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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 84137/2019
1) REPORTABLE: NO
2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
3) REVISED.
SIGNATURE
DATE 02 March 2026
In the matter between:
MILLICENT VUYISWA SHONGWE Applicant
(Identity Number: 7[...])
and
THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED 1st Respondent
(Registration No: 1962/000738/06)
SHERRIFF OF THE HONOURABLE COURT – 2nd Respondent
BOKSBURG
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS 3rd Respondent
JUDGMENT ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
MM MOJAPELO AJ
INTRODUCTION
1. Before me is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment
and order I delivered on 3 February 2025, in which I dismissed the applicant's
application for rescission of the default judgment granted by Basson J on 23
June 2023. The applicant also seeks condonation for the late filing of the
application for leave to appeal, which was delivered on or about 4 September
2025, some seven months out of time.
2. The application was initially set down for hearing on 19 February 2026.
On that date, the applicant failed to appear but timeously provided a medical
certificate, necessitating a postponement to 02 March 2026. My directives issued
on 19 February 2026 explicitly stated that should either party fail to comply with
the directives or the set -down, the matter would be determined on the papers.
On 02 March 2026, the applicant again failed to appear, sending an email citing
her "mental state" without an accompanying medical certificate. Counsel for the
first respondent appeared and confirmed service of the directives and notice of
set-down. In light of the applicant's repeated absence and the clear terms of my
prior directive, I have determined that it is in the interests of justice and the
finality of litigation to decide this application on the basis of the written
submissions and the papers filed of record.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
3. Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 provides that
leave to appeal may only be granted where the judge is of the opinion that:
3.1. The appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
3.2. There is some other compelling reason why the appeal should
be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration.
4. The threshold for granting leave to appeal has been raised under the
current dispensation. As the Supreme Court of Appeal held in MEC
Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha 2016 (6) SA 1 (SCA) at para 17:
"An applicant for leave to appeal must convince the court on proper
grounds that there is a reasonable prospect or realistic chance of
success on appeal. A mere possibility of success, an arguable
case or one that is not hopeless, is not enough. There must be a
sound, rational basis to conclude that there is a reasonable
prospect of success on appeal."
5. The word "would" in section 17(1)(a)(i) indicates a measure of certainty
that another court will differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed
against, not merely that it might do so.
THE CONDONATION APPLICATION
6. As the Supreme Court of Appeal held in Panayiotou v Shoprite Checkers
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2016 (3) SA 110 (GJ), an application for leave to appeal has
not been made for the purposes of section 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act where
it has been delivered outside the prescribed time periods, unless and until
condonation has been granted. I must therefore first consider whether
condonation should be granted.
7. Rule 49(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules provides that where leave to appeal is
required and has not been requested at the time of judgment, application for such
leave shall be made within fifteen days after the date of the order. Judgment was
delivered on 3 February 2025. The application for leave to appeal ought to have
been delivered by 24 February 2025. It was served on 4 September 2025 - a
delay of seven months.
8. In Uitenhage Transitional Local Council v South African Revenue
Service 2004 (1) SA 292 (SCA) at para 6, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated:
"One would have hoped that the many admonitions concerning
what is required of an applicant in a condonation application
would be trite knowledge among practitioners who are
entrusted with the preparation of appeals to this Court:
condonation is not to be had merely for the asking; a full,
detailed and accurate account of the causes of the delay and
their effects must be furnished so as to enable the Court to
understand clearly the reasons and to assess the responsibility.
It must be obvious that if the non -compliance is time-related
then the date, duration and extent of any obstacle on which
reliance is placed must be spelled out."
9. The applicant's affidavit in support of condonation is wholly
inadequate. The explanation offered is that after judgment was granted, she
looked for an attorney to help her but could not secure one in time due to
exorbitant fees, and that she tried "free legal options which did not work". No
dates are provided. No institutions are identified. No steps are particularised.
There is no account whatsoever for the period from 3 February 2025 to 4
September 2025.
10. The applicant knew by 3 February 2025 that she was dissatisfied with
the outcome. She provides no explanation for why she did not immediately
seek assistance, or why, having failed to secure legal representation, she did
not act in person within the prescribed time. This is particularly material given
that she had previously represented herself when entering an appearance to
defend in the main action and when launching the rescission application itself.
