THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case No: 2025-140150
In the matter between:
PETER PAULOS MOLOKO MONYEPAO Applicant
and
CITY OF EKHURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY First Respondent
CITY OF EKHURHULENI METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY:
KAGISO LERUTLA ACTING MUNICIPAL MANAGER Second Respondent
ADV SANELE SIBISI N.O. Third Respondent
ADV BRIDGETTE SEHLAPELO Fourth Respondent
Heard: 26 August 2025
Reasons delivered: 10 February 2026
REASONS FOR ORDER
PHEHANE, J
Introduction
[1] This is an urgent application in which the applicant seeks orders:
1.1. declaring that his suspension by the first respondent has lapsed;
(1) Reportable: NO
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3) Revised
____________ ______________
Signature Date
2
1.2. declaring that his internal disciplinary hearing scheduled to
recommence on 27 and 28 August 2025, is unlawful and invalid;
1.3. a final order i nterdicting and restraining the respondents or
functionaries under the first respondent from disciplining him for any of
the charges in the charge sheet dated 30 June 2025, including the
continuation of the disciplinary hearing on 27 and 28 August 2025;
1.4. directing the respondents to lift his suspension.
[2] The first and second respondents (the respondents) oppose this application.
[3] After hearing oral submissions by the parties on 26 August 2025, this Court
issued an order dismissing the application with punitive costs.
[4] Brief reasons for the order follow below.
Background
[5] The applicant was employed by the first respondent in the position of Chief
Information Officer since April 2022. By virtue of his position, the applicant’s
role is that of a senior manager as contemplated in section 56 of the Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act
1 (the MSA).
[6] On 15 April 2025, t he applicant was suspended from duty as a precautionary
measure pending discipli nary proceedings in terms of the provisions of
regulation 6 of the Regulations 2 published in terms of section 120 of the MSA
(the Regulations).
[7] The applicant previously launched an application in this Court under case
number 2025-056915 in which application, he alleged that his suspension was
unlawful for failure by the respondents to comply the regulations , including
challenging the authority of the second respondent to suspend him . This
Court per Matyolo AJ issued an order and judgment on 29 May 2025 (the
Matyolo AJ judgment) pronouncing that the applicant’s suspension was lawful
1 Act 32 of 2000.
2 Local Government: Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers, 2010, published under GN 344 in
GG 34213 dated 21 April 2011.
3
and his application was accordingly dismissed. In that application, the
applicant’s cause of action was premised on unlawfulness consequent upon
an alleged breach of contract by the respondent ; the applicant disavowed
reliance on the cause of action premised on the unfairness of his suspension
in terms of the unfair labour practice dispensation of the Labour Relations Act3
(LRA). Of relevance to this present application, with reference to the
provisions of regulation 6(6)(a), Matyolo AJ remarked that the suspension of
the applicant was lawful and that it could not continue for more than 90 days.
[8] It is pertinent for the purposes of this application at this juncture to set out
what regulation 6(6) reads:
‘(6)(a) If a senior manager is suspended, a disciplinary hearing must
commence within three months after the date of suspension, failing
which the suspension will automatically lapse.
(b) The period of three months referred to in paragraph (a) may not be
extended by council.’
[9] Following the Matyolo AJ judgement, on the same day, that is, on 29 May
2025, the respondents obtained a council resolution in terms of regulation 10
of the Regulations, which resolution authorised the respondents to institute a
disciplinary hearing against the applicant.
[10] It is necessary for the purposes of the present application to set out the
provisions of regulation 10 in its entirety. It reads:
‘10. Conducting disciplinary hearing
(1) The disciplinary hearing must commence—
(a) within three months of the resolution to institute disciplinary
action; and
3 Act 66 of 1995, as amended.
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(b) on a date not less than seven days and not more than 10 days
from the date of service of the charge sheet and the written
notice of the disciplinary hearing on the senior manager.
(2) The hearing must be conducted by the presiding officer who may
determine the procedures to be followed, provided that the—
(a) rules of natural justice are adhered to at all times;
(b) matter is speedily resolved with the minimum of legal
formalities;
(c) presiding officer in discharging his or her obligations—
(i) exercises care, diligence and acts impartially; and
(ii) does not consult or confer with any of the parties or
their representatives on the merits or demerits of the
case.
(3) The officer leading evidence—
(a) must commence the disciplinary hearing by reading out the
charges to the senior manager;
(b) may call witnesses and produce book[s], document[s] or
object[s];
(c) may cross- examine any witness called to testify on behalf of
the senior manager;
(d) may inspect any book[s], document[s] or object[s] produced by
the senior manager; and
(e) must present arguments on the merits of the case.
(4) The senior manager has the right to—
(a) be heard in person or through a representative;
(b) call witnesses and produce book[s], document[s] or object[s];
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(c) cross-examine any witness called to testify by the officer
leading evidence; and
(d) inspect any book[s], document[s] or object[s] produced by the
officer leading evidence.
(5) The presiding officer—
(a) may, at any time during the hearing—
(i) ask any party any questions to clarify any matter;
(ii) ask any party or his or her witnesses any question on
any matter relevant to the charges;
(iii) proceed with the hearing if no satisfactory reasons are
furnished for the absence of the party against whom
charges of misconduct are being brought;
(iv) make such interim determinations or rulings as he or
she deems necessary; and
(b) must—
(i) after having considered the evidence before him or her,
make a finding;
(ii) in the event of a verdict of guilt, invite and hear any
plea in mitigation or aggravation of sanction by the
senior manager prior to imposing a sanction; and
(iii) impose an appropriate sanction.’
[11] It is common cