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[2026] ZAGPJHC 350
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City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Rosinah (2022/027659) [2026] ZAGPJHC 350 (1 April 2026)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2022/027659
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/ NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES/NO
(3)
REVISED:
YES/NO
In
the matter between:
CITY
OF JOHANNESBURG METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
Applicant
and
MOTLOLISI
VUYELWA ROSINAH
Respondent
JUDGMENT
VAN
ASWEGEN AJ
INTRODUCTION:
[1]
This
is a rule 30 application to set aside the replication delivered by
the Respondent whilst she was
ipso
facto
barred from doing do.
[1]
Contrary hereto the Respondent is seeking condonation for the late
delivery of the said replication.
[2]
[2]
On
30 November 2022
,
the Respondent served and filed a Summons against the Applicant. The
Respondent's claim is one of delict, seeking damages due
to injuries
incurred on
17 November 2022
after she fell into an open manhole while walking along the pavement
or footway on Plein Street, Jeppestown, Johannesburg. The
Respondent
pleaded that the Applicant,
alternatively
the Applicant's employees,
alternatively
the Applicant's agents owed a duty of
care to the road users and in particular to Respondent, to ensure a
duty of care.
[3]
The Applicant served and filed its Special Plea and Plea on
13
February 2023
.
[3]
[3.1]
The special plea relates to non-compliance with sections 4(1)(b) and
4(2) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings
against Certain Organs
Act, Act 40 of 2002 (“the Act”)
[3.1.1]
The Applicant pleads that:
[3.1.1.1]
the provisions of section 4(1)(b) as mentioned above was not adhered
to in that
the notice was not addressed to and sent directly to the
Applicant's Municipal Manager.
[3.1.1.2]
the Respondent also failed to comply with the provisions of section
4(2) as
mentioned above in that the notice was not delivered by hand,
alternativel
y sent by certified mail within seven days of
transmitting same electronically as prescribed by Section 4(2) of the
Act, or at all.
[4]
After the Plea and Special Plea, the Respondent did not file her
Replication within the 15 days required by the Uniform
Rules of Court
("Uniform Rules"), as specified in rule 25:
“
25.
Replication and plea in reconvention
(1)
Within 15 days after the service upon him of a plea and
subject to sub-rule (2) hereof, the plaintiff shall where necessary
deliver
a replication to the plea and a plea to any claim in
reconvention, which plea shall comply with rule 22.
[Rule
25(1) substituted by GNR 2021 in G. 3304 with effect from 15 November
1971, GNR 2164 in G.10958 with effect from 2 October
1987, GNR 2642
in G. 11045 with effect from 31 December 1987.
]”
[5]
The Respondent, as a result of her failure to serve and file a
Replication
in the set-out time,
effectively became
ipso facto
barred.
[5.1]
Rule 26 states:
“
26.
Failure to deliver pleadings – Barring
Any
party who fails to deliver a replication or subsequent pleading
within the time stated in rule 25 shall be ipso facto barred
.”
[6]
The Respondent served and filed her Replication on
2
October 2024
,
without seeking an order to lift the bar.
[4]
The replication was 402 days late.
[7]
The Applicant asserts that this was an irregular step, and served
a
Notice
in terms of Rule 30(2)(b) of the Uniform Rules to remove the
aforementioned cause of complaint.
[5]
[7.1]
Rule 30(1) states that a party to a cause in which an irregular step
has been
taken by any other party may apply to court to set it aside.
[8]
In terms of Rule 30(2)(b) the Applicant had, within 10 days of
becoming aware of the step, by written notice afforded
the Respondent
an opportunity of removing the cause of complaint within 10 (ten)
days. The Respondent failed to do so, resulting
in this Application.
[9]
In terms of rule 30(1) a party to a cause, in which an irregular step
has been taken by any other party, may apply to
court to set it
aside.
CONDONATION
APPLICATION
:
[10]
The condonation application dated 27 November 2024,
[6]
stems from the fact that the Applicant launched a Rule 30 application
seeking the removal and setting aside of the Respondent’s
Replication, which application is opposed.
[11]
In the application for condonation for the late filing of the
Respondent’s replication the Respondent in her affidavit
explains the reasons for the delay.
