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[2] In the particulars of claim, he avers that he suffered damages in the amount R
9 300 000.00 which comprises of the following:
1.1 Future medical expenses: Undertaking
1.2 Past medical expenses: R 1000 000.00
1.3 Past loss of income: R 300 000.00
1.4 Future loss of income: R 4000 000.00
1.5 General damages: R 4000 000.00
[3] Merits were settled in favour of the plaintiff and quantum remains outstanding in
respect of all heads of damages.
[4] When the matter came for trial, counsel advised me that the defendant has raised a
special plea of non -compliance with the provisions of Section 24 of the Road Accident
Fund Act of 1996, as amended. By agreement between the parties, the special plea was
to be argued first, and quantum had to stand over for later determination.
[5] The essence of the defendant’s special plea is that plaintiff’s claim for past medical
expenses, past loss income, future loss of income as well as future medical expenses is
not substantially compliant in that the prescribed form by the plaintiff was not completed
in all its particulars save for general damages. The contention by the defendant is that
plaintiff was required to indicate in the claim form the various heads of damages upon
which the claim is based. Because he did not do so, he cannot enforce the claim by way
of summons, nor can he submit a new (additional) RAF 1 form. According to the
defendant, plaintiff can only submit one claim form.
[6] In addition to the above defendant alleges that by submitting an additional form which
does not bear a stamp of the RAF the claim for additional head of damages should be
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rejected as invalid and unenforceable. There is also an argument raised that the claim
may for that reason be regarded as fraudulent though no evidence was adduced to
support this allegation.
[7] Plaintiff denies allegations of fraud and argues that there is simply no legal basis upon
which such a claim can be made. The fact that the RAF 1 claim form does not bear a
stamp cannot be a reason for rejecting it as invalid. It is not a peremptory requirement of
the Act that a claim form should be stamped on all pages before the claim can be said to
be valid.
[8] Mr Magagula, counsel for the plaintiff is correct in his submission that the law does not
prescribe a requirement that a claim form should be stamped before the court can accept
it as valid for purpose of enforcement of the claim. This is because the act of stamping a
form is an internal administrative process within the exclusive control of the RAF. The
claimant bears no responsibility whatsoever for ensuring that the form is stamped on all
pages or at all. Of course, this is not to say that the defendant cannot raise a defence that
the claim was not lodged and therefore not unenforceable. However, in raising the
defence the fund cannot rely on non -compliance with its own internal administrative
process to defeat the claim.
[9] The RAF Act allows the lodgment of claims through registered mail and a claimant
who is confronted with a defence that his/her claim has not been lodged, need only
produce proof of lodgment to defeat that defence. To require the claimant to bear the
responsibility for the fund’s internal processes will not only be burdensome but too
onerous as he does not have control over the process. Accordingly, the issue about the
stamp is pure red herring and should in all fairness not keep us detained any further
because it is not a prescribed legal requirement for the validity of the claim.
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[10] This now brings me to Section 24 of the RAF Act. The purpose of section 24 has
been the subject of many cases and has received the attention of both the Supreme Court
of Appeal as well as the Constitutional Court. The position is that a claimant is required
to submit a completed RAF 1 claim form which substantially with the requirements
prescribed in the Act and the Regulations. The claimant should provide all the information
necessary to enable the Fund to investigate the claim and determine the exten t of its
liability, if any.
[11] The test in assessing whether a claim complies substantially with the prescribe d
requirements is an objective one. The prescribed form must be examined to see whether
or not on all information it contains, a reasonable insurer would have been prevented by
any omission or inaccuracy therein from properly investigating the claim and determining
its attitude towards it. The minimum amo unt of information to be supplied includes the
identity of the claimant, the accident, the identification of the insured m otor vehicle, the
injuries and the loss caused thereby, and the compensation claimed.
[12] In Van Zyl MM v RAF, (34299/2009) 2012 SA GSJ (11 June 2012) Satchwell J dealt
with the meaning of a claim and arrived at a conclusion that the Act does not refer to
many claims or rights. There is only a claim for compensation which is in respect of “any
loss or damage” suffered. The Act does not spell out rights or claims in respect of different
causes of loss or damage. Her conclusion, with which I agree, was guided by the authority
of the Appellate Division in Evins v Shield Insurance, 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) where Corbett
JA expressed the legal position as follows:
“a plaintiff who suffers bodily injury will at common law and under legislation have a
single cause of action in respect of damages claimable by him whether such
damages relate to patrimonial loss or constitute a solatium for pain and suffering,
disfigurement, disability, etc”.
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[13] As I see it, failure by the claimant to indicate an amount for a particular head of
damage in the Raf 1 claim form cannot be a basis for the fund to refuse to assess the
claim for additional head of damages submitted later through another RAF claim form or
directly in the summons when that claim arises from the same cause of action. This is so
because a delictual claim is based on a cause of action and not head of damages.
Damages constitute an element of a delict and needs to be proven together with o ther
requirements before the wrongdoer can be said to be liable for the loss wrongfully
committed by his act or failure to act.
