IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE DIVISION: GQEBERHA
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
DATE: 24 MARCH 2026__________
SIGNATURE: __________________
CASE NUMBER: 3903/2024
In the matter between
SHACKLETON CREDIT MANAGEMENT (PTY) LIMITED Applicant
And
NNDANDULENI BERNIS KHAVHADI First Respondent
LUTENDO KHAVHADI Second Respondent
_______________________________________________________________________
Summary: Application – provisional sequestration - - Insolvency Act 24 of 1953 -
(section 8(b), inability to pay debt, not indirect enforcement. Two stage process–rule nisi
and final order. Application – refused with costs.
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________
NTLAMA-MAKHANYA AJ
[1] This is an application for provisional sequestration of the first and second
respondents’ joint estate who are married to each other in community of property.
[2] The applicant sought a provisional order of sequestration in terms of the Notice
of Motion:
(i) that the joint estate of the respondents is placed under provisional
sequestration.
(ii) The respondents and any other party who wishes to avoid such an
order being made final, are called upon to advance reasons , if any,
why the Court should not grant the final sequestration of the
respondent’s estate on a date to be determined by the Court.
(iii) ordering that the costs of this application be costs in the
sequestration of the respondents
(iv) that the applicant be and is hereby granted and /or further
alternative relief.
[3] On the other hand, the first and second respondents who will be jointly referred
to in this judgement as ‘respondents’ opposed this application. Broadly, they
argued that these proceedings were an indirect way of collecting the debt they
owed the applic ant. I n addition, it was not necessarily for the benefit of other
creditors. The reasons will be articulated during the course of this judgment.
[4] In essence, the relief sought and issues to be determined require this Court to
establish the circumstances that resulted in this impasse between the parties.
BACKGROUND
[5] This matter arose out of an instalment of sale agreement between the first
respondent and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (Standard Bank). The
respondent defaulted on this agreement and an application for a default
judgment was instituted and granted against him. This order, with Case Number:
4283/14 dated 13 March 2015 was for the payment of R369.466.61 including
interest and costs on an at torney and client scale. This amount doubled to R738
933.33. Further, the applicant concluded a deed of cession with Standard Bank.
The deed was ceded unconditionally to the applicant on the 01st of August 2017
and with all the rights, title and interest in and to the book debts listed in the
schedule to the cession.
[6] The respondents, having failed to satisfy the debt, several attempts were made
for the resolution of this issue in an amicably way without any results. The
applicant approached his attorneys, Claudia De Combos of Lyn & Main Attorneys
(De Combos ) to take steps on his behalf. The attorneys issued a writ of
execution in respect of movable property against the respondents. The services
of the Sheriff were instituted to serve warrants of executi ng the debt in question,
which also failed. In this instance, the Sheriff initiated this process on 18 April
2024; 03 May 2024 and 04 May 2024 without any succ ess in locating the
respondents. On the 18th of May 2024, after another failed attempt to serve the
writ of execution in terms of Rule 46 at […] Street, […], P ort Elizabeth for the
satisfaction of the debt due , the Sheriff made a Nulla Bona Return. The Return
indicated that ‘after a diligent search , there was no sufficient and disposable
property that could be found to satisfy the writ’.
[7] The respondents raised arguments against this background and will be
contextualized in the analysis of the submissions made. This then brings me to
the issues in dispute.
ISSUES
[8] The centrality of the issues in this application is to determine whether:
(i) the respondents committed an act of insolvency.
(a) the non -payment of a debt amount to an act of
insolvency?
(b) the failure to point out executable assets constitute an act
of insolvency?
(c) the “delay” in satisfying a debt constitute an act of
insolvency? and
(ii) there will be a benefit to creditors if the respondent’s joint estate is
sequestrated.
[9] These issues serve as the lens through which the legal framework may set the
pathway in addressing the dispute in this matter.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
[10] The Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 lays down the framework to determine whether a
person has committed an act of in solvency in terms of section 8(b) which reads
as follows:
(a) […] …
(b) if a Court has given judgment against him and he fails, upon the
demand of the officer whose duty it is to execute that judgment, to
satisfy it or to indicate to that officer disposable property sufficient
to satisfy. it, or if it appears from the return m ade by that officer that
he has not found sufficient disposable property to satisfy the
judgment.
