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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2025-047934
In the matter between:
SA TAXI IMPACT FUND (RF) PTY LTD Applicant
And
SIPHO VILAKAZI
[Identity Number: 8[… ]] Respondent
In re:
SA TAXI IMPACT FUND (RF) PTY LTD Plaintiff
1.NOT REPORTABLE
2. NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
Date: 19 March 2026
Signature: Khaba AJ
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And
SIPHO VILAKAZI
[Identity Number: 8[… ]] Defendant
Neutral Citation : SA taxi Impact Fund (RF) Pt y Ltd v Sipho Vilakazi (047934-2025)
[2026] ZAGPJHC ------ (19 March 2026)
Coram: Khaba AJ
Heard: 12 February 2026.
Delivered: 19 March 2026 – This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation
to the parties’ representatives by email, by being uploaded to CaseLines and by release
to SAFLII. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 19 March 2026.
Summary: Application for Summary Judgment – whether the requirements contained in
Rule 32(1) and (2) of the Uniform Rules of Court have been satisfied – No facts pleaded
to support bona fide defence – Application granted.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
1. The application for summary judgment is granted.
2. The instalment sale agreement with agreement number: 125154:132643 is
hereby cancelled.
3. The respondent is ordered to return the motor vehicle, being a 2023 Toyota
Quantum/ Hiace 2.5 D -4D Sesfikile 16s with engine number: 2[ …] and chassis
number: A[…] (“the motor vehicle”) to the applicant forthwith.
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4. The applicant’s claim for payment contained in paragraph 10 of its particulars of
claim is postponed, pending the return of the motor vehicle to the applicant and
the determination of the value, the calculation of the amounts due to the
applicant and judgment of that amount, together with interest and costs.
5. The applicant shall retain all the monies paid by the respondent to the applicant.
6. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this applicat ion on the scale as
between attorney and client scale, including cost of counsel on scale C.
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
KHABA AJ:
Introduction:
[1] This is an application for summary judgment brought by the applicant (plaintiff in
the main action) against the respondent (defendant) in terms of Rule 32(1)(b)
and (c) of the Uniform Rules of Court. The applicant seeks an order cancelling
the instalment sale agreement concluded between the parties, the return of the
motor vehicle which forms the subject matter of that agreement, and the
postponement of its monetary claim pending the return and realisation of the
vehicle.
[2] The agreement incorporated standard terms and conditions, including that
ownership of the vehicle would remain with the applicant until all amounts had
been paid in full, and that in the event of breach, the applicant would be entitled
to cancel the agreement, repossess the vehicle, and claim the shortfall after
realisation of the vehicle.
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[3] Having carefully considered the papers filed of record, and the heads of
argument filed by both parties’ representatives, and the applicable legal
principles relied upon both counsels, I have come to the conclusion that
summary judgment must be granted in favour of the a pplicant. What follows are
the reasons for this conclusion.
The Factual Background:
[4] The facts giving rise to this application are largely undisputed, and where
disputes exist, they are not such as to preclude the granting of summary
judgment. They may be summarised as follows.
[5] On 24 November 2023, and at Midrand within this court's area of jurisdiction,
the parties concluded a written instalment sale agreement. The agreement is
governed by the provisions of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 ("the NCA") ,
the applicant being a registered credit provider with registration number
NCRCP8156, as evidenced by the certificate annexed to the particulars of claim
as annexure "A".
[6] In terms of the agreement, the applicant financed the respondent's acquisition
of a 2023 Toyota Quantum/Hiace 2.5 D -4D Sesfikile 16s motor vehicle, bearing
engine number 2[ …] and chassis number A […] ("the motor vehicle"). The
purchase price, after deduction of a deposit of R25,000.00, resulted in a total
deferred amount of R597,835.02, payable in 91 monthly instalments of
R16,793.11, commencing on 1 January 2024. The interest rate was variable,
linked to the prime overdraft rate, and stood at 23.75% at the time of conclusion
of the agreement.