[12]
The Respondent contends that Advocate Mchasa was originally
instructed by the Respondent’s attorneys and had the
chance to
review both the Applicant's Plea and Special Plea. After considering
these, he saw no reason to file a replication.
[13]
Mr. Nentswuni, the Respondent’s attorney, took all necessary
steps to fulfil the Respondent's mandate concerning
her case,
including arranging a medico-legal evaluation with Dr. D. E. Gantz,
who examined the Respondent on
12 September 2023
. Dr. Gantz
subsequently prepared a medico-
legal report,
which was
attached to the Respondent's notice under Rule 36(a) and (b), and was
electronically served on 27 April 2024.
[14]
The Respondent’s attorney collaborated with the Applicant's
legal representatives to facilitate the Respondent’s
attendance
for a medico-legal assessment by Dr. S. Bugwandin, an Orthopaedic
Surgeon, which was conducted on
22 August 2024.
Dr. Bugwandin
subsequently prepared a medico-legal report, which was served
electronically on
27 September 2024.
[15]
In
September 2024
, Advocate Mchasa became unavailable due to
other commitments and was unable to continue assisting Mr Nentswuni
regarding the Applicant's
matter. Consequently, Mr Nentswuni
appointed a new counsel and engaged the services of Advocate M.C.
Phathela.
[16]
On
11
September 2024
,
the Applicant's attorneys emailed the Respondent's attorney, asking
Mr Nentswuni to clarify how the Respondent planned to address
the
Special Plea.
[7]
[17]
Mr Nentswuni sought an opinion from Advocate Phathela concerning the
Applicant's attorney's request, and the advocate
took some time to
respond to Mr Nentswuni.
[18]
On
27
September 2024
,
the Respondent's attorney sent a second email to follow up on his
earlier request. Advocate Phathela was consulted and advised
that it
is necessary to file a replication to the Applicant's special
plea.
[8]
[19]
Advocate Phathela finalized the replication and provided it to Mr
Nentswuni on
2 October 2024
, who served and filed it with the
Applicant’s attorneys that same day.
APPLICANT’S
ARGUMENT:
[20]
The Applicant's counsel submitted that, due to the Respondent being
ipso facto
barred, it is necessary for the Respondent to seek
leave from the court through an application to uplift the bar before
the Applicant
may proceed with the filing of her Replication.
[21]
After receiving a Rule 30 notice, the Respondent chose to file an
Application for Condonation rather than address the
complaint.
[22]
When a party requests condonation from the court, it is seeking
permission to carry out a specific action that was not
completed
within the designated time frame.
[23]
In this instance, the Respondent had proceeded to serve a Replication
without first requesting that the bar imposed upon
her be lifted.
Counsel for the Applicant contended that it is not permissible for a
litigant to apply for condonation retrospectively.
[24]
The Applicant further asserted that requesting condonation did not
alter or diminish the situation that the Respondent
was experiencing.
RESPONDENT’S
ARGUMENT:
[25]
The Respondent’s counsel admitted that delivery of the
replication was not in line with proper procedure and is
irregular.
He further presented the following arguments:
[25.1]
the court has a discretion to condone the irregular step;
[25.2]
that a litigant should not be punished as a result of a legal
representative’s
negligence;
[25.3]
both the interest of justice and fairness dictate that the
condonation
should be granted so that the matter can proceed to
trial;
[25.4]
the Respondent, being
dominus
litis
, would not act in a manner
detrimental to her own interests. She seeks to have the proceedings
heard without undue delay.
[25.5]
Rule 27(3) of the Uniform Rules of Court
allows that a court may, on
good cause
shown, condone any non-compliance with the Rules.
[25.6]
The explanation for the delay in submitting the replication was
attributable
to divergent opinions among the Respondent’s legal
representatives. The initial advocate expressed his opinion that a
replication
to the Applicant’s Plea and Special Plea was
unnecessary, whereas the second strongly insisted it was essential.
[25.6.1]
Advocate Mchasa, who
initially handled the case, decided that filing a replication
was
unnecessary. In September 2024, however, Advocate Mchasa became
unavailable due to other commitments and was no longer able
to assist
Mr Nentswuni with the Respondent's matter. Consequently, Mr Nentswuni
sought new legal representation and subsequently
appointed Advocate
M.C Phathela.
