(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised
25/03/2026
____________ ______________
Signature Date
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case No: JR374/2023
In the matter between:
CITY OF MBOMBELA MUNICIPALITY Applicant
and
SIPHO WILBERFORCE MASHELE First Respondent
KUVHANGANANI SELBY RATSHIEDANA Second Respondent
Heard: 3 December 2025
Delivered: 25 March 2026
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
representatives by email. The date for hand- down is deemed to be on 25 March
2026.
JUDGMENT
HORN, AJ
Introduction
2
[1] This is a review application in terms of section 158(1)(h) of the Labour
Relations Act.1
[2] The applicant (the Municipality) seeks to review and set aside the disc iplinary
appeal ruling of the second respondent (the appeal chairperson) in terms of
which he altered the disc iplinary finding and sanction imposed on the first
respondent (the employee) by the initial disciplinary chairperson.
[3] The Municipality does not pray for the substitution of the disc iplinary findings
made by the appeal chairperson, but rather the remittance of the appeal to be
heard by an alternative appeal chairperson.
Non-appearance of first respondent’s legal representatives
[4] Before turning to the review, it is necessary to briefly deal with what transpired
when the matter was called on 3 December 2025.
[5] Suffice it to say that Advocate M. Gwala SC appeared on behalf of the
Municipality together with attorneys from the offices of his instructing
attorneys. There was , however, no appearance on behalf of the employee,
nor were any of his legal representatives present.
[6] When the Court enquired why the employee and/or or his legal
representatives were not present ,2 Counsel for the Municipality advised as
follows:
6.1 the review application was initially enrolled for hearing before Savant
AJ on 5 November 2025;
6.2 on that date, there was also no appearance on the part of the employee
or his legal representatives;
6.3 also on that date, the Municipality’s legal representatives had made
contact with the employee’s attorneys who had advised them that they
would not be appearing, but they confirmed that they had
1 Act 66 of 1995, as amended
2 Mngomezulu Attorneys have represented the first respondent from the inception of the matter.
3
communicated the Court date with the employee on at least two prior
occasions;
6.4 prior to 5 November 2025, n o notice of withdrawal of attorneys of
record had been filed , notwithstanding that the employee’s attorneys
had no intention of attending Court;
6.5 in the meantime, there was a concern raised by Savant AJ concerning
the potential of a conflict of interest , resulting in the need for an
alternative presiding officer;
6.6 the Municipality sought costs for the proceedings on 5 November 2025;
and
6.7 the upshot of all of the above was an Order by S avant AJ postponing
the matter to 3 December 2025 , an alternative Judge being appointed,
and the costs of 5 November 2025 being reserved for subsequent
determination.
[7] Given that the employee and/or his legal representatives were again not
present on 3 December 2025, the matter stood down so that the Municipality’s
legal representatives could again reach out to the employee’s attorneys
telephonically. After doing so, the Court was informed of the following:
7.1 an email was sent by the Municipality’s attorneys to the employee’s
attorneys on 18 November 2025 containing a notice of set down for 3
December 2025. It is possible that this email might not have been
received by them;
7.2 the Municipality’s attorneys had, however, managed to make contact
with the employee’s attorney (Mr Mngomezulu) on 3 December 2025;
7.3 Mr Mngomezulu had indicated that he was indeed aware that the
matter was proceeding on 3 December 2025. He had, in the meantime,
not received any further instructions from the employee prior to the
initial hearing of the matter on 5 November 2025 and he therefore
proposed that the matter should proceed in their absence. It was
4
suggested that the employee’s argument in opposition to the review,
encapsulated in the employee’s prior heads or argument ,3 be
considered by this Court.
[8] The above is obviously an entirely unsatisfactory set of developments. It is
trite that an attorney must either withdraw from a matter or continue to act .4 A
legal representative cannot remain on record and decline to attend Court
when a matter is enrolled. This has now transpired on two consecutive
occasions in this matter.
[9] The impression that this Court is left with, albeit open to some doubt given the
non-appearance, is that the employee’s attorneys were unable to secure
instructions from the employee and had therefore decided that they would not
attend Court but would also not withdraw in the hope of receiving such
instructions at the eleventh hour . If true, this would be incongruous with the
ethical obligations of a legal representative.