[7] The material terms of the agreement, as recorded in the particulars of claim and
admitted by the respondent in his plea, include the following: ownership of the
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motor vehicle would remain vested in the applicant until all amounts had been
paid in full (clause 6.6); the respondent chose the address stipulated in
paragraph 3 of the particulars of claim as his domicilium citandi et executandi
(clause 6.7); and in the event of breach, the applicant would be entitled, after
due demand, to terminate the agreement, obtain possession of the vehicle,
dispose of it in accordance with the provisions of the NCA, and recover from the
respondent any shortfall remaining after such sale (clause 6.8).
[8] The applicant performed its obligations in terms of the agreement. The motor
vehicle was duly delivered to the respondent.
[9] The respondent, however, failed to honour his payment obligations. The
respondent fell into arrears, and by 26 March 2025, the arrears stood at
R193,211.69. This is evident from the statement of account annexed to the
particulars of claim as annexure "D".
[10] On 19 July 2024, the applicant dispatched a notice in terms of section 129(1)(a)
of the NCA to the respondent's chosen domicilium address by registered post. A
copy of the notice and proof of postage are annexed to the particulars of claim
as annexure "E". The SAPO track and trace report, annexed as a nnexure "F",
confirms that the notice reached the Wadeville Post Office on 12 August 2024
and that a first notification was dispatched to the respondent.
[11] The respondent failed to respond to the notice. The respondent did not
approach a debt counsellor, nor did he seek alternative dispute resolution. The
respondent remained in default for a period exceeding twenty business days,
and more than ten business days elapsed after delivery of the section 129
notice before the institution of these proceedings.
[12] On 07 April 2025, the applicant instituted action against the respondent. The
respondent delivered a plea on 17 June 2025. In his plea, he admitted the
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conclusion of the agreement and the material terms thereof. The respondent
raised, however, two primary contentions: first ly, that he was making efforts to
settle the arrears and had arranged funds for that purpose; and secondly , that
his failure to pay was occasioned by the suspension of his transportation permit,
which had since been reinstated.
[13] On 08 July 2025, the applicant launched this application for summary judgment.
The application is supported by an affidavit deposed to by Mr . Mbuso Ivan
Dube, the Legal o perations manager of the applicant, who verifies the cause of
action, confirms the respondent's breach, and avers that the respondent does
not have a bona fide defence to the claim. Annexed to the affidavit is a
resolution of the applicant's board of directors, marked "MID1" , authorising Mr .
Dube to depose to the affidavit and to institute these proceedings on the
applicant's behalf.
[14] The respondent delivered an answering affidavit on 17 June 2025
(notwithstanding that this post -dates the summary judgment application, it is
treated as his opposition thereto). In his affidavit, the respondent repeated his
earlier contentions and added that he had not received the section 129 notice.
The respondent also alleged that he had made several attempts to engage with
the applicant to arrange payment, but that the applicant had rebuffed his efforts.
[15] On 04 February 2026, the respondent filed a supplementary affidavit setting out
additional factual material of a more extensive nature. The respondent alleged
that he had purchased three vehicles financed by the applicant, that his
operating permits were only issued in April 2025, that the applicant had opened
a false fraud case against him which caused him to lose investor support, and
that he had been unable to generate income as a result. The respondent further
alleged that he had sold his late grandparents' property to raise funds, but that
alleged that he had sold his late grandparents' property to raise funds, but that
delays in the winding up of the estate had prevented the release of the funds.
The respondent claimed to be a registered debt collector, security officer, and
professional driver, and that the false fraud case threatened his ability to earn a
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living. The respondent pleaded with the court to direct the applicant to
recapitalise the arrears and allow him to resume payments.
The issues for Determination:
[16] The crisp issues for determination by this Court are:
[16.1] Whether the applicant has satisfied the requirements of Rule 32 of the
Uniform Rules of Court and has complied with the procedural
requirements under Rule 32(1) and (2);
[16.2] Whether the respondent has raised a bona fide defence that raises
triable issues for trial; and
[16.3] The appropriate order as to costs.
