IN THE WESTERN CAPE OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION CAPE TOWN)
Case No. 2026 – 024042
In the matter between:
KEVIN WILLIAMS FIRST APPLICANT
CONCERNED BROTHERS OF THE
KNIGHTS OF DA GAMA SECOND APPLICANT
and
SUPREME OFFICERS OF THE
KNIGHTS OF DA GAMA FIRST RESPONDENT
THE AWP BOARD OF MANAGEMENT SECOND RESPONDENT
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN CATHOLIC
BISHOPS CONFERENCE (SACBC) THIRD RESPONDENT
THE SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE
SERVICES FOURTH RESPONDENT
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT FIFTH RESPONDENT
Corum: MAGONA-DANO AJ
Hearing Date: 12 February 2026
Order: 12 February 2026
Reasons: 02 March 2026
Summary: urgent application -applicant declared a vexatious litigant before--
date of institution of these proceedings to the vexatious order - intention to
litigate or preparatory steps not amounting to instituting of proceedings - service
of application papers could be a ground to argue but issuing of the papers is
required- condonation or seeking leave retrospectively impe rmissible-failure to
prove instituting proceedings before vexatious order was granted nullifies the
proceedings-failure to adhere to warnings to withdraw and consequences
thereof.
REASONS
________________________________________________________________
MAGONA-DANO AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1] This was an urgent application brought by the First and Second
Applicants on 12 February 2026 seeking an array of reliefs some of which were
declaratory orders, interim interdict and further relief directing the further
conduct of the matter.
[2] On the same day, an order striking the matter from the roll with costs de
bonis propriss was granted against the First Applicant as he was declared a
vexatious litigant before instituting these proceedings.
[3] From 16 February 2026 , the First Applicant , requested reasons to the
order that was granted by this Court. These are the reasons.
[4] For convenience sake, I will refer to the First Applicant as Mr. Williams
and use the designated names as listed in the papers for other parties. Only the
First and Second Respondents opposed the application.
RELEV ANT BACKGROUND
[5] Mr Kevin Williams ( Mr Williams) appeared on his behalf and on behalf
of the Second Applicant. The First and Second Respondents were represented
by Ms Samkange.
[6] Prior to dealing with the main application, the First and Second
Respondents raised several preliminary points, including that the App licant had
been declared a vexatious litigant prior to filing this application.
[7] As indicated before t he court upheld this point in limine , striking the
matter from the roll with costs de bonis propriis against Mr. Williams. The
reasons address only this issue, which was central to the Court’s decision.
[8] As indicated before, the point in limine raised was fatal to the application
being heard. The point raised related to an order where Mr W illiams was
declared a vexatious litigant on 04 February 2026.
BACKGROUND HISTORY
[9] It is common cause that Mr Williams was declared a vexatious litigant by
order of this Court case no 2025-058552, dated 04 February 2026, the order was
granted in terms of section 2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956
(the Act). The order partly read as follows:
“1. Mr Kevin Williams is declared to be a vexatious litigant in terms of section
2(1)(b) of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956.
2. No legal proceedings shall be instituted by Mr Kevin Williams, a cting in his
personal capacity or in any representative capacity in terms of which he purports to
represent any legal entity including Paper and Tissue Solutions (Pty) Ltd, against
Thomson Wilks Inc and/or Mr Nicholas John Elliot, in any court or inferior court
without the leave of the court, or any judge thereof, or that inferior court, as the case
may be, and such leave shall not be granted unless the court or judge or the inferior
court, as the case may be, is satisfied that the proceedings are not an ab use of the
process of the court and that there is prima facie ground for the proceedings.
3. Mr Kevin Williams is declared to be a vexatious litigant in terms of the common
law…”
[10] The effect of that order was to prohibit Mr Williams from instituting or
continuing any legal proceedings without the prior leave of this Court.
[11] Notwithstanding the aforesaid order, Mr Williams, acting on his behalf
and for the Second Applicant issued the present application on 05 February
2026 through court online and had it served on all Respondents. Only the First
and Second Respondents opposed the application. As indicated there were
several points in limine raised by the First and Second Respondents.
Point in Limine -Vexatious Litigant
First Applicant’s case
[12] Mr Williams filed a supplementary affidavit relating to this point and
averred that the vexatious litigant proceedings were separate and distinct to
those before this Court. The subject matter of the parties and issues in that
matter ( vexatious application)were wholly distinct from the issues raised in the
current application.