[25.6.2]
On
11
September 2024
, the Applicant's legal
representatives emailed
the Respondent's
attorney. In this message, they asked Mr. Nentswuni to clarify how
the Respondent intended to address the Special
Plea.
[25.6.3]
Advocate Phathela, convinced Mr. Nentswuni of the importance and need
to
deliver a replication to the Applicant’s Plea and Special
Plea.
[25.6.4]
The Applicant's enquiry
regarding the Respondent's approach to the Special Plea
may be
interpreted as a request for a response to the Special Plea. It was
contended that this conduct could be regarded as a waiver
of any
opposition, as well as an invitation for the Respondent to address
the Special Plea.
[25.7]
The Applicant was not prejudiced. The Replication did not raise
any
new issues but addressed compliance with section 3, 4(1)(b) and 4(2)
of the Act. Lawful demand and notice under section
3 of the
Institute of Legal Proceedings against Organ of State Act, Act 40 of
2002, along with the letter (Annexure “
RV1
”),
were included in paragraph 12 of the Respondent’s Particulars
of Claim.
[9]
[25.8]
Any costs orders should be costs in the main action.
DELIBERATION:
[26]
In
Saloojee and another, NNO v Minister of Community Development
1965 (2) SA 135
(A) the following was held:
[26.1]
condonation of the non-observance of the Rules of the Appellate
Division
was not a mere formality;
[26.2]
the litigant applying for condonation had to satisfy the court that
there was sufficient cause for excusing him/her from compliance;
[26.3]
whenever a litigant realised that he had not complied with a Rule of
Court, he/she had to apply for condonation without delay.
[26.4]
that there is a limit beyond which a litigant cannot escape the
results
of his attorney's lack of diligence or the insufficiency of
the explanation tendered. To hold otherwise might have a disastrous
effect upon the observance of the Rules of the Appellate Division.
[27]
In this case, the condonation application stems from conflicting
views held by the two counsels appointed by the Respondent’s
attorney.
[28]
On
11 September 2024
, the Applicant's legal team sent an email
to the Respondent's attorney requesting clarification regarding the
Respondent's approach
to the special plea.
[29]
Mr. Nentswuni sought an opinion from Advocate Phathela regarding the
request made by the applicant's attorney, who took
some time to
respond to Mr. Nentswuni.
[30]
On
27
September 2024
,
the Respondent's attorney sent a second follow-up email. Advocate
Phathela advised that a replication to the Applicant's special
plea
is required.
[10]
[31]
On
2 October 2024
, Advocate Phathela settled the replication,
which Mr. Nentswuni served and filed with the Applicant’s
attorneys the same
day.
[32]
Upon receipt of the second counsel’s opinion recommending
delivery of a replication, the Respondent’s attorney
acted
promptly. He sought to address a prior omission that had
disadvantaged his client and proceeded in the client’s best
interests. The replication was prepared and delivered on
2 October
2024.
[32.1]
In
Limpopo Provincial
Council of the South African Legal Practice Council v Chueu
Incorporated Attorneys and others (459/22)
[2023] ZASCA
112
(26
July 2023)
at
paragraph 4 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated:
“
Legal
practitioners are obliged to conduct themselves with the utmost
integrity and scrupulous honesty. Public confidence in the
legal
profession is enhanced by maintaining the highest ethical standards.
A lack of trust in the legal profession goes hand in
hand with the
erosion of the rule of law. The Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (the
LPA) replaced the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 and
came into operation on
1 November 2018. Like its predecessor, the objects of the LPA are,
inter alia, to promote and protect the
public interest and to enhance
and maintain appropriate standards of professional and ethical
conduct of all legal practitioners.
As such the Limpopo LPC is not an
ordinary litigant, but generally acts for the public good. Legal
proceedings brought by the Limpopo
LPC in this regard are sui generis
and the disciplinary powers of the High Court over the legal
practitioners are founded in its
inherent jurisdiction as the
ultimate custos morum of the legal profession.”
[32.2]
The Respondent’s attorney, guided by the advice of second
counsel, conducted himself in a professional manner
by acting swiftly
in preparing a replication and presenting and advocating the
Respondent’s case appropriately before the
court. This court
finds no fault with the actions of the Respondent’s legal team
in their diligent pursuit of their client’s
best interests.
