10] On 28 May 2025, the Respondent charged the Applicant with misconduct in that
she allegedly failed to comply with a reasonable instruction to report at IMC (per
her re-deployment) without proper cause.
[11] The trade union ostensibly referred a dispute as contemplated in Section 24 of
the LRA to the bargaining council on behalf of the Applicant , and arbitration was
set down for 07 July 2025. Save for a notice of set down and a vague allegation
that the matter was postponed for hearing to an undisclosed date during March
2026 as a result of the Respondent’s alleged “unpreparedness”, the full detail of
the referral and process was not disclosed by the trade union.
[12] On or about 19 August 2025, Colonel Dlamini , Acting Regional Head of PPS –
KZN directed correspondence to the Section Head – Operational Support,
requesting that the Applicant’s salary be suspended as she failed to report for
duty after finalization of the disciplinary investigation on 01 August 2025.
[13] The Applicant’s salary was stopped on 30 August 2025. She became aware of
the stoppage on or about 09 September 2025 when a medical service provider
informed her that her medical aid was discontinued.
[14] On the Applicant’s own version, she ceased reporting for duty on 10 September
2025, as she allegedly lacked the financial resources to attend work.
[15] On 03 October 2025, the Applicant’s erstwhile attorneys of record issued a letter
of demand to the Respondent and advised that should her salary not be
reinstated and the unpaid remuneration be settled by 30 October 2025, legal
action would ensue.
[16] On 16 October 2025, the Respondent replied to the letter of demand and
conveyed that the Applicant ’s complaints have been thoroughly addressed
conveyed that the Applicant ’s complaints have been thoroughly addressed
through internal processes , and the re- deployment was occasioned in the
interest of the Applicant as well as the Respondent in its capacity as her
employer. Despite the Applicant’s acknowledgement of receipt of the re-
deployment instruction, she has failed to report for duty (at IMC) and disciplinary
charges have been levelled against her. It was stressed that the Respondent
5
cannot remunerate the Applicant in circumstances where she is not reporting for
duty and not rendering any services to the Respondent.
[17] Only on 11 February 2026 , a fresh letter of demand was authored by the
Applicant’s current attorneys of record, which letter of demand was served on 13
February 2026. The Respondent was placed on terms to settle the employee’s
unpaid remuneration by no later than 20 February 2026 , failing which, this court
would be approached on an urgent basis.
[18] On 18 February 2026, the Applicant filed a statement of claim for payment of
arears remuneration in the Durban seat of this Court. Full and further detail of
this referral were not disclosed.
[19] On 23 February 2026, the state attorney advised the Applicant’s attorneys of
record that the issue of unpaid remuneration is lis pendens.
[20] On 02 March 2026, the Applicant’s attorneys of record confirmed their instruction
to launch this urgent application, and that the statement of claim was withdrawn.
[21] This application was served on the Respondent’s attorneys of record on 05
March 2026.
Preliminary Issues
[22] As a point of departure, Rule 3(1) of the Labour Court Rules 2 (‘the Rules’)
stipulates the following in respect of the seat where proceedings must be
initiated:
‘Unless the Judge President directs otherwise, proceedings must be initiated at the
seat of the court nearest the place where the dispute which is the subject matter of
the proceedings arose.’
[23] It is common cause between the parties that the dispute arose in KwaZulu- Natal.
Despite this fact, the Applicant disregarded the rule and i nitiated proceedings in
the Johannesburg seat of the Labour Court , and from the bar it was advanced
that the matter was initiated at the Johannesburg seat of this Court because that
is where the Respondent is situated. Ms Ngada for the Applicant candidly and
correctly conceded that the matter ought to have been instituted in Durban. This
correctly conceded that the matter ought to have been instituted in Durban. This
2 Rules Regulating the Conduct of Proceedings of the Labour Court, GN 4475a in GG 50608 of 3 May
2024
6
error resulted in a logistical challenge in the office of the State Attorney
representing the Respondent, as different offices of the state attorney had to be
engaged in opposing this application.
[24] It is furthermore curious that the statement of case was correctly initiated in the
Durban seat of this Court, but the Applicant elected to initiate the urgent
application in the Johannesburg seat.
[25] Be that as it may, the issue is not dispositive of the matter as this seat of the
court has national jurisdiction. That being said, this is a consideration as to the
issue of costs, which will be dealt with below.
