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2026
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[2026] ZAGPPHC 189
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Pienaar v Jennings Inc and Others (2024-093956) [2026] ZAGPPHC 189 (24 February 2026)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Case
number: 2024-093956
Date
of hearing: 12 February 2026
Date
delivered: 24 February 2026
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE 24/2/26
SIGNATURE
In
the application between
:
PIERRE
PIENAAR
Applicant
and
JENNINGS
INC
First
Respondent
ANDRI
JENNINGS
Second Respondent
PIERRE
PIENAAR NO
Third Respondent
JOHAN
JORDAAN NO
Fourth Respondent
KOBUS
VAN DER WESTHUIZEN NO
Fifth Respondent
(in
his
capacity
as
·
trustee
of the insolvent
estate
of Pierre Pienaar)
SAMUEL
SIYABONGA
MOHLONGI
N.O.
Sixth Respondent
(in
his capacity as trustee of the insolvent
estate
of Pierre Pienaar)
JUDGMENT
SWANEPOEL
J:
[1]
The applicant
seeks leave to appeal against my order of 5 December 2025 in which I
held the applicant in contempt of the order of
Manamela AJ (as he
then was), and in which I imposed a sentence of imprisonment which
was partially suspended.
[2]
The material
grounds for appeal are the following:
[2
.
1]
That the Court erred in sentencing the applicant to imprisonment;
[2.2]
That the sentence should have been suspended;
[2
.
3]
That the Court
erred in dealing with the matter as if it were unopposed
,
whilst the
applicant appeared in Court in person
;
[2.4]
That the Court erred in not enquiring from the applicant whether he
wanted to appoint an attorney and/or acquire the services
of the
Legal Aid Board;
[2.5]
That the Court erred in holding that in the absence of an answering
affidavit, the matter would be considered on the applicant's
version,
and the oral statements could not be considered;
[2.6]
That the Court should
have found that there was insufficient evidence to find the applicant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
;
[2
.
7]
That the Court
erred by imposing a sentence that exceeds the sentence sought by the
first and second respondents.
[3]
In
a
supplementary
notice
for
leave
to
appeal
,
the
applicant
contended that the order of Manamela J required the first and second
respondents to institute action within 20 days of
the order. The
applicant alleges that the action was instituted outside of that time
period
,
resulting in
the interim order laps
i
ng.
[4]
The latter
argument
,
that
the interim order lapsed can be easily
disposed on
.
The Manamela
AJ order was handed down on 4 September 2024
.
Twenty court
days expired on 3 October 2024. The summons was issued on 3 October
2024 at 14h54
,
on the 20
th
court day
.
It was held in
Labuschagne
v Labuschagne
;
Labuschagne
v Minister van Justisie
1
that an
action
i
s
launched when the papers are issued
,
not when
service occurred
.
The action was
thus launched timeously.
[5]
The applicant
'
s
first and second ground for leave to appeal is that he should not
have been sentenced to direct imprisonment. That ground
was
not pursued in argument
,
and I am not
sure why direct imprisonment for thirty days is inappropriate
,
more
especially when the applicant has expressly said that he does not
intend to stop pursuing his defamatory vendetta against the
second
respondent. In my view direct imprisonment for such a short period is
imminently appropriate
.
[6]
The third and
fifth grounds are that the matter should not have been dealt with on
an unopposed basis
.
The applicant
did not present any authority for the proposition that
,
where there is
no version by the applicant under oath, the matter may still be
regarded as being opposed. The rules are clear and
are spelled out
expressly in the notice of motion: If the applicant wanted to oppose
the matter he was obliged to deliver a notice
of opposition, and he
was obliged to file an answer to the founding affidavit. He failed to
do so. He also never sought a postponement
of the matter in order to
file an answer
.
[7]
I also know of
no authority that the applicant's oral statements in court
,
which were not
under oath
,
could be
regarded as evidence. In my view the applicant's statements carried
no evidentiary value whatsoever
.
