I
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NOR!~ GAUTENG,HI.QH_ COURT)
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED
30 March 2026
DATE
In the matter between:
TURE
ANSIE PISTORIUS OOSTHUIZEN N.O.
Case number: 236657/2025
First Applicant
(In her capacity as trustee of the Lettie Pistorius Familie Trust)
STEPHANUS GERHARDUS GRIESEL N.O. Second Applicant
(In his capacity as trustee of the Lettie Pistorius Familie Trust)
JOHANNES CHRISTIAAN DE BEER N.O. Third Applicant
(In his capacity as trustee of the Lettie Pistorius Familie Trust)
DANIEL CHRISTIAAN PHILLIPUS MARITZ
THEODOR PISTORIUS
JOHANE PISTORIUS
NADIA KUHN
ERIK OOSTHUIZEN
Fourth Applicant
Fifth Applicant
Sixth Applicant
Seventh Applicant
Eight Applicant
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HELLA SU-ALETTE GREYLING Ninth Applicant
and
A LETT A PETRONELLA SUSANNA PISTORIUS N.O. First Respondent
(In her capacity as trustee of the Lettie Pistorius Familie Trust)
ALETTA PETRONELLA SUSANNA MARITZ Second Respondent
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
MINNAARAJ:
Introduction:
[1] The feud before me involves the Pistorius family and, more specifically,
the Lettie Pistorius Familie Trust ("the Lettie Trust"). In this judgment,
some of the parties will be referred to by using their first names. This
should not be construed as being derogatory or disrespectful. As we are
• dealing with a family, this reference is purely for clarity.
[2] Johannes Stander Pistorius ("Johannes") and Aletta Petronella Susanna
Pistorius ("Lettie") were married and blessed with three children: Theo,
Rina, and Ansie.
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[3] Ansie is the first applicant herein in her capacity as trustee of the Lettie
Trust. Lettie is cited herein as the first respondent in her capacity as
trustee of the Trust.
[4] Johannes and Lettie are also the grandparents of seven grandchildren.
Six of the grandchildren are cited herein as the fourth to ninth applicants.
One of the grandchildren, Rina's daughter, is cited as the second
respondent, and the founding affidavit alleges that she is not cited as an
applicant because she wishes to remain neutral.
[5] Johannes and Lettie built the Pistorius empire through dedication and
hard work. In 1986, Johannes was a farmer, and Lettie worked at a
public school. Johannes then developed the first shopping mall.
Johannes and Lettie got a R3 million loan from the bank for this
development. The interest rate at the time stood at 27%. The couple
worked hard to take good care of their family and to look after their
business. Johannes only took his first dividend from the business 14
years later in the meagre amount of RS 000.00. All this hard work paid
off, resulting in what the papers describe as the Pistorius Group of
Companies ("the Pistorius Group). The main focus of the Pistorius Group
is property development.
[6] With their foresight, Johannes and Lettie established trusts for each of
their children. The Lettie Trust was also established, with Lettie and their
grandchildren as beneficiaries. Johannes and Lettie were the founders
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(referred to in the trust deed in the singular as 'founder') of and the first
trustees (referred to in the trust deed in the singular as 'trustee') of the
Lettie Trust.
[7] According to Lettie, the purpose of these trusts was to ensure that the
fruits of their labour were directed towards the welfare, education, and
development of their descendants, and that they were afforded every
opportunity to thrive. In Lettie's words: " ... my husband and I jointly
decided to establish the trust referred to herein. These were the Johan
Pistorius Familie Trust, the Lettie Familie Trust, the Rina Pistorius
Familie Trust and the Ansie Oosthuizen Familie Trust, all of which were
conceived as vehicles through which each child might cultivate a
foundation of wealth, enabling them to secure their own futures and
provide for their families with dignity and independence. The rationale
was not merely financial; it was rooted in our belief that the values of
hard work, foresight, and stewardship should be embedded in the
structures we created."
[8] I pause to remark that Theo, Rina, Ansie, and their children must be
immensely grateful for the foresight and generosity of their parents and
grandparents. Unfortunately, the harmonious vision of Johannes and
Lettie runs an inevitable risk of being shattered by factions, suspicion,
aspersions, conspiracies and distrust not only between siblings but also
between a daughter and her mother, a son and his father, and
grandchildren and their beloved grandmother.
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[9] Each trust is the sole shareholder of a separate holding company with
the same name as the trust. These holding companies are shareholders
of companies in the Pistorius Group. The Lettie Trust is but one of four
shareholders in this whole structure.
[1 O] Ansie was employed by Johannes as financial manager for the
Pistorius Group in 2013. In 2016, Johannes appointed Ansie, together
with the second and third applicants ("the disputed trustees"), as trustees
to the trusts. Lettie is also a trustee of all four of the trusts.
[11] On 18 September 2018, Johannes passed away. In his will, he
nominated his children as trustees of their respective trusts. Johannes
did not nominate anyone to replace him as trustee in the Lettie Trust.
[12] The disputed trustees, together with other persons, are trustees
of all four trusts. In 2019, Ansie was appointed by all shareholders of the
various companies as Chief Executive of the Pistorius group.
[13] On 27 October 2025, the first respondent, through her attorney,
informed the disputed trustees that Lettie had decided to remove them
as trustees of the Lettie Trust. In their stead, the first respondent
appointed Mr Frederick Jacobus Snyman ("Mr Snyman") and Rina.