[26] Ms Ngada further conceded that in accordance with the notice of motion, reliance
on Sections 32(3)(b) and 34(1) of the BCEA is misplaced as the Respondent’s
failure to pay remuneration did not fall within the ambit of a deduction, and the
Applicant is still employed by the Respondent.
[27] Accordingly, save for a determination on whether the matter is urgent, the issue
to be determined is whether the conduct of the Respondent offends against the
prescripts of Section 32(3)(a) of the BCEA , entitling her to a declaratory order
and reinstatement of her remuneration.
Urgency
[28] In the oft quoted authority of Jiba v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development and Others3 (‘Jiba’), this Court held that:
‘Rule 8 of the rules of this Court require a party seeking urgent relief to set out the
reasons for urgency and why urgent relief is necessary. It is trite law that there are
degrees of urgency. And the degree to which the ordinary applicable rules should
be relaxed is dependent on the degree of urgency. It is equally trite that an
applicant is not entitled to rely on urgency that is self-created when seeking a
deviation from the rules.’
[29] It is trite that urgency may not be self ‑created by an applicant through a failure to
institute proceedings at the earliest reasonable opportunity. The diligence and
institute proceedings at the earliest reasonable opportunity. The diligence and
expedition with which a litigant acts upon the occurrence of the cause of action
are material considerations in determining whether a matter is indeed urgent. Any
3 (2010) 31 ILJ 112 (LC) at para 18
7
undue delay following the event giving rise to the litigation invariably undermines,
if not negates, the assertion of urgency. An applicant is therefore enjoined to
approach the court without delay; absent a satisfactory explanation for such
delay, the application is liable to be struck from the roll for want of urgency.
4
[30] In addition to the aforesaid, a n applicant who approaches the court on an urgent
basis effectively seeks an indulgence, namely to be afforded preference over
other litiga nts, in order to avert prejudice or harm that may ensue or persist
should the impugned conduct continue. It is incumbent on an Applicant seeking
urgent relief to demonstrate w hy substantial redress cannot be obtained in the
ordinary course at a hearing in due course.
[31] These two considerations are pivotal for the Court to exercise its judicial
discretion in determining whether a matter is so urgent that an immediate hearing
is justified.
[32] In Radebe and Others v Aurum Institute
5 (‘Radebe’), Prinsloo, J said the
following with regard to self-created urgency:
‘An applicant that is well aware of the harm he or she alleges to suffer, who takes
no steps over a protracted period of time, and then launches an urgent application,
is likely to have his or her application struck from the urgent roll. Thus, to the extent
that an applicant wishes its matter to be accorded urgency, in the same token it is
expected of such an applicant to have acted with the same urgency that the matter
deserves, failing which the invariable conclusion to be reached is that any urgency
claimed is self-created.’
And
‘It is not sufficient for a party when approaching a court on an urgent basis to adopt
the approach that it is of right entitled to preferential treatment failing which it would
suffer prejudice in the event that its urgent application is not granted. A party needs
to demonstrate that it had also in asserting its rights, acted diligently and with the
to demonstrate that it had also in asserting its rights, acted diligently and with the
urgency that the matter it seeks to pursue requires. The Applicants failed dismally
in this regard.
4 Baloyi & Others v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa [2021] ZALCJHB 26 (03 March 2021) at para
12. See also Radebe and Others v Aurum Institute (2024) 45 ILJ 876 (LC) ; National Union of
Metalworkers of SA v Bumatech Calcium Aluminates (2016) 37 ILJ 2862 (LC) ; National Police Services
Union and others v National Negotiating Forum and others (1999) 20 ILJ 1081 (LC) ; Association of
Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others v Northam Platinum Ltd and Another (2016) 37 ILJ 2840
(LC) at para 26.
5 (2024) 45 ILJ 876 (LC) at paras 35 and 37 - 38
8
In essence, the Applicants waited too long to bring this application and by the time
they had approached this Court for relief, it became a matter of self-created
urgency. Even if there is urgency, such urgency is self-created. This Court does
not entertain self-created urgency and for this reason alone, the application falls to
be struck from the roll.’
[33] With regard to the issue of non- payment of remuneration leading to financial
hardship as a ground for urgency, in Democratic Nursing Organization of South
Africa and Another v Director General Department of Health and Others 6
(‘Denosa’) Molahleni, J (as he then was) said the following:
‘The application further stands to fail on the ground that the applicant has failed [to]
demonstrate the existence of urgency. In Hultzer v Standard Bank of South Africa
(Pty) Ltd [1999] 8 BLLR 809 (LC), at para [13], the Court held that financial
hardship or loss of income is not regarded as a ground for urgency. The Court
arrived at this conclusion following the earlier decision in University of the Western
Cape Academic Staff & others v University of the Western Cape (1999) 20 ILJ
1300 (LC) at para [17] where the Court in that case held that:
“17 With regard to the notion of irreparable harm it needs to be mentioned that
loss of income as a result of dismissal is the inevitable consequence and as
such provides no good ground for the granting of urgent interim relief. Special
circumstances must be advanced to persuade a court to oblige … In
considering the issue of irreparable harm the court will also consider the
adequacy or not of any alternative remedy that may be available.”
The Court in Malatji v University of the North [2003] ZALC 32 (LC) and following
the decision in National Sorghjum Bierbrouery (Edms) Bpk (Rantoria Divisie) v
John NO & Ander (1990) 11 ILJ 971 (T), held that in general, financial hardship
and loss of income are not considered to be grounds for urgent relief. In order to
and loss of income are not considered to be grounds for urgent relief. In order to
succeed when reliance is based on financial hardship, exceptional circumstances
must be shown before urgent interim relief can be granted.’
[34] Financial hardship is not a passe partout to redress in the urgent court . More is
required, and the Applicant seeking redress on an urgent basis due to financial
hardship is required to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. In this regard,
6 (J2386/08) [2009] ZALCJHB 84 (5 January 2009); (2009) 30 ILJ 1845 (LC) at paras 15 - 16
9
Lagrange, J said the following in Matshidiso v Chief Executive Officer - South
African Social Security Agency and Another7 (‘Matshidiso’)
‘I agree with the proposition in Ledimo & others v Minister of Safety & Security &
others that there is no immutable rule that financial exigencies cannot be invoked
to lay a basis for urgency. This is so in that courts in any event enjoy a discretion in
the overall determination of whether a matter should be accorded urgency or not.
Inasmuch as factors surrounding financial hardship on their own are not a basis for
according a matter urgency, these have to be determined together with other facts
and circumstances pleaded in the founding papers, which point to a conclusion
that those facts and circumstances are exceptional, thus necessitating that the
matter should be treated as urgent.’
[35] On score of urgency, this Court is accordingly enjoined to consider whether the
urgency in casu was self-created, and whether the Applicant has demonstrated
exceptional circumstances in respect of financial hardship militating in favour of
treating this matter as urgent.
Analysis
[36] On the score of urgency, the Applicant asserted in her founding affidavit that the
matter is urgent as she would not obtain substantial redress in the normal course
because the s toppage of her salary is likely to persist for a considerable time,
and she is suffering financial prejudice as a result. She further claims a “lack of
certainty” about the intentions of the Respondent, i.e. whether her salary will be
reinstated or not and the prejudice is thus of a continuing nature.
[37] These allegations are in an of itself , wholly insufficient to establish urgency. In
order to sustain the argument of urgency , the Applicant needed to demonstrate
that the Court was approached at the earliest reasonable opportunity , and that
she was not dilatory in launching the application. She further needed to establish
she was not dilatory in launching the application. She further needed to establish
that her circumstances are of such an exceptional nature, that urgent relief
should be granted to her.
[38] The Applicant’s salary was stopped on 30 August 2025, and she became aware
of this fact on or about 09 September 2025. This urgent application was only
launched on 05 March 2026, just shy of 6 months after the alleged wrong
occurred. In an attempt to ameliorate the delay in launching this application, the
7 (J 1175/2022) [2022] ZALCJHB 365 (29 September 2022)
10
Applicant and the trade union essentially blames their former attorneys of record
for not executing instructions in a timely manner , which instructions the trade
union, on the Applicant’s behalf, alleges to have given on or about 23 September
2025. The first letter of demand, presumably issued in accordance with this
instruction, imposed a deadline for response and restoration of the status quo
ante on the Respondent of 30 October 2025.
[39] On 16 October 2026, a response was provided by the Respondent. The content
of the response was clear and unambiguous. Simply put, if the Applicant does
not report for duty as re-deployed, she is not entitled to remuneration
8.