[33]
The Respondent’s counsel acknowledged that it is an undisputed
fact that the Applicant's replication was served
and filed late, with
the delay amounting to
402 days.
[34]
The Replication, dated
1
October 2024
,was delivered on
2
October 2024
.
[11]
[35]
Subsequently, the Respondent submitted a condonation application
dated
27
November 2024
seeking condonation for the late delivery of the Replication, which
was dated
1
October 2024.
[12]
[36]
The
condonation application was accordingly served after
delivery of the replication. It is accepted that this is not the
ideal procedural
sequence. However, having delivered the replication
late, the Respondent was obligated to apply for condonation.
[36.1]
It is trite that Rule 25(1) requires to Plaintiff, where necessary,
to deliver a replication to the plea. What this
means is that a
replication must be filed only when it is necessary to do so.
[36.2]
If the replication was filed outside the time limits set by the Rules
of Court (after 15 days), the document was formally
out of time and
had to be accompanied or followed by a condonation application to be
properly before the court.
[37]
On 18 December 2024
[13]
the
Applicant served a Rule 30 application seeking the removal and
setting aside of the Respondent’s Replication.
[38]
It is accepted that the normal practice would have been for the
Respondent to have sought condonation for the upliftment
of the bar
and only thereafter to deliver her replication. However, the
Respondent did seek condonation albeit after the fact (delivering
of
the replication). The Respondent was obligated to seek condonation.
[39]
The Respondent is seeking condonation in terms of Rule 27(3) of the
Uniform Rules of Court. This rule stipulates:
“
The
court may, on good cause shown, condone any non-compliance with these
Rules
.”
[14]
[40]
This court has a discretion to condone non-compliance with the Rules,
which must be exercised judicially on a consideration
of the facts of
each case.
[15]
In
essence it is a matter of fairness to both sides. A judicial
discretion is not an absolute or unqualified discretion
but must be
exercised in accordance with recognised principles.
[16]
The rules have purposely conferred a very extensive discretion on the
court and it is highly desirable not to abridge this.
[41]
Certain factors have been indicated as being usually relevant but the
weight to be given to any factor depends on the
particular
circumstances of each case.
[17]
These
factors are not individually decisive but must be weighed the one
against the other. The cogency of any factor will
vary according to
the circumstances, including the particular rule that has been
infringed. In each case the question is whether
good
or
sufficient
cause
has been shown for the relief sought.
[18]
Good
cause
requires that the application is
bona
fide
.
[19]
Sufficient
cause
includes the litigant’s prospects of success.
[42]
The court may consider several factors, including the following:
[42.1]
t
he degree of non-compliance,
[42.2]
the explanation of the delay,
[42.3]
the prospects of success,
[42.4]
the importance of the case,
[42.5]
the nature of the relief,
[42.6]
prejudice
to the other side
[20]
which
cannot be compensated by a suitable order for costs,
[42.7]
the convenience of the court,
[42.8]
the avoidance of unnecessary delay in the administration of justice
and
[42.9]
the degree of negligence of the persons responsible for the
non-compliance.
[21]
[43]
In this instance, the delay was attributable to differing
perspectives between the two counsels. The second counsel maintained
that a replication was necessary. Upon receiving this opinion, the
Respondent’s attorney promptly acted, the second counsel
settled the replication, and it was delivered. This action addressed
an earlier omission that had adversely affected the client,
the
Respondent, thereby safeguarding her interests. The replication was
appropriately drafted and submitted.
[43.1]
The facts in this case are similar to
N.F
v Santam Limited (11554/2017) [2024] ZAWCHC 12 (26 January 2024)
where condonation was granted for the
late filing of a replication. The condonation was only sought 5
(five) years after the close
of pleadings.
[43.1.1]
In the aforesaid matter the first counsel also saw no need to
replicate but the second counsel
differed in that a replication had
to be delivered.
[43.1.2]
Good cause
and the interest of justice required the
application to proceed.
[44]
The condonation application is
bona
fide
made, especially given the Respondent’s pleadings—specifically
paragraph 12 of the Particulars of Claim with reference
to Annexure
RV1.