[13] Additionally, the urgent application in this matter was prompted by actions
taken by the First Respondent, as detailed in a correspondence dated 12
December 2026, which had an impact on the interests of the Second Applicant.
On his return from Europe , Mr Williams took a flight to Cape Town where he
attended to the application papers deposing to a founding affidavit which was
commissioned on 26 January 2026. According to him t his was the date the
proceedings were instituted in terms of the law.
[14] Further that he had been trying to load the application papers on the court
online system between 30 January and 04 February 2026, he also sent emails to
court online support desk and attempted to contact the helpline number multiple
times during this period to no avail.
[15] On 03 February 2026, he had couriered hard copies to be served privately
on First, Second and Third Respondents in Gauteng and Pretoria before
issuance in this Court, the waybill from DHL was proof.
[16] On 05 February 2026 upon receipt of a case number at about 08h00 , he
proceeded to serve immediately on the Respondents and by 11:45 am, they were
served.
[17] Mr Williams repeated that the proceeding s were instituted on 26 January
2026, the date he signed the founding affidavit, and this was before he was
declared a vexatious litigant, the latter case was argued on 29 January 2026 and
a judgment delivered on 04 February 2026.
[19] He confirmed receiving correspondence dated 06 February 2026 from the
First and Second Respondents’ Attorneys demanding that he remove s this
application which was enrolled on urgent s court for 12 February 2026 or a
punitive cost order would be sought against him . Mr Williams did not comply
because he believed in the above stated.
[20] He further averred that should the court not be with him regarding his
defence above he was also seeking condonation and that leave be granted due to
the merits of the case and the history of his attempts stated above . That public
interest and the interest s of justice require that this matter cannot simply be
strike out.
[21] To Mr Williams , the proceedings were prima facie meritorious and not
instituted to harass.
[22] The court should find that the proceedings were instituted on 26 January
2026 before the vexatious litigant order. Alternatively grant him condonation
and leave to institute and prosecute these proceedings, with retrospective effect.
The First and Second Respondent’s case
[23] These Respondents averred in the ir answering affidavit that the urgent
application had preliminary issues that were dispositive of the matter in toto,
namely:
a. Applicant was declared vexatious litigant and absence of leave to
institute these proceedings;
b. Urgency;
c. Applicant’s locus standi;
d. Court’s jurisdiction.
[24] They confirmed that Mr Williams was declared a vexatious litigant by
this Court on 04 February 2026 ( vexatious order) . He instituted these
proceedings on 05 or 06 February 2026.
[25] The vexatious order was granted pursuant to the Act in particular section
2(1)(b) which prohibits institution of further proceedings without prior leave,
and it operates prospectively from the date it was granted.
[26] The Act is preventative in nature wit h a purpose to protect courts and
litigants from further abusive litigation. It is not punitive.
[27] Further, Mr Williams has tried to avoid this statutory prohibition using
the preparatory steps taken before the order was granted or attempted electronic
uploads as instituting of fresh proceedings, this he was wrong in. In motion
proceedings, legal proceedings are instituted upon service of the notice of
motion on the respondent.1
[28] That le ave is a precondition to institution and cannot be granted
retrospectively as Mr Williams wanted. Allowing such would negate the
statutory safeguard of the Act.2
[29] To the First and Second Respondent the institution of these proceedings
was in direct contravention of the Court’s order, and this Court should re nder
them incompetent and the application st and to be dismissed on this ground
alone.
ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED
(a) Whether the present proceedings were instituted prior or after the vexatious
order was granted ; if after
(b) Whether Mr Williams lawfully instituted the proceedings by seeking the
required leave of the Court before such institution; if not
(c) Whether can such failure to seek leave be condoned and leave be granted
belatedly with retrospective effect;
(d) Whether the application const itutes an abuse of process warranting
dismissal with a punitive cost order or not.
1 Republikuinse Publikasies (Edms) Bpk v Afrikaanse Pers Publikasies (Edms) Bpk 1972 (1) SA
773 (A).
2 Beinash v Wixley 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA) and confirmed in Beinash v Ernst Young 1999 (2) SA116
(CC).
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
[30] Once a litigant is declared vexatious, access to court is conditional upon
leave, and proceedings instituted without such leave are a nullity attr acting
punitive consequences.