[10] The Court has nevertheless proceeded to determine the matter with reference
to the papers and the respective heads of argument as proposed. It has ,
unfortunately, not enjoyed the benefit of the employee’s attorneys’ oral
argument in that regard.
[11] In relation to costs, it appears to me that the employee’s attorneys ought to be
afforded the opportunity to file an affidavit with the Registrar of this Court
indicating why an order of costs de bonis propriis would not be appropriate
given their non-attendance on two occasions. This is set out below.
Background to Review
[12] In summary, the employee was charged by the Municipality for allegedly
failing to disclose his interest in a company owned by his wife, namely The Art
Crew (Pty) Ltd , notwithstanding that he was involved in the Municipality’s
3 Filed on 7 August 2024 and apparently prepared by Advocate LP Zwane at the instruction of the
employee’s attorneys
4 See: Sayed NO v Road Accident Fund 2021 (3) SA 538 (GP) (4 March 2021) at paras 18 and 19
5
procurement process in terms of which that company ultimately secured a
contract with the Municipality.5
[13] According to the Municipality, prior to the institution of the charges, the appeal
chairperson had assisted the Municipality in preparing the employee’s charge
sheet. It is worth mentioning that the employee and the appeal chairperson
both dispute this.
[14] After a disciplinary hearing presided over by an independent chairperson, the
employee was found guilty of all charges . T he disciplinary chairperson
imposed the sanction of summary dismissal.
[15] Being aggrieved with the above, the employee lodged an appeal in terms of
section 17 of the South African Local Government Bargaining Council :
Disciplinary Procedure and Collective Agreement (“the SALGA Discplinary
Procedure”).6
[16] The appeal form submitted by the employee on 9 November 2022 states as
follows:
1) ‘PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS
The chairperson has drawn inferences and conclusions on matters
that were not substantiated by testimony, he add and rely on hearsay
evidence.
2) HARSHNESS OF THE SANCTION
The sanction applied by the Presiding Officer does not match the
offence, even though I showed remorse by apologizing for both myself
and my wife in question, however the Presiding Officer continued and
gave me a very harsh sanction. Moreover at no stage did the
employer testify that the relationship between the employer and the
employee was broken beyond repair.
5 There were t hree separate charges proffered against the employee alleging inter alia various
breaches of the Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff Members, the SALGBC: Discplinary Procedure
and Collective Agreement (failing to complete the requisite conflict of interest form provided to him)
6 Circular No 01/2018
6
Lastly could I be furnished with the recordings or transcripts of the
case to assist me in substantiating my appeal.’
[17] Whilst item 1 under the above appeal is entitled ‘Procedural Unfairness’, it is
debatable as to whether the complaint embodied under that heading actually
speaks to the substance of the outcome, being related, as it is, to the alleged
misapplication of the evidence by the chairperson.
[18] The appeal chairperson was subsequently appointed on 10 November 2022.
He directed the parties to file written submissions in support of the appeal.
[19] In a subsequent email concerning the appeal sent by the Employee’s Union
representative on 6 December 2022, refere nce was again made to the
harshness of the sanction and to the employee’s personal circumstances
(including his three dependents and the employee being the sole
breadwinner). The aforesaid email does not , however, include any challenge
in respect of the finding of guilt on any of the charges.
[20] In the ensuing appeal outcome issued on 10 February 2023,7 the appeal
chairperson nevertheless found the employee guilty of charge 1 but not guilty
of charges 2 and 3.
[21] In respect of the findings of not guilty, t he thrust of the decision was that the
requirement for the completion of declaration of interest forms only applies to
Senior Managers and therefore the employee was not required to make such
a disclosure concerning his wife’s company. The Municipality disputes this
and says that the Code of Conduct for Municipal Staff Members, including its
relevant conflict of interest provisions, apply to the employee.
[22] In respect of the appropriate sanction for the finding of guilt on charge 1, this
was altered from summary dismissal to reinstatement . This decision was
based inter alia on the application of the principle of consistency with
reference to other employees who had been purportedly found guilty of similar
offenses but where a sanction short of dismissal was applied.
offenses but where a sanction short of dismissal was applied.