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[14] On 31 October 2025, Ansie's attorney (who is now the applicants'
attorney) responded. In this letter, the trustees' removal and the reasons
for it were sought.
[15] On 5 November 2025, Ansie's attorney addressed a letter to the
first respondent's attorney, stating that they are of the view that the
purported removal of the disputed trustees is irregular and/or unlawful.
Another request was made that the motivation behind, and the reasons
for the removal be provided.
[16] On 6 November 2025, this letter was also delivered to the third
respondent. The third respondent was requested not to take any action
regarding the purported decisions to remove the disputed trustees.
[17] On 7 November 2025, the first respondent's attorney provided a
response. The relevant parts of this letter read:
" ... In respect of the Lettie Pistorius Family Trust, it is a matter of
common cause among the parties that the relationship between
the co-trustees has irretrievably broken down, owing to a
confluence of factors, not least longstanding familial discord.
Our client, Mrs Lettie Pistorius, has on numerous occasions
expressed her dissatisfaction with the administration of the family
trusts and has informed your Ms Oosthuisen (Ansie) that the
current status is not what she and her late husband had
foreshadowed when establishing the respective trusts.
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Notwithstanding these objections, Ms Ansie Oosthuizen has
persisted in managing the trusts in a manner she deems
appropriate, irrespective of our client's concerns and requests."
The first respondent's attorney further stated:
"It is not understood why each sibling is not afforded the
opportunity to administer his or her own trust, as was envisaged
by our client and the late Mr Pistorius. The only plausible
explanation for the continued insistence on retaining her role as
trustee, alongside Messrs Griese/ and de Beer, is to exclude the
other children from the management of the holding company.
We are of the view that as co-founder of the Lettie Pistorius
Family Trust she is in terms of the express provisions of the trust
deed entitled to remove the trustees of the trust and appoint new
trustees.
Should you persist with an urgent application same will be
opposed and a punitive cost order will be sought against the trust
alternatively the trustees in their personal capacity.
You are respectfully urged to act in accordance with what is just
and equitable, by affording each sibling the autonomy to
administer his or her own trust - a course that would not only
honour the founder's original vision but also serve to restore and
preserve familial harmony. We await your reply in this regard."
[18] On 10 November 2025, a virtual meeting was held to discuss the
affairs of the Rina Pistorius Familie Trust. The first respondent was
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present as trustee of the Rina Pistorius Familie Trust. During this
meeting, it was agreed that once it concludes, a meeting of the Lettie
Trust will be held. A meeting of the Lettie Pistorius Trust was then held,
and a transcript of this meeting is attached to the founding affidavit.
According to Ansie, although Lettie stated she was all by herself during
the meeting, it is common cause that Theo was present in the
background.
[19] On the evening of 10 November 2025, Lettie sent an email to
Ansie and Mr Griese!. In this email, Lettie raised concerns about the
Lettie Trust's financial position and expressed her frustration with its
management. According to Ansie, this was merely Theo speaking
through his mother.
[20] On 11 November 2025, the first respondent's attorney informed
all the beneficiaries of the Lettie Turst of the removal of the disputed
trustees.
[21] On the same date, Ansie's attorneys addressed another letter to
the first respondent's attorney in which the following was stated with
reference to the meeting held on 10 November 2025:
" .. . All the Trustees were present, including our client as well as
Mr Chris de Beer and Mr Fanie Griese/. It became evident during
this meeting that Mrs Lettie Pistorius had no intention of any of
the Trustees to vacate their positions and was in favour of their
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participation .
Our client therefore understands that Mrs Lettie Pistorius has also
decided not to proceed with the removal of the Trustees (insofar
as it is possible for her to do so).
All indications are that we do no longer have to advise our client
in this regard."
[22] I pause to state that, on a reading of the meeting transcript, there
was no indication that the first respondent made any reference to the
fact that she would not stand by the decision she had made to remove
the disputed trustees. From my reading, this issue was alive, and
everyone was aware of it. On page 15 of the typed transcript, Mr Griesel
referred to outgoing trustees and to whoever the trustees would be in the
future. It is further clear from the meeting transcript that neither of the
disputed trustees raised their removal at this meeting.
[23] On 12 November 2025, the first respondent's attorney responded
to the letter dated 11 November 2025. The relevant part of this letter
reads as follows in paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof:
"3. Our client unequivocally denies the assertion that she has
abandoned her intention to seek the removal of the
trustees. She remains firmly committed to the position
articulated in the formal notice and the reasons advanced
in our preceding correspondence.
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4. In light of your contrary assertion, we hereby request that
you furnish our client with the agenda, audio recording,
and/or minutes of the trust meeting upon which your view
is purportedly based."
[24] On 13 November 2025, Ansie's attorney responded by indicating
the following:
"With reference to the above-mentioned matter (and also with
reference to the "WhatsApp" messages between yourself and our
Mr Wagenaar) we confirm that our client, and perhaps some of
the other beneficiaries in terms of the Trustls will bring a court
application during the course of next week for the current situation
to be resolved.
We will not at this stage reply to your request, and. we may
perhaps deal with such requests in our client's court application."
[25] On 2 December 2025, the third respondent issued Letters of
Authority confirming that Lettie, Mr Snyman, and Rina are the sole
trustees of the Lettie Trust.