[11] The purpose of this section encapsulates a two-stage process which set s the
tone for the sequestration of the estate. First stage, the Court may grant a
provisional order together with a rule nisi which calls on the party to show cause
and reasons for any factor that may bar the issuing of the final order. This stage
seeks to ensure that respondents are aware of the proceedings against them and
are given an opportunity to counter the action, failing which a rule nisi will be
granted against them. The second stage, on failure to satisfy the first
requirement, would be the legal basis for gra nting the final order due to non -
fulfilment of justifying the case against the final order.
[12] Furthermore, I am of the view that section 8(b) should not be read in isolation of
section 10 of the Insolvency Act. The latter section seeks to ensure that there is a
genuine and bona fide application that will not be prejudicial to either party and
provides as follows:
“If the Court to which the petition for the sequestration of the estate of a
debtor has been presented is of the opinion that prima facie:
(a) the petitioning creditor has established against the debtor a
claim such as is mentioned in subsection (1) of section 9; and
(b) the debtor has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent;
and
(c) there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of
creditors of the debtor if his estate is sequestrated, it may make
an order sequestrating the estate of the debtor provisionally.”
[13] The courts are therefore required to ensure strict adherence to these
requirements because of the impact of the final order not only on the debtor but
for all the affected parties. Such adherence is borne by the fact that the process
of execution will have to be halted until the appointment of the Trustee by the
Master of the High Court . Even after appointment, the Trustee will not exercise
an overnight process because a proper investigation of the debtor’s affairs will
have to be conducted before a distribution to various creditors can be made.
[14] The language of section 8(b) requires the applicant to enforce the judgment debt
after complying with enforcement proceedings before lodging an application for
provisional sequestration. The overall purpose of section 8(b) is to ensure a fair
and justifiable process in the distribution of the debtor’s property. It turn to equally
serve as an advantage to all the affected parties. It is not an indirect enforcement
of the existing debt without having established that the debtor has committed an
act of insolvency . Therefore, the consequent results of provisional sequestration
may unearth other assets that may be available for distribution to creditors. In
essence, it also helps to identify creditors that may not have been known or knew
about the ‘solvency’ status of the debtor.
[15] Thus, in the context of this case, could it be conclusively reached, considering
this legal framework that provisional sequestration will be j ustifiable and
advantageous to creditors? In answering this question, I must first deal with the
submissions made by the parties.
PARTIES SUBMISSIONS
Applicant
[16] In this case, the applicant submitted that the respondents committed an act of
insolvency in terms of sections 8(b) and 8(c) of the Insolvency Act in that:
(i) the Sheriff rendered a Nulla Bona Return when he attended
to execute the writ in respect of movable property,
(ii) by benefiting certain creditors above others as evidenced by
the TransUnion Report that shows that the respondent is
paying other creditors and
(iii) particularly servicing:
(a) the bond with SA Home Loans.
(b) the FNB loans whilst not servicing the applicant; and
(c) Vodacom account.
[17] This is the crux of applicants’ case for the respondent’s provisional sequestration
of their joint estate. This is reinforced by the respondent’s marriage in community
of property which widens the pool of assets for the relief sought.
Respondents
[18] The respondents opposed the application and submitted that the applicant failed
to prove the nulla bona, acts of insolvency and the fact that the application would
be of benefit to the creditors. They disputed the facts relating to effecting of
service and argued against the proper execution of service of the warrant as
recorded in the Nulla Bona Return. They submitted that the servi ng of the
warrant was fatal in that the Sheriff did not satisfy himself with the search for
movable and or in the alternative, immovable property as he did not get into the
property. They contended that the service was never executed in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Uniform Rules of Court. They also submitted that reliance on
the Trans Union Report was nothing more than hearsay evidence to prove the
truth of underlying information reported by a third party . Besides, Ms Bisset, who
filed a founding affidavit, did not have authority to execute these proceedings
against them.
[19] These submissions, as is the case with the background above , do not provide
any significant difference to the material issues to be determined by this Court. In
these circumstances, the submissions will not be exhausted and will be
expanded in this judgment.
[20] Therefore, considering the legal framework above and its link to the parties’
submissions, what constitutes a justi fiable and legitimate reason that will be
beneficial to the applicant should an order of provisional sequestration be
granted? Secondly, what impact would it have on the respondents? Lastly, how
does it become of benefit to creditors which are not limited to the applicant?