7 The Municipality says that it only became aware of the outcome on 13 February 2023
7
[23] The Municipality is bound by the appeal chairperson’s finding until these are
set aside by a Court. The reasons for this were recently summarised by this
Court in National Lotteries Commission v Mafonjo and Another .8 The binding
nature of the appeal outcome is also confirmed in section 17.15 of the SALGA
Disciplinary Procedure.9
[24] The Municipality raises the following grounds of review:
24.1 the appeal chairperson was conflicted and ought not to have presided
over the appeal hearing;
24.2 the appeal chairperson failed to take into account material evidence,
took into account irrelevant considerations and exceeded his powers by
going beyond the scope of the appeal and altering findings of guilt in
circumstances where the employee only appealed against sanction;
and
24.3 the result of the above errors was that the appeal chairperson arrived at
an unreasonable result.
The Conflict
[25] Counsel for the Municipality urged this Court to draw an inference that the
subsequent conduct of both respondents (employee and appeal chairperson),
including through the filing of a confirmatory affidavit by the appeal
chairperson together with the employee’s answering affidavit, suggests an
improper relationship between them.
[26] This argument was advanced by the deponent to the replying affidavit inter
alia in the following terms:
‘I submit that the fact that the respondents have always had a relationship
may now be inferred from their conduct. In fact, a collusion is glaring between
them hence they have a guilty cons cious (sic) which compels them to half-
8 (2023) 44 ILJ 1991 (LC) (23 June 2023) at para 18. See also: Bergrivier Local Municipality v Swartz
and Another (2026) 47 ILJ 339 (LC) at para 3
9 The clause states as follows: - “The determination of the Presiding Officer of the Discplinary Appeal
Hearing cannot be altered by the Municipal Manager or any governing structure and shall be final and
binding on the Employer subject to any remedies permitted by law”.
8
heartedly explain their relationship. They deliberately failed to disclose to the
Honourable Court that they both worked for the applicant at some stage
before the second respondent joined SALGA.’
and
‘I submit that the inference may be drawn that the respondents actually knew
each other prior to the appeal. This is so because they both worked for the
applicant and at the same time prior to the second respondent joining
SALGA. As stated above, the second respondent was a labour relations office
(sic) employed as such by the applicant at the same time when the first
respondent was also employed by the applicant. The applicant is not a big
organisation. Its employees, current and former, know each other.’
and
‘It is suspicious that the respondents will feel a need to explain their
relationship. The fact that they are collaborating and supporting each other in
this application is indicative of the fact that they know each other. Further they
do not take the court into their confidence by explaining how it is that now
they have the engagements if they did not know each other at all. They do not
explain how they have come into contact so much so that they can share
information as they have done in these proceedings.’
[27] In relation to the threshold for such an inference to be drawn, the Court’s
attention was drawn to the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Cooper and Another v Merchant Trade Finance Ltd 10. Here the Court held as
follows:
‘It is not incumbent upon the party who bears the onus of proving an absence
of an intention to prefer to eliminate by evidence all possible reasons for the
making of the disposition other than an intention to prefer. This is so because
the court, in drawing inferences from the proved facts, acts on a
preponderance of probability . The inference of an intention to prefer is one
which is, on a balance of probabilities, the most probable, although not
necessarily the only inference to be drawn. In a criminal case, one of the “two
necessarily the only inference to be drawn. In a criminal case, one of the “two
cardinal rules of logic” referred to by Watermeyer JA in R v Blom is that the
10 2000 (3) SA 1009 (SCA) (1 December 1999) at para 7
9
proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference
from them save the one to be drawn. If they do not exclude other reasonable
inferences then there must be a doubt whether the inference sought to be
drawn is correct. This rule is not applicable in a civil case. If the facts permit of
more than one inference, the court must select the most “plausible” or
probable inference. If this favours the litigant on whom the onus rests he is
entitled to judgment. If on the other hand an inference in favour of both parties
is equally possible, the litigant will have not discharged the onus of proof.
Viljoen JA put the matter as follows in AA Onderlinge Assuransie-Assosiasie
Beperk v De Beer:-
‘Dit is, na my oordeel, nie nodig dat ‘n eiser wat hom op
omstandigheidsgetuienis in ‘n siviele saak beroep, moet bewys dat die
afleiding wat hy die Hof vra om te maak die enigste redelike afleiding moet
wees nie. Hy sal die bewyslas wat op hom rus kwyt indien hy die Hof kan
oortuig dat die afleiding wat hy voorstaan die mees voor-die-hand liggende en
aanvaarbare afleiding is van ‘n aantal moontlike afleidings.’