[26] The removal of the disputed trustees, already communicated on
27 October 2025, was the trigger of events that culminated in this
application before me. On 3 December 2025, they delivered an urgent
application. The application was to be heard on 17 December 2025.
Apart from urgency, the following relief is sought:
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a. That the first respondent is ordered to cooperate in the
furtherance of the mediation process in accordance with the
Mediation Directive and the Protocol thereto, and that Mr Alan
Nelson SC be appointed as the mediator to urgently conduct
mediation in this matter and to invite such members of the
Pistorius family as he might deem fit to partake therein.
b. That the removal of the first to third applicants as trustees of the
Lettie Trust is set aside as having been ultra vires the powers of
the first respondent.
c. In the alternative to the setting aside of the removal of the first to
third applicants, it is declared that the first respondent was
disqualified from being a trustee of the Lettie Trust at the time of
the removal of the first to third applicants as trustees, and that
accordingly the removal is declared to be nul and void ad initio.
d. In the further alternative, that the removal of the first to third
trustees be suspended pending the outcome of the mediation
referred to above in a settlement between the first respondent and
the first to third applicant, or the final determination of this matter,
whichever happens first, unless a court orders otherwise.
e. That the first respondent be prohibited pending the outcome of
this matter from appointing other persons as trustees in the Lettie
Trust, and that the third respondent be authorised to withhold
letters of appointment from any person claiming so to have been
appointed pending the outcome of this application.
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f. That the applicants' costs of the application be paid by the Lettie
Trust on the scale as between attorney and own client.
[27] On 4 December 2025, the applicants' attorney directed a letter to
the first respondent's attorney:
" ... With further reference to your letter of earlier today, our clients are
prepared (without prejudice to any of their rights) to agree to remove the
matter from the urgent roll of 17 December 2025 on the following
conditions:
1. Our clients maintain that the appointment of the 2 (TWO) new
Trustees, on the letter of authority attached to your letter, was
unlawful, and is without any effect. There is ample opportunity in
support of this contention. Should the matter proceed to hearing,
this contention will be argued. At this stage it is not necessary to
debate this point.
2. All the parties agree that no decisions whatsoever will be taken
and/or given effect to by the Lettie Pistorius Family Trust
(whoever the lawful Trustees may be).
3. Should the mediation fail, the matter may be set down by our
clients on the urgent roll for the Court to make a decision as soon
as possible thereafter. We submit that we can attempt, to the
extent that it would be possible, if dates in this regard can be co
ordinated between our respective offices.
We await your URGENT response. If your client agrees with the above,
we will file a Notice of Removal."
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[28] It is evident that an agreement was reached to proceed with the
mediation. The urgent application was removed from the roll, and
mediation between the parties was conducted on 19 and 20 January
2026. It is now clear that the mediation has ended.
[29] On 10 March 2026, the applicants delivered a supplementary
affidavit, and the office of the Acting Deputy Judge President was
approached for a special urgent allocation. The application was
allocated to me for a hearing on 18 March 2026.
[30] The first respondent delivered an opposing affidavit, and Ansie,
despite being on vacation in India, managed to depose to the replying
affidavit.
[31] The applicants also delivered an application to join Rina and Mr
Snyman as the fourth and fifth respondents to the proceedings.
Urgency:
[32] Under the heading 'urgency', the applicants contend that the
application is urgent as:
a. The Lettie Trust has a vital role to play in the valuation that has to
be submitted in the Anko arbitration (in terms of which certain of
the companies in the Pistorius Group must purchase the shares
in the Anko Trust) and will not be able to do so as a result of the
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dispute before this court, unless at least an interim ruling is made
to govern decision-making by the trust.
b. Urgent instructions need to be given to the cost consultant on the
bill of costs delivered by the Anko Trust.
c. Money to be paid to Anko Trust will have to be finalised through
the shareholders, and this would certainly include that each of the
shareholders (which includes the Lettie Trust) will need to provide
security. Nothing in that process can be finalised without the
effective involvement of the Lettie Trust. Against the disputes
referred to in the application before this court, the Lettie Trust
cannot participate therein.
d. A second phase of development started on 1 September 2025.
Lephalale Commercial Properties is involved in this process, and
the current dispute with the Lettie Trust could seriously delay this
development.
e. Erf 344 Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd (in which Lephalale Properties
(Pty) Ltd is a 68% shareholder) bought out two shareholders.
Payment has already been made for this transaction, and four
further payments of R12 million per year are due. The Lettie Trust
will have to participate in the decision-making regarding its
financing.
f. Erf 344 Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd is also in a critical time of
business, where a second phase of the Tshilamba Mall has
already commenced construction in September 2025. The conflict
among family members places enormous pressure on the
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business and increases the risk of failing to open on time. The
cost of this development is R140 million, with the Lettie Trust also
playing a role.
g. Erf 344 Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd obtained rights to develop a
shopping centre known as Namakgale R71 . The value of this
project is approximately R280 million. This is the biggest
development in the Pistorius Group. The financial pressures on
the group resulting from the paralysis of the Lettie Trust may leave
it unprepared to commit to this development. Negotiations are
ongoing to secure support for this project and to attract anchor
tenants. An application for financing has already been made and
approved in principle. The Lettie Trust is involved in this project
and will be required to participate in decisions.
h. The annual shareholders meeting of companies in the Pistorius
Group needs to take place in February 2026. All the planning for
this has to be done immediately, and then shortly after the
Christmas holidays. This cannot happen in respect of those
companies in which the Lettie Trust is a shareholder, as the Lettie
Trust cannot make decisions.
i. The trustees of the Lettie Trust play a vital role in the huge and
intricate business transactions in the Pistorius Group. The first
respondent has never taken a leading role, although she was
always invited to participate and was kept abreast about the
affairs and interests of the Lettie Trust. The first respondent is not
able to manage the Lettie Trust on her own. She may consider
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appointing others, but the applicants doubt that she can do so
responsibly. It is stated that the first respondent is being advised
and influenced by Theo, who has failed to properly manage his
own business and personal affairs. The removal of Messrs.