[17] The applicant contends that the respondent has not raised any bona fide
defence, that the defences sought to be raised are without merit, and that no
triable issues exist. The application for summary judgment ought, therefore, to
be granted as prayed in the notice of motion.
The Legal Framework:
[18] The summary judgment procedure is a valuable mechanism to prevent delay
and abuse of process by defendants who have no real defence to a claim. It is
not intended to deprive a defendant with a triable issue or a sustainable defence
of his or her day in court. The purpose of the procedure was eloquently
captured in Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint
Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA)1 the court held:
1 Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA) at para 32.
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"The rationale for summary judgment proceedings is impeccable. The procedure is not
intended to deprive a defendant with a triable issue or a sustainable defence of her/his
day in court. ... If the defendant’s defence is not bona fide or if the notice of intention to
defend has been delivered solely for the purpose of delay, the plaintiff should not be
compelled to await a trial date. To do so would, in many instances, permit a defendant
with no defence to exploit the delays inherent in litigation and, in the process, to cause
the plaintiff unjustifiable and often irrecoverable commercial prejudice."
[19] In Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) 2 at 423A-C, the
Appellate Division (as it then was) held that a defendant seeking to resist
summary judgment must:
"…disclose fully the nature and grounds of the defence and the material facts relied
upon therefor... with sufficient particularity and completeness to enable the Court to
decide whether the affidavit discloses a bona fide defence. ... If the defence is averred
in a manner which appears in all the circumstances to be needlessly bald, vague or
sketchy, that will constitute material for the Court to consider in relation to the
requirement of bona fides."
[20] In Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk 1976 (2) SA 226 (T) 3, the court
emphasised that a defendant must engage meaningfully with the plaintiff's claim
and must not plead vague generalities or conclusory allegations that are not
substantiated by solid facts. The defendant must set out facts which, if proved
at trial, would constitute a complete defence to the claim.
[21] Where the plaintiff is a corporate entity, the deponent to the summary judgment
affidavit may legitimately rely on records in the company's possession for
personal knowledge of the relevant facts. In Rees v Investec Bank Ltd [2014]
ZASCA 91; 2014 (4) SA 220 (SCA)4, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed:
ZASCA 91; 2014 (4) SA 220 (SCA)4, the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed:
2 Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at 423A-C at 423A-C.
3 Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk 1976 (2) SA 226 (T) at 228.
4 Rees v Investec Bank Ltd [2014] ZASCA 91; 2014 (4) SA 220 (SCA) at para 16.
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"As stated in Maharaj, 'undue formalism in procedural matters is always to be
eschewed' and must give way to commercial pragmatism. At the end of the day,
whether or not to grant summary judgment is a fact-based enquiry. Many summary
judgment applications are brought by financial institutions and large corporations. First-
hand knowledge of every fact cannot and should not be required of the official who
deposes to the affidavit on behalf of such financial institution."
[22] These principles guide the determination of the present application.
The Compliance with Rule 32:
[23] Rule 32(2) requires that an application for summary judgment be supported by
an affidavit made by the plaintiff or by any other person who can swear
positively to the facts verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed, and
identifying any point of law relied upon. The affidavit must also briefly explain
why the defence pleaded does not raise any genuine issue for trial.
[24] The applicant's deponent, Mr . Dube, is the Legal o perations manager of the
applicant. Mr. Dube states in his affidavit, that by virtue of his position, he has in
his possession and under his direct control all the applicant's records, accounts,
and other relevant documents pertaining to the respondent's account. He has
acquired direct knowledge of the respondent's financial position and the status
of his account. He verifies the cause of action as set out in the particulars of
claim, the facts and allegations surrounding the cause of action, the documents
relied upon, and the amount claimed.
[25] The respondent does not dispute the deponent's personal knowledge. The
respondent does not challenge the delivery of the vehicle or the conclusion of
the contract. The deponent's affidavit complies with the requirements of Rule
32(2). The applicant has, therefore, established a valid claim for summary
judgment.
