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2026
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[2026] ZANWHC 56
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Erithacula Investments CC v Rustenburg Local Municipality (1573/18) [2026] ZANWHC 56 (23 March 2026)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH
WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Not
reportable
Case
no:1573/18
In
the matter between:
ERITHACULA
INVESTMENTS CC
PLAINTIFF
And
RUSTENBURG
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
DEFENDANT
Coram:
Wessels
AJ
Judgment
reserved:
11
March 2026
Delivered:
This judgment was handed down electronically, circulated to the
parties’ representatives via email, uploaded to CaseLines,
and
released to SAFLII. The date and time for the handing down of the
judgment are deemed to be 14h00 on 23 March 2026.
Summary
:
Cession—
Nature and effect of — Cessionary acquires no greater rights
than cedent possessed —
Nemo plus iuris
principle —
Where final account under main contract establishes that cedent is
indebted to debtor, no monies are owing upon
which cession can
operate — Defences available against cedent may be raised
against cessionary — Condition precedent
— Clause
requiring certification of invoices by engineer and cedent —
Failure to comply with certification requirement
fatal to claim —
Such certification constitutes condition precedent to debtor's
payment obligation.
Practice
— Absolution from the instance — Test at close of
plaintiff's case — Whether there is evidence upon which
a
court, applying its mind reasonably, could or might find for the
plaintiff —
Claude Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v Daniel
1976
(4) SA 403
(A) applied.
Municipality
— Contracts — Oral agreements — Municipality bound
by constitutional and statutory procurement framework
— Section
217 of Constitution — Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of
2003 — Oral agreement unenforceable in
absence of compliance
with procurement requirements — Non-variation clause in written
agreement precludes oral supplementation.
JUDGMENT
Wessels
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an action in which the
plaintiff, a close corporation that conducted business as a
subcontractor, claims payment from the
defendant upon a contract of
cession concluded between the plaintiff, the defendant, and the main
contractor, Makgotamishe Building
Construction (Pty) Ltd
("Makgotamishe").
[2]
The plaintiff's claims are threefold.
Claim A is for payment in the sum of R4,441,887.16 in respect of two
invoices (invoices 10A
and 11A), allegedly due and payable by the
defendant to the plaintiff in terms of the cession agreement. Claim B
is for payment
of retention monies in the amount of R1,534,926.19,
representing 10% withheld from payments due to the plaintiff under
the subcontract
agreement with Makgotamishe, which the plaintiff
contends became payable upon termination of the main contract and
should have
been paid by the defendant in terms of the cession
agreement. Claim C is for payment of R39,666.67 in storage fees
allegedly due
under an oral agreement with the defendant for the
storage of materials destined for the project.
[3]
At the close of the plaintiff's case,
the defendant applied for absolution from the instance. I have had
the benefit of comprehensive
heads of argument from both counsel, for
which I am grateful. This judgment concerns that application.
[4]
This Court notes that following the
hearing of the matter for absolution from the instance, the matter
was stood down to 24 October
2025, specifically for the filing of the
plaintiff’s heads of argument. While those heads of argument
were evidently filed
with the Office of the Registrar by that date,
they were not brought to the attention of this Court at that time.
The delay in
finalising this matter was resolved only when my
secretary contacted the plaintiff’s attorneys directly to
obtain the documents.
Upon the heads of argument being furnished to
my secretary, I immediately engaged with the evaluation of the
submissions and the
writing of this judgment.
Parties’
contractual relationship
[5]
Before addressing the evidence, it is
necessary to delineate the contractual framework within which this
dispute arises. The evidence
established that three interrelated
agreements governed the parties’ legal relationships.
[6]
First, there was the main construction
agreement between the defendant and Makgotamishe, concerning the
construction of certain
elements of the Rustenburg Rapid Transport
System (‘principal agreement’). The plaintiff was not a
party to this agreement.
[7]
Second, a subcontract agreement was
concluded between Makgotamishe (as the contractor) and the plaintiff
(as the subcontractor),
under which the plaintiff undertook to
provide glazing, aluminium, steel, and related services. The
defendant was not a party to
this subcontract.
[8]
Third, a tripartite cession agreement
was concluded between the defendant, Makgotamishe, and the plaintiff.