[14] Writing on this aspect in the matter of Mukwevho v RAF, (3864/2020) [2024]
ZALMPPHC 179 (15 November 2024), Monene AJ said the following:
“It is not our law that if a party does not list a particular head of damages at
lodgement of a claim or subsequent pleading, such a claim as it arises from the
same facts or cause of action prescribes as separate from other claimsor the main
cause of action”.
In Nonkwali v RAF (105/2007) [2008] ZASCA 3 (6 March 2008) the SCA per Maya JA
(as she then was) clarified this point as follows:
“Authorities are legion to the effect that a plaintiff who claimed for damages
sustained as a result of wrongful and negligent driving under the Act’s
predecessors had but a single, indivisible cause of action and that the various
items constituting the claim were thus not separate claims or separate causes of
action”.
The interpretation, in my view, necessarily extends to claims brought under the Act as it
has the same objective and effect as these previous statutes.
The effect of this finding cannot be articulated better than Corbett JA did in Evins v Shield
Insurance Co Ltd, 1980 (2) SA 814 (A) at 836 C -E. There the court dealing with the
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concept of a single cause of action in the context of prescription with regard to the
amendment of a plaintiff’s claim as originally pleaded by him, said:
“where a plaintiff seeks by way of an amendment to augment his claim for damages,
he will be precluded from doing so by prescription if the new claim is based upon a
new cause of action and the relevant prescriptive period has run, but not if it was
part a nd parcel of the original cause of action and merely represents a fresh
quantification of the original claim or the addition of a further item of damages”.
The cause of action is one and indivisible for prescription purposes and portions thereof
cannot be excised and be said to have prescribed when the cause of action to which they
belong has not prescribed.
[15] I fully align myself with the above sentiments. This is in line with the “once and for all”
rule which requires a party with a single cause of action to claim in one an d the same
action whatever remedies the law accords him. The ration ale underlying the rule is that,
if a cause of action has previously been finally litigated between the parties, then a
subsequent attempt by the one to proceed against the other on the same cause for the
same relief can be met by an exception rei judicatae vel litis finitiae. The rationale in our
law is to prevent inextricable difficulties arising from discordant or conflicting decisions
due to the same suit being aired more than once in different judicial proceedings or
actions. The Rule has its origins in considerations of public policy which require that there
should be a term set to litigation and that an accused person or defendant should not be
twice harassed in respect of the same cause. Olesitse NO v Minister of Police (470/2021)
[2022] ZASCA 90 (15 June 2022) at para 19 -20 and 2024 (2) BCLR 238 (CC) at para
51-52.
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[16] During oral submissions I asked counsel to share their views on the judgment of Zitha
v RAF, (228/ 2024) [2026] ZAMPMBHC 7 (30 January 2026) authored by Ratshibvumo
DJP. Mr Mathebula for the defendant unsurprisingly placed much reliance on it and
submitted that the defendant fully endorses the interpretation and the reasons
underpinning it. Mr Magagula contend ed otherwise and submitted that he does not
support the interpretation of section 24 contained in the judgment.
[17] As I see it, Zitha does not introduce a new approach to the interpretation of the
provisions of section 24 of the RAF Act. It confirms the correctness of all the previous
judgments on this issue including RAF v Busuku. The findings it makes in relation to the
RAF claim form was case specific and it is no authority for the proposition by the RAF
that a claimant cannot enforce a claim for heads of damages not previously mentioned in
the RAF claim form nor does it say that there can be no instance where a claimant can
submit an additional RAF claim form. All what it says is that if this were to happen, the
claimant should be able to provide an explanation if required to.
[18] From my reading of the judgment, the defendant raised several discrepancies with
the form, and the plaintiff or his counsel could not provide a plausible explanation in
answer to the queries. It then gave rise to suspicion of it being a fraudulent transaction,
but no specific finding was made in this regard.
[19] The above is not the case. No material discrepancies have been raised in the instant
case except that the claim form was not stamped. The plaintiff explained that the form
was acknowledged and processed by the defendant after it was lodged through a
registered mail. An objection was raised within a period of 60 days from the date of
submission. The objection letter stated that the defendant does not accept documents
sent via e -mail or posted and informed plaintiff that it will raise a special plea sho uld
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APPEARANCES:
Attorney for the Plaintiff: Ms EM Mabaso, Mabaso Attorneys
Pegasus Building 1 210
Amarand Avenue Menlyn Maine
Pretoria,
0181
Tel: 013 752 3069/ 072 098 3611
C/O NP MADONSELA ATTORNEYS
38 Mostert Street
Cheritta Building Second Floor, Unit 7
Mbombela
Tel: 013 752 3069
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Advocate Magagula
E-Mail: adv.magagulachambewrs@maglaw.co.za
Attorneys for the Defendant Ms G Mokoena
The State Attorney Mbombela
3rd floor, Admin Building,
West wing
R104 Samora Machel Drive
Mbombela
Tel: 013 101 3722
Counsel for the Defendant: Advocate Mathevula
E-Mail: ritomathevula@duma.nokwe.co.za
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Date of Hearing: 18 February 2026
Date of delivery: 11 March 2026