,
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"31-~
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
In the matter between:
KGETLENGRIVIER LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
and
MAGALIES WATER
Coram: Wessels AJ
Date of hearing : 27 February 2026
Not reportable
Case number:2238/24
Applicant
Respondent
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electron ically by circulation to the
parties' representatives via email. The date and time for hand-down of the
judgment is deemed to be 14h00 on 23 March 2026.
2
Summary: Practice - Application for upliftment of notice of bar and condonation
- Requirements of good cause restated - Applicant, a municipality, seeking to
raise special pleas of prescription, non-compliance with s 3 of Act 40 of 2002,
and arbitration clause.
Prescr iption - Acknow ledgement of debt - Memorandum of agreement
concluded post-litigation providin g for partial payment of R3 million - Whether
such conduct constitutes acknowledgement of liabil ity sufficient to interrupt
prescription in terms of s 14 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 - Held that it does.
Organs of state - s 3 notice requirement of Act 40 of 2002 - Applicability to
contractual claims - Claim for payment in terms of written agreeme nt is not a
claim for damages - Notice requirement does not apply - Nicor IT Consulting
(Pty) Ltd v North West Housing Corporation 2018 (3) SA 485 (SCA) followed.
Arbitration - Arbitration clause - Whether ousts cowt's jurisdiction - Held that
it does not-Parekh v Shah Jehan Cinemas 1980 (1) SA 301 (D) applied.
Costs - Punitive costs awarded on an attorney and client scale.
JUDGMENT
WesselsAJ
Introduction
[1] This is an opposed application in which the defendant seeks an order for
the upliftment of a notice of bar and condonation for its failure to file a plea
timeously in the main action instituted against it by the plaintiff. The plaintiff
opposes the application.
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[2] The specific relief sought in the notice of motion is threefold: First, that the
defendant's failure to file a plea be condoned and the notice of bar be uplifted;
Second, that the defendant be granted leave to deliver and file a plea within 5
days of the order; Third, that any party opposing the application be ordered to pay
the costs on Scale C.
Factual Background
[3] On 7 May 2024, the plaintiff issued a combined summons out of this Court
against the defendant. The claim arises from a written Water Services Level
Agreement concl uded between the parties, in terms of which the plaint iff
provided bulk water services, operations, and maintenance to the defendant's
water treatment facilities. The plaintiff claims payment of R49 499 266.63,
representing outstanding amounts alleged ly due since October 2015.
[ 4] The defendant served a notice of intention to defend on 17 May 2024
through its erstwhile attorneys, Rangwako Attorneys Inc. The defendant's plea
was due by 17 June 2024, yet no plea was filed.
[5] On 6 August 2024, the plaintiff served a notice of bar on the defendant,
requiri ng the defendant to deliver its plea within 5 days. The five-day period
lapsed on 1 3 August 2024 without any plea being filed. Consequently, the
defendant was ipso facto barred from pleading.
[6] On 7 August 2024, the day after service of the notice of bar, the Municipal
Council approved the suspension of the then municipa l manager, Mr G.C.
Letsoalo. It appointed Mr Andrew Pholose ('Mr Pholose') as the acting mun icipal
manager.
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[7] On 22 August 2024, Mr Pholose deposed that he learned of an impending
application for defaultjudgment against the defendant . He investigated the matter
and, finding the exp lanations received from officials and the erstwhile attorneys
unsatisfactory , terminated Rangwako Attorneys' mandate on 26 August 2024. On
27 August 2024, he appointed new attorneys, Fihla & Associates.
[8] On 28 August 2024, the new attorneys wrote to the plaintiff's attorneys ,
Shuping Attorneys, informing them of their appointment and requesting the last
notice filed in the matter. Despite this communication, no steps were taken to
bring the present application until the notice of motion in this application was
signed on or about 18 October 2024 and served shortly thereafter.
[9] In the founding affidavit to the present application, Mr Pholose explains
the delay as arising from what he describes as 'po litical instability ' and
'institutional instability' that have plagued the defendant for years. He refers to a
judgment of this Court dated 8 October 2024 in which the defendant 's suspension
of its municipal manager was challenged. He states that the reasons for the
erstwhile attorneys' failure to file a plea are unclear but are reasonably suspected
to be related to the chronic instability. He further explains that after his
appointment, it took time to settle in, investigate the matter, terminate the
mandate of the previous attorneys, appoint new attorneys, and for those attorneys
to familiarise them selves with the matter and consult counsel.