It is this agreement
upon which the plaintiff's claim is founded. A
proper understanding of the relevant legal principles governing
cession and their
application to the terms of this particular cession
agreement is essential to the determination of the plaintiff’s
claims.
Principles
of cession
[9]
A
party relying on a cession must allege and prove the contract of
cession, that is, a contract in terms of which a personal right
against a debtor is transferred from the creditor as cedent to a new
creditor as cessionary. The purpose of a cession agreement
is to
divest the cedent of the cedent’s rights against the debtor and
to subject the debtor to another creditor
[1]
.
[10]
A
fundamental principle, rooted in the common-law maxim
nemo
plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet
,
is that a person cannot cede something that does not belong to them
and to which they have no right
[2]
.
The trite position is that the cessionary obtains the rights
transferred, subject to all defences and exceptions that could have
been asserted against the cedent. This principle is reflected in the
recognised defences available to a debtor sued by a cessionary,
which
include any defence (except defences of a personal nature) that the
debtor would have had against the cedent.
[11]
These principles, applied to the present
matter, yield the following propositions. Firstly, the plaintiff, as
cessionary, must prove
the existence and terms of the cession
agreement. That much is not in dispute, as the agreement was admitted
into evidence. Secondly,
and critically, the plaintiff can claim no
greater rights against the defendant than Makgotamishe itself
possessed. If Makgotamishe
had no claim against the defendant, or if
its claim was extinguished or reduced by counterclaims properly
raised in a final account,
the plaintiff cannot assert a claim that
Makgotamishe did not have. Thirdly, the defendant may raise against
the plaintiff any
defence that it could have raised against
Makgotamishe, including the defence that no monies are owing under
the main contract
or that the final account establishes an
indebtedness by Makgotamishe to the defendant.
[12]
With these principles in mind, I turn to
consider the specific terms of the cession agreement upon which the
plaintiff relies.
The
Cession Agreement
[13]
The cession agreement is structured to
achieve a particular purpose, which is to ensure that the plaintiff,
as subcontractor, receives
payment directly from the defendant for
work performed under its subcontract with Makgotamishe. However, this
direct payment mechanism
is circumscribed by specific conditions and
operates within the limits of the underlying contractual
relationships.
[14]
In terms of paragraph 4.1 of the cession
agreement, Makgotamishe ceded to the plaintiff ‘…all its
title and interest
to claim and receive from [the defendant] payment
of all and any monies owing or which may in future become owing by
[the defendant]
to [Makgotamishe]…’. This clause
establishes the scope of the cession. Notably, it does not create an
independent
obligation on the part of the defendant to pay the
plaintiff; rather, it transfers to the plaintiff Makgotamishe’s
right
to claim payment from the defendant. The corollary of this,
applying the
nemo plus iuris
principle, is that if no monies are owing by the defendant to
Makgotamishe, there is nothing upon which the cession can operate.
The plaintiff stands in the shoes of Makgotamishe and can claim no
greater rights than Makgotamishe itself possesses.
[15]
Clause 4.2 of the cession agreement
records the defendant’s undertaking to pay the plaintiff.
Still, this undertaking is limited
to payments.‘…due for
the above supply and delivery of materials’ and is subject to a
maximum amount. This clause
must be read together with clause 4.1 and
cannot be construed as creating an independent obligation to pay,
apart from the defendant’s
underlying indebtedness to
Makgotamishe.
[16]
Clause 4.3 of the cession agreement is
of particular importance. It provides that the defendant ‘will
pay the plaintiff within
30 days of receipt of an invoice, duly
invoiced to [the defendant], and certified by the consulting engineer
and [Makgotamishe]
that the materials are acceptable and the amount
may be paid.’ This clause performs two functions. Firstly, it
establishes
a payment timeline, requiring payment within 30 days of
receipt of an invoice. Secondly, and more significantly, it imposes a
condition
precedent to the defendant’s payment obligation in
that the invoice must be certified by both the consulting engineer
and
Makgotamishe, certifying both the acceptability of the materials
and that the amount may be paid. The certification requirement
serves
an important purpose. It ensures that, before the defendant is
obliged to pay, confirmation is obtained from both the professional
team overseeing the project and the Makgotamishe that the work has
been properly performed and that the amount claimed is indeed
due.
Without such certification, the defendant has no means of knowing
whether the plaintiff’s claim is legitimate or whether
it
corresponds to work that has been approved and accepted under the
main contract.
