REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case Number: 2025-076951
1. REPORTABLE: NO
2. OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3. REVISED: NO
Date: 31 March 2026
In the matter between:
REUBEN MAKAMA FIRST APPLICANT
ABRAHAM LECHABA SECOND APPLICANT
ADAM MOGOPODI THIRD APPLICANT
and
MINISTER OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES FIRST RESPONDENT
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES SECOND RESPONDENT
This Order is made an Order of Court by the Judge whose name is reflected herein, duly
stamped by the Registrar of the Court and is submitted electronically to the Parties/ their
legal representatives by email. This order is further uploaded to the electronic file of this
matter on Case Lines by the Judge or his/her Secretary. The date of this order is deemed
to be 31 March 2026
JUDGMENT
K. STRYDOM, AJ
Introduction
1) The first, second and third Applicants are inmates of the Losperfontein Correctional
Centre. They are all serving life sentences and have each, at date hereof, been
incarcerated for more than 20 years. They were unrepresented in the current
proceedings for judicial review of a decision of the first and/or second Respondent, that
effectively amounted to a refusal to grant their release on parole.
2) Whilst they initially sought an order substituting the respective decisions, they, at the
second hearing date hereof, collectively abandoned that relief in favour of the
alternative prayer for remittal and reconsideration of their applications for parole by the
First Respondent (“the Minister”) and/or the Second Respondent (“the NCCS”).
3) When the matter was initially heard on 17th of March 2026, it quickly became evident
that the ‘record’ provided by the Respondents in terms of Rule 53, was incomplete and
consisted of only two documents in respect of each Applicant:
a) the NCCS’ short summary of the report and recommendation of the Parole Board,
and,
b) a single page consisting of the recommendation of the NCCS, followed by the
decision of the Minister in relation to the NCCS’ recommendation; denoted by his
placing a tick mark over a box marked either “Approved” or a box marked ‘Not
Approved’.
4) The following could, however, be gleaned from the NCCS’ summary:
a) The first applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2005. He was 38 years old
at the time. He is approximately 61 years old now and has spent the last 21 years
behind bars. The Correctional Supervision and Parole Board (“the Parole Board”)
first recommended his release on parole in 2021. The second Respondent (“the
NCCS”) however did not recommend to the Minister (first Respondent) that parole
be granted. The Minister, in 2023, abided by the NCCS’ recommendation. The
Parole Board, in 2024, again recommended that he be granted Parole, however, the
Parole Board, in 2024, again recommended that he be granted Parole, however, the
NCCS again, in 2025, did not recommend same to the Minister. The Minister
agreed with the NCCS’ recommendation (that he not be granted parole) and ticked
the “Approved” box. .
b) The second Applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2000. He has been
incarcerated for 26 years. The Parole Board has also recommended his release
twice (at least); in 2019 and again in 2021. In 2019, the NCCS did not recommend
his release on parole to the Minister. The second time around, in 2021 the NCCS
did in fact recommend that the Minister grant parole. The Minister, however, did not
agree with the NCCS’ recommendation and , in 2024, ticked the “Not Approved”
box.
c) The third Applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2004 and has been
incarcerated for 22 years. The Parole Board has recommended that he be granted
parole. However, in 2023, the NCCS did not recommend same to the Minister, who,
in 2024 noted his agreement with the NCCS in this regard by ticking the “Approved”
box.
5) No reasons were provided by the Minister (in respect of the second Applicant) or the
Minster and/or the NCCS (in respect of the first and third Applicants) for the refusal to
recommend/ grant parole.
6) Given the paucity of the ‘record’ and the striking disparity between the
recommendations made and the subsequent decision of the Minister, I stood the matter
down to the 27th of March 2026. The Respondents were ordered to file the complete
record in respect of each applicant. In the hope that a rational connection between
recommendation and decision could possibly be drawn by inference, it was specifically
ordered that the record should include the minutes of the meetings of the Parole Board
and the minutes of any meetings of the NCCS and/or the Minister.