[ 1 O] Regarding a defence, the defendant indicates its intention to assail the
plaintiff's claim mainly on technical grounds being: A special plea of
prescription, contending that the debt became due in October 2015 and the
summons was only issued in May 2024, more than three years later; A special
plea of non-compliance with s 3 of the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against
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Ce1tain Organs of State Act 1 (' Act 40 of 2002 '); A special plea that the agreement
contains an arbitration clause which ousts the juri sdiction of this Court.
[ l l] The plaintiff opposes this application. In its answering affidavit, it contends
that the explanation for the delay is neither reasonable nor acceptab le. The
plaintiff points out that the defendant has been legally represented throughout the
proceedings and cannot escape the consequences of its legal representatives'
conduct. It highlights the unexplained periods of delay: from 17 May to 17 June
2024 (when the plea was due); from 18 June to 5 August 2024 (the period before
the notice of bar); from 6 to 13 August 2024 (the 5-day period in the notice of
bar); and from 14 August to late October 2024 (when this application was
eventually launched).
[ 12] The plaintiff further contends that the defendant has no bona fide defence.
Jn support of this averment, it attaches a Memorandum of Agreement ('MOA')
concluded on 9 September 2024 between the parties and the Bojanala Platinum
District Municipality ('Bojanala '). Under the MOA, Bojanala agreed to provide
the defendant with financial assistance to pay a portion of its debt to the plaintiff.
An initial payment of R3 million was made to the plaintiff on 4 October 2024 in
terms of the MOA. The plaintiff argues that this payment constitutes an
acknowledgement of debt, thereby interrupting prescr iption. It further argues that
a notice in terms of s 3 of Act 40 of 2002 does not apply to contractual claims.
Regarding the arbitration clause, it contends that such a clause does not oust a
court's jurisdiction.
[13] In reply, the defendant advances that the MOA does not constitute an
acknowledgement of the full debt and cannot interrupt prescription for a debt that
'Institution of Legal Proceedings against certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002.
6
had already prescribed. It contends that the agreement relates only to pa1t of the
debt and that the dispute between the parties remains unresolved.
The Issues in Dispute
(14] The issues for dete1mination by this Cou1t are twofold: First, whether the
defendant has shown good cause for the upliftment of the bar and condonation
for its failure to file a plea timeously; Second, if good cause is shown, whether
the defendant has disclosed a bona fide defence to the plaintiffs claim which
carries prospects of success.
The Legal Framework
[15] Rule 27 of the Uniform Rules of Court provides the legal basis for this
application. Rule 27(1) permits a court, upon application, to make an order
extending any time prescribed by the rules and, in terms of Rule 27(3), empowers
a comt, on good cause shown, to condone any non-compliance with the rules.
[16] The Supreme Court of Appeal ('SCA') in lngosstrakh v Global Aviation
Investments (Pty) Ltcf-confirmed that when a defendant is under bar, it must show
good cause why condonation should be granted. Importantly for the present
application, the comt further held that a defendant must explain both the period
before the notice of bar and the period thereafter. fn Madinda v Minister of Safety
and Security 3, the Supreme Comt of Appeal ('SCA') held:
2 Ingosstrakh v Global Aviation Investments {Pty) Ltd and Others (934/2019) [2021] ZASCA 69; [2021] 3 All SA 316 (SCA) ; 2021 (6) SA 352 (SCA) (4 June 2021) para 22. 3 Madinda v Minister a/Safety and Security, Republic a/South Africa ( 153/07) [2008] ZASCA 34; [2008] 3 All SA 143 (SCA); 2008 (4) SA 312 (SCA)(28 March 2008) para I 0.
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'Good cause' looks at all those factors which bear on the fairness of granting the relief as
between the parties and as affecting the proper administration of justice. In any given factual
complex it may be that only some of many such possible factors become relevant. These may
include prospects of success in the proposed action, the reasons for the delay. the suniciency
of the explanation oJTered, the bona tides of the applicant, and any contribution by other
persons or parties to the delay and the applicant's responsibility therefor."