[17]
Clause 4.8 of the cession agreement
contains a warranty by Makgotamishe that, as at the date of the
agreement (October 2016), there
were no counterclaims that might
extinguish the claims that form the object of the cession. This
clause implicitly recognises the
principle that the operation of the
cession depends on the existence of enforceable claims that are not
subject to set-off or counterclaim.
It also foreshadows the
possibility that subsequent events might give rise to counterclaims
that could affect the position.
[18]
Clause 7 of the cession agreement
provides that the plaintiff and the defendant accept the cession
‘subject to the terms and
conditions of this agreement’.
This clause reinforces that the terms of the cession agreement govern
the parties’ rights
and obligations and cannot be asserted
independently thereof.
[19]
Clause 8 is a standard non-variation
clause. It provides that the agreement constitutes the entire
agreement between the parties
and that no amendment, alteration,
variation, or addition shall have any force or effect unless it is in
writing and duly signed.
This clause has particular significance for
the plaintiff’s third claim, which is founded upon an alleged
oral agreement
for storage fees. The clause precludes any oral
variation or supplementation of the parties’ contractual
relationship. It
requires that any binding agreement between the
plaintiff and the defendant be reduced to writing and properly
signed.
[20]
The cession agreement must also be
understood in the context of the main contract and the subcontract.
The main contract between
the defendant and Makgotamishe incorporated
the principal agreement. The principal agreement provides for the
defendant’s
termination of the contract in the event of
Makgotamishe’s default.
[21]
It further provides that, upon
termination, the principal agent shall timeously commence and
complete a final account, and that,
after termination, the principal
agent shall continue to issue interim payment certificates in a nil
amount until the quantum of
damages has been determined and the final
account has been completed. The principal agent is the professional
person or firm appointed
by the defendant to oversee the principal
agreement.
[22]
Only then will the final payment
certificate be issued. The effect of these provisions, as emerged
during cross-examination, is
that upon termination, further payments
are effectively frozen pending the completion of the final account.
Any entitlement to
payment must ultimately be determined in the final
account.
[23]
The termination of the principal
agreement has significant implications for the operation of the
cession agreement. If the principal
agreement is terminated,
Makgotamishe’s rights to payment from the defendant are no
longer governed by the interim payment
certification process but
become subject to the final account process. More fundamentally, if
the final account reveals that Makgotamishe
is indebted to the
defendant rather than the converse, then there are no monies owing by
the defendant to Makgotamishe upon which
the cession can operate.
Applying the principles set out above, the defendant may raise this
as a defence to any claim by Makgotamishe
and, by extension, to any
claim by the plaintiff as a cessionary.
[24]
It is against this contractual backdrop
that the plaintiff's claims must be evaluated.
The
Evidence
[25]
At the commencement of the trial,
counsel for the defendant indicated that the expert notice that had
been served would not be relied
upon during the plaintiff’s
case. The plaintiff then proceeded to lead the evidence of its sole
witness, Mr Baloyi, the plaintiff’s
director.
[26]
Mr Baloyi testified that the plaintiff
had provided goods and services to Makgotamishe in terms of the
subcontract agreement. He
confirmed that the principal agreement had
been terminated. In response to questions from his own counsel, he
stated that he had
no knowledge of any amount of R8 million allegedly
owed by Makgotamishe to the defendant, and that he only became aware
of this
during the litigation.
[27]
Under cross-examination, Mr Baloyi was
taken through the various sections of the agreements referred to
above. He confirmed that
the principal agreement was between the
defendant and Makgotamishe, and that the plaintiff was not a party
thereto. He similarly
confirmed that the subcontract was between the
plaintiff and Makgotamishe, and that the defendant was not a party
thereto. He agreed
that the cession agreement constituted the
contractual foundation for his claim, and that, in terms of clause
4.3 thereof, payment
by the defendant was conditional upon the
invoice being certified by the consulting engineer, the materials
being acceptable, and
the amount being payable.
When
confronted with the two invoices relied upon, Mr Baloyi ultimately
agreed that they had not been so certified. He acknowledged
that the
main agreement between the defendant and Makgotamishe had been
terminated on or about 12 July 2017, as pleaded by the
plaintiff.