[22]
In this paragraph, the Respondent, as Plaintiff, pleaded compliance
with section 3 of the Institute for Legal Proceedings against
Certain
Organs of State Act, Act 40 of 2002. It is evident that the
replication deals with compliance regarding section 3 of Act
40 of
2002. The replication does not introduce new issues but instead
clarifies facts already pleaded.
[45]
The Applicant in this matter, who is also the Defendant in the main
action, is, in accordance with section 1(1)(b) of
Act 40 of 2002, a
municipality and therefore an organ of state as provided for in
section 151 of the Constitution. Furthermore,
the debt in question
arises from a delict and constitutes a debt as contemplated by
section 1(1) of Act 40 of 2002.
[46] Subsections
3(1) and (2) of Act 40 of 2002 require that a notice of intended
legal proceedings must be given to the concerned
organ of state by
the creditor within six (6) months from the date on which the debt
became due. This is a peremptory step before
legal proceedings can be
instituted.
[47]
In
Mohlomi
v Minister of Defence
[23]
notice requirements exist to allow an organ of state to promptly
investigate alleged incidents and claims, enabling it to take
timely
legal action.
[48]
This principle was articulated in
Mothupi v Member of the
Executive Council,
Department
of Health Free State Province
[24]
as follows:
“
The
object of a provision such as s 3 is to enable the State, a large and
cumbersome organisation, to investigate claims so as to consider
whether to
settle
or compromise a claim before costs escalate unnecessarily, or to
properly
prepare its defence – which may be frustrated
if it is unable to investigate
relatively soon after the
alleged incident occurred
.
[49]
The Respondent also had to show
good cause
. Encapsulated in
good cause
is the reasonable explanation for the delay,
prospects of success in the main case, and lack of unreasonable
prejudice to the other
party.
[50]
After considering the explanation for the delay, it is accepted as
reasonable, since advocates may differ in their approach
to
litigation and trial preparation. The court must next assess the
Respondent’s likelihood of success in the main case.
The
Respondent's claim is clearly founded on delict in that she sustained
injuries from falling into a manhole, approximately one
foot deep and
one foot wide, on
17
August 2020
while walking along Plein Street in Jeppestown, Johannesburg. The
Respondent claims that the Applicant or,
alternatively,
its employees or agents - had a duty of care to road users,
specifically the Respondent, to ensure that the manhole on Plein
Street
was addressed and/or repaired within a reasonable
timeframe.
[25]
[51]
The Applicant in its Plea admits to the duty of care subject to
notification of the need for maintenance and repairs
of,
inter
alia
,
road networks, footways, traffic mobility and management of manholes
and /or manhole covers within its jurisdiction; the prioritisation
thereof and the availability of financial resources and manpower in
order to effect such maintenance and repairs to road networks,
footways, traffic mobility and management of manholes and/or manhole
covers and public spaces within its jurisdiction.
[26]
[52]
Upon review of the pleadings and the presentation of the evidence
called for by the Applicant at trial stage, it appears
that the
Respondent has a strong likelihood of success on the merits in the
main action.
[53]
As to prejudice to the Applicant, the replication does not concern
and raise a new issue but deals with a pleaded fact
–
compliance with Act 40 of 2002. It can accordingly not be prejudicial
to the Applicant. In contrast, the Respondent could
face significant
prejudice because non-prosecution of the main action might occur.
Additionally, prescription may become relevant.
[54]
In
Madinda
v
Minister of Safety and Security, Republic of South Africa
(153/07)
[2008]
ZASCA 34
(28
March 2008) para [10]
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that:
“
Good
cause looks at all those factors which bear on the fairness of
granting the relief as between the parties and as affecting
the
proper administration of justice. In any factual complex it may
be that only some of many such possible factors become
relevant.
These may include prospects of success in the proposed action, the
reasons for the delay, the sufficiency of the
explanation offered,
the bona fides of the applicant and any contribution by other persons
or parties, to the delay and the Applicant’s
responsibility
therefor.
”
[55]
In assessing the issue of condonation, this court considers that the
following factors support the granting of condonation:
[55.1]
the importance of this case to the Respondent – the case
considers
a claim based upon delict for damages arising from injuries
sustained by the Respondent where the Applicant has an admitted duty
of care;
[55.2]
the sound prospects of success – if evidence can be lead as
called
for by the Applicant;
[55.3]
the ventilation of all issues properly and fully before a court –
compliance with the Act was pleaded in the Particulars of Claim and
the replication clarifies and substantiates this issue.