[ 17] Regarding the requi rement of a bona fide defence, the test is not whethe r
the defence is likely to succeed, but whether, on the facts di.sclosed, the defendant
appears to have a defence which is both bona fide and good in law. The defendant
is expected to set out its defence with sufficient particularity to enable the court
to assess its prospects of success.
Absence of explanation for the default
[ 18] The plaintiff's pnmary submissio n is that the defendant has failed to
provide a reasonab le and acceptab le explana tion for its failure to file a plea
timeously. Plaint iff's counsel argued that the explanation tendered is vague,
gener ic, and does not account for multip le periods of delay. [ tum to apply the
trite principles constituting good cause to the facts of this case.
[ 19] Regard ing the default, the defen dant has failed to provide a reasonab le and
acceptab le expla nation for several distinct periods of delay. The first period is
from 17 May 2024, when the notice of intention to defend was filed, to 17 June
2024, when the plea was due. There is simply no explanation for why a plea was
not filed during t his period. The defendant was legally represented, and its
attorneys had a clear obligation to file a plea within the prescribed time.
[20] The second period is from 18 June 2024 to 5 August 2024, the period
before the notice of bar was served. This spans approximate ly one and a half
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months. Again, there is no explanation for the defendant's inaction during this
time. The erstwhile attorneys were on record and took no steps to regularise the
position.
[21] The third period is the five-day period stipulated in the notice of bar, from
6 to 13 August 2024. The notice of bar was an unequivocal warning that the doors
of the court were closing to the defendant, yet the defendant did nothing. Even
after the appointment of Mr Pholose as acting municipal manager on 7 August
2024, no steps were taken to communicate with the plaintiff's attorneys and
request an extension of the period allowed by Rule 26 or file the plea.
[22] The fomth and most significant period is from 14 August 2024, when the
bar took effect , to late October 2024 , when this applicat ion was eventually
launched. Mr Pholose was appointed on 7 August 2024. He learned of the
impending default judgment on 22 August 2024, upon which he terminated the
erstwhi le attorneys' mandate on 26 August 2024 and appointed new attorneys on
27 August 2024. The new attorneys wrote to the plaintiff's attorneys on 28 August
2024. Despite this, the present application was not filed until late October 2024.
Even if one allows time for the new attorneys to familiarise themselves with the
matter and consult counsel, a delay of nearly two months from the appointment
of new attorneys is excessive and, more pertinently, unexplained.
[23] Tbe explanation that the defendant has been plagued by politica l and
institutional instability is vague and generic. While courts are generally
sympathetic to the difficu lties faced by organs of State, such generalised
assertions cannot constitute a reasonable and acceptable explanation for a failure
to comply with the rules of court over an extended period, pa1ticularly where the
defendant has been legally represented throughout. As this Court held in Wesley
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v Min;ster of Police 4, shifting blame to a legal representative does not constitute
a full explanation, especially where the defendant has not acted with the required
speed and diligence.
(24] In Salojee and Another v Minister of Community Development 5, the SCA
made it clear that there is a limit beyond which a litigant cannot escape the
consequences of the conduct of its legal representatives. The court held:
'To hold otherwise might have a disastrous effect upon the observance of the Rules
of this Court. Considerations ad misericordiam should not be allowed to become
an invitation to laxity. In fact this Court has lately been burdened with an undue
and D increasing nwnber of applications for condonation in which the failure to
comply with the Rules of this Court was due to neglect on the part of the attorney.
The attorney, after all, is the representative whom the litigant has chosen for
himself, and there is little reason why, in regard to condonation of a failure to
comply with a Rule of Court, the litigant should be absolved from the normal
consequences of such a relationship ,_ no matter what the circumstances of the
failure are.'
[25] This principle applies with equal force to the defendant.
(26] Furthermore , the defendant has not demonstrated that it has been acting
bona fide. The sequence of events suggests that this application was prompted
only by the imminent threat of a default judgment by the plaintiff. The plaintiff 's
allegation, which is not denied in reply, is that this application was filed only after
the plaintiff had set the matter down for default j udgment. This indicates that the
4 Wesley v Minister of Police (219/20) [2023] ZANWHC 32 (3 March 2023) para 18. 5
Salojee and Ano/her v Minister of Community Deve/opme11t 1965 (2) SA 135 (A) at 141 C-E.