[28]
Mr Baloyi was referred to clause
36.5.10 of the principal agreement, which provides that upon
termination, the principal agent
shall continue to issue interim
payment certificates in a nil amount until the quantum of damages has
been determined and the final
account has been completed. Mr Baloyi
initially expressed disagreement with the defendant’s counsel’s
interpretation,
but ultimately accepted the wording of the clause.
When referred to the final accounts prepared by the principal agent,
which indicated
that Makgotamishe owed the defendant the amount of
R12,148,344.16. Mr Baloyi stated that he could not comment on these
documents,
as they concerned matters between the defendant and
Makgotamishe, which he was not a party to, and which involved matters
beyond
his knowledge.
[29]
He furthermore confirmed that the
invoices upon which his claim was based (in particular Invoice 11A)
were rendered not by the plaintiff,
but by ‘Erita EDW, a
division of Erita Holdings Pty Ltd’, being a different legal
entity than the plaintiff.
[30]
Regarding the storage fees claim (Claim
C), Mr Baloyi explained that this arose from an instruction to keep
goods on site. Still,
he acknowledged that no written agreement had
been concluded and that he was not aware of any procurement process
having been followed.
The
test for absolution from the instance
[31]
The
legal principles governing an application for absolution at the close
of the plaintiff's case are well established. In
Claude
Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v Daniel
[3]
the court articulated the test, as has consistently been applied by
our courts, as follows:
‘…
when
absolution from the instance is sought at the close of plaintiff's
case, the test to be applied is not whether the evidence
led by
plaintiff establishes what would finally be required to be
established, but whether there is evidence upon which a Court,
applying its mind reasonably to such evidence, could or might (not
should, nor ought to) find for the plaintiff.’
[32]
At
this stage, a court does not weigh competing inferences or assess
credibility. A court assumes that the plaintiff's evidence
is
true
[4]
. The enquiry is whether,
on that assumption, there is evidence upon which a reasonable court
might grant judgment in the plaintiff's
favour.
[33]
However, as was cautioned in
Claude
Neon Lights
(at 409G), the test
remains whether there is evidence upon which a court ‘could or
might (not should or ought to)’
find for the plaintiff. A court
must still be satisfied that the plaintiff has adduced evidence on
all the elements necessary to
establish a prima facie case.
Evaluation
of plaintiff's case on claims A and B
[34]
Applying the above test to the evidence
led, and having regard to the relevant principles of cession and the
terms of the cession
agreement as set out above, I am unable to
conclude that a reasonable court might find for the plaintiff on
claims A and B. Several
insurmountable difficulties confront the
plaintiff’s case.
[35]
Firstly, the cession agreement itself,
upon which the plaintiff's claim is founded, contains a clear
condition precedent to payment.
Clause 4.3 requires that invoices be
certified by the consulting engineer and Makgotamishe, confirming
that the materials are acceptable
and that payment may be made. Mr
Baloyi ultimately conceded, under cross-examination, that neither of
the invoices had been so
certified.
[36]
The certification requirement is not a
mere formality. It is the mechanism by which the defendant obtains
assurance that the work
claimed for has been properly performed and
approved under the main contract. Without such certification, the
defendant has no
independent means of verifying the plaintiff’s
entitlement to payment. The plaintiff's failure to lead any evidence
of certification,
and indeed Mr Baloyi’s concession that no
certification occurred, means that the plaintiff has not established
that the condition
triggering the defendant’s payment
obligation has been fulfilled. The evidence adduced establishes the
opposite: the invoices
were not certified as required.
[37]
Secondly, and more fundamentally, the
plaintiff’s claim is premised upon the existence of monies
owing by the defendant to
Makgotamishe. The cession agreement, by its
very nature, can only operate to transfer existing rights. Clause 4.1
thereof refers
to monies owing or which may in future become owing by
the defendant to Makgotamishe. The plaintiff, as cessionary, stands
in the
shoes of Makgotamishe and can claim no greater rights than
Makgotamishe itself possesses. This is the direct application of the
nemo plus iuris
principle.
[38]
If no monies are owing by the defendant
to Makgotamishe, there is nothing upon which the cession can operate,
and the defendant
cannot be obliged to pay the plaintiff.
Furthermore, the defendant may raise against the plaintiff any
defence that would have
been available against Makgotamishe. If
Makgotamishe has no claim against the defendant, the defendant may
raise that defence against
the plaintiff.
