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ZOLEKA ZIDE Ninth Respondent
MAKHOSAZANA NDLELA Tenth Respondent
TOKOLOGO NGOASHENG Eleventh Respondent
MANTOMBI NKOSI Twelfth Respondent
KGOMOTSO RAMOLOBENG Thirteenth Respondent
ADOLF MAREMA Fourteenth Respondent
TERENCE NKOSI Fifteenth Respondent
MTHUNZI MBULI Sixteenth Respondent
SITHEMBISO ZUNGU Seventeenth Respondent
ABRAHAM MABUKE Eighteenth Respondent
PINKIE NUMA Nineteenth Respondent
ZANELE ZONDO Twentieth Respondent
EUNICE MGCINA Twenty First Respondent
TUMELO RAMOSHABA Twenty Second Respondent
MUZI NKOSI Twenty Third Respondent
JULIUS MAPUTLA Twenty Fourth Respondent
NANDIPHA ZONELA Twenty Fifth Respondent
KGOERANO KEKANA Twenty Sixth Respondent
LONDIWE MCWABE Twenty Seventh Respondent
THUTUKILE ZUMA Twenty Eighth Respondent
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ELECTIONS MANAGEMENT AND
CONSULTING AGENCY OF AFRICA
Twenty Ninth Respondent
NOLUTHANDO WHITE Thirtieth Respondent
JUDGMENT
DU PLESSIS J
Introduction
[1] In this urgent application, the applicant seeks interim relief interdicting the
Regional Executive Committee (REC) from exercising its powers pending a review
under part B of the December 2025 regional elective conference. The first twenty-eight
respondents are the ANC and the elected members of the REC. The twenty-ninth and
thirtieth respondents are EMCA and Ms White, the external agency and its principal
engaged to conduct the elections. Only the first twenty-eight respondents oppose Part
A.
[2] The factual background is as follows: the ANC Greater Johannesburg Regional
Conference took place from 3 to 5 December 2025. The REC was elected at that
conference. The applicant alleges serious irregularities in the conduct of the elections,
namely: a conflict of interest on the part of the EMCA and Ms White; failure to
announce results in-conference; post-conference alteration of results to give effect to
gender parity; and the subsequent discovery of opened ballot papers from the
conference at Ms White’s private residence.
[3] On 17 December 2025, the applicant sent a written complaint to the ANC
Secretary-General. Further correspondence followed in February 2026, including a
letter from his attorneys addressed to Mr Papo in his provincial capacity. No formal
internal decision was communicated to him. He then launched this application in
March 2026.
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Urgency
[4] The applicable principles relating to urgency are settled. Rule 6(12)(b) requires
an applicant to set out explicitly the circumstances rendering the matter urgent and the
reasons why he cannot obtain substantial redress in due course. The focus is on the
absence of substantial redress, not the mere presence of harm.
[5] The applicant does not rely on the December 2025 conference as a trigger for
urgency. Rather, he states that the REC’s consequential decisions are imminent:
preparations for the 2026 local government elections and the Gauteng provincial
conference, as well as decisions already taken, such as the recall of the Executive
Mayor of Johannesburg.
[6] The respondents submit that the applicant delayed for several months in
bringing his application and could have pursued his review in the ordinary course.
They submit that the conference is long past, and that internal remedies remain
available. Much of their address in court was focused on the issue of internal remedies
within the context of urgency.
[7] To start, it must be noted that the possibility of consequential decisions by the
REC existed from the moment it was constituted in December 2025. The applicant did
not seek urgent relief then. That delay is a factor weighing against urgency, but it is
not decisive on its own.
[8] More fundamentally, however, the application is brought prematurely because
the applicant has not invoked the internal processes available to him. For that reason,
too, the matter does not meet the test of urgency.
[9] Membership of the ANC is governed by its constitution, guidelines and rules,
which together constitute a contract between the party and its members, like in any
voluntary association. I would add that it is a contract that must be understood through
the prism of section 19 of the Constitution, which provides that every citizen has the
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right to participate in the activities of a political party. The Constitutional Court in
Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress1 stated:
“Before demonstrating that some of the irregularities raised were established it is
necessary to outline the nature of the legal relationship that arises from membership
of the ANC. At common law a voluntary association like the ANC is taken to have been
created by agreement as it is not a body established by statute. The ANC’s constitution
together with the audit guidelines and any other rules collectively constitute the terms
of the agreement entered into by its members. Thus the relationship between the party
and its members is contractual. It is taken to be a unique contract.”
[10] This should be read with paragraph 73, which states:
“Section 19 of the Constitution does not spell out how members of a political party
should exercise the right to participate in the activities of their party. For good reason
this is left to political parties themselves to regulate. These activities are int ernal
matters of each political party. Therefore, it is these parties which are best placed to
determine how members would participate in internal activities. The constitutions of
political parties are the instruments which facilitate and regulate participation by
members in the activities of a political party.”
[11] The court further recognised that this contractual framework does not preclude
judicial oversight, and that members have a right to require compliance with the party’s
constitution and to challenge unlawful conduct when appropriate. This, of course, is
so.
[12] It is against this contractual framework, informed by section 19, that the
applicant’s obligation to utilise the internal dispute-resolution mechanisms set out in
the ANC constitution and guidelines must be assessed.
[13] Where a voluntary association establishes internal structures and procedures
[13] Where a voluntary association establishes internal structures and procedures
for resolving disputes members are ordinarily expected to utilise those mechanisms
1 [2012] ZACC 31 par 79, relying on Natal Rugby Union v Gould [1998] ZASCA 62; 1999 (1) SA 432 (SCA) and
Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa 1974 (3) SA 633 (A).
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before approaching courts, unless they can demonstrate that internal processes have
been exhausted, are unavailable, or would be futile. This was neatly set out in Sithole
and Others v African National Congress,
2 which I agree with.
[14] Sithole, building on Ramakatsa, correctly, in my view, treats the ANC
constitution as the terms of a contractual relationship between the party and its
members. This has two consequences. First, the ANC is bound to organise its affairs,
including conferences and disputes, in accordance with that framework. The applicant
claims this did not happen. Second, when a member seeks to assert rights under that
contract, he must do so through the mechanisms the framework creates, including the
prescribed procedures.
[15] In that regard, the ANC constitution provides a multi-tiered internal dispute-
resolution architecture (moving from branch to regional to provincial to national
structures, with dedicated dispute bodies). The applicant is an experienced party
member who, even on his own version and papers, is familiar with the constitutional
scheme. Yet, he did not invoke any of the formal dispute mechanisms as prescribed
by the ANC constitution and guidelines.
[16] What he did instead was to address correspondence to the Secretary-General,
followed by a letter, through his attorneys, to a provincial office-bearer. While those
letters reflect his dissatisfaction and the seriousness with which he viewed the alleged
irregularities, they did not trigger the dispute-resolution machinery contemplated by
the party’s rules.
[17] The applicant’s explanation that he did not use the prescribed structures
because his letters were not acknowledged or answered cannot assist him. Nowhere
does he set out any steps taken to formally lodge a complaint in the manner required
by the ANC rules, nor does he show that any competent internal body refused to
entertain such a complaint, unreasonably delayed once seized with it, or otherwise
entertain such a complaint, unreasonably delayed once seized with it, or otherwise
rendered the internal remedies ineffective.
2 [2023] ZAGPJHC 791; [2023] 3 All SA 890 (GJ). See paragraph 22 where Fisher J quotes the process in full.
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[18] In my view, in this case, it is not sufficient to merely state that no internal
remedies need be pursued. To hold that a member may side-step the carefully
designed dispute structures by writing to an inappropriate functionary, waiting for a
relatively long period, and then effectively declaring those structures unnecessary by
launching an urgent application, would undermine the internal constitutional order of
the voluntary association that the courts are required to respect.
[19] I therefore find that, on these facts, the applicant has not exhausted the
available internal processes and has not advanced cogent reasons why those
remedies were unavailable, inadequate or futile. The application is, in that sense,
premature.
[20] I accept that the applicant has acted out of a genuine concern for the integrity
of his party’s internal democracy and electoral processes. That concern, however
sincere, cannot override his obligation to adhere to the internal dispute -resolution
mechanisms prescribed by the ANC constitution and guidelines themselves, to which
the applicant bound himself upon becoming a member.
[21] This finding should not be interpreted as saying that members can never
approach a court directly. There might well be circumstances where, for instance, such
remedies are demonstrably illusory, or are themselves part of the complained-of
illegality, where direct judicial intervention is justified. This, however, is not such a case
on the facts before me.
[22] The matter, therefore, must be struck from the roll.
[23] This leaves the question of costs. I have had regard to the applicant’s
submission that, even if he were to fail on urgency and interim relief, no order as to
costs should be made because he acted from a genuine concern for the ANC’s internal
democracy and had attempted, unsuccessfully, to ventilate his complaints within the
party. While I accept his bona fides, the decision to bypass the prescribed internal
party. While I accept his bona fides, the decision to bypass the prescribed internal
dispute-resolution mechanisms and to enrol an unripe dispute in the urgent court has
nevertheless required the respondents to oppose on an urgent basis. In these