10
defendant was content to remain inactive until the proverbial Sword of Damocles
was hanging over its head.
[27] The matter does not end there. The replying affidavit was deposed to on 15
January 2025, but was only served on the plaintiffs attorneys on 29 January 2025.
No explanation is provided for this delay. Thereafte r, the defendant did nothing
to set the matter down. It was the plaintiffs attorneys who set the present
application down on 6 October 2025 for hearing on 27 February 2026. For
approximately 9 months, the defendant took no action to prosecute its own
application. This conduct is entirely inconsistent with a party that claims it has
always intended to defend the claim. As the SCA observed in Madinda6, the
strength or weakness of a party's case may colour its conduct.
[28] The defendant' s pro longed inactivity speaks volumes. The conclus ion is
inescapable that the defendant has failed to provide a reasonab le and acceptable
explanation for its default.
The acknowledgement of debt and interruption of prescription
[29] The plaintiff 's second argument targets the defendant's proposed special
plea of prescription. The plaintiff submits that the MOA concluded on 9
September 2024 and the payment of R3 million made on 4 October 2024
const itute an unequivocal acknowledgement of indebtedness , thereby
interrupti ng prescription in tenns of s 14 of the Prescr iption Act7('Presc ription
Act').
6 lbidfn3.
7 Prescripti on Act 68 of 1969.
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[30] Section 14(1) of the Prescription Act provides that the running of the
prescription is interrupted by an express or tacit acknowledgement of liability by
the debtor. The law is well settled that an acknowledgement of debt need not be
in any particu lar form. Any conduct from which an acknowledgement can be
inferred is sufficient to interrupt prescript ion.
[31] The facts are unassailab le. On 9 September 2024, the defendant, together
with the Bojanala, entered into an MOA with the plaintiff. The delivery note
attached to this agreement explicitly states that the purpose of the financial
assistance is 'to pay a part of the KRLM's (the defendant) debt due and owing to
MWB (the plaintiff)'. The agreement itself records that Bojanala will provide
financial assistance to the defendant to pay a part of the defendant's debt due and
owing to the plaintiff.
[32] On 4 Octobe r 2024, payment of R3 million was made to the plaintiff. The
plaintiffs bank statement reflects an incoming payment of R3 million from the
defendant. This payment was made after the conclusion of the MOA and was
clearly in furtherance of its terms.
[33] The defendant's contention that the agreement does not const itute an
acknowledgement of the full debt misses the point. The acknowledgement relates
to the debt claimed. The partia l payment is an act consistent with an
acknowledgement of indebtedness. Even if part of the debt had prescribed prior
to September 2024, the acknowledgement and payment interrupt prescriptio n and
revive the debt. The defendant's specia l plea of prescription is therefore without
merit.
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[34] I align myself with the approach of the SCA in Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd
v Letsemeng Local Municipality 8, where the court held:
'Letse rneng's defence on the merits is no defence at all - that it should not be ordered to pay
what it agreed to pay because it was unable, due to its financial weakness, to do so. To the
extent that this may amount to the tacit raising of a defence of impossibility of performance,
the position is clear: if a person promises to do something that can be done, such as
delivering a thing or paving a debt, but which that person cannot do due to circumstances
peculiar to themselves, they are nonetheless liable on the contract. The commercial
mayhem that would result, if the rule was othenvise, is not difficult to imagine.
Contractual obligations are enfo rced by courts irrespective of whether a defaulting party
is able to pay or not. The focus is on the rights of the innocent party, not the means of the
defaulting partv." (emp hasis added)
(35] The defendant has acknowledged its indebtedness, concluded an
agreement providing for payment , and made a payment of R3 million. It cannot
now be heard to say that the debt has prescribed.
Lack of merit in the defendant's proposed defences
[36] The plaintiff submits that each of the proposed special defences is legally
untenable and that the defendant has therefore failed to disclose a bona fide
defence with any reasonable prospects of success .
8 Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd v Letsemeng Local Municipality 2022 (2) SA 347 (SCA) para 22.
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(a) Special Plea of Non-compliance with Section 3 of Act 40 of 2002
[37] The defendant contends that the plaint iff failed to serve a notice in terms
of s 3 of Act 40 of 2002. This contention is unsustainable for the reasons that will
follow.