[39]
The final accounts presented to Mr
Baloyi in cross-examination indicate not only that no monies were
owing by the defendant to Makgotamishe,
but that Makgotamishe was
indebted to the defendant in a substantial amount. The final account
reflects that Makgotamishe owes
the defendant R12,148,344.16. Mr
Baloyi conceded that he could not dispute these documents, as they
concerned matters between the
defendant and Makgotamishe to which he
was not privy.
[40]
The plaintiff bore the onus of proving
that the defendant owed money to Makgotamishe at the time of the
termination of the principal
agreement, or that such monies became
owing thereafter. No evidence was led to this effect. Mr Baloyi’s
testimony was confined
to the work performed by the plaintiff under
the subcontract. He did not know the financial position between the
defendant and
Makgotamishe arising from the main contract. In the
absence of any evidence establishing the underlying debt, the
plaintiff cannot
succeed on a claim based on a cession of that debt.
[41]
Thirdly, the evidence established that
the principal agreement was terminated on or about 12 July 2017. The
principal agreement
provides that upon termination, the principal
agent shall continue to issue interim payment certificates in a nil
amount until
the quantum of damages has been determined and the final
account has been completed.
[42]
The effect of this clause, as Mr Baloyi
ultimately accepted, is that further payments are frozen pending the
final account. The
termination of the principal agreement
fundamentally alters the basis upon which payments are to be made.
Any entitlement to payment
must ultimately be determined in the final
account. The final accounts, having now been completed, reveal that
Makgotamishe is
indebted to the defendant rather than the converse.
The defendant is therefore entitled to raise this as a defence
against any
claim by Makgotamishe and, by extension, against the
plaintiff as a cessionary.
[43]
The invoices upon which the plaintiff
relies bear dates well after the termination. Even assuming, in the
plaintiff's favour, that
invoice 10A (dated 4 July) might have been
rendered prior to termination, there was no evidence that it had been
certified, nor
that the 30-day period referred to in that clause had
elapsed prior to termination.
[44]
Fourthly, a further difficulty arises
from the identity of the entity that rendered the invoices. Bearing
in mind that the plaintiff
is cited herein as Eritacula Investments
CC, Invoice 11A reflects ‘Erita EDW, a division of Erita
Holdings Pty Ltd’,
a private company with a different
registration number from that of the plaintiff. Mr Baloyi’s
explanation that this was
merely a matter of a logo being used does
not, in my view, cure the evidentiary impasse.
[45]
The cession agreement was concluded with
the plaintiff. A different legal entity issued the invoices upon
which the plaintiff relies
for payment. The plaintiff led no evidence
to explain its relationship with Erita Holdings Pty Ltd, nor to
establish that the plaintiff
was entitled to payment for invoices
issued by that entity. This raises the fundamental question that if
the invoices were issued
by a different entity, on what basis can the
plaintiff claim payment in respect thereof. The plaintiff did not
seek to amend its
particulars of claim to reflect that the claimant
was a different entity, nor did it lead evidence to establish that it
was the
alter ego of or entitled to claim through the entity that
issued the invoices.
[46]
Fifthly, and finally, the plaintiff's
claim for retention monies (included within Claims A and B) is
founded upon clause 10.5 and
10.12 of the subcontract agreement. As
Mr Baloyi correctly conceded, that agreement governed the release of
retention and was an
obligation of Makgotamishe, not the defendant.
The retention mechanism operates within the subcontract relationship.
Clause 10.5
of the subcontract provides for the deduction of
retention from interim payments due to the subcontractor. Clause
10.12 sets out
the mechanism for the release of retention, which is
triggered upon completion of the subcontract works and the expiry of
the defect
notification period. It places the obligation to pay
retention on the contractor (Makgotamishe).
[47]
The defendant, not being a party to the
subcontract, cannot be liable for the release of retention monies in
terms thereof. The
cession agreement, properly construed, cedes
rights to payment under the main contract, not rights arising under
the subcontract.
While the cession agreement references retention in
clause 4.2, this reference must be understood in context, in that it
records
that retention will apply to invoices issued by the
plaintiff, reflecting that the plaintiff’s entitlement to
payment from
Makgotamishe under the subcontract was subject to
retention. It does not create an independent obligation on the
defendant to pay
the retention, nor does it transform the defendant’s
obligation under the cession into an obligation to pay amounts that
the defendant is not owing to Makgotamishe under the main contract.