DISCUSSION
[21] The main issue in this application was to establish whether the respondents
committed an act of insolvency. Secondly, whether such an act was prejudicial to
other creditors. Lastly, whether the applicant provided sufficient reasons to justify
the order for provisional sequestration of the respondent’s estate.
[22] Let me reiterate, a provisional sequestration is a step that requires a party or
anyone to show cause on the return date as to the reasons why it should not be
made final. It serves as a bridge towards the order of final sequestration. This is
of significance in that it sets the bar high to minimize any possibility of litigious
behavior that may not only undermine the foundations that regulate the principles
of a provisional order but the final order itself. The view was similarly endorsed
by Windell J in Body Corporate of Charlemagne v Drysdale1 who held:
1Body Corporate of Charlemagne v Drysdale [2026] ZAGPHC 68.
“[The relief sought in sequestration proceedings] is not merely a matter of form. It
reflects a failure to appreciate the statutory scheme and the safeguards built into
the Act for debtors, creditors, employees and other affected parties.
Sequestration orders have far-reaching consequences: upon the grant of such an
order, a debtor is divested of his or her estate, which vests in the Master until a
trustee is appointed and thereafter in the trustee. The application must therefore
be assessed strictly against t he requirements for a provisional sequestration
order, failing which it cannot succeed,”2 (emphasis mine).
[23] I turn now to the subject of contention in this matter. I must state that an act of
insolvency is the creation of a statute in terms of section 8(b) of the Insolvency
Act. It is also qualified by meeting the requirements that are provided in terms of
section 9 which include amongst others, (i) the disclosure of the respondent’s
marital status and full particulars of the spouse, (ii) service of the application on
the Master, (iii) South African Revenue Services (SAR S); (iv) debtor’s
employees; (v) registered trade union s and (vi) valid and timeous certificate by
the Master that an adequate security has been lodged and (vii) filing of an
affidavit setting out how the service was effected by the person who effected it. In
this case, the applicant demonstrated compliance with these requirements. The
satisfaction of this obligation is not in dispute. However, his confirmation that he
was not aware of any employees employed by the respondent is not viewed by
this Court as mala fide. Taking all the relevant factors cumulatively , the dismissal
of the case based on a technicality will limit the evolution of the principles relating
to the overall scheme of the Insolvency Act.
[24] The applicant argued that the respondents’ inability to service their principal debt
was indicative of factual and prima facie evidence of the act of insolvency .
was indicative of factual and prima facie evidence of the act of insolvency .
According to him, it justified the order of obtaining the provisional sequestration.
In rebuttal, the respondents submitted that the value of their property exceed ed
the amount owed to the applicant . I am inclined to accept this submission. This
2 Ibid para 3.
was not disputed by the applicant as he equally submitted an audit of the
respondent’s financial standing.
[25] It is also of significance that I deal with the question of the Nulla Bona Return
after the Sheriff made several attempts to effect service to no avail. This is
prompted by the respondent’s argument about its effective service. As noted
above, on the 18th of May 2024, the second respondent was at the ir place of
residence when the Sheriff arrived to execute the warrant. Thus, the Sheriff
demanded the amount due and for the respondent to sign the writ. T here was an
exchange between them and the respondents said that it was ‘impossible to pay
the amount claimed or any amount ’ brings to the question raised above whether
it constituted an act of insolvency? How does the mere response of not having
money to satis fy the debt amount to an act of insolvency? In essence, does the
Sheriff able to determine whether the respondents were “factually” insolvent?
These questions might be raised, they are of significance in that Rule 4(1)(a)(iv)
of the Uniform Rules of Court empowers the Sheriff to first, ‘serve a notice or
process of court at a domicilium citandi by delivering or leaving the notice or
process in a manner by which in the ordinary course the notice or process would
come to the attention and be received by the intended recipient . Secondly, report
to the court how the process was served and why it was served in that manner. ’
In this case, the respondent was at her place of residence and was shown the
writ of execution, thus, she refused to sign it. Let me repeat, does the refusal to
sign a writ constitute an act of insolvency? It also trite mentioning that there was
a Nulla Bona Return which was made on the 12th of June 2020 at the height of
COVID-19 pandemic.