Selke J expressed the matter in Govan v Skidmore thus:-
‘...... in finding facts or making inferences in a civil case, it seems to me that
one may, as Wigmore conveys in his work on Evidence, (3
rd ed. para 32), by
balancing probabilities select a conclusion which seems to be the more
natural, or plausible, conclusion from amongst several conceivable ones ,
even though that conclusion be not the only reasonable one.’
Holmes JA in Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Limited v
Koch explained that he understood “plausible”, in the context of the remarks
of Selke J, to mean “acceptable, credible, suitable’ . (emphasis added,
footnotes omitted)
[28] Even on the less strenuous test applicable to the drawing of inferences in civil
matters, this Court is not prepared to conclude that the more plausible
inference to be drawn from the fact that the appeal chairperson put up a
inference to be drawn from the fact that the appeal chairperson put up a
confirmatory affidavit is that there existed a prior collusive relationship
between the appeal chairperson and the employee.
10
[29] It is the practice of this Court that Commissioners of the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration ( CCMA) and Bargaining Councils are
cited in review applications in their official capacities. This ensures not only
that record s of proceedings are timeously dispatched to the Court , but also
importantly affords those presiding Commissioner s the opportunity to file a
supporting affidavit should they wish to do so.
[30] Whilst presiding Commissioners generally do not take such a step, where
allegations of bias or other impropriety are made, it is not uncommon for them
to assist this Court by filing supporting affidavits ventilating issues dealing with
their alleged improper behaviour.
[31] Given the status of the finding of the appeal chairperson, being binding on the
employer, as it is, and the allegations concerning an alleged conflict of interest
on his part, it does not appear to me particularly untoward that the appeal
chairperson might have sought to submit to this Court an affidavit correcting
certain allegations pertaining to him which he contends are incorrect.
[32] The confirmatory affidavit filed by the appeal chairperson does no more than
confirm that he did not know the employee prior to the appeal and that he did
not assist with the preparation of the charges against the employee as alleged
in the Municipality’s founding affidavit.
[33] It is, in my view, at least equally as probable that there was a genuine reason
for the appeal chairperson to file a supporting affidavit together with the
answering papers as it is that there was some nefarious conspiratorial reason
for him doing so.
[34] The same is true in respect of the allegations that the employee and the
appeal chairperson must have known one another because they both worked
at the Municipality at roughly the same time.
[35] An insufficient factual basis is put up to allow this Court to draw such an
inference. To the extent that such an inference was available at all, one would
inference. To the extent that such an inference was available at all, one would
have expected the Municipality’s papers to present a more detailed case,
including by advising of the number of employees employed at the
11
Municipality, the proximity of the employee’s and appeal chairperson’s work,
any shared tasks or work events, etc… Instead, all that is put up is that they
were both employed by the Municipality at some stage, and therefore that
they must have known one another to some extent , thereby purportedly
rendering the appeal chairperson conflicted. This Court cannot draw such a
conclusion without something more.
[36] There are also significant difficulties with the suggestion that there was a
conflict of interest given the appeal chairperson’s involvement in discussing
the charges to be brought against the employee.
[37] For one thing, this is emphatically denied by the confirmatory affidavit put up
by the appeal chairperson. His denial is moreover consistent with a nnexure
FA2 to the founding affidavit, being an email from him to the Municipality
enclosing the draft charges in which he was involved. The attachments to that
email are charges in respect of Messrs. Sammy Knosi and Sibusiso Sumbane
(not the employee).
[38] Whilst subject to a dispute of fact, the denial by the appeal chairperson that
he discussed the employee’s charges with Mesdames. Kgomommu and Phiri
of the Municipality is not so far -fetched or clearly untenable as to warrant
rejection. This Court must accordingly accept the respondent’s version.
11
[39] For all of these reasons, the first ground of review must fail.
Exceeding Scope of Authority
[40] In relation to the second ground of review, however, the Municipality’s case is
more compelling.