7) Counsel for the Respondent advised that Parole Board was in possession of only the
part of the record that related to their recommendations, whilst the Minister’s office was
in possession of the remainder of the record leading up to the making of the impugned
decision.
8) The Parole Board provided its complete records in respect of the first and third
8) The Parole Board provided its complete records in respect of the first and third
Applicants. Inexplicably, it did not provide any further records in respect of the second
Applicant. Counsel for the Respondent indicated that, despite her request, the Parole
Board has remained ‘mute’ as to why the records were not forthcoming.
9) However, as none of the Applicants are aggrieved by the Parole Board’s
recommendations (it had, after all, recommended that each of the Applicant be granted
parole), its failure to supply its portion of record in relation to the second Applicant,
does not bar a determination of his application in casu. However, in light of my finding
and given the probable future importance of that portion of the record, it will be ordered
that same be uploaded to the Case Lines profile herein.
10) Of greater significance to the determination sought in casu, is the fact that the Minister
has, in present day common parlance, ‘blue ticked”1 his own legal representatives by
failing to provide any reply to their requests to be furnished with his portion of the
record.
The Applicants’ application for condonation
11) As indicated from the outset, the Applicants are unrepresented. That they are laymen
must factor into any decision regarding non compliance with the provision of the
Uniform Rules or, in terms of Section 7(3) of PAJA, failures to adhere to the prescribed
time periods within which reasons should have been requested for the adverse
decision or within which the judicial review application should have been launched.
12) The Applicants sought condonation for any non-compliance in broad general terms. In
the founding affidavit they reiterated their status incarcerated lay persons, who had to
conceive and draft the present application for judicial review, without access to or
advice from a legal practitioner. For their part, the Respondents have also not taken
issue with any non compliance on the part of the Applicants. In their answering affidavit
they note that condonation is sought and “...in amplification..” state that“...the
Application for condonation... has no legal bearing or relevance in this current
application wherefore this point should, not be taken further.”
13) I do not intend to list each and every instance where the Applicants’ papers do not
comply with the Uniform Rules of Court. I am satisfied that condonation should be
granted in this regard.
14) As to “condoning” non-compliance with the time periods set out in PAJA, by extending
14) As to “condoning” non-compliance with the time periods set out in PAJA, by extending
same in terms of Section 7(3), I am similarly satisfied that, insofar as the second and
third Applicants have brought this application outside of the 180 day period provided for
in PAJA, those time periods should be extended from the applicable date of the
1 "Blue-ticked" primarily refers to the WhatsApp read-receipt feature where two blue checkmarks indicate a
message has been read. It has become slang for being ignored, as the recipient has seen the message but not
replied.
Minister’s decision to not grant them parole, respectively, until 3 May 2025, when this
application was served on the Respondents by postal transmission.
15) From their respective affidavits it also seems as if none of the Applicants requested
reasons for the impugned decisions within the requisite 90 day period as prescribed by
Section 5(1) of PAJA. They appear to be under the impression that the furnishing of
reasons is governed by the provisions of Rule 53(1)(b), which places a duty on an
administrator to, in addition to the record, also provide the reasons for the adverse
decision, within 15 days after receipt of the notice of motion. At the latest therefore, it
can be accepted that the Minister and/or the NCCS, were required to provide the
record and the reasons by the end of June 2025. In the absence of any prejudice noted
by the Respondents in this regard, this period is also extended.
Points in limine raised by the Respondents
16) Initially, in terms of the heads of argument filed on behalf of the Respondents two
points in limine were raised:
a) First point in limine: The Respondents submitted no final decision as to parole has
been made and that, as such, there is nothing for this Court to review. The
argument seemed to centre around the fact that in each case there was a
timeframe provided after which the relevant Applicant’s profile could be submitted to
the NCCS again for consideration of parole.
b) Second point in limine: The Respondents contend that the Applicants had failed to
exhaust the internal remedies provided for in terms of Sections 75 and 77 of the
Correctional Services Act, 111 of 1998 (“the Act”).