Geyser and De Beer, two independent trustees who, over the
years, served the trusts with great distinction and without
consulting them, is a clear indication of irresponsible and reckless
behaviour, typical of Theo, who, after all, wrote a letter to Ansie
on 9 October 2025 on behalf of their mother.
j. The first respondent is not in a position to govern the trust in the
best interest of the beneficiaries. Her decision to summarily
dismiss all the trustees except herself is evidence of her inability
to exercise the functions of a trustee, let alone to responsibly
exercise a power to act alone in dismissing and appointing other
trustees.
k. Since the first respondent started living with Theo about 10
months ago, the first respondent started employing the services
of Theo's attorney, Mr Malan. She has now decided to remove
the disputed trustees for no valid reason. It seems as if someone
is preparing the way for a take-over of the management of the
affairs of the Pistorius group. Mr Malan is not impartial as he is
friends with Mr Rossel from the Anko Trust.
I. The indication to the first respondent's attorney was that the
application would be brought a week prior to it actually being
brought, but the delay was caused by the involvement of several
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witnesses who had to be consulted as and when all of them were
available. The applicants' attorney worked after hours and over
weekends to prepare the application.
[33] In the applicants' supplementary affidavit, no specific grounds of
urgency are raised, leaving the court guessing as to whether it was
triggered by the money transferred to the first respondent and how the
first respondent utilised the money.
[34] The first respondent challenges the application's urgency. This
challenge is premised on the following grounds:
a. The application was not urgent when it was first brought in
December 2025, and it is not urgent now.
b. The first respondent removed the disputed trustees on 27
October 2025. The urgent application was issued only on 3
December 2025, after the third respondent had appointed the
new trustees and issued the new Letter of Authority on 2
December 2025.
c. The applicants elected to mediate, and the first respondent
agreed to the mediation. According to the first respondent, the
mediation concluded on 29 January 2026. In the replying affidavit,
the applicants pertinently deny that the mediation concluded on
that day. It is now common cause that the mediation concluded.
d. The applicant's attorney only advised the first respondent
attorney of their intention to set the application down on the urgent
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roll again, on Wednesday, 2 March 2026, and delivered the notice
of set down and the supplementary affidavit on Thursday, 5 March
2026.
e. When the matter was referred to mediation, the applicants'
attorney undertook that should the mediation fail, and the matter
be once again set down on the urgent roll by the applicants, they
would attempt to "to the extent possible", to coordinate dates with
the first respondent's attorney. No attempt whatsoever was made
to do so. This caused the first respondent immense prejudice as
she and her legal team were left with 4 days (including the
weekend) to complete her opposing affidavit to the initial founding
affidavit, and to consult and prepare an answer to the
supplementary affidavit. The first respondent's senior counsel,
who has been involved in this and a related matter since early
2025, was not available, as he was briefed in an arbitration that
begins on 9 March 2026 and is set down for two weeks. It was
therefore necessary to brief new counsel on short notice to study
the voluminous founding papers (in excess of 500 pages), to
come to grips with the issues and complicated factual matrix, and
to complete the answering affidavit to both the founding and the
supplementary affidavits. This comes at high costs.
f. Rina, the co-trustee, is on holiday in the Cape, and the first
respondent is unable to obtain a confirmatory affidavit from her.
This limits Rina's input.
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g. The applicants have not expressly stated what is so urgent at this
stage that the application must be heard now and that substantial
redress will be impossible in the normal course. The allegations
on which they rely are not pertinent to the relief they seek. The
applicants rely on commercial urgency, arising from the
withdrawal of R1 500 000.00 from the Lettie Trust's investment
account, which was then paid to Lettie in her capacity as a
beneficiary of the Lettie Trust.
h. The withdrawal upon which the re-enrolment of the application is
based was effected in accordance with the powers of the
incumbent trustees and in the exercise of their discretion. It was
not effected in breach of the undertaking given by the Trust's
attorney of record, as alleged or at all. The withdrawal is simply
used as an excuse to re-enrol in the application on the urgent roll.
