IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case No : 077258/2025
DATE: 11 -02- 2026
In the matter between:
EXOTHERMIC AND RAILWAY Applicant / Plaintiff
TECHNOLOGY (PTY) LTD
and
THERMITREX (PTY) LTD Respondent / Defendant
J U D G M E N T
MOULTRIE, J : This is an application that is interlocutory to
an interlocutory application in a matter that commenced as
an action. The applicant in the current interlocutory
application is the plaintiff in that action.
Amongst other various interlocutory skirmishes that
the parties are involved in , in relation to the action, is a Rule
30 application that the defendant launched during August
2025. I will refer to that application in this judgment as “ the
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE :
(1) REPORTABLE : No
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES : No
(3) REVISED : YES (23 March 2026)
....................................................
SIGNATURE
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Rule 30 application”, despite the fact that at least one other
Rule 30 application has been brought in the action .
The Rule 30 application has been met by an answering
affidavit, and a replying affidavit has also been filed. The
Rule 30 application is thus ripe for enrolled in the ordinary
course on the opposed motion court roll .
The relief sought before me is an order declaring that
the Rule 30 application is fatally defective and that it is liable
to be dismissed. The basis advanced for this relief by Mr
Sambane, the director of the applicant who purports to
represent it , is the allegation that the defendant in the action
is not diligently prosecuting the determination of the Rule 30
application via the opposed motion court roll. Even assuming
that this contention is valid, the appl icant ’s remedy is simply
for the applicant to follow the procedure laid down in the
practice dire cti ve s for setting down the Rule 30 application
on the opposed motion court roll . The current application is
fatally irregular and defective and cannot possibly succeed .
Even if it had not been opposed, it falls to be dismissed.
Before proceeding to consider the issue of costs, I note
that the applicant is an incorporated company. As such, only
an admitted legal practitioner may represent it in court , and
the only circumstances under which it may be represented by
Mr Sambane as its director would be if he brought a formal
application before the Court entitling him to do so. The
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reasons for this rule have been canvassed in some of the
highest courts in the country. I refer , for example , to the
matter of Manong and Associates (Pty) Ltd v Minister of
Public Works 2010 (2) SA 167 (SCA) at para s 3 to 16, in
which the Supreme Court of Appeal considered whether this
requirement for legal representation of corporations was
Constitutionally problematic . The Court found that it was not.
Notwithstanding this, I considered (as my brother
Wilson J did in the case of Dis -Chem Sunward Park (Pty)
Ltd and Another v HG Manola CC 202 3 JDR 3792 (GJ) at
para 9) that it would be rude not to allow Mr Sambane an
opportunity to address me . Unfortunately, however, Mr
Sambane has abused the indulgence I granted him out of
common politeness . Despite having been warned by me at an
early stage of the hearing today that this application is
fundamentally misconceived (and despite the fact that the
respondent ’s legal representatives have similarly placed him
on notice that they consider this application to be
misconceived) he has chosen to pursue it. He accepts ,
expressly , that he does so out of ignorance . But yet he
persists, forcefully so – even in the face of gentle and polite
prompting from the bench.
The question that I must consider is whether the
applicant should be required to pay the costs of the
respondent and if so, on what scale. In doing so, I consider
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that the following factors are relevant:
Firstly, it appears that this is the second time that the
applicant has purs ued a similar cause of action, albeit in
relation to a different Rule 30 application.
Secondly, although Mr Sambane informs me that he is
well -aware of the fact that he has no right or entitlement to
represent the applicant , and despite the best offices of this
Court (and of the respondent’s representatives ), he appears
to be wilfully insistent on taking up the time of other litigants
and seeking to “jump the queue ”. His complaint that the
plaintiff cannot afford to employ a legal representative is
irrelevant – precisely because of the fact that it is a
corporation. The courts depend upon legal representatives to
adequately represent litigants and not waste time. In any
event, although a range of different possibilities exists as to
how legal representation (or at least advice ) may be secured,
Mr Sambane does not appear willing to seek out, let alone
take , such advice .
In the circumstances, even though I accept that this
application is not intentionally vexatious, I do find that it is
vexatious in fact – in the sense that the respondent should
never have been brought to court to deal with it . A litigant
who brings another to court under such circumstances, even
out of ignorance and lack ing vexatious intention , may be
mulcted in costs on a punitive scale (cf. Re Alluvial Creek
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Ltd 1929 CPD 532 at 535 ; Ernst & Young v Beinash 1999
(1) SA 1114 (W) at 1148B -C ). I am of the view that that is
the appropriate course to follow in the current circumstances.
I therefore issue the following order:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent’s costs
on the scale as between attorney and client.
…………………………..
MOULTRIE, J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE OF EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT :
11 February 2026
DATE REVISED: 23 March 2026
For the Applicant: HJ Sambane
For the Respondent: M Henning instructed by Hoosen
Wadiwala I nc.