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Whether the Respondent has raised a bona fide defence:
[26] The burden now shifts to the respondent to satisfy the court that he has a bona
fide defence to the claim. He must disclose the nature and grounds of his
defence and the material facts upon which it is based with sufficient particularity
and completeness.
[27] The respondent's answering affidavit and supplementary affidavit raise several
contentions. I shall deal with each in turn.
The alleged non-receipt of the section 129 notice:
[28] The respondent contends that he did not receive the notice in terms of section
129(1)(a) of the NCA. This contention must be evaluated against the undisputed
evidence placed before the court by the applicant.
[29] The applicant dispatched the notice by registered post to the respondent's
chosen domicilium address on 19 July 2024. The SAPO track and trace report,
annexed to the particulars of claim as Annexure "F", confirms that the notice
reached the Wadeville Post Office on 12 August 2024 and that a first notification
was sent to the recipient. The notice was, therefore, delivered to the relevant
post office, and the postal service issued a notification to the respondent.
[30] Section 129(5) of the NCA provides that the credit provider is considered to
have satisfied its obligation to deliver the notice if it has delivered it to the postal
service for delivery by registered mail to the consumer's address. Section
129(7) deems delivery to have occurred when the notice reaches the relevant
post office or postal agency. The legislature has prescribed that written
confirmation by the postal service of delivery to the relevant post office
constitutes proof of delivery for the purposes of section 129(5).
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[31] In Williams v Shackleton Credit Management [2023] ZAWCHC 246 5, the court
held that the law does not require that the notice in fact come to the consumer's
knowledge. What is required is that the credit provider establish that the notice
was delivered by registered post to the post office that would send a delivery
notice to the consumer. The Constitutional Court in Sebola and Another v
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another [2012] ZACC 11; 2012 (5) SA
142 (CC) and Kubyana v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd [2014] ZACC 1;
2014 (3) SA 56 (CC) established that proof of despatch together with a track
and trace report creates a rebuttable presumption of delivery.
[32] The respondent has not provided any evidence to rebut this presumption. He
merely states that he did not receive the notice. The respondent does not allege
that the notification was not left at his address, that he was away, or that the
post office failed to notify him. A bald denial, without more, is insufficient to
displace the presumption of delivery.
[33] Moreover, the section 129 notice was annexed to the combined summons,
which was served on the respondent personally. The respondent was,
therefore, informed of his rights under section 129 at the latest upon service of
the summons. He has not, to date, exercised any of those rights. He has not
approached a debt counsellor, nor has he sought alternative dispute resolution.
As the court held in Firstrand Bank v Maseng and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC
799, if non-compliance is cured between service of summons and the hearing, it
would be pointless to postpone the proceedings. This defence is without merit
and does not constitute a bona fide defence.
The suspension of the transportation permit:
[34] The respondent contends that his failure to pay was caused by the suspension
of his transportation permit, which has since been reinstated. The second
5 Williams v Shackleton Credit Management [2023] ZAWCHC 246 at para 38.
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respondent argues that he is now in a position to generate income and address
the arrears.
[35] This contention does not constitute a defence to the claim. The instalment sale
agreement imposes an unconditional obligation on the respondent to make
monthly payments. Clause 4.8 of the agreement expressly provides that
payment of the instalments is still required even if the vehicle is damaged,
defective, destroyed, or no longer of any use. The respondent's ability to
generate income from the vehicle does not affect his obligation to pay.
[36] The suspension of the permit may explain why the arrears arose, but it does not
excuse them. The law of contract does not generally excuse performance
simply because it has become more difficult or less profitable. As the Supreme
Court of Appeal held in Unibank Savings and Loans Ltd (formerly Community
Bank) v Absa Bank Ltd 2000 (4) SA 191 (SCA) 6, a debtor's financial difficulties,
even if occasioned by circumstances beyond his or her control, do not
constitute a defence to a claim for payment.
[37] Moreover, the respondent's explanation is, with respect, somewhat lacking in
credibility. The agreement was concluded in October 2023. The respondent was
required to make payments from January 2024. The statement of account
reveals that the respondent made sporadic payments during 2024, suggesting
that he was able to generate some income during that period. He did not
approach the applicant to seek a restructure of the debt or payment relief. He
simply stopped paying.