[35] On the specific grounds of urgency as contained in the founding
affidavit, it is the case of the first respondent:
a. The valuation process has already been completed and the
amount of the Anko claim has been fixed. The Lettie Trust was
not a party to the arbitration, the award was not made against the
Lettie Trust, and the Lettie Trust is not liable to pay out Anko. The
first respondent's case is that she has, throughout, been kept in
the dark, and she is hardly in a position to advise now.
b. All of a sudden, the Lettie Trust is now portrayed as having an
important role to play, notwithstanding the fact that from the
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inception of the Anko arbitration process, the trusts were
deliberately excluded from access to any information relating
thereto.
c. No cogent information is provided as to why the Lettie Trust has
any role to play in decisions regarding the mentioned property
developments. Ansie is the controlling mind of the respective
trusts and companies, and the Lettie Trust's importance at this
stage is not understood.
d. The present trustees may participate in decision-making,
provided they are given sufficient information.
e. Ansie is still the CEO, and she will still be in charge of the Pistorius
Group's day-to-day business.
f. It is categorically denied that the first respondent is incapable of
managing the affairs of the Lettie Trust or to exercise independt
judgment. The first respondent states that she has actively
engaged in the business since its inception and has, moreover,
appointed suitable, qualified individuals to serve alongside her as
trustees. Mr Snyman is a chartered accountant, and Lettie has
known him for many years. Mr Snyman was also involved in the
business when Johannes was still alive.
g. The notion that Theo exerts any influence over Lettie's decisions
is pertinently repudiated, and Lettie states that she finds the
animosity directed by Ansie towards her brother wholly
incomprehensible.
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h. There was no need to have consulted with the disputed trustees
prior to their removal. Their expertise is insufficient to prevent their
removal, and Lettie respectfully believes they can be replaced.
i. There is nothing untoward about Mr Malan. Lettie had long
warned Ansie that she intended to take steps to right what she
perceived as a breach of Johannes' wishes.
j. The disputed trustees were aware of the status quo since the
service of their removal in October 2025. It took them more than
a month to serve the urgent application despite a threat to
approach the urgent court.
k. It was impossible for the first respondent to comply with the time
constraints the applicants placed on her.
[36] In the replying affidavit, the applicants did not elaborate on the
grounds of urgency. They further failed to specifically answer to the
allegations raised by the first respondent challenging the urgency of the
application. It is trite that in the absence of a reply, the respondent's
version, as it stands in the answering affidavit, stands to be accepted as
uncontested on those allegations that have challenged the content of the
founding affidavit.1
[37] The circumstances that an applicant avers render a matter
urgent, and the reasons why he claims that he could not be afforded
1 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltdv Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)
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substantial redress at a hearing in due course must, in terms of Rule
6(12) (b), be set forth explicitly in the supporting affidavit.2
[38] The requirements under Rule 6(12)(b) are peremptory, and mere
lip service will not suffice. 3 A proper explanation must be provided as to
why an applicant should be granted preferential treatment to be heard in
the urgent court, as opposed to having to join the queue in the normal
course of the motion court.
[39] One of the key requirements of urgency is that an applicant
establish that they will not obtain substantial redress in due course. In
this regard, it was stated by Tuchten J in Mogalakwena Municipality v
Provincial Executive Council, Limpopo 2016 (4) SA 99 (GP) at
paragraph 64:
"It seems to me that when urgency is in issue, the primary investigation
should be to determine whether the applicant will be afforded substantial
redress at a hearing in due course. If the applicant cannot establish
prejudice in this sense, the application cannot be urgent. Once such
prejudice is established, other factors come into consideration. These
factors include (but are not limited to): whether the respondents can
adequately present their cases in the time available between notice of
the application to them and the actual hearing; other prejudice to the
respondents and the administration of justice; the strength of the case
2 IL&B Marcow Caterers v Greatermans SA 1981 (4) SA 108 (C) at 110
3 Luna Meubel Vervaardigers Eiendoms Beperk v Makin & Another (trading as Makin 's Furniture
Manufacturers) 1977 (4) SA 135 (W) at l37F - G
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made by the applicant; and any delay by the applicant in asserting its
rights. This last factor is often called, usually by counsel acting for
respondents , self-created urgency. "4
[40) Where an applicant sits on its hands or takes its time to bring an
urgent application, such urgency is self-created, unless an acceptable
explanation is provided for the full period applicable to the urgency of the
application (Roets NO and Another v SB Guarantee Company (RF) (Pty)
Ltd and Others (36515/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 754 (6 October 2022).
[41] Self-created urgency should not be countenanced (Black Shash
Trust v Minister of Social Development and Others (Freedom Under Law
Intervening) 2017 (3) SA 335 (CC) at paragraph 36).
[42) In Dynamic Sisters Trading (Pty) Limited and Another v Nedbank
Limited (081473/2023) [2023) ZAGPPHC 709 (21 August 2023), Adams
J stressed that urgent applications should be refused in cases when the
urgency relied upon was clearly self-created, that consistency is
important, and that legal certainty is a cornerstone of a legal system
based on the rule of law.
[43) In the application before this court, the disputed trustees did not
act when they were informed on 27 October 2025 that the first
respondent had removed them as trustees. They elected not to approach
4 See also: East Rock Trading (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite and Others ( 11 /33767)
[20 11] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011 )
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the court for an interdict against the third respondent to prevent the
issuance of the new Letter of Authority appointing Mr Snyman and Rina
as the replacement trustees, pending an application to challenge the first
respondent's authority to remove the disputed trustees as trustees.
Instead, they addressed a letter to the third respondent, asking the third
respondent not to act on the decision taken by the first respondent; this
clearly was not sufficient.
[44] No single allegation is made as to why the applicants would not
obtain substantial redress in due course. This is an essential element in
urgent applications, and the applicants dismally failed in this regard.
Despite repeated questions from the court during the argument, the
applicants' counsel could not provide a satisfactory response on this
crucial aspect.
