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THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case no: 2026-062610
In the matter between:
FADEL LOGISTICS SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD Applicant
And
THE REVOLUTIONARY UNION OF SOUTH
AFRICA (RETUSA)
First Respondent
MEMBERS OF RETUSA LISTED IN A Second Respondent
MEMBERS OF RETUSA LISTED IN B Third Respondent
NATIONAL BARGAINING COUNCIL FOR THE
ROAD FREIGHT AND LOGISTICS INDUSTRY
Fourth Respondent
Heard: 18 March 2026
Delivered: 18 March 2026
Application brought ex parte to interdict strike before its commencement –
section 68(2) of the LRA requiring 48 hours’ notice to trade union – imminence
of strike not grounds for lesser period of notice – interdict refused.
(1) Reportable: Yes
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes
_________ ________
Signature Date
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JUDGMENT
HARVEY J
[1] This is an urgent application for a rule nisi interdicting the respondents,
including identified employees, from participating in contemplated strike action,
declaring the intended strike unprotected on the basis that the strike notice is
alleged to be defective, and restraining the respondents from engaging in
unlawful conduct including violence and obstruction, pending the return date.
[2] The application is placed before me ex parte.
[3] From the founding papers it appears that t he applicant received a strike notice
on 16 March 2026 giving notice of a strike set to commence on 19 March 2026
at 06h00.
[4] It was submitted from the bar that at 21h30 on the evening of 16 March 2026
the applicant emailed the union calling upon it to retract the notice. This email
was not placed before the court. The present application was instituted on 17
March 2026 with no notice to the respondents.
[5] Section 68 of the LRA regulates strikes and lockouts which are not in
compliance with the LRA. Section 68(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on this
Court to grant orders restraining persons from participating in a strike or any
conduct in furtherance or contemplation of a strike. That power is expressly
limited by section 68(2), which provides that the Court may not grant an order
restraining a strike unless at least 48 hours’ notice of the application has been
given to the respondent s. A shorter period may however be permitted only if
written notice of the intention to apply for an order has been given, the
respondent has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard before a
decision is taken, and good cause has been shown why a period shorter than
48 hours should be permitted. The section is peremptory in its terms.
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[6] As the application was brought ex parte the Court asked counsel to address it
on the requirements of s68(2).
[7] Counsel for the applicant initially submitted that section 68(2) does not apply
where strike action has not yet commenced. That submission cannot be
sustained. Section 68(1) expressly empowers the Court to interdict both actual
and contemplated strike action. The limitation in section 68(2) attaches to the
grant of an order restraining a strike. It is not confined to strikes that have
already commenced. In court, c ounsel properly conceded that the subsection
also applies in circumstances where strike action is anticipated.
[8] It was next submitted on behalf of the applicant that prior notice to the
respondents was not required because the relief sought is interim in nature – as
it is coupled with a rule nisi, the respondents may anticipate the return date.
[9] That contention cannot be sustained. Section 68(2) applies to any order
restraining a strike, including interim relief. An order granted together with a rule
nisi operates immediately and limits the exercise of the right to strike. The fact
that the relief is framed as interim, or that a return date is provided, does not
displace the requirement that the respondent be given notice and a reasonable
opportunity to be heard before the order is granted. A hearing after the grant of
an interim interdict does not satisfy the subsection.
[10] In addition, t he applicant relied on the imminence of the strike following a 48
hour strike notice to argue that the matter should be heard urgently . That is the
ordinary statutory position and does not constitute good cause for dispensing
with notice of an interdict application. If it did, the protection afforded by section
68(2) would be rendered ineffective.
[11] Reliance was in addition placed on the applicant’s concerns about potential
violence and harm should the strike proceed. Those concerns are based on
violence and harm should the strike proceed. Those concerns are based on
allegations which are untested. They do not, in any event, bring the application
within section 68(2) , which does not provide for ex parte relief. That section
permits only a shorter period of notice, subject to compliance with its
requirements.
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[12] No basis was laid upon which this Court could conclude that even a truncated
period of notice could not have been afforded, or that the respondents could
not have been heard before the order was sought.
[13] To the extent that the application is motivated by the absence of agreed
picketing rules, that is a separate issue. The regulation of picketing does not
determine the existence of the right to strike. Disputes concerning picketing
rules are to be pursued through the mechanisms provided for in the Act , and
the Court notes that the applicant has already referred such a dispute to the
fourth respondent bargaining council . The absence of agreed picketing rules is
not a basis upon which this Court will interdict strike action in circumstances
where the 68(2) notice requirement has not been met.
[14] In these circumstances, the applicant has not brought itself within section 68(2),
and the interdictory relief sought cannot be granted.
Order
[1] The application is dismissed.
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SJ Harvey
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
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Appearances:
For the Applicant: Mr Zwane instructed by Dentons South Africa