[38] Even if the suspension of the permit were accepted as a full explanation for the
default, it does not provide a defence to the claim. It may explain why the
arrears arose, but it does not entitle the respondent to resist cancellation and
repossession
6 Unibank Savings and Loans Ltd (formerly Community Bank) v Absa Bank Ltd 2000 (4) SA 191 (SCA) at para 9.3.1.
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The Allegations in the Supplementary Affidavit:
[39] The supplementary affidavit filed on 0 4 February 2026 raises new and serious
allegations. The respondent alleges that the applicant opened a false fraud
case against him, which caused him to lose investor support and damaged his
reputation within the taxi industry. The respondent further alleges that the
investigating officer verified his membership of the taxi association and that the
prosecutor withdrew the case. The respondent further alleges that he sold his
late grandparents' property to raise funds, but that delays in the winding up of
the estate have prevented the release of the funds. The respondent also claims
to be a registered debt collector, security officer, and professional driver, and
that the false fraud case threatened his ability to earn a living.
[40] These allegations, if true, are deeply concerning. They suggest conduct on the
part of the applicant that, if established, could amount to an abuse of process.
They raise serious questions about the applicant's conduct and its treatment of
the respondent. However, the critical question for present purposes is whether
these allegations constitute a defence to the applicant's claim.
[41] The claim before this court is for cancellation of the agreement and return of the
vehicle based on the respondent's breach. The respondent's allegations do not
address the breach. They do not assert that the applicant breached the
agreement. They do not assert that the agreement is invalid. They do not assert
that the respondent is not in arrears. The allegations relate to events that
occurred after the breach and, in some cases, after the institution of
proceedings.
[42] Even if the fraud case were opened without justification, that would not
extinguish the respondent's obligation to pay the instalments. Even if the
respondent lost investor support as a result, that does not excuse his failure to
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pay. Even if the respondent suffered reputational harm, that does not constitute
a defence to the claim.
[43] The respondent has not sought to amend his plea to raise these allegations as
a defence. They are raised in a supplementary affidavit filed in opposition to
summary judgment. The purpose of summary judgment proceedings is not to
determine counterclaims or allegations of improper conduct. It is to determine
whether the defendant has a defence to the claim.
[44] In District Bank Ltd v Hoosain and Others 1984 (4) SA 544 (C)7, the court held:
"A defendant faced with a claim for summary judgment must appreciate that, while the
Court is not called upon to adjudicate disputed issues of fact in order to enable it to
decide whether the defendant has a good and bona fide defence to the claim, the Court
must be appraised of the facts upon which defendant relies with such completeness as
to be able to hold that, if these statements of fact are found at the trial to be correct,
judgment should be for the defendant."
[45] The respondent's allegations, even if proved, would not result in judgment for
him. At best, they might support a claim for damages or some other remedy, but
they do not defeat the applicant's claim. They are, therefore, not a defence.
[46] I am mindful of the serious nature of the respondent's allegations. If the
applicant has indeed laid false criminal charges against the respondent, that
conduct is deserving of the strongest censure. It is conduct that this court
cannot and will not condone. However, the appropriate forum for that censure is
not this application for summary judgment. The respondent may pursue his
remedies in separate proceedings , but those matters are not before me, and
they do not constitute a defence to the applicant's claim.
7 District Bank Ltd v Hoosain and Others 1984 (4) SA 544 (C) at 547H-548A.
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Evaluation: Bona Fides and Triable Issues:
[47] Having examined each of the respondent's alleged defences, I am compelled to
conclude that none of them meets the requirements set out
in Maharaj and Breitenbach. The respondent has not disclosed a bona fide
defence. He has not raised any triable issue.
[48] The respondent's answering affidavit is, in large measure, a repetition of his
plea. It contains bald denials, vague undertakings, and conclusory allegations. It
does not engage meaningfully with the applicant's claim. It does not set out
facts which, if proved at trial, would constitute a defence.