[31] The right of access to courts does not extend to litigation that is repetitive,
meritless, or oppressive and constitutes an abuse of judicial process. Beinash v
Wixley.3
[32] A litigant declared vexatious may not instit ute or continue proceedings
without prior leave of the Court; proceedings instituted without such leave are
incompetent. (Corderoy v Union Government 1918 AD 512 at 517).
[33] Non-compliance with a vexatious order cannot be cured retrospectively
by explanation, condonation, or reliance on alleged earlier attempts to litigate.
(Western Assurance Co v Caldwell’ s Trustee 1918 AD 262 at 271).
[34] It is trite that proceedings are instituted when process is issued by the
Registrar. Preparatory steps, draft ple adings, or unsuccessful attempts to file
papers do not constitute the institution of proceedings. The operative date is the
date of issue (Federated Trust Ltd v Botha 1978 (3) SA 645 (A) at 654E–F).
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
When were the proceedings instituted?
3 supra at 734E–H.
[35] Mr Williams submitted that proceedings were instituted when he signed
the affidavit on 26 January 2026 and therefore not when the documents were
physically filed or served -citing the Absa case .4 This was before the vexatious
litigant order.
[36] He further made submissions suggesting that even the attempts made to
file on several dates on case line from 30 January to 04 February 2026 ought to
be considered as they demonstrated that he was attempting to file these
proceedings well before 4 February 2026.
[37] Ms Samkange submitted th ese proceedings were instituted from the time
the papers were served on the Respondents (after being issued) on 05 February
2026. This was a day after the vexatious order. The preparatory steps taken
before the order was made did not form part of “instituting” of proceedings.
[38] The Absa Bank case Mr Williams depended on was not supportive of his
case, not only was it distinguishable, but his dependence on it was also ill -
conceived. That case dealt with the issue relating to when does service of
process occur for purpose of interrupting prescription. It held that for purpose of
prescription, service occurred upon service of process on the debtor, not upon
drafting or internal preparation of documents.
Analysis
[39] I had taken into account that t he Supreme Court of Appeal repeatedly
affirmed that it is the issue of process which brings litigation into existence.
(Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Oneanate Investments (Pty) Ltd 1998 (1)
4 Mr Williams referred to Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Absa Bank Bpk 1995 (1) SA
653 (A).
SA 811 (SCA); Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005
(4) SA 199 (SCA). Antecedent steps, however earnest, do not constitute the
commencement of proceedings.
[40] Importantly, our courts have also rejected reliance on failed filing
attempts or uniss ued papers as constituting instituted proceedings. In Naidoo v
Matlala NO 2012 (1) SA 143 (GNP), the court held that until papers are issued
by the Registrar, they have no legal force and cannot be regarded as proceedings
before court, regardless of attemp ts to file or serve them. Similarly, in Moulded
Components and Rotomoulding SA (Pty) Ltd v Coucourakis 1979 (2) SA 457
(W), it was emphasised that litigation is a formal juridical act regulated by the
court, not an informal process capable of being initiated by unilateral conduct of
a litigant.
[41] In my view, based on the above, it must be the date of issue of the papers
on 05 February 2026 that can only be regarded as the date of instituting of these
application proceedings before me, this was when the legal proceedings had
legal force. Service thereafter merely perfect ed the proceedings as against the
respondent and trigger ed procedural time periods, while attempted service of
unissued papers is a nullity in law.5
Was there leave obtained to institute these proceedings?
[42] I bears to mention that t he history of this matter shows how Mr Williams
got himself involved in a matter well aware that a court was seized with the
question of whether his conduct warrants a vexatious -litigant declaration.6 One
5 Naidoo v Matlala NO 2012 (1) SA 143 (GNP).
6 The vexatious order application was heard on 29 January 2026 and he appeared in person.
would think he would reasonably exercise restraint and await the court’s
determination.
[43] Mr Williams did the opposite. Strictly speaking, his decision to continue
launching proceedings during that period reflects a disregard for the authority of
the court and illustrates a pattern of conduct consistent with vexatious litigation.
[44] Returning to dealing with the question above, t he vexatious judgment was
delivered on 04 February 2026. He continued to have the application papers
issued on 05 February 2026 and have them served without obtaining leave from
the Court first.