[45] The purported grounds of urgency for the annual shareholders'
meetings to take place in February 2026 have evaporated, as February
2026 has come and gone prior to the hearing of this application. In any
event, as would be evident from the paragraphs dealing with the decision
taken by the first respondent, the Lettie Trust is duly represented by the
newly appointed trustees, and they can provide all the inputs required to
further the interest of the Lettie Trust and the beneficiaries of the Lettie
Trust. The Lettie Trust is also one of four shareholders, and the
importance the applicants attach to the Lettie Trust in running the
Pistorius Group is not convincing.
25
[46] This application is not urgent and is an abuse of the urgent court's
purpose. It follows that the application must be struck from the roll due
to lack of urgency.
[47] At the hearing of the application, the parties addressed the court
on the merits, and, despite the lack of urgency, the court will proceed to
deliver judgment on the merits.
Decision taken on 27 October 2025:
[48] The core dispute is whether the first respondent acted within her
powers in removing the disputed trustees from the Lettie Trust on 27
October 2025. The applicants seek an order that the removal of the
disputed trustees should be set aside as have been ultra vires the
powers of the first respondent.
[49] Counsel for both the applicants and the first respondent relied on
Jooste N. 0. and Another v Pretorius and Others 2025 (3) SA 95 (SCA)
in advancing their arguments on the first respondent's decision.
[50] As summarised in Jooste at paragraphs 50 and 51:
"[50] The proper approach to the interpretation of the above
provisions is settled:
'It is the language used, understood in the context in which
it is used, and having regard to the purpose of the provision
26
that constitutes the unitary exercise of interpretation . . ..
(T)he triad of text, context and purpose should not be used
in a mechanical fashion. It is the relationship between the
words used, the concept expressed by those words and
the place of the contested provision within the scheme of
the agreement (or instrument) as a whole that constitute
the enterprise by recourse to which a coherent and salient
interpretation is determined. '
[51] The inevitable starting point is the language of the statutory
provisions and clause 11 of the trust deed. Section 20( 1) of the Act
empowers a court to remove a trustee from office, if it is in the
interests of the Trust and the beneficiaries. Section 20(1) does not
state that this power is exclusive to the court. Nor is there any reason
to read such limitation into s 20(1 ). Thus, s 20(1) does not detract
from the principle that a founder may reserve the right to remove a
trustee, or may confer it on some other person, if that right is
stipulated in the trust instrument. The principle is illustrated by this
very case: clause 10. 7 of the trust deed provides, inter alia, that the
founder, with the support of at least a 66% majority of trustees, is
entitled to remove a trustee."
[51] On the interpretation, the Supreme Court of Appeal relied on the
judgments in Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd and Another v Coral Lagoon
Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA) ([2021] 3
All SA 647; [2021] ZASCA 99) para 25, with reference to Natal Joint
27
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) ((2012] 2 All SA 262; (2012] ZASCA 13) para 18 and University of
Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary and Another 2021
(6) SA 1 (CC) (2021 (8) BCLR 807; [2021] ZACC 13).
(52] On 27 October 2025, the first respondent, through her attorney,
informed the disputed trustees that she had removed them as trustees
under clause 4.3.3, read with clauses 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, of the trust deed.
[53] In terms of the trust deed:
a. The founder (oprigter) (singular) of the Lettie Trust is Johannes
and Lettie.
b. The trustee (singular) of the Lettie Trust is Johannes and Lettie.
c. The purpose of the establishment of the Lettie Trust is for the
benefit of the beneficiaries (Aangesien: Die Oprigter begerig was
om die hierinvermelde Trust te vestig vir en ten behoewe van die
begunstigdes , onderhewig aan die terme en voorwaardes soos
meer volledig hierinlater uiteengesit:)
d. Clause 1.1: Words indicating the singular would also include the
plural and vice versa (Woorde wat die enkelvoud aandui, oak die
meervoud in en omgekeerd; .. .)
e. Clause 1.2.1: "Trustees" is defined as the first trustees or other
trustee or trustees of the Trust from time to time ("Trustees"
beteken die eerste trustees of ander trustee of trustees van tyd to
tyd van die trust;)
28
f. Clause 1.2.2: "beneficiaries" (in terms of the addendum to the
trust deed, effected on 25 June 2015) is defined as Lettie and her
grandchildren, with Lettie and Johannes being the income and
capital beneficiaries of the trust according to the discretion of the
trustees.
g. Clause 4.3. The first trustees will have the right and the authority
to (Die eerste trustee sat die reg en bevoegdheid he am):
i) Clause 4.3.1 deals with the passing away of a trustee and
circumstances that would bar a trustee from acting as a
trustee, such as resignation, mental incapacity, insolvency,
etc., and is not applicable to the facts before this court.
ii) Clause 4.3.2: During their lifetime, in writing, to discharge
any trustee and to appoint someone else in the place of
such a trustee ( Gedurende hut teeftyd skriftelik enige
trustee to ontstaan en iemand anders in sy ptek aan te
stel).
iii) Clause 4.3.3: Through a will or during their lifetime in
writing, appoint another person or persons (including a
person or persons that might be one of the beneficiaries or
might become a beneficiary) to exercise the rights afforded
to the first trustees in terms of sub-paragraphs 4.3.1 and
4.3.2 and 4.3.3 (Kragtens testament of gudrende hul
teeftyd skriftelik enige ander persoon of persone
(insluitende 'n persoon persone wat een van die
begunstigdes mag wees of word) aan te stel om die regte
29
wat aan die eerste trustees verleen is kragtens sub
paragraw 4. 3. 1 en 4. 3. 2 en van hierdie sub-paragraaf uit
te oefen).