11. The delay of seven months is egregious and unexplained. The applicant
has failed to discharge the onus of showing good cause for condonation. On this
basis alone, the application must fail.
PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS ON APPEAL
12. Even if I were to overlook the inadequacy of the condonation application,
the prospects of success on appeal are so poor that condonation cannot be
granted on that basis either.
13. The applicant advances nine grounds of appeal. I address each in turn.
Ground 1: Failure to give the applicant an opportunity to present her case
14. The applicant contends that she was never given an opportunity to
present her case. This ground is without merit. The rescission application was
properly before the court.
15. The applicant had filed founding papers. The first respondent had filed
opposing papers. The applicant elected not to file a replying affidavit. She did not
file heads of argument. She was served with a notice of set down. When the
matter was called on 3 February 2025, she was not present. I stood the matter
down to afford her an opportunity to attend. She did not do so. I was satisfied that
she had been properly informed of the date and that the matter was properly
before me.
16. The applicant was dominus litis. She chose not to prosecute her
application. She cannot now complain that she was not afforded an opportunity to
be heard. There is no reasonable prospect that another court would find that I
erred in proceeding to hear the matter in her absence.
Ground 2: Failure to consider the seriousness of the matter
17. The applicant contends that I failed to consider the seriousness of the
matter, particularly the fact that the order would render her homeless. This
ground is also without merit. At paragraph 21 of my judgment, I expressly
considered the applicant's reliance on section 26 of the Constitution and Rule
46A. I noted that Rule 46A is the procedural instrument through which the court
balances access to adequate housing with a credit provider's enforcement rights.
I noted that the default court had been apprised of the Rule 46A factors and had
fixed a substantial reserve price. I found that the applicant had not shown that a
less intrusive measure existed that would satisfy the judgment debt, given the
magnitude of the arrears, nor had she proposed a viable repayment plan.
magnitude of the arrears, nor had she proposed a viable repayment plan.
18. I was alive to the constitutional dimension of the matter. I considered it.
I found that the equities did not favour rescission. There is no reasonable
prospect that another court would find that I failed to consider the seriousness
of the matter or the applicant's constitutional rights.
Ground 3: Failure to grant a postponement
19. The applicant contends that I erred in not granting her a
postponement, as she stated that she was lost and on her way to court. This
ground is without merit. No formal application for a postponement was brought.
The matter was ripe for hearing. Affidavits had been exchanged. The applicant
had been given ample notice of the hearing date. I stood the matter down to
afford her an opportunity to attend. She did not do so. There is no reasonable
prospect that another court would find that I erred in refusing a postponement
in these circumstances.
Ground 4: Failure to consider the applicant's rights to adequate housing
20. This ground has been addressed under Ground 2 above.
Ground 5: Failure to consider non-compliance with section 129 of the NCA
21. The applicant contends that I failed to consider that the first respondent
never complied with section 129 of the National Credit Act and that the section
129 notice was never served on her. At paragraph 20 of my judgment, I expressly
considered this complaint. I noted that it was made baldly. I noted that the
litigation history reflected prior debt review and a National Consumer Tribunal
order dated 12 March 2015, and that the first respondent had proceeded under
section 88(3)(b). I found that no concrete demonstration was made that
statutory pre -enforcement notices were absent or defective, or that any such
defect would avail the applicant in light of the procedural history and personal
service.
22. I considered this ground. I found it to be without merit. There is no
reasonable prospect that another court would find that I erred in this regard.
Ground 6: The court erred in believing everything said by the first
respondent
23. This ground is vague and unparticularised. It does not identify any
specific finding that I made that was erroneous or any specific evidence that I
wrongly accepted or rejected. I had before me all the affidavits exchanged
between the parties . I evaluated the evidence and made findings on the papers.
There is no reasonable prospect that another court would find that I erred in my
evaluation of the evidence.