17) During oral argument, counsel however confirmed that the Respondents have
abandoned any reliance on the first point in limine.
18) The second point was raised in the first set of heads of argument filed on behalf of the
Respondents. It was omitted from the Respondents’ amended heads of argument and
Respondents. It was omitted from the Respondents’ amended heads of argument and
though not formally abandoned, was, sagely, also not pressed for during argument. In
any event, the objection is capable of expeditiously determination (and dismissal):
a) In terms of Section 75(8) of the Act“...(a) decision of the Board is final except that
the Minister, the National Commissioner or the Inspecting Judge may refer the
matter to the Correctional Supervision and Parole Review Board for
reconsideration...”. [underlining my own]
b) In casu, the Applicants are aggrieved by the Minister’s decision and not that of the
(Parole) Board. The internal review, per Sections 75 and 77 of the Act, is therefore
not applicable to the present dispute.
Applicable legal framework and principles
The applicable parole regime
19) As the Applicants are serving life imprisonment sentences, the Minister’s powers in
relation to parole, are circumscribed in Section 78 of the Act:
“(1) Having considered the record of proceedings of the Correctional Supervision and Parole
Board and its recommendations in the case of a person sentenced to life incarceration,
the National Council may, subject to the provisions of section 73 (6) (b) (iv), recommend to
the Minister to grant parole or day parole and prescribe the conditions of community
corrections in terms of section 52.
(2) If the Minister refuses to grant parole or day parole in terms of subsection (1), the Minister
may make recommendations in respect of treatment, care, development and support of
the sentenced offender which may contribute to improving the likelihood of future placement on
parole or day parole.
(3)......
(4) Where the Minister refuses or withdraws parole or day parole the matter must be
reconsidered by the Minister, on advice of the National Council, within two years.
20) All three Applicants were convicted of crimes committed2 before 01 October 2004. As
such, in terms of Section 136(3)(a) of the Act, they are entitled to be considered for
parole after having served 20 years of their respective sentences and not 25 years in
terms of Section 73(6)(b)(iv)).
The duty to furnish reasons for the decisions
21) In terms of Section 33(2) of the Constitution “...(e)veryone whose rights have been
adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.”
22) The provisions of Section 5 of PAJA give expression and content to this right.
Subsection 3 underscores that the principle that transparency is inherent to just
Subsection 3 underscores that the principle that transparency is inherent to just
administrative action: Where an administrator fails to provide adequate reasons, the
Court engaged with the judicial review of the decision must presume that“...the
administrative action was taken without good reason”, unless there is evidence to the
2 Phaahla v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Another (Tlhakanye Intervening) [2019] ZACC 18
contrary or the departure from this requirement is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances (subsection 4).
23) The failure of an administrator to furnish any (or even, adequate) reasons would
normally render the impugned decision reviewable.3
24) I am alive to the debate in academic circles that arose as a result of the judgment in
Barnard v Minister of Justice, Constitutional Development and Correctional Services
and Another.4
a) In terms of Section 78(2) of the Act, only the decision to refuse parole and the
recommendations to be followed by the department before reconsidering of parole
in future have to be communicated to the offender. The Minister is not required to
provide reasons for his refusal of parole.
b) In Barnard, the reasons for the Minister’s refusal were communicated to the
Applicant for the first time in the Minister’s answering affidavit. The Court did not
fault the Minister in this regard and proceeded to review (and ultimately set aside)
the impugned decision.
c) The question of whether substantive reasons for the denial of parole should be
communicated, and whether these reasons should be given to the offender at the
same time that the decision is communicated to the Parole Board, was therefore left
undecided.5
25) To my mind the provisions of Section 78(2) should be interpreted within the context of
Section 33 of the Constitution and Section 5 of PAJA to by necessary implication
require of the Minister to provide the offender with reasons for the refusal,
simultaneously with the communication of the refusal itself.