[54] The applicants argued that it could never have been the intention
that the first respondent would be allowed to discharge trustees as if she
were the sole trustee of the Lettie Trust. Reliance was placed on the
words "hut leeftyd" (their lifetime), and it was submitted that whilst
Johannes and Lettie were still both alive, they could only take a joint
decision to remove a trustee and to appoint someone in such trustee's
place. As Johannes has passed away, the applicants' case is that Lettie
is no longer empowered to make such decisions on her own.
[55] In clause 7 of his will, Johannes nominated Ansie, Rina and Theo
to replace him as trustee in their individual trusts. Johannes did not
nominate any person in terms of clause 4.3.3 of the deed of trust to
replace him as trustee of the Lettie Trust.
[56] In appointing each child to his or her own trust as trustee in his
place, Johannes' intention was clear: each child should manage his or
her own trust in conjunction with Lettie, Ansie and Messr. Geyser and
De Beer.
[57] In applying the interpretation test to Johannes's will, the only
conclusion is that he applied his mind when he elected not to appoint a
30
trustee in his place to the Lettie Trust and that it would suffice if Lettie
now manages the Lettie Trust in conjunction with Ansie and Messr.
Geyser and De Beer. By not appointing someone in his place, Lettie has,
in effect, now become the sole founder and first trustee of the Lettie
Trust.
[58] As first trustee, Lettie, as first respondent, is bestowed with the
authority to act in accordance with clause 4.3.2 of the deed of trust: she
may discharge (remove) any trustee and appoint someone in his or her
place.
[59) Premised on the above conclusion, it follows that the first
respondent was duly authorised to take the impugned decision to
remove the disputed trustees of the Lettie Trust and to appoint Rina and
Mr Snyman in their place.
[60) The next question is whether the first respondent was required to
apply the rules of natural justice when making the impugned decision.
These rules have their origin in administrative law and are generally
expressed in two maxims: audi alteram partem (hear the other side, or
the audi principle) and nemo iudex in propria causa (no one may judge
in his own cause). Procedural fairness, in the form of the audi principle,
concerns giving people an opportunity to participate in decisions that are
likely to affect them and to influence their outcomes.5
5 Jooste N. 0. at par 40
31
[61] In paragraph 41 of Jooste N.O., the Supreme Court of Appeal
found that the impugned decision, the removal of trustees, however,
does not constitute administrative action as defined in the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and consequently, procedural
fairness in the context of administrative action does not arise, since a
trust is a legal institution sui generis (of its own kind). The Supreme Court
went on to state the following:
"[42] That said, the removal of a trustee is a decision of
considerable importance for the governance of a trust. A trustee
will ordinarily have no claim of right to hold the office of
trusteeship. But there is good reason to hear from a trustee before
a decision is taken to remove them. This is so because a decision
to remove a trustee must be well informed and taken in the best
interests of the trust and the fulfilment of its objects. What the
trustee has to say enhances good decision-making.
[43] Clause 11.1.5 may a/so not be invoked arbitrarily; nor on the
basis of the unreasoned exercise of majoritarian power; nor to
settle good-faith disagreements; nor on the ground of minor
irregular conduct by a trustee that does not affect the
administration of the Trust, its assets or the beneficiaries. What
matters is the proper administration of the Trust, to secure and
carry out its objects, in the best interests of the Trust and the
beneficiaries . But where, as here, a breakdown in relations makes
the task of trustees difficult or impossible, coupled with a real risk
32
to the financial survival of the Trust and the welfare of the
beneficiaries, replacement of a trustee may be the only option.
[62) It is common cause that the first respondent did not give the
disputed trustees an opportunity to be heard. This failure has no bearing
on the procedure the first respondent followed and does not affect her
right to remove the disputed trustees.
[63) On 7 November 2025 (Annexure "A23"), the first respondent's
attorney provided the reasons for the removal of the disputed trustees.
The reasons included:
a. The relationship between the co-trustees has irretrievably broken
down, owing to a confluence of factors, not least longstanding
familial discord.
b. Lettie has informed Ansie on numerous occasions that the
administration of the trusts is not what Lettie and Johannes had
foreshadowed when establishing the respective trusts.
c. Notwithstanding these objections, Ansie persisted in managing
the trusts in a manner she deems appropriate, irrespective of
Lettie's repeated concerns and requests.
d. The only plausible explanation for the continued insistence of
Ansie to retain her role as trustee, alongside Messrs Griese! and
De Beer, is to exclude Theo and Rina from the management of
the holding company.
33
[64] The rift in this family is far deeper than simply a quarrel between
a mother and her daughter. This is clear from the confirmatory affidavits
filed by the grandsons, Phillip Maritz (the fourth applicant) and Theodor
Pistorius (the fifth respondent). Phillip undertook serious endeavours to
restore peace and harmony to the family, but to no avail. Phillip went so
far as to abandon his rights as a beneficiary of the Lettie Trust to avoid
further conflict and create space-tor healing within the family. Instead, it
is evident that there is distrust and animosity between the two family
factions: the Ansie factiorL cmd the Lettie faction.