(38] In refetTing to Nicor JT Consulting (Pty) Ltd v North West Housing
Corporation 9, a decision of this Division, the SCA in Vhembe District
Municipality v Stewarts and Lloyds Trading (Pty) Ltd10 has authoritatively settled
this position as follows :
'As correctly observed by Rall AJ in Thabani Zulu, the evidence in damages cases is more
likely to depend on the memory of people than on documents, and it is accordingly desirable
that the defendant be given timeous notice of the proceedings in order for it to be able to
investigate the contemplated claim, and to secure the necessary evidence. By contrast as Lever
AJ put it in Nicor Consulting (para 26). ·a claim fur payment in terms of a contract is more
likely to rely on documentary evidence. such as contracts, delivery notes and correspondence,
as well as possible lega l issues. such as whether or not the relevant funct ionary had the
necessary authority to enter into the contract or not·. I accordingly hold, as the high court
did, that as the first respondent's claim is not a damag es claim the Act does not apply to
it. It was therefore unnecessary for the first respondent to have complied with s 3 of the
Act.' ( emphasis added)
[39] The Comt in Nicor concluded that a 'debt' for the purposes of Act 40 of
2002 is confined to a claim for damages. This interpretat ion is consistent with the
traditional justification for notice prov isions, which is to allow organs of state to
9 Nicor IT Consulting (Pry) Ltd v North West /lousing Corporation 2010 (3) SA 90 (NWM). 10 Vhembe District Municipality v Stewarts And Lloyds Trading (Booysens) (Pty) limited and A1101her (397/13) (2014] ZASCA 93; l2014] 3 All SA 675 (SCA) (26 June 20 14) para 16.
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investigate claims that depend on witnesses' memories. As the court explained the
reaso ning behind a statutory demand in Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 11 :
'An insistence on notices of the kind required by s 113(1) is by no means peculiar to the
particular proceedings that it governs . Similar condition s precedent to the institution of actions
are and have long been familiar fcatw-es of our statutory terrain, especially the part occupied
by departments of State. provincial administrations and local authorities once they become
prospective defendants. The conventional explanation for demanding prior notification of any
intention to sue such an organ of government is that, with its extensive activities and large staff
which tends to shift, it needs the opportunity to investigate claims laid against it. to consider
them responsib ly and to decide. before getting embroiled in litigation at public expense,
whether it ought to accept, reject or endeavour to settle them.'
[40] The plaintiff's claim is manifestly cont ractual. It is based on a written
agreement and is supported by documentary evidence. During oral argument,
counsel for the defendant fairly conceded this point. This concession was
properly made. The special plea of non-compliance with s 3 of Act 40 of 2002 is
without merit.
(b) Special Plea Based on the Arbitratio n Cla use
[ 41] The defendant contends that the Water Services Level Agreement contains
an arbitratio n clause that ousts this comt's jurisdiction. This contention is equally
without merit.
11 Moh/omi v Minister of Defence (CCT4 l/95) [1996] ZACC 20; 1996 (12) BCLR 1559; 1997 (I) SA 124 (26 September 1996) para 9.
15
[ 42] The authorities are clear that an arbitration agreement does not deprive the
cou1t of its ordinary jurisdiction. In Parekh v Shah Jehan Cinemas (Pty) Ltd and
Others 12, the court held that:
'An arbitration agreement does not deprive the Court of its ordinary jurisdiction over
the disputes which it encompasses. All it does is to oblige the parties to refer such disputes
in the first instance to arbitration, and to make it a pre-requisite to an approach to the
Court for a final judgment that this should have happened. While the arbitration is in
progress, the Court is there whenever needed to give appropriate directions and to exercise
due supervision . And the award of the arbitrator cannot be enforced without the Court's
imprimatur, which may be granted or withheld. But that is by no means all. Arbitration
itself is far from an absolute requirement, despite the contractual provision for it. If
either party takes the arbitrable disputes straight to Court, and the other does not protest,
the litigation follows its normal course, without a pause.'