Review of the impugned decisions
26) In casu, no firm determination as to the interpretation of S82(2) vis-à-vis the approach
followed in Barnard, is required: The present application differs from Barnard in one
notable respect: Whereas in Barnard, the Minister’s reasons were (belatedly)
communicated to the offender, no such reasons were proffered by the Minister in
communicated to the offender, no such reasons were proffered by the Minister in
3 See for instance: National Lotteries Board v South African Education and Environment Project [2012] 1 All SA
451 (SCA); 2012 (4) SA 504 (SCA) (28 September 2011) at para 27
4 2016 (1) SACR 179 (GP)
5 Nanima R “Barnard v Minister of Justice: the minister’s verdict - Deciding on parole for offenders serving life
sentences” SA Crime Quarterly No. 59, March 2017
relation to any of the Applicants herein. In Barnard, the Minister deposed to the
answering affidavit and fully expanded on his reasons for the refusal. The answering
affidavit in casu is deposed to by the legal services manager of the Department of
Correctional Services, who, at most, can attest to the factors (as gleaned from her
perusal of the record) upon which she would have based the parole refusals, had she
been the Minister. Her opinion as to whether or not a respective Applicant should be
released on parole, is simply that: her opinion.
27) Simply put: there are no reasons before me. There is also no explanation as to why,
almost 10 months after the application was served, those reasons have yet to be
furnished. The decisions to refuse the respective parole applications of each of the
Applicants, stand to be reviewed and set aside on this basis alone. As was eloquently
stated in National Lotteries:
“[27] The duty to give reasons for an administrative decision is a central element of the
constitutional duty to act fairly. And the failure to give reasons, which includes proper or
adequate reasons, should ordinarily render the disputed decision reviewable. In England
the courts have said that such a decision would ordinarily be void and cannot be validated
by different reasons given afterwards – even if they show that the original decision may
have been justified. For in truth the later reasons are not the true reasons for the decision,
but rather an ex post facto rationalization of a bad decision.”.
28) As the Applicants have now abandoned the relief for substitution of the Minister’s’
decision, an examination into the minutiae of the common cause facts to determine
whether a ‘pattern of conduct’ has been establish that would evince the futility of
remitting the decision back to the Minister, is no longer required.
29) However, a comparison between the steps the NCCS in 2021 urged the first Applicant
29) However, a comparison between the steps the NCCS in 2021 urged the first Applicant
to take in order to “improve his situation”, the consequent steps taken by him and the
steps recommended the NCCS in 2025, provides a poignant illustration of how the
absence of reasons disseminates any possibility of an inference of rationality in casu:
2021 NCCS STEPS TAKEN (per Parole
Board 2025)
2025 NCCS
1. Undergo individual
Psychotherapy to address
criminogenic needs and
behaviour modification
Attended psychotherapy for
interventions in order to
address his criminogenic
needs. His engagement was
satisfactory
1. Undergo intensive
individual psychotherapy to
address criminogenic
needs, with violence
propensity, ongoing
oppositional behaviour and
anti-social personality
disorder traits.
2. Risk assessment by
non-treating Clinical
Psychologist
He attended the programme
as prescribed.
According to the risk
assessment report his risk for
reoffending can be classified
as low.
2. Risk assessment by a
non-treating Psychologist
3. Attend crime related
correctional programmes
He attended:
- Restorative justice, -
Changing lanes,
- Cross road,
- Behaviour Modification on
Gangsterism,
- New Beginnings -
Gender Based Violence
Awareness programme, -
Anger management
Economic Crime (Robbery)
3. Attend the following
programmes:
- Change is Possible
- Moral Regeneration,
Relapse Prevention and
Resilience Enhancement.
4. Victim tracing and
restorative justice
processes should be
pursued.
He participated in the Victim
Offender Mediation/ Dialogue
processes with the victim's
family
5. He should be
encouraged and assisted
to improve his
educational/ Vocational
skills
He completed AET level 4 and
acquired Vocational Skills
and Training in
- Big Tree Vegetable
Production skills
(Agriculture),
- Cooking, Safety & Hygiene.