[49] The supplementary affidavit, while raising serious allegations, does not alter this
conclusion. The allegations do not constitute a defence. They may support a
counterclaim, but they do not defeat the claim.
[50] In Tshwane City v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association 2019 (3) SA 398
(SCA)8, the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated that summary judgment may be
granted if the defendant fails to set out a defence that is both bona fide and
good in law. The respondent has failed to do so.
[51] The applicant has established a clear and unanswerable claim. The respondent
is in breach of the agreement. The arrears are substantial. The applicant has
complied with its obligations under the NCA. The respondent has no defence.
[52] The application for summary judgment must, accordingly, succeed.
Costs:
8 Tshwane City v Blair Atholl Homeowners Association 2019 (3) SA 398 (SCA) at para 32.
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[53] The applicant seeks costs on the attorney and client scale. It relies on two
grounds: first, that the respondent has raised frivolous points that lack merit,
putting the applicant to unnecessary expense; and second, that the agreement
provides for attorney and client costs in the event of litigation.
[54] Clause 11.2 of the agreement provides that all attorney's costs will be recovered
from the respondent on the attorney and client scale if the matter is defended.
Clause 6.8.5 of the particulars of claim similarly records that the agreement
entitles the applicant to recover costs on an attorney and client scale.
[55] In Nel v Waterberg Landbouers Ko- operatiewe Vereeniging 1946 AD 597 9, the
court held that attorney and client costs may be awarded where special
considerations arise from the circumstances giving rise to the action or from the
conduct of the losing party, to ensure that the successful party is not out of
pocket in respect of the expense caused by the litigation.
[56] In Re Alluvial Creek Ltd 1929 CPD 532 10, the court added that such an order
may be granted without any reflection upon the party where the proceedings are
vexatious, in the sense that they put the other side to unnecessary trouble and
expense which the other ought not to bear.
[57] The respondent has defended this action on grounds that are without merit. His
plea and answering affidavit contain bald denials and vague undertakings. He
has not, at any stage, made a genuine attempt to settle the arrears or to engage
constructively with the applicant. The supplementary affidavit, while raising
serious allegations, does not detract from the fact that the respondent is in
breach and has no defence to the claim. The applicant has been put to
unnecessary expense in pursuing this application.
9 Nel v Waterberg Landbouers Ko-operatiewe Vereeniging 1946 AD 597 at 607.
10 Re Alluvial Creek Ltd 1929 CPD 532 at 535.
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[58] In the circumstances, and in accordance with the terms of the agreement, I am
satisfied that a costs order on the attorney and client scale is appropriate.
Order:
[59] In the circumstances, the following order is made:
1. The application for summary judgment is granted.
2. The instalment agreement concluded between the applicant and the
respondent on about 24 November 2023, bearing agreement number:
125154:132643 is hereby cancelled.
3. The respondent is ordered and directed to return the motor vehicle
being a 2023 Toyota Quantum/Hiace 2.5 D-4D Sesfikile 16s with engine
number: 2[ …] and chassis number: A […] (“motor vehicle”) to the
applicant forthwith.
4. The applicant’s claim for payment contained in paragraph 10 of its
particulars of claim is posted, pending the return of the motor vehicle to
the applicant and the subsequent determination of the value, the
calculation of the amounts due to the applicant and judgment for the
amount, together with interest and costs.
5. The applicant shall retain all monies paid by the respondent to the
applicant.
6. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application on the
scale as between the attorney and client scale, including costs counsel,
such costs to be taxed on scale C.
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__________________________________
KHABA AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Appearances:
Counsel for the Applicant: Adv. T L Smith
Instructed by: MVR Attorneys Inc
Tel: 011 560 6887
Email: jacobusE@mvrinc.co.za
Counsel for the Respondent: Adv. L Matshidza
Instructed by: Munyai Attorneys
Tel: 065 146 7052/ 065 836 6454
Email: dezamncanyi@gmail.com
Date of Hearing: 12 February 2026
Date of Judgment: 19 March 2026