[55.4]
the Applicant would suffer no prejudice if condonation is granted as
the replication deals with pleaded facts.
[55.5]
in the event of refusal of condonation the Respondent will suffer
severe
prejudice as her claim will be jeopardized in that it would be
incapable of prosecution, the action can be dismissed which will
result in the mal-administration of justice.
[55.6]
the Respondent has provided an adequate, satisfactory and bona fide
explanation for the delay in the delivery of her replication.
[56]
Since this case has not proceeded to trial, the Respondent was
entitled in these circumstances to apply for permission
to file her
replication late.
[57]
The replication was served before the condonation application rather
than after, which Respondent’s counsel acknowledged
was
irregular because it did not follow the usual order of applying for
condonation first and then submitting the pleading. Nevertheless,
it
is evident that the Respondent has complied with the requirement to
request condonation.
[58]
The Respondent has demonstrated valid reasons for requesting
condonation by giving a reasonable explanation for the delay,
showing
strong prospects of success on the merits, and indicating that
denying condonation would cause her significant harm (dismissal
of
the action) while causing no disadvantage to the Applicant.
[59]
This court is of the firm opinion that the interest of justice
dictates that condonation should be granted. The Respondent
ought to
be permitted to pursue its claim when a compelling case exists and
should not face dismissal or be precluded from prosecution
solely due
to an allegation of non-compliance with the Act, particularly where
compliance has been asserted in the Particulars
of Claim.
[60]
In summary, while the Respondent has acknowledged the irregularity in
the delivery of the replication, this court, in
the interest of
justice, declines to set aside the replication. The Respondent has
demonstrated good and sufficient cause for condonation.
Accordingly,
a proper case has been established by the Respondent for granting
condonation for the late filing of her replication.
[61]
This court condones the irregular step. The interest of justice
dictates that condonation be granted.
[62]
As to costs, this court is of the opinion that the opposed costs of
both the rule 30 application and the condonation
application are to
be costs in the main action.
[63]
I accordingly make the following order:
Order
[1]
The application in terms of rule 30, to remove and set aside the
Respondent’s replication, is dismissed;
[2]
The Respondent’s application for condonation in respect of the
late filing of her replication is granted;
[3]
The costs of both the Rule 30 and condonation applications are to be
costs in the main application.
S
VAN ASWEGEN
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
For
the Applicant:
Adv
K Pule
instructed
by J Fitzhenry Attorneys Inc
Tel:
(063) 698 6650 / (072) 647 594
joanne@jflegal.co.za
For
the Respondent:
Adv
TML Mashitoa
instructed
by Netswuni Attorneys Incorporated
Tel:
(0110 264 1057
info@nentswuniattorneys.co.za
[1]
Case
Lines 005-1
[2]
Case
lines 003-32
[3]
Case
Lines 001-31
[4]
Case
Lines 001-39
[5]
Case
Lines 014-1
[6]
Case
Lines 003-32
[7]
Annexure
“MN1”
[8]
Annexure
“MN2”
[9]
Case
Lines 001-20
[10]
Annexure
“MN2”
[11]
Case
Lines 001-32
[12]
Case
Lines 003-32
[13]
Case
Lines 005-21
[14]
Barclays
Nasionale Bank Bpk v Badenhorst 1973 (1) SA 333
(N)341;
Marais
v Aldridge
1976 (1) SA 746
(T)
752
[15]
Federated
Employers Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd v
McKenzie 1969 (3) SA 360
(A)
[16]
Kathrada
v Arbitration Tribunal 1975 (2) SA 673
(A)
[17]
Federated
Employers Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd v McKenzie supra-362
.
[18]
F
ederated
Employers Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd v McKenzie supra-362
[19]
TLE
(Pty) Ltd v The Master of the High Court and
Others
2012 (2) SA 502
(GSJ)
at [12].
[20]
Securiforce
CC v Ruiters
2012 (4) SA 252
(NCK)
at [12];
[21]
Saloojee
v Minister of Community Development supra-138
;
[22]
Case
Lines 001-20
[23]
1997 (1) SA 124 (CC).
[24]
[2016] ZASCA 27
[25]
Case
Lines 001-18
[26]
Case
Lines 001-28