He is currently busy with
General Maintenance skills
Program
30) In court, the first Applicant, bemoaned the fact that, despite his compliance with each
and every recommendation made by the NCCS in 2021, the NCCS in 2025
recommended that he take the very same steps again. In the absence of any reasons
or records from the first Respondents in this regard, I share his befuddlement.
31) That an explanation linking decision to the facts is required, is all the more evident
when one considers the NCCS’ 2025 recommendation that he (again) attends
psychotherapy to address his “...criminogenic needs, with violence propensity, ongoing
oppositional behaviour and anti-social personality disorder traits.” I have perused the
entire record provided by the Parole Board. In the almost 300 pages of reports from
case managers, psychologists, social workers, work supervisors etc., I could not find
one single reference to him having a propensity for violence (in fact the opposite in
stated) or that he suffers from any ongoing ‘oppositional behaviour’ or ‘anti-social
personality disorder’ traits. Given that the last two mentioned are diagnosable
psychological disorders, the reference by the NCCS to these disorders, when the
assessing clinical psychologist did not, is disconcerting.
32) I pause to note that the NCCS’ summary also states that the first Applicant had
previously been found guilty of murder and that he, whilst on parole following his
conviction for that murder, committed the murder for which he is presently serving his
life sentence. As conceded by the Respondents’ counsel, this is blatantly incorrect. He
had been convicted and sentenced for burglary in 1991 and had completed his
sentence long before the murder underpinning the present life sentence, occurred in
2003.
33) In relation to the third Applicant, a similar comparison, yields similar results.
34) The position of the second Applicant (for whom there is no record or reasons) can only
be described as pitifully perplexing. The NCCS’ summary indicates that:
a) The Parole Board had previously (in 2017) recommended parole. The NCCS did
not agree and recommended reconsideration after another 12 months (i.e by
August 2018). It was recommended that the second Applicant improve his
vocational skills, complete sexual offender and crime related programmes and that
vocational skills, complete sexual offender and crime related programmes and that
updated reports be obtained. From the summary is evident that he complied with
these recommendations, that updated reports were obtained and that he underwent
a risk assessment by a psychologist, who noted his risk of reoffending to be low.
b) The Parole Board, in September 2019, again recommended that he be granted
parole. A year and a half later, in February 2021, the NCCS concurred and
recommended to the Minister that his parole be approved. More than three years
later, in August 2024, the Minister, for reasons only known to him, disagrees with
the NCCS’ 2021 recommendation, ticks “Not Approved” and determines that the
second Applicant must wait at least another 12 months before submitting his profile
for reconsideration. In the interim, the Minister recommended that in order “to
improve his situation”, the second Applicant should undergo (another) risk
assessment and that updated reports should (again) be obtained.
c) Neither recommendation provides any indication as to what the Minister saw in the
documentation before him, that the NCCS did not. Nor does the fulfilment of either
fall within the control of the second Applicant. The fact that the reports may have
become ‘stale’ by the time the Minister had regard to them some 6 years after they
had been prepared in 2019, is solely attributable to the inordinate delay between
the NCCS recommending that parole be granted in 2021 and the Minister deciding
otherwise in 2024.6
35) The second Applicant, it seems, is no more than kidnapped passenger, gagged and
bound in the boot of bureaucracy; powerless to effect any change to, and having no
say in, where the vehicle, that controls his very fate, is sent by the Respondents.