[40] It is apposite to state that the Applicant never reported to I CM as instructed but
continued to report at PPS, and on her own version, she stopped reporting for
duty in toto on 10 September 2025. It is necessary to repeat that until August
2025, despite not reporting as instructed, the Applicant received remuneration,
and she even appears to have claimed overtime as recorded in the “overtime
register” attached to the replying affidavit. The stoppage of her salary due to not
reporting as instructed occurred in August 2025. No financial prejudice to the
Applicant occurred prior to August 2025, and the period that followed after her
salary was stopped is the period relevant to the urgency of the current
application.
[41] On this score, the Applicant alleges that she did not have the financial means,
post stoppage of her remuneration, to attend work. This allegation is belied by
the fact that on the documents she annexed to her replying affidavit, she
apparently attended work 18 December 2025. Furthermore, it was disclosed in
the replying affidavit that the Applicant was dependent on loans to make ends
meet after her salary was stopped.
[42] This explanation is oblivious to the obvious solution that the Applicant could
[42] This explanation is oblivious to the obvious solution that the Applicant could
similarly have obtained the necessary funds to report for work as instructed and
8See: Mpanza and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Correctional
Services and Others (JS708/14) [2017] ZALCJHB 48; (2017) 38 ILJ 1675 (LC) at para 32 wherein the
following was said:
‘As a contract of employment is a contract with reciprocal rights and obligations, the applicants
were under an obligation to work in which case the Department was under an obligation to pay
for their services. Therefore the Department was entitled to refuse to pay the applicants as they
refuses (sic) to work. In other words, the applicants were legally not entitled to refuse to carry
out their side of the employment contract. In fact, it was them who were in breach of their
employment contract by unlawfully failing to perform their obligations. As the applicants failed to
render their services to the Department, the Department became entitled, in law, to implement the
no-work, no-pay and no-benefit rule.’
11
still earn her salary. The issue for the Applicant is that she did not want to
comply with the re-deployment instruction. Had she complied with the instruction
under protest , pending the outcome of the dispute referred to the SSSBC, the
entire situation could have been avoided. Incidentally, this goes to the heart of
the allegation that she does not have a suitable alternative remedy. There is a
dispute about her re- deployment pending before the SSSBC where it will
ultimately be determined whether her re- deployment was lawful or not. There is
an unsatisfactory explanation as to why she did not, pending the outcome of the
dispute before the SSSBC at least report and perform her duties as re- deployed
under protest.
[43] Be that as it may, on the facts before court, the Applicant has not reported for
work since at least 10 September 2025 to date of hearing of this application.
Remuneration is a quid pro quo for services rendered by an employee, and the
Applicant rendered no services to the Respondent, on her own version, since 10
September 2025. Even if the Respondent’s argument that the Applicant failed to
report for duty since 21 January 2025 is rejected, the Respondent certainly
became entitled to refuse payment of rem uneration of the Applicant as of 10
September 2025 to date.
[44] The Respondent’s reply to the letter of demand ought to have been clear to the
Applicant and the union. The effect of the reply is that by 16 October 2025, there
was an impasse between the parties, and this application ought to have been
launched without delay.
[45] The gist of the explanation for the delay is that the erstwhile attorneys of record
did not act with diligence. This explanation does not pass muster. Neither the
Applicant, nor the trade union took reasonable steps which would in the final
analysis be sufficient to excuse the substantial delay in instituting the current
proceedings.
proceedings.
[46] The Applicant made wholly insufficient allegations with regard to urgency in the
founding affidavit. Instead, details of the timeline between the cessation of her
remuneration and the launching of this application were only advanced in reply.
It was incumbent upon the Applicant to set out her case fully in the founding
affidavit, and she cannot make out her case on urgency only in the replying
affidavit. In any event, even the timeline set out in the replying affidavit does not
demonstrate any degree of urgency as there are insufficient allegations to
12
reasonably explain and excuse the effluxion of time between 10 September 2025
and 05 March 2026.
[47] Even if the Applicant is given the benefit of the doubt in that the Respondent’s
final resolve to persist with the non-payment of her salary for the reasons already
detailed in this judgment only became known to her after the Respondent’s reply
to the letter of demand on 16 October 2025, in the context of an urgent
application, it is still a considerable period of time , and in those circumstances,
approximately 5 months lapsed before this application was launched.