[26] This Court is inclined not to pronounce on this Return except for raising its
“eyebrows” about the period between that return and the 2024 return. This Court
“eyebrows” about the period between that return and the 2024 return. This Court
was of the view that the 2020 return could not have been used as the legal basis
in this application. This raised the question of the benefit that returns could have
in these proceedings. The initiation of this process in the year 2020 and only to
be re-started in the year 2024 leaves this Court finding itself with the difficulty of
establishing what could have been the cause of delaying the execution of the
2020 order at that time when it was granted. I am persuaded by the respondents
who argued that the period between 2020 and 2024 rendered th at return as stale
with no force and effect. The applicant might have indicated and is evident from
the papers and o ral argument that various attempts were pursued to resolve the
impasse between them with the possibility of settling the debt to no avail. Thus,
the crux of the issue was the existence of a court order that was supposed to
have been executed at the time when it was issued. After the passage of time,
what effect does the 2020 order had in showing the respondent’s indebtedness
which in turn should prove an act of insolvency when it was not executed?
[27] Let me revert, the respondents in their answering affidavit averred that their
estate was not insolvent. They referred to and argued that the amount owed to
the applicant is far less than the value of their estate as to be indicated below .
Cumulatively, the respondents argued that the total assets were beyond the
amount they owe to the applicant. However, if the respondents have more assets
to satisfy the debt raised a question about what could have been the reason for
not paying the debt ? To what extent should creditors go in ensuring the
enforcement of the debt owed? It is incomprehensible that the respondents will
not pay the debt even after a default judgment was granted against them. This
Court was unable to fi nd a justifiable reason if they have more assets and could
not satisfy the debt?
[28] Another issue raised by the respondents which this Court viewed as n ot having
legal basis was the argument against the authority of Ms Bisset who was granted
authority to act on behalf of the applicant , Ms Bisset was vested with all the
authority to act on behalf of the applicant , Ms Bisset was vested with all the
authority to undertake any function or role that is directly linked to the company.
This appointment was properly captured in a meeting of Dire ctors that was held
on the 19th of May 2022. In this regard, the respondents clutched legal straws
which this Court dismisses and could not go beyond the dismissal itself as it saw
no need for further consideration by this Court . This Court frowned upon the
basis relied on when the established facts were placed before it relating to the
authority that was vested on Ms Bisset.
[29] The overall relief and arguments against it, as gleaned from both parties’
affidavits, raised another contentious issue relating to the commission of an act
of insolvency and inability to pay the debt owed. Let me assume, I am correct, to
what extent an order of provisional sequestration will be of benefit to creditors?
ADVANTAGES TO CREDITORS?
[30] The Insolvency Act seeks to ensure that there are fair processes and equitable
distribution of the debtor’s assets to the benefit and an advantage to all creditors.
The main legal issue in both papers and oral arguments was related to the extent
to which the provisional sequestration may be of equal benefit to other cr editors.
Kooverjie J in Body Corporate Acubens v Foforane 3 simply stated that the
‘applicant is required to satisfy two requirements [whether] the respondent had
committed an act of insolvency and the sequestration will be of benefit to th e
creditors.’4 This means that t he provisional sequestration is not individualistic in
approach. It seeks to ensure that creditors that might be owed by the debtor are
afforded an opportun ity to have their claims satisfied when the final order is
made. Reddy J in Prevance Bonds (PTY) Ltd v XYD Property Group (PTY) Ltd 5
had put a legal perspective on the benefit that is linked to creditors and held:
“… the hand of law is laid upon the estate of the general body of creditors
that must be considered. No transaction can thereafter be entered into
regarding estate matters by a single creditor to the prejudice of the
3 Body Corporate Acubens v Foforane [2025] ZAGPPHC 649.
4 Ibid para 22.
5Prevance Bonds (PTY) Ltd v XYD Property Group (PTY) Ltd (3506/24) [2026] ZANWC 32.
general body. The claim of each creditor must be dealt with as it existed at
the issue of the order.”6
[31] Ponnan ADP in Liberty Group Limited v Moosa7 provided further guidance on the
purpose of provisional sequestration and the benefit it would have in the
creditors. He held:
“Advantage to creditors may lie in the prospect of finding assets falling into the
insolvent estate, which may have been concealed or improperly disposed of. It
will be sufficient if the creditor, on an overall view on the papers, can show, for
example, that there are reasonable grounds for coming to the conclusion that
upon investigation and inquiry a trustee may be able to unearth assets that might
then be attac hed, sold and the proceeds disposed of for distribution amongst
creditors.”8
[32] It is deduced from above that the applicant must prove the inability of the
respondents to pay the debt. On the other hand, this Court is required to be
careful in assessing whether a legitimate case of provisional sequestration has
been made and it will also be of benefit to other cre ditors. Provisional
sequestration is not made for an aggrieved party to indirectly use the law under
the name of the interests of a benefit to other creditors. Fourie J in OBC
Distribution Centre (Pty) Ltd t/a OBC Cold Storage v Correia 9 had put this Cour t
at ease as he held:
“A court must be cautious to infer insolvency from circumstances. … the
inability to pay a debt should not be taken out of its context, for it may be
“consistent with a state merely of temporary financial embarrassment” or
6 Ibid para 12.
7 Liberty Group Limited v Moosa [2023] ZASCA 52.
8 Ibid para 27.
9OBC Distribution Centre (Pty) Ltd t/a OBC Cold Storage v Correia [2014] ZAGPPHC 743.
due to “commercial insolvency” in circumstances where a debtor’s
liabilities do not exceed the value of his assets.”10
[33] It is drawn from above that an application for a provisional sequestration must be
considered holistically and not to be based on silky grounds that will not stand
legal scrutiny. Similarly, the applicants are placed on an equal footing to ensure
that they will not scratch around and engage in a nationwide chase of who might
be creditors that will also benefit from the sequestration. The consequent result
of provision al sequestration must be its outcome and not the first step itself.
Cachalia JA in Naidoo v Absa Bank Ltd11 in concurrence Windell J, held:
“Sequestration proceedings are not in and of themselves ‘legal
proceedings to enforce the agreement’ ...... [ They ] are instituted by a
creditor against a debtor not for the purpose of claiming something from
the latter, but for the purpose of setting the machinery of the law in motion
to have the debtor declared insolvent’ – they are not proceedings ‘for the
recovery of a debt’.... [And] rights of the two litigants but also of third
parties, and involves the distribution of the insolvent’s property to various
creditors, while restricting those creditors’ ordinary remedies and imposing
disabilities on the insol vent – it is not an ordinary judgment entitling a
creditor to execute against a debtor.”12
[34] The applicant, in his founding affidavit which was corroborated by the
respondents in their answering affidavit affirmatively put this Court into
confidence th at the respondent’s debt exceeded the amount owed to the
Applicant. The applicant was privy to the respondent’s status quo as he recorded
that the respondents purchased the property on 13 November 2009 and was
registered at the King William’s Town Deeds Of fice on 10 March 2010. The said
property was described as:
10 Ibid para 4.
11Naidoo v Absa Bank Ltd [2010] 4 All SA 496.
12 Ibid para 4 (footnotes omitted).
“ERF [… … …. ] Township, [… Measuring 917 (Nine Hundred and
Seventeen) Square Metres Held by a Deed of Transfer […] Situated at […]
[ … ], Port Elizabeth.”
[35] As adduced by the applicant before this Court, a t the time of regist ering the
property, the respondents passed a bond in favour of SA Home Loans for R740
000.00. The value of the property had since increased to R1 140 000.00 and R2
300 000.00 with a municipal value of R1 50 0 000.00. The applicant went on to
submit that the SA Home Loans bond was at R287 216. 00 and the sale price of
the property should be in the region of R1 140 000.00 and R2 3000 000.00. The
applicant further brought to the attention of this Court the judgement by Cameron
J in Commissioner for Sou th African Revenue Services v Hawker Air Services
(Pty) Ltd; Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Hawker Aviation
services Partnership 13 who held that ‘the prospect of a benefit should not be
remote and reasonable belief should exist that an investigation might be
unearthed for the benefit of creditors. ’14 In this case, the benefit does not fall
within the classification of a reasonable belief because, first, the identified
creditors were owed far less than the amount that could have contributed to the
determination of the act of inso lvency. Secondly, given that the debts owed by
the respondents to SA Home Loans: R287 216; FNB; R1519 and Vodacom R204
and the applicant R622 021. 81 in total amount R910 960. 81. This Court
considered the amount owed by the applicant to the respondents of R116 911.41
which reduces the total amount owed by the respondents to R794 048.59 . The
applicant’s calculations of the value of the respondents exceeds the amount they
owed to credi tors. What value does this application bring to the creditors? What
reasonable belief will be held to exist when a pecuniary loss to the creditors does
not constitute any act of insolvency? In these circumstances, it is linked to the
not constitute any act of insolvency? In these circumstances, it is linked to the
Sheriff’s return of not finding any executable assets at the responde nt’s place of
13 Commissioner for South African Revenue Services v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner for
South African Revenue Service v Hawker Aviation services Partnership 2006 (4) SA 292 (SCA).