36) A perusal of recent judgments from this division, have, regrettably, revealed that this
deplorable state of affairs has become ‘par for the course.’ The following extracts from
the 2024 judgment of Du Plessis AJ (as she then was) in Maingane7 simultaneously
illustrate this tendency, as well as accurately encapsulate my sentiments:
“[77] A common concern raised in court (Mr Sikhosana, Mr Mbehele and Mr Lephaila
expressly so) was that a requirement is repeatedly imposed that the sentenced offenders
must repeat programmes they have already completed and can be considered again for
parole only after 18 – 24 months. The requirement that an offender redo a successfully
completed rehabilitation programme in order to be eligible for parole may in the absence of
other warranting factors be arbitrary, capricious and possibly irrational. If the effect of
other warranting factors be arbitrary, capricious and possibly irrational. If the effect of
6 The first Applicant has likewise suffered at the hand of these administrative delays. It would be recalled that
this is the second time this parole has been refused. In 2021, the Parole Board recommended that parole be
granted. The NCCS disagreed and (in May 2021) recommended that his profile be placed before it again after 24
months had lapsed (i.e 2023). However, as the erstwhile Minister only approved the NCCS’ 2021
recommendation in May 2023, the 24 month period only lapsed in March 2025. I shall venture no further opinion
than to describe the delay as ‘unfortunate’ .
7 Mazingane and Others v Minister of Correctional Services and Others [2024] ZAGPJHC 1092 (28 October
2024). See also: Mbatha v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Another (5876/2022) [2024]
ZAGPPHC 269 (15 March 2024) where the Court similarly also bemoaned the abject failure of the Minister to
provide ANY reasons.
repeated recommendations is that the inmate will never be placed on parole, this may well
conflict with the Constitution.”
.....
[108] The various applications in this judgment highlights some common fault lines in the
parole system for “lifers”. Some of these fault lines were also highlighted in countless other
cases such as Motsemme v Minister of Correctional Services, Dlomo v Minister of
Correctional Services, Williams v Minister of Correctional Services and Mabuse v Minister
of Justice and Correctional Services, relating to inexcusable delays and irrational decision-
making. If these issues are not effectively addressed, the courts will continue to be
inundated with applications such as these, by people who are justifiably frustrated. In that
regard, I echo what Wilson J said in Mabuse:
“The law […] recognises that incarceration, even incarceration of people who have
committed very serious offences, ought not to continue for longer than it can be
justified. The necessary complexity of the process for considering the fitness for
release of a person serving a life sentence ought not to be allowed to obscure the need
for prompt and diligent attention to their circumstances. In each of the applicants’
cases, there is reason to believe that the necessary complexity of the task the
respondents face has not been met with the level of care, administrative capacity or
attention to detail the law requires (see, in this respect, section 237 of the Constitution,
1996).”
Costs
37) As the Applicants appeared in person, no ‘costs’ as traditionally understood (i.e legal
party and party costs) have been incurred.
38) However, at the hearing the first Applicant indicated that he had incurred certain
expenses (such printing, compensation of third parties who delivered documents on
their behalf to the post office, data costs etc.) At the time of the hearing, he did not have
schedule of the exact expenses at hand but estimated that he had spent in the region
of R500-00.
of R500-00.
39) He was granted an opportunity to upload a schedule of expenses and any proof of
payments made to Case Lines by the 26th of March 2026. The Respondents were
afforded an opportunity to upload their submissions in contestation of any item listed in
schedule, if any, before the 30th of March 2026. No such submissions have been made
and it is therefore assumed that the Respondents do not intend to oppose the first
Applicant’s claim in this regard.
40) The first Applicant’s schedule, (which he has named “Bill of costs”), sets out various
expenses totalling R2040-00. Of that amount, R1000-00 is noted as being a gesture of
“goodwill” for a law student who assisted the Applicants in drafting of the court papers.
Having also once, in the distant past, been a suffering law student, one can certainly
understand and sympathise with such the request. Unfortunately, it would be unlawful
for a Court to order that payment be made in respect of legal services provided by a
person who is not (yet) an admitted legal practitioner: In terms of Section 33(1)(b) of
the Legal Practice Act no person other than duly admitted, practising legal practitioner
may, “...in expectation of any fee, commission, gain or reward..” draw up any
documents relating to any action in a court of civil jurisdiction within the Republic.