[8]
As far as the
contention that there was insufficient evidence to find the applicant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is concerned
,
I disagree.
The ev
i
dence
,
which is set
out in my judgment and which I will not repeat
,
is
overwhelming
.
I have no
doubt that it was the applicant who continued to defame the first and
second respondents on Facebook
,
and I do not
believe the contention that a mysterious
administrator
,
who is unknown
to everyone,
suddenly and without the applicant's knowledge, posted the identical
defamatory material on the applicant's Facebook
site.
[9]
The
applicant's
contention,
that I was
bound to only impose the
sanction
sought by the first and second respondents, namely, 30 days'
imprisonment,
and that I was
not entitled to impose the added suspended sentence is also in my
view bad in law. Contempt proceedings do not only
concern the rights
of the aggrieved party. They also aim at protecting the dignity of
the Court and at reinforcing the integrity
of court orders. The
Court, therefore, has an interest in the imposition of a sentence
that achieves that purpose. For those reasons,
a court hearing a
contempt application is entitled to impose a sentence that it regards
as just and equitable in the circumstances,
even if it exceeds the
sentence sought by the applicant.
[10]
In this case the
applicant was clear on his intention not to let his vendetta against
the first and second respondents go. Instead
of providing assurances
that he would abide by the order in future, the applicant expressed
his intention to continue to pursue
the first and second respondents.
He also concocted a story by which he sought to escape responsibility
by laying the blame on
an unknown
'administrator'.
The
applicant
was not forthcoming
,
nor was he
truthful. He continued to defame the first and second respondents in
court. In all these circumstances, and in order
to ensure that the
applicant carried the proverbial
sword
over
his
head
in
order
to
prevent
him
from
again defaming
the
first
and
second
respondent,
I
believed
the
added
suspended sentence to be appropriate
.
[11]
The final
ground
,
that
I should have explained the applicant's rights to legal
representation
,
and I should
have given him an opportunity to obtain such representation is
equally without merit. The applicant is a seasoned litigator,
and on
his own version he has been involved in some 37 cases involving the
first and second respondents in one capacity or another.
He has been
sequestrated
,
and he has
been the subject of the original contempt proceedings
.
He is a
businessman and not a naïve litigant.
[12]
Contempt
proceedings entail a quasi-criminal enquiry. Although the proceedings
are civil in nature
,
the respondent
in a contempt application is faced with criminal sanction
,
and the
possible loss of his freedom. Such a matter is not to be dealt with
lightly
,
and
in certain circumstances it may well be appropriate to warn the
respondent of his right to legal representation as one would
do in a
criminal court.
[13]
However
,
this is not
such a case. The applicant has been litigating against the first and
second respondents
,
and against
other persons
,
over a period
of some 12 years
.
He knows that
he has the right to legal representation
,
and his rights
in respect of oppos
i
ng
the application are expressly spelled out
i
n
the notice of motion
.
[14]
Warning a person of
his right to legal representation is not merely a matter
of rote
,
it is aimed
at ensuring
that the
person
is
aware
of
his
rights
.
In a case like
this, where the applicant knew that he could obtain legal advice
,
to require a
formal notification to be made to the applicant would be placing form
over substance
.
He knew
exactly what his rights were
.
[15]
Consequently,
I do not
believe that
another court would reasonably come to a different finding.
[16]
I
make the following
order:
[16.1]
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
[16.2]
The costs of the application shall be paid by the applicant's
insolvent estate, on the attorney/client scale.
SWANEPOEL
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION PRETORIA
Counsel
for the applicant:
Mr.
T Roos
Instructed
by:
Van
Heerden
&
Krugel
Attorneys
Counsel
for the respondent
M
Jacobs
Instructed
by:
Roos
van Dyk Attorneys Inc
Hearing
on:
12
February 2026
Judgment
on:
24 February 2026
1
1967 (2) SA
575
(A)