14 Ibid para 29.
residence. It is my view that the Sheriff has limited authority in terms of proving
the ‘factual’ status relating to the act of insolvency.
[36] The Applicant further identified that the respondents are director s / members of
three entities:
(i) The Big Tree Holiday Lodge CC, [… ].
(ii) Expansum Capital (Pty) Ltd, […] and the newly registered entity in
2023:
(iii) Mirero Studio (Pty) Ltd, [ …]
[37] I am not going to reproduce this information because it is also in the respondent’s
answering affidavits. In the circumstances of the established facts, what
constitutes an act of insolvency as measured against the R622 021.81 debt that
is owed by the respondents to the applicant? Is this not the abuse of the court
processes and the applicant used an indirect attempt to enforce the default
judgment against the respondents ? In concurrence with Windell J and C achalia
above, I reiterate that “ the declaration of insolvency in the interest of creditors
does serve as an alternative to debt -collection mechanism where execution
remains available.”15
[38] It is, therefore, my respectful view that this application was not about the benefit
of creditors but ‘self-serving approach’ which is an indirect mechanism to enforce
the applicant’s own default judgment against the respondents. The use of
provisional sequestration is an abuse of the processes of this Court. It was also a
misapplication of the content of section 8(b) of the Insolvency Act. In this regard,
the applicant ha d placed a limited number of audited potential creditors (SA
Home Loans, Loans and Voda com) that do not indicate an excess of the
respondent’s financial liability that could have enabled the determination of the
act of insolvency. The applicant was also not better placed to claim the amount
15 See note 1 above and note 11.
due because it was a lso below the amount that is owed by the respondents. In
essence, the applicant, including the three creditors, outweighs any argument
that may counter the respondent’s financial liabilities. The respondent’s financial
capacity was laid bare and could not have gone beyond an enquiry in
establishing whether there were assets that could have been hidden . This was
important for this case because as Twala J stated in Mercantile Bank Limited A
Division of Capitec Bank Limited v Ross 16 ‘securing the pecuniary benefit to the
creditors … to protect the general body of the public [was beyond was the scope
of the applicant’s investigation into the assets that could have been hidden by the
respondents].’17 Therefore, t he servicing of debts held by the respondents with
the existing creditors was immaterial because they d id not constitute a prejudice
against them, including the applicant. The value of the respondents’ assets had
been factually established that they do not fall within the category of section 8(b)
of the Insolvency Act.
[39] A proper conspicuous of evidence did not lead to the conclusion that provisional
sequestration was necessary . Provisional sequestration procedures should not
be used as a form of punishment and a pretext of benefit to other creditors. It is
my view that there were no justifiab le reasons that could have resulted in the
provisional sequestration of the respondents’ assets to ensure the subsequent
benefit to the applicant and other creditors . Therefore, I do not see any reason
that justified the success of this application.
[40] It is also a standing principle that costs should follow the results . The costs are
meant to justify the merits of each case. They are not as a measure to punish the
loosing litigant. In the circumstances, the costs will be ordered as they appear
below.
[41] In the result, the following order is made:
16 Mercantile Bank Limited A Division of Capitec Bank Limited v Ross [2023] ZAGPJHC 435.
16 Mercantile Bank Limited A Division of Capitec Bank Limited v Ross [2023] ZAGPJHC 435.
17 Ibid para 25.
[41.1] The application for a provisional sequestration of the First and Second
Respondent’s joint estate is refused.
[41.2] The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of this application on Scale B
including the cost of one Counsel where so employed.
___________________________
N NTLAMA-MAKHANYA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GQEBERHA
.
Delivery: This judgment is issued by the Judge whose name appears herein and is
submitted electronically to the parties /legal representatives by email. Its date of
delivery is deemed 24 March 2026.
Date Heard: 12 February 2026
Date Delivered: 24 March 2026
Appearances:
Applicant: Advocate KD Williams
Gqeberha
Instructing Attorneys: Lynn & Main
Strahavon
Respondent: Advocate D Madokwe
Gqeberha
Instructing Attorneys: Makaba & Partners Inc
Randburg