[48] The communication between the t rade union and the Applicant’s erstwhile
attorney of record was sporadic, and no sense of urgency permeated these
interactions. T he explanation proffered by the trade union, that they gave
instructions to launch this urgent application to the erstwhile attorney of record on
or about 23 September 2025, and they only realized that this instruction was not
executed on 30 January 2026 when the attorney rendered a statement of
account which demonstrated that the matter was not finalized, leaves much to be
desired. The trade union allegedly received a legal opinion instead of a draft
application on 30 September 2025. It is averred that t he union official then
contacted the attorney telephonically and it was agreed that an urgent application
would be issued. Thereafter , a legal opinion was sought from counsel by the
former attorneys on or about 17 November 2025, despite the alleged agreement
between the attorney and the trade union to initiate urgent proceedings . The
trade union did not take appropriate action in response to the attorney’s failure to
execute their agreement and they were only spurred into action when the
statement of account was received from the former attorney of record at the end
of January 2026. The WhatsApp message annexed to the replying affidavit,
wherein the union official expressed that he was not pleased with the attorney is
wherein the union official expressed that he was not pleased with the attorney is
simply not enough to excuse their own lack of diligence . Insofar as the Applicant
is concerned, no facts of any steps she took to advance the matter were
disclosed in either the founding or the replying affidavit. In fact, both affidavits
were deposed to by a union official, and the Applicant did not even depose to any
confirmatory affidavit. This being the case, there is no evidence of any enquiries
about the status of her matter being made at any time by the Applicant.
13
[49] In Saloojee and Another NNO v Minister of Community
Development9 (‘Saloojee’) the former Appellate Division said the following:
‘If, as here, the stage is reached where it must become obvious also to layman that
there is a protracted delay, he cannot sit passively by, without so much as directing
any reminder or enquiry to his attorney and expect to be exonerated of all blame;
and if, as here, the explanation offered to this court is patently insufficient, he cannot
be heard to claim that insufficiency should be overlooked merely because he has left
the matter entirely in the hands of his attorney. If he realises upon the aptitude or
remissness of his own attorney, he should at least explain that none of it is to be
imputed to himself. That has not been done in this case.’
[50] As held in Saloojee , in the absence of any diligence demonstrated by either the
Applicant or the trade union, their inaction cannot be excused in these
proceedings by blaming the erstwhile attorney as the sole cause of the delay.
[51] The Applicant would have had to advance excellent reasons why her matter
remains urgent, some 6 months after the alleged wrong having occurred, whilst
on the version of the trade union, they always had the intention to launch this
application.
[52] Put differently, if the Applicant genuinely intended to launch this application since
the alleged stoppage of her salary, why did it take 6 months to initiate the matter?
No reasonable explanation, let alone an acceptable one has been advanced in
casu. This Court is of the view that the facts of this case are the epitome of self-
created urgency.
[53] Having considered the evidence and the submissions before the Court, the only
reasonable conclusion is that the urgency in casu was entirely self -created. In
those circumstances, the application stands to be struck off the roll.
Conclusion and Costs
[54] Having found that urgency was self -created and that the matter stands to be
[54] Having found that urgency was self -created and that the matter stands to be
struck from the roll, the merits of the interdict sought by the Applicant will be
determined in the ordinary course.
[55] This leaves the question of costs. From the very inception of this dispute, the
employee was represented by the trade union. The trade union is well-
9 1965 (2) SA 135 (A)
14
established and is no stranger to proceedings in this Court. The trade union
ought to have taken sufficient measures to ensure that the matter was
prosecuted with the necessary expedience on behalf of its member, and to
simply blame the ertswhile attorney is not an acceptable excuse for their own, as
well as the Applicant’s failure to expedite the matter . At the end of the day, the
trade union was the conduit between the employee and the attorney, and
ultimately, the buck stops with them. They ought to have realized that this case
was hopeless on the score of urgency, yet they persisted with the application
albeit with new legal representation.
[56] In Dladla v Council of Mbombela Local Municipality and Another
10 this Court
considered the issue of costs and said the following:
‘The award of costs is a matter which falls wholly within the discretion of the court.
In coming to a conclusion, the circumstances of the particular case should be
taken into consideration including but not limited to the conduct of the parties which
may have a bearing on the question of costs.’