[48]
Taking
the plaintiff's evidence as true, and applying the test in
Claude
Neon Lights
[5]
,
I am satisfied that no reasonable court could or might find for the
plaintiff on claims A and B. The evidence establishes the
absence of
the very foundation upon which those claims rest.
Claim
C: The storage fees
[49]
The plaintiff’s claim for storage
fees in the amount of R39,000.00 faces similar, if not more
pronounced, difficulties.
[50]
Mr Baloyi testified that this claim
arose from an instruction to keep goods on site. He acknowledged that
no written agreement was
concluded. Clause 8 of the cession agreement
provides that the contract constitutes the entire agreement between
the parties and
that no amendment, alteration, or variation shall
have any force or effect unless reduced to writing and duly signed.
The cession
agreement is not merely an agreement between the
plaintiff and Makgotamishe. It is a tripartite agreement to which the
defendant
is a party. Clause 8 accordingly binds the plaintiff and
the defendant and precludes any oral variation or supplementation of
their
contractual relationship.
[51]
The
plaintiff seeks to enforce an oral agreement allegedly concluded with
the defendant. It is trite that a municipality, as an
organ of state,
is bound by the constitutional and statutory framework governing
public procurement. Section 217 of the Constitution
requires that
contracts for goods and services be concluded in accordance with a
system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive,
and
cost-effective. The Municipal Finance Management Act
[6]
and the applicable supply chain management regulations prescribe the
manner in which municipalities may procure goods and services.
These
provisions exist to ensure that public funds are expended in a manner
that is lawful, regular, and transparent, and to prevent
abuses
arising from informal or undocumented arrangements.
[52]
Mr Baloyi confirmed that he was not
aware of any procurement process having been followed in respect of
the alleged storage agreement.
In the absence of compliance with the
statutory procurement framework, any agreement purportedly concluded
with the municipality
would be invalid. The plaintiff led no evidence
to establish that the alleged oral agreement complied with the
applicable legal
requirements. Indeed, Mr Baloyi’s evidence
suggested that the arrangement was informal and arose from an
ad
hoc
instruction.
[53]
Moreover, clause 8 of the cession
agreement expressly precludes any oral variation or supplementation
of the parties’ contractual
relationship. The plaintiff cannot
rely upon an oral agreement that is inconsistent with the written
agreement upon which its entire
case is founded. The cession
agreement governs the contractual relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant. If the parties
intended to enter into a separate
agreement for storage fees, they were obliged to do so in writing and
to comply with the applicable
procurement requirements.
[54]
I am satisfied that no reasonable court
could or might find for the plaintiff on Claim C. The evidence
establishes that no valid
agreement was concluded and that any
purported oral agreement would be unenforceable for non-compliance
with statutory procurement
requirements and in light of the
non-variation clause in the cession agreement.
Conclusion
[55]
In view of the foregoing conclusions,
the defendant’s application for absolution from the instance
must succeed on all the
claims.
Costs
[56]
The general rule is that costs follow
the result. The defendant has successfully applied for absolution
from the instance, and there
is no reason to depart from the general
rule.
Order
[57]
In the result, I make the following
order:
1.
The defendant’s application for
absolution from the instance is granted.
2.
The plaintiff is ordered to pay the
defendant's costs of suit on Scale B.
M
WESSELS
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
NORTH
WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Appearances
For
plaintiff
:Adv
GK Seleka
Instructed
by
:Mogau
Attorneys
:Rustenburg
:c/o
GA Mokaa Attorneys
:Mahikeng
For
defendant
:Adv
NG Laubscher
Instructed
by
:AB
Scarrott
:c/o
Tlou Attorneys
:Mahikeng
[1]
Cf:
Lief
NO v Dettmann
1964
(2) SA 252
(A) and
Johnson
v Inc General Insurances Ltd
1983 (1) SA 318 (A).
[2]
Brayton
Carlswald (Pty) Ltd and another v Brews
2017
(5) SA 498
(SCA) para 12.
[3]
Claude
Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v Danie
l
1976 (4) SA 403
(A) at 409G-H.
[4]
Atlantic
Continental Assurance Co of SA v Vermaak
1973 (2) SA 525
(E) at 527C-D.
[5]
Op cit
fn 3.
[6]
Municipal
Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.