[65] There is a complete breakdown in the relationship of trust
between Ansie and Lettie. It also appears that the respect one would
expect from a daughter towards her mother has been a casualty in this
ongoing feud. Throughout the correspondence between Ansie and
Lettie, and in the transcription of the meeting held on 10 November 2025,
Ansie addressed Lettie as "Ma" (Mother). On 18 February 2026, this tone
changed. In an email from Ansie to Lettie (Annexure "SA16"), Ansie
addressed her mother as "Lettie" and proceeded in a very formal,
businesslike manner.
[66] There is also a distrust of Lettie towards Mr Griese! and Mr De
Beer. Under these circumstances, the first respondent's decision to
remove the disputed trustees was the only option. Having a discussion
with the disputed trustees would not have contributed in any manner.
The failed mediation and Phillip's sincere attempts speak volumes.
34
[67] The applicants did not criticise the capabilities and bona tides of
Mr Snyman and Rina. The removal of the disputed trustees and the
subsequent appointment of Mr Snyman and Rina can in no manner pose
any risk to the financial survival of the Lettie Trust or the welfare of the
beneficiaries.
[68] In the premises, it follows that the decision taken by the first
respondent was not ultra vires and the application stands to be
dismissed.
[69] Suffice it to state that no convincing evidence was presented to
make out any case that Lettie is incapable of acting as a trustee or that
she is not acting in the best interest of the Lettie Trust and its
beneficiaries, the dismissal of the application requires no further address
on this contentious aspect.
Joinder of Mr Snyman and Rina as the fourth and fifth respondents:
[70] On 5 March 2026, the applicants delivered a notice to join Mr
Snyman and Rina as the fourth and fifth respondents to the application.
[71] The first respondent's decision to appoint Mr Snyman and Rina
as trustees to the Lettie Trust is valid, and as such, it follows that Mr
Snyman and Rina, in their capacities as trustees, must be joined to these
proceedings.
35
Costs:
[72] In Phillip's words, the apparent propensity within this family to
resolve disputes through litigation is surprising. Everyone has the
Constitutional Right of access to justice and to have a dispute
adjudicated. But ideally, courts should not be a battlefield for families to
resolve their differences.
[73] Johannes and Lettie had only the best intentions for their children
and grandchildren when they created the various trusts. From a reading
of the papers, it is evident that it would never have been Johannes'
intention that the fortune he left his children and grandchildren would end
up in a raging war between the two factions. Although they may legally
be entitled thereto, it was disturbing to note that the fourth to ninth
applicants' attorney addressed a letter on 29 November 2025
demanding payment from the Lettie Trust in the total amount of
R2 777 362.00. Was this letter indeed addressed to enforce these six
grandchildren's vested rights, or was it written as a sign of intimidation,
audacity, entitlement, greed or some other tactic? This, whilst logic
dictates that their grandmother, who was part and parcel of ensuring the
existence of the family fortune, is properly taken care of, not only as the
matriarch of the family, but also as the income and capital beneficiary of
the trust created bearing her name.
[74] There is no basis why the Lettie Trust should be left out of pocket
Ironically, the applicants prayed for an order that the Lettie Trust should
36
pay the costs of the application on the scale as between attorney and
own client. Ordering the Lettie Trust to pay the costs of the application
would be in direct conflict with the applicants' alleged noble motives: to
protect the Lettie Trust and the beneficiaries' interests.
[75] The battle between the two factions will result in casualties, and
one of those casualties will be a costs order against the applicants.
Regarding Phillip, his actions are commendable, but unfortunately,
unlike his sister, he supported this application and, as such, will be held
liable for the costs, together with his cousins.
[76] In my view, the urgent application was an abuse that must be
discouraged. Equally, using the courts to settle family feuds and
entertaining aspersions against one another should be dissuaded. In the
premises, a punitive costs order would be appropriate.
[77] Both sides employed senior counsel, and that employment was
justified.
[78] As the disputed trustees were lawfully removed as trustees of the
Lettie Trust, they are no longer acting as trustees of the Lettie Trust, and
they are therefore liable for the costs of the application in their personal
capacity.
37
[79] The second and third applicants were, however, appointed as
independent trustees of the Lettie Trust and are not embroiled in the
familial dispute between the Ansie and Lettie factions. I cannot find any
justification for penalising the second and third applicants in their
personal capacity with a costs order; accordingly, no costs order would
be made against them.
Order:
Consequently, I make the following order:
1. Frederick Jacobus Snyman N.O. and Rosina Johanna Botha N.O., in
their capacities as duly appointed trustees in the Lettie Pistorius Familie
Trust, are joined to these proceedings as the fourth and fifth
respondents.
2. The application dated 3 December 2025 is dismissed.
3. The first applicant, in her personal capacity, jointly and severally with the
fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth applicants, the one paying
the other to be absolved, is to pay the costs of this application on the
scale as between attorney and client, such costs to include the costs
occasioned by the employment of senior counsel.
Heard on
For the Applicants
Instructed by
For the First Respondent
Instructed by:
Date of Judgment
38
Minnaar AJ
Acting Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
: 17 June 2025
: Adv. J L van der Merwe SC with Adv J
Janse van Rensburg
: Gerhard Wagenaar Attorneys
: Adv H R Fourie SC
: Malan Attorneys
: 30 March 2026