41) The nature of and amounts paid in relation to remainder of the listed expenses
(totalling R1040-00) are however considered to be reasonable and necessary
ORDERS
42) In relation to the first Applicant, REUBEN MAKAMA, the following order is made:
1. The decision of the first Respondent, made on the 10th of May 2025 to approve the
recommendation of the second Respondent, dated 25-28 March 2025, to the effect
that the first Applicant should not be released on parole, as well as any
recommendations in respect of treatment, care, development and support or time
periods prescribed for reconsideration of his profile by the second Respondent,
contained therein, is hereby reviewed, set aside and remitted to the first
Respondent for reconsideration.
2. The second Respondent shall, within 14 calendar days of this order, deliver to the
First Respondent and the first Applicant, an amended summary of the Correctional
Supervision and Parole Board’s report and recommendations of the Case
Management Committee that served before it in 2024. The amended summary shall
accurately reflect the factual and circumstantial content of those reports as they
accurately reflect the factual and circumstantial content of those reports as they
were set out in the 2024 reports.
3. The first Applicant may within 17 calendar days of this order, furnish the first
Respondent with written submissions detailing any additional or new factors not
evident from the content of the 2024 report of the Correctional Supervision and
Parole Board, detailing any factual inaccuracies contained in either the second
Respondent’s summary and/or updated summary or in the Correctional Supervision
and Parole Board’s 2024 report and/or any other factors the first Respondent should
take into consideration.
4. For purposes of his reconsideration and determination, the first Respondent is
directed to have regard to the following:
4.1. The content of this judgment;
4.2. The entire report and Annexures of the Correctional Supervision and Parole
Board 2024 report.
4.3. The written submission of the first Applicant per 3 above, if supplied.
4.4. The amended summary of the second Respondent per 2 above, if supplied
4.5. The following dicta of the Constitutional Court in Walus v Minister of Justice and
Correctional Services (202)3 2 BCLR 224 (CC):
“[37] In considering the applicant’s appeal, it is appropriate to refer back to what
was said in the first few paragraphs of this judgment. That is that section 36 of
the CSA tells us that the objective of the implementation of a sentence of
imprisonment is to enable the sentenced prisoner to “lead a socially responsible
crime-free life in the future”. On the face of it, this seems to suggest that, where,
on all the evidence, the risk of a prisoner re-offending, if he or she were
released on parole, is low, the relevant authorities should seriously consider
releasing such prisoner on parole because the objective of the implementation
of a sentence of imprisonment would have been achieved.”
5. The first Respondent shall communicate the outcome of his reconsideration to the
first Applicant in writing, no later than 17h00 on the 8th of May 2026, irrespective of
whether the orders set out in 2 and 3 above have been complied with by the party
referenced in each respectively.
6. Should the outcome of the reconsideration constitute a refusal to grant parole to the
first Applicant, the first Respondent shall provide the first Applicant with written
reasons for the decision simultaneously with the communication per 5 above.
reasons for the decision simultaneously with the communication per 5 above.
7. The Respondents are liable for the expenses incurred by the first Applicant in
prosecuting this application in the amount of R1040-00, which amount shall be paid
to the first Respondent within 14 calendar days of this order.
43) In relation to the second Applicant, ABRAHAM LECHABA, the following order is
made:
1. The Respondents are ordered to ensure that the complete record is uploaded to the
Case Lines platform within 5 days hereof.
2. The decision of the first Respondent, made on 14th of August 2024, to not approve
the recommendation of the second Respondent, dated 24-26 February 2021, to the
effect that the second Applicant should be released on parole, as well as any
recommendations in respect of treatment, care, development and support or time
periods prescribed for reconsideration of his profile by the second Respondent,
contained therein, is hereby reviewed, set aside and remitted to the first
Respondent for reconsideration.
3. The second Applicant may within 17 calendar days of this order, furnish the first
Respondent with written submissions detailing any additional or new factors not
evident from the content of the report of the Correctional Supervision and Parole
Board, or any factual inaccuracies contained in the second Respondent’s 2021
summary of the in the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board’s report and/or
any other factors the first Respondent should take into consideration.