Ground 7: Failure to consider that the applicant never refused to pay
24. The applicant contends that I failed to consider that she never refused
to pay the first respondent. At paragraphs 17 to 19 of my judgment, I expressly
considered the applicant's case that she had concluded a subsequent
arrangement with the first respondent to pay "any reasonable amount until her
financial situation becomes viable". I found that this allegation was bald and
unsupported by documentary proof or particularity. I found that no terms, dates,
or written confirmations were provided, nor was there evidence of payments
consistent with a restructured arrangement superseding the bar and the default
process. I found that the applicant did not deny liability or arrears, and that the
alleged arrangement was insufficient to constitute a triable defence.
25. I considered this ground. I found it to be without merit. There is no
reasonable prospect that another court would find that I erred in this regard.
Ground 8: Failure to consider that the applicant has movable property to
satisfy the debt
26. The applicant contends that I erred in declaring her property specially
executable whereas she has movable property to satisfy the judgment debt. At
paragraph 21 of my judgment, I expressly considered this issue. I found that the
applicant had not shown that a less intrusive measure existed that would satisfy
the judgment debt, given the magnitude of the arrears, nor had she proposed a
the judgment debt, given the magnitude of the arrears, nor had she proposed a
viable repayment plan. The applicant's assertion that she has movable property is
bald and unsubstantiated. She has provided no particulars, no valuations, no
evidence whatsoever of the existence or value of such movable property. There is
no reasonable prospect that another court would find that I erred in this regard.
Ground 9: Error with regard to the reserve price
27. The applicant contends that I erred with regard to the reserve price. This
ground is vague and unparticularised. It does not identify any specific error. At
paragraph 21 of my judgment, I noted that the default court had fixed a
substantial reserve price. The applicant does not explain what error I made or
what the reserve price ought to have been. There is no reasonable prospect that
another court would find that I erred in this regard.
COMPELLING REASON
28. The applicant has not identified any compelling reason why the appeal
should be heard. There is no important question of law. There are no conflicting
judgments. There is no discrete issue of public importance. This is a
straightforward application for rescission in which the applicant failed to establish
good cause. The legal principles are well-established. The outcome turned on the
evaluation of the facts and the exercise of discretion. There is no compelling
reason why the appeal should be heard.
CONCLUSION
29. The applicant has failed to provide a full, detailed and accurate explanation
for the seven -month delay in noting the application for leave to appeal.
Condonation cannot be granted.
30. Even if condonation were to be granted, the applicant has no reasonable
prospect of success on appeal. All nine grounds advanced were considered in my
judgment of 3 February 2025. All were found to be without merit. The
applicant has not identified any misdirection of fact or law. She has not shown
that another court would come to a different conclusion. She seeks, in effect, a
second bite at the cherry. That is not the purpose of an appeal.
31. The application for condonation is dismissed. The application for leave to
appeal is dismissed.
32. Regarding the wasted costs of 19 February 2026, the first respondent
sought an order for the applicant to pay these costs. I decline to make such an
order. The postponement on that date was occasioned by the submission of a
formal medical certificate by the applicant. The first respondent has provided no
evidence to gainsay the validity of that certificate or the medical necessity of the
postponement at that time. Consequently, it is appropriate that each party bears
its own costs in respect of the proceedings on 19 February 2026.
33. The mortgage bond provides for costs on an attorney and client scale
in enforcement proceedings. This application for leave to appeal is part of
those proceedings. The application lacked merit. It was brought after an
inadequate explanation for the delay. It sought to revisit issues already
ventilated and determined without engaging meaningfully with the reasons
given in the judgment. In these circumstances, an attorney and client costs
order is warranted.
ORDER
As a result, I make the following order:
1. The application for condonation for the late filing of the application
for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
3. The applicant ( Ms. Millicent Vuyiswa Shongwe) is ordered to pay the
first respondent's costs of the applications for condonation and leave
to appeal on the scale as between attorney and client.
4. Each party shall bear its own costs in respect of the wasted costs
occasioned by the postponement on 19 February 2026.
MM Mojapelo
ACTING JUDGE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
02 March 2026
Counsel for the
Applicant Attorney for
the Applicant
: No Appearance
: In person (No Appearance)
Counsel for the First Respondent : Adv. M Rakgoale
Attorneys for the First Respondent : Vezi & de Beer Inc