[41] In South African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration and Others (“SARS”)
12 the Constitutional Court was faced with
the review of an arbitration award that found that the employer had acted
11 See Plascon-Evans Paints (TVL) Ltd v Van Riebeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] 2 All SA 366 (A)
12 [2017] 1 BLLR 8 (CC)
12
unlawfully by unilaterally altering the outcome of an independent chairperson
and changing the sanction to dismissal.13
[42] In SARS the Court made a number of obiter remarks that are of persuasive
value in this matter. These include the following:
‘[16] He pleaded guilty and a favourable sanction was successfully
negotiated by the Chairperson of the disciplinary enquiry with Mr
Moodley, an employee and a representative of SARS in those
proceedings. Presumably after a discussion with Mr Kruger and his
representatives, the sanction was imposed. It reads:
‘9.5.1 Final written warning valid for six months as well as
suspension without pay for ten (10) days.
9.5.2 Furthermore he should undergo counselling.’
[17] Upon receipt of the report on the outcome of the disciplinary enquiry,
the SARS Commissioner changed it from a final written warning to a
dismissal. This was however done without affording Mr Kruger the
opportunity to contest the appropriateness of the higher and terminal
sanction. As a result, Mr Kruger challenged the fairness of his
dismissal. He referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) for conciliation and
later arbitration. The issues to be decided by the CCMA
arbitrator (Arbitrator) were as follows—
‘2.1 Whether the dismissal of [Mr Kruger] was procedurally and
substantively unfair.
2.2 Whether a Commissioner of [SARS] had powers to convert a
sanction of final written warning, and suspension without pay
to dismissal.’
[18] Mr Kruger was understandably aggrieved by the SARS
Commissioner’s alteration of the sanction, from a final written warning
to a dismissal. Understandably because of the non-observance of his
13 The Judgment related to the reinstatement of an employee who had used vile racial slurs and the
refusal of the employer to accept the discplinary chairpersons finding in that regard.
13
right to be heard prior to making a decision detrimental to his interests
and in circumstances where the Commissioner did not appear to have
the legal authority to do so…’ (emphasis added).
[43] The above remarks represent a trite position, namely that parties with a direct
and substantial interest in the outcome of a matter ought at least be afforded
the opportunity to be heard before a decision is taken that implicates their
rights, more especially in the broader context of employment disputes.
[44] In a similar vein, in the Municipality’s heads of argument reliance is placed on
the Judgment of the Constitutional Court in Morudi and Others v NC Housing
Services and Development Co Limited and Others (“Morudi”)14
[45] In Morudi, an attorney was prevented from representing his clients because
he was purportedly not properly before the Court. This was so, according to
the Court a quo, because his clients were cited incorrectly in their capacity as
directors of the relevant company, and because the company had withdrawn
from the dispute. The wider dispute, however, was related to their
shareholding in that company, with his clients and a number of other persons
being present in Court on the day claiming such a shareholding.
[46] The attorney in Morudi subsequently withdrew , but before doing so advised
the Court a quo that the many other shareholders present wished to address
the Court. The Court did not permit this. A later rescission application failed
because the persons were indeed present in Court , and therefore the
requirements for rescission were, according to the court a quo, not met.
[47] In setting aside the Supreme Court of Appeal’s subsequent decision not to
rescind the Order, the Constitutional Court held as follows:
‘[33] It must follow that when the High Court granted the order sought to be
rescinded without being prepared to give audience to the applicants, it
committed a procedural irregularity. The Court effectively gagged and
committed a procedural irregularity. The Court effectively gagged and
prevented the attorney of the first three applicants – and thus these
applicants themselves – from participating in the proceedings. This
14 2019 (2) BCLR 261 (CC).
14
was no small matter. It was a serious irregularity as it denied these
applicants their right of access to court.’ (emphasis added)
[48] The Municipality submits that the same consideration apply in this matter. The
employee’s appeal was narrow in ambit, the appeal chairperson directed that
it be heard with reference to written submissions and the employee’s written
submissions confirmed that the issue was with the sanction, and not with the
finding of guilt. The Municipality was not afforded the opportunity to deal with
the other issues in the appeal mero motu raised by the appeal chairperson.
[49] The above argument is indeed persuasive. The appeal chairperson
proceeded to set aside the finding of guilt on two charges and alter the
sanction applicable to the employee. It is apparent that he did so without
forewarning or allowing the Municipality to make any submissions in relation
to the employee’s purported innocence in respect of those charges.