[57] It is appropriate to refer to the dictum in Mokoena v Merafong Municipality and
Others11 wherein the following was said:
'In casu, the applicant brought a meritless application to this court and fairness
dictates that the respondents cannot be expected to endure enormous costs
defending litigation where more thought and consideration had to be put in before
approaching this court on an urgent basis. This is more so where the costs
incurred by the respondents are paid from taxpayers' money and I can see no
reason why the taxpayers should be burdened with the costs in this application ... '
[58] The trade union bound itself as a party to this litigation, and they are thus not
immune to a cost order in these proceedings 12. Given the fact that the
Respondent is an organ of state, the legal costs incurred in opposition of this
application should not fall to the public purse in circumstances where the
application should not fall to the public purse in circumstances where the
application was brought on an urgent basis by the Applicant and the trade union,
knowing full well that the expeditious resolution of labour disputes is part and
parcel of the purpose of the LRA and their case on urgency was hopeless.
10 [2008] (29) ILJ 1893 (LC)
11 (2020) 41 ILJ 234 (LC) at para 36
12 South African Airways Technical (SOC) Ltd v South African Transport And Allied Workers Union and
Another (2014) 35 ILJ 1638 (LC) at [32] – [37]
15
[59] The Court returns to the issue of instituting proceedings in the Johannesburg
seat of this Court, as opposed to the Durban seat. The Respondent lamented
the fact that the litigation was initiated in Johannesburg. Not only did the dispute
arise in Durban, but several processes are either currently running or have been
instituted in the area. The Respondent is an organ of state, and the Office of the
State Attorney (‘the state attorney’) usually acts as legal representative to organs
of state involved in litigation. Different offices of the state attorney serve different
areas.
[60] The Respondent alleged that the urgent application was served on the
respondent's offices as well as on the State Attorney, Pretoria on 5 March 2026.
The answering affidavit was required by 12 March 2026. However, the letter of
demand was emailed to the Section Head: Labour Litigation, Legal Services,
National Head Office who advised that the applicant had served a statement of
claim on the same facts, which matter was being dealt with by the Office of the
State Attorney, Kwazulu- Natal on 18 February 2026. The prejudice to the
Respondent is clear on this score. Various internal processes are applicable in
the office of the state attorney, and the failure to institute these proceedings in
the appropriate seat of this Court made a response under severe time constraints
far more difficult than it needed to be. The Respondent s complaints are not
without merit.
[61] Parties cannot ignore the rules of this Court as if they do not exist . The current
rules have been effective since July 2024, but despite this fact, parties continue
to litigate as they did under the regime of the old rules, which have been
repealed.
[62] While the previous rules did not dictate where proceedings should be initiated,
the current rules do. It is in fact such a serious condition, that it is only with leave
of the Judge President of this Court that proceedings may be instituted in a seat
of the Judge President of this Court that proceedings may be instituted in a seat
other than the one closest to where the dispute arose. The rule is further
peremptory.
[63] This matter was brought before the Court when urgency had lapsed, long prior to
the institution of the current application. In this regard, it is necessary to repeat
16
what was said in Maphalle v National Heritage Council and Others 13 by van
Niekerk, J (as he then was):
'In casu, the Applicant brought an urgent application at a time when urgency has
passed. There was no consideration of the applicable authorities on the issue of
this Court interfering in incomplete disciplinary hearings and the warnings
contained in those judgments. This application amounts to an abuse of process. To
make matters worse for the Applicant, she was legally represented and did not
approach this Court as an unrepresented layperson who did not know better.’
[64] Given the prejudice as alleged by the Respondent as well as the seriousness of
the non-compliance with the rules of this court, and the total lack of urgency, t he
interest of justice and fairness in the prevailing circumstances militates in favour
of ordering the trade union to pay the Respondent’s costs.
[65] In the premises, the following order is made:
Order
1. The application is struck from the roll due to lack of urgency;
2. POPCRU is ordered to pay the Respondent’s party and party costs ,
including the cost of Counsel where so employed, on Scale B.
_______________________
L. Steenkamp
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Ms N Ngada
Instructed by: Ngada Attorneys
13 (J1502/2021) [2021] ZALCJHB 452 (13 December 2021) at para 101
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For the First Respondents: Adv. M Rambachan-Naidoo
Instructed by: The State Attorney