4. For purposes of his reconsideration and determination, the first Respondent is
directed to have regard to the following:
4.1. The content of this judgment;
4.2. The entire report and Annexures of the Correctional Supervision and Parole
Board’s report that was considered by the second Respondent when it
recommended, in 2021, that the second Applicant should be granted parole..
4.3. The written submission of the second Applicant per 3 above, if supplied.
4.4. The following dicta of the Constitutional Court in Walus v Minister of Justice and
Correctional Services (202)3 2 BCLR 224 (CC):
“[37] In considering the applicant’s appeal, it is appropriate to refer back to what
was said in the first few paragraphs of this judgment. That is that section 36 of
was said in the first few paragraphs of this judgment. That is that section 36 of
the CSA tells us that the objective of the implementation of a sentence of
imprisonment is to enable the sentenced prisoner to “lead a socially responsible
crime-free life in the future”. On the face of it, this seems to suggest that, where,
on all the evidence, the risk of a prisoner re-offending, if he or she were
released on parole, is low, the relevant authorities should seriously consider
releasing such prisoner on parole because the objective of the implementation
of a sentence of imprisonment would have been achieved.”
5. The first Respondent shall communicate the outcome of his reconsideration to the
second Applicant in writing, no later than 17h00 on the 8th of May 2026.
6. Should the outcome of the reconsideration constitute a refusal to grant parole to the
second Applicant, the first Respondent shall provide the second Applicant with
written reasons for the decision simultaneously with the communication per 5
above.
44) In relation to the third Applicant, ADAM MOGOPODI, the following order is made:
1. The decision of the first Respondent, made on the 25th of March 2024, to approve
the recommendation of the second Respondent, dated 21-23 February 2024, to the
effect that the third Applicant should be not released on parole, as well as any
recommendations in respect of treatment, care, development and support or time
periods prescribed for reconsideration of his profile by the second Respondent,
contained therein, is hereby reviewed, set aside and remitted to the first
Respondent for reconsideration.
2. The third Applicant may within 17 calendar days of this order, furnish the first
Respondent with written submissions detailing any additional or new factors not
evident from the content of the report of the Correctional Supervision and Parole
Board, or any factual inaccuracies contained in the second Respondent’s 2024
summary of the in the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board’s report and/or
any other factors the first Respondent should take into consideration.
3. For purposes of his reconsideration and determination, the first Respondent is
directed to have regard to the following:
3.1. The content of this judgment;
3.2. The entire report and Annexures of the Correctional Supervision and Parole
Board’s 2023 report that was considered by the second Respondent when
Board’s 2023 report that was considered by the second Respondent when
made its recommendations in 2024.
3.3. The written submission of the third Applicant per 2 above, if supplied.
3.4. The following dicta of the Constitutional Court in Walus v Minister of Justice and
Correctional Services (202)3 2 BCLR 224 (CC):
“[37] In considering the applicant’s appeal, it is appropriate to refer back to what
was said in the first few paragraphs of this judgment. That is that section 36 of
the CSA tells us that the objective of the implementation of a sentence of
imprisonment is to enable the sentenced prisoner to “lead a socially responsible
crime-free life in the future”. On the face of it, this seems to suggest that, where,
on all the evidence, the risk of a prisoner re-offending, if he or she were
released on parole, is low, the relevant authorities should seriously consider
releasing such prisoner on parole because the objective of the implementation
of a sentence of imprisonment would have been achieved.”
4. The first Respondent shall communicate the outcome of his reconsideration to the
third Applicant in writing, no later than 17h00 on the 8th of May 2026.
5. Should the outcome of the reconsideration constitute a refusal to grant parole to the
third Applicant, the first Respondent shall provide the third Applicant with written
reasons for the decision simultaneously with the communication per 4 above.
___________________________
K STRYDOM
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Dates of hearing: 17 and 26 March 2026.
Date of judgment: 31 March 2026
For the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Applicants: Appearances in person
For the 1st and 2nd Respondents: Adv M Nteso, instructed by the State attorney, Pretoria