[50] In addition, the appeal chairperson also placed emphasis on alleged
inconsistency in discipline. There was evidently no evidence in relation to this
issue placed before him (same being absent from the appeal record) and he
appears to have drawn this information from other cases in which he was
involved. He also did so without asking the Municipality for a response to the
consistency issue.
[51] The collective agreement provides as follows:
“17.8 the appeal shall be heard on the grounds of appeal submitted by the
employee and any amendment thereto by having regard to the record
of the discplinary hearing proceedings and the submissions and
argument of the parties thereof.
17.9 the appeal shall not entail the re-hearing of the matter”.
[52] In Riekert v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and
Others15 the Court noted that a significant departure from a disc iplinary code
and procedure could render a dismissal procedurally unfair. Fairness applies
15 [2006] 4 BLLR 353 (LC).
15
equally to employees and employers in relation to sanctions in discplinary
matters.16
[53] For all of the reasons set out above, the appeal chairperson did not comply
with the clauses of the SALGA Discplinary Code when going beyond the
grounds of appeal cited by the employee and taking into account evidence
outside of the record the disciplinary hearing.
[54] Even in the event that the appeal chairperson was empowered to do this at all
(i.e. given the fairly wide wording of the employee’s initial appeal complaint
‘on procedure’), then at the very least he ought to have advised the
Municipality that the scope of the appeal would be extended to cover the
findings on the merits (in addition to sanction) as well as the issues of
consistency in relation to sanction. This was critical to afford the Municipality
the right to be heard and the opportunity to make any submissions that it may
wish to in that regard.
[55] By not informing the Municipality of the expanded scope of the appeal, the
appeal chairperson effectively deprived the Municipality of a proper
opportunity to be heard in relation to critical aspects of the appeal. This
included the legal issues related to the applicability of the Code of Conduct for
Municipal Staff Members insofar as the employee was concerned.
[56] The appeal chairperson therefore acted outside of the ambit of his powers in
terms of the SALGA Discplinary Procedure related to appeals. This resulted in
an appeal process that was manifestly unfair to the Municipality , and a
consequent unfair outcome which is now binding upon it.
[57] The Municipality’s second ground of review must accordingly prevail and the
employee’s appeal must be remitted for a de novo appeal hearing.
[58] In the premise the following order is made:
Order
16 See National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Vetsak Co-operative Ltd 1996 (4) SA 577 (A) at 589b.
16
1. The second respondent’s internal disciplinary appeal finding dated 10
February 2023 is reviewed and set aside.
2. The disciplinary appeal is remitted back to the applicant for a hearing
before an appeal chairperson other than the second respondent . In
terms of the SALGA Discplinary Procedure, the parties retain the right
to agree to appoint an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators existing in
the relevant division of the South African Local Government Bargaining
Council.
3. The appeal hearing is to commence de novo with the first respondent
being entitled to raise any issues on appeal by way of new appeal
submissions and the applicant being entitled to respond thereto in
accordance with the SALGA Discplinary Procedure.
4. The first respondent’s attorneys, Mngomezulu Attorneys, are directed
to deliver an affidavit within fifteen (15) days of receipt of this Judgment
explaining why an Order of costs de bonis propriis should not be made
as a result of their non- attendance on 5 November 2025 and 3
December 2025 respectively. That affidavit must address, in detail ,
whether Mngomezulu Attorneys received proper notice of the
proceedings on 5 November 2025 and 3 December 2025 respectively
as well as the specific reasons for their non-attendance.
5. The applicant shall, within ten (10) days after receipt of the affidavit
referred to in paragraph 4 of this Order, deliver an answering affidavit
in response to any of the allegations made should it dispute any of the
allegations contained therein.
6. The first respondent shall, within five ( 5) days of receipt of any such
affidavit referred to in paragraph 5 of this Order, have the opportunity to
deliver a replying affidavit to the extent it considers this necessary.
7. The question of costs is reserved pending receipt and consideration of
the aforementioned affidavits.
17
______________________
J. Horn
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
18
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Advocate M. Gwala SC
Instructed by: Mzuzu Attorneys
For the First Respondent: Mngomezulu Attorneys - no attendance