[43] The Constitutional Court in Lufuno Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v
Andrews and Another 13 emphasised the principle ofpaity autonomy, but this does
not mean that parties can, by private agreement, oust the constitutional
jurisdiction of the courts. The court stated the following:
·The decision to refer a dispute to private arbitration is a choice which, as long as it is
voluntarily made. should be respected by the cou11s. Parties are entitled to determine what
matters are to be arbitrated. the identity of the arbitrator, the process to be followed in the
arbitration , whether there will be an appeal to an arbitral appea l body and other similar matters.'
[ 44] A court retains discretion to enforce the arbitration clause, taking into
account the interests of justice. The defendant has not even alleged, let alone
established, that it would be convenient for the dispute to be referred to
established, that it would be convenient for the dispute to be referred to
12 Parekh v Shuh Jehun Cinemas (Pty) Ltd and Others 1980 (I) SA 301 (D) at 305 E-G. 13 lufimo Mphaphuli & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Andrews and Another (CCT 97/07) [2009] ZACC 6; 2009 (4) SA 529 (CC); 2009 (6) BCLR 527 (CC) (20 March 2009) para 2 19.
16
arbitration. It has not brought an application for a stay of proceedings. It has not
addressed its prospects of success in such an application. In circumstances where
the amount has been outstanding for years, where the defendant has
acknowledged its indebtedness, and where it seeks to avoid its contractual
obligations, it cannot be said that it would be convenient to refer the matter to
arbitration. The arbitrat ion clause does not render this Court's jurisdiction
incompetent, and the specia l plea based on the arb itration clause is without merit.
(c) The Special Plea of Prescription
[ 45] As already dealt with extensively earlier in this judgme nt, the special plea
of prescr iption is w ithout merit in light of the existence of the MOA and the
payment of R3 mill ion. Section 14 of the Prescription Act prov ides that the
running of prescription is interrupted by an express or tac it acknowledgement of
liability by the debtor. The defendant1s acknowledgement and pa1tial payme nt are
unequivocal.
[ 46] In conclusion on this issue, the defendant has failed to disclose a bona fide
defence with any reasonable prospects of success. Its proposed defences, on
proper analysis, lack merit.
The prejudice to the plaintiff
[ 4 7] The prejudice to the plaintiff if the bar were to be uplifted must also be
considered. The plaintiff has been prov iding essential water services to the
defendant's community without remuneration for an extended period. It is a water
board, establis hed to provide water services, and relies on payment for its services
to sustain its operations. Further delay in finalising this matter would compound
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the prejudice it already suffers . The defendant, on the other hand, faces no
prejudice beyond being held to account for its contractual obligations.
Conclusion
[48] In conclu sion, the defendant has failed to satisfy the requirements of good
cause. Its explanation for the extensive delay is inadequate and falls short of the
standard required by our coui1s. More fundamentally, it has failed to disclose a
bona fide defence to the plaintiffs claim. The defence s it seeks to raise are without
merit and hold no reasonable prospects of success . Each of the plaintiff's three
main lines of argument succeeds and the application stands to be dismissed.
Costs
[ 49] Regarding costs, the general rule is that costs follow the result. The plaintiff
has been compe lled to oppose this application. The plaintiff seeks costs on an
attorney and own client scale, contending that the defendant failed to disclose
material facts, namely the MOA and the R3 million payment, and has acted in
bad faith throughout.
[50] The plaintiff has rendered services and should be paid therefor . The
defendant concluded the MOA, acknowledging its indebtedness by having made
a partial payment, yet it cont inues to resist payment. When the plaintiff
approached this Court to enforce its rights, the defendant frustrated that attempt
through this application. The conduct of the defendant, including its failure to
disclose material facts, its inconsistent pleadings, and its prolonged inactivity ,
wa1Tants a punitive costs order.
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[51] In the circumstances, I am persuaded that this is an appropriate case for a
costs order on the attorney and client scale. The defendant's conduct thro ughout
these proceedings has been unreasonable and has occasioned unnecessary
expense and delay for the plaintiff. Such conduct should be censured.
Order
[52] Accordingly , the following order is made:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent 's costs as between attorney
and client.
MWESSELS
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Appearances
For applicant
Instructed by
For the respondent
Instructed by
:Adv TM Makgat ho
:Fihla and Associates
:Pretoria
:c/o Mothusi Marumo Attorneys
:Mahikeng
:Adv 01 Monnahela
:Shuping Attorneys
:Rusten burg
:c/o DC Kruger Attorneys
:Mahikeng
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