[45] He was approached by the First and Second Respondent’s Attorneys who
expressly informed him that the proceedings had been instituted in breach of a
standing vexatious litigant order. He was warned that the application was
irregular and was invited to withdraw it or a punitive cost order against him
would be sought.
[46] Despite this warning, Mr Williams elected to persist with the application.
The continuation of the proceedi ngs in the face of a clear statutory prohibition
granted by a Court of law and a direct warning , constituted an abuse of the
process of this Court.
[47] The purpose of the Vexatious Proceedings Act is to prevent precisely this
type of conduct and to pro tect both litigants and the courts from repetitive and
unlawful litigation (Beinash v Wixley 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA) at 734B–C).
[48] In my view having found that the proceedings were instituted on 05
February 2026, I find that Mr Williams did not seek nor obtain the leave of this
Court prior to issuing the application. In the absence of such leave, the Court
was not competent to entertain the matter.
Compliance with statutory and court -imposed preconditions to litigation is not
optional and goes to the legitimacy of the proceedings.
Can Condonation be granted and leave granted retrospectively?
[49] Mr Williams filed a supplementary affidavit addressing the allegations
relating to him being declared a vexatious litigant. In that affidavit, he sought
leave to have his failure to not comply with the vexatious order condoned and
that he be granted leave t o institute these proceedings with retrospective effect
from 26 January 2026.
[50] Ms Samkange made submissions that there was no proper application
seeking leave before this Court , this was only mentioned in the replying
affidavit and in any event, such leave cannot be granted retrospectively.
[51] In my view , the nature of the vexatious order is clear on the process to
follow, obtain leave first before you can institute any other proceedings. This
can only be by a full application proceedings, not in the middle of proceedings
through making averments in an affidavit seeking leave with unsubstantiated
grounds. This was improper and could not be considered.
[52] In any case , there was no proper condonation application for bringing
application for leave before this Court. To be clear regarding the notice of
motion before this Court , Rule 6(12) condones procedural non -compliance; it
does not resurrect proceedings that are jurisdictionally barred.
[53] Condonation constitutes substantive relief and must be sought expressly
in the notice of motion, in casu, it was not. It cannot be inferred from or granted
on the basis of explanatory averments contained only in an affidavit.7
[54] Therefore Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules permits the Court, in urgent
matters, to condone non -compliance with procedural requirements relating to
form and time, but it does not dispense with compliance with substantive legal
or jurisdictional prerequisites.8
[55] Once a litigant has been declared vexatious, prior leave of the Court is a
threshold jurisdictional requirement, and proceedings instituted without such
leave are a nullity. 9 Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by urgency , waiver or
indulgence. (Chirwa v Transnet Ltd 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC)).
[56] Having stated all the above in my view; litigation cannot be
retrospectively validated by reference to intention or failed administrative steps.
Procedural acts acquire legal effect only once properly completed in accordance
with the Rules of Court (Western Assurance Co v Caldwell’s Trustee 1918 AD
262 at 271).
[57] Since Mr Williams a cted on behalf of the Second Applicant, deposed to
the founding affidavit on their behalf, their case had to fall with him.
7 NDPP v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA).
8 Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin 1977 (4) SA 135 (W); Phillips v NDPP 2006 (1)
SA 505 (CC).
9 Beinash v Wixley supra.
[58] It was based on these circumstances, the application was struck from the
roll since it was instituted in contravention of a valid court order that declared
Mr Williams a vexatious litigant.
[59] Having reached the finding detailed above, it was unnecessary to address
any additional issues pertaining to this matter. The sole remaining consideration
was the determination of costs related to the application that was struck out.
Costs
[60] Ms Samkange made submissions that a punitive cost order was warranted
in light of the circumstances of this matter.
[61] That as stated o n 06 February 2026 after service of the application to the
Respondents, the First and Second Respondent’s Attorney forwarded
correspondence to Mr Willia ms warning him, amongst others, t hat he was
declared a vexatious litigant and ought to withdraw this application or a punitive
cost order would be sought against him. He defiantly proceeded with the
matter.
[62] Submissions were further made that such a punitive cost order was
warranted to send a message to the applicants and others who abuse the Court
that such abuse shall not be tolerated.
[63] Mr Williams submitted that the Biowatch 10 principle applied, this was a
public interest matter that he ought not be punished for, he represented members
of the public who stood to suffer if he did not intervene as he was requested to
10 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC).
do so on behalf of the Second Applicants and elderly people belonging to the
NPO.
[64] I considered the parties submissions above and can state that I understand
the Biowatch principle to say that in constitutional litigation against the State:
a. If a private party challenges the constitutionality of State conduct in
good faith, and , even if that party is unsuccessful, they should not
ordinarily be ordered to pay the State’s costs.
[65] The rationale is to avoid deterring litigants from vindicating
constitutional rights for fear of adverse costs orders. Constitutional litigation
serves the public interest.
[66] I was not convinced that there was any public interest litigation involved,
Mr Williams is a private person who was declared a vexatious litigant and
should not have pursued this litigation without the required leave.
[67] As he explained his role in this matter , he was merely designated to only
depose to an affidavit and represent a group of individuals who wanted to
challenge decisions made over the years by the governing structures of a n
NPO11 they are members of. Mr Williams confirmed he was not a member of
the NPO and that he had no ties with it.
[68] Mr. Williams completely disregarded the Court’s processes and orders;
despite the vexatious order dated 04 February 2026, he issued and served these
proceedings on 05 February 2026. He initiated these proceedings without
obtaining the Court’s permission and continued despite being cautioned
11 Catholic Order of the Knights of da Gama.
regarding his misconduct. Consequently, he caused the respondent to incur
unnecessary legal expenses and expended judicial time on an urgent basis, fully
aware that he was in contempt o f a court order. I was of the view that a n
ordinary costs order would not have adequately reflected the Court’s
disapproval.
[69] In that regard , I was of the view that c osts de bonis propriis was
warranted where a litigant acts in bad faith, with reckle ssness, or in wilful
disregard of the authority of the Court ( Public Protector v South African
Reserve Bank 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) at paras 223 –225). I regarded that Mr
Williaims’s persistence in unlawful litigation justified such an order.
[70] The costs order had to be imposed, and it was accordingly not punitive
for its own sake, but necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial process and
to deter further abuse.
CONCLUSION
[71] It is based on the above reasons that the order was made on 12 February
2026 that:
a. The matter was struck from the roll with costs de bonis propriis against
Mr Williams (the First Applicant).
[72] Finally, it needs to be mentioned that on 16 February 2026 my Registrar
received a request for reasons from Mr Williams. F ollowing this, he sent
multiple emails over the subsequent days; initially, he sought reasons, but later
his correspondence included threats to report me if I did not provide the reasons
according to his constantly changing deadlines.
[73] The frequency and tone of the communication went beyond a legitimate
enquiry as to progress and amounted to an attempt to impose undue pressure
through threats and influence over the judicial process. Such conduct is
inconsistent with the dignity of the court, undermine s judicial independence,
and is to be condemned.
[74] While parties may request reasons and make reasonable enquiries
regarding progress, the preparation of reasons is a judicial function that cannot
be subjected to pressure or self-imposed timelines.
[75] I consider it necessary to record that the preparation and delivery of
reasons is an integral component of the judicial function. In terms of section 165
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, the courts are
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law. Judicial authority
is exercised without fear, favour or prejudice, and no person (or organ of state)
may interfere with the functioning of the courts.
[76] The delivery of judgment and reasons is regulated within th e
constitutional and statutory framework, including the Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013, and the ethical standards issued under the authority of the Judicial Service
Commission. These instruments recognise both the obligation to deliver
judgments within a r easonable time and the institutional independence
necessary to do so properly.
[77] The timing of Court’s reasons is determined by the proper discharge of its
judicial duties, having regard to the complexity of the matter, the Court’s
caseload, and the demands of justice. It is not open to litigants to seek to impose
timelines, exert pressure through threats, or otherwise attempt to influence the
Court in the performance of its function.
[78] This observation is made to guide future conduct, communicatio ns with
the court should remain measured, respectful, and procedurally appropriate
otherwise courts cannot function if judicial officers are required to work under
the shadow of daily ultimatums or threats of complaint.
_________________________________
MAGONA-DANO AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
For First Applicant: In person( Mr Kevin Williams)
For Second Applicant: Mr Kevin Williams
kevwilliams231@gmail.com
Instructed by The Second Respondents
Counsel for the First & Second
Respondent: Adv Gugulethu Samkange
gugz@capebar.co.za
Instructed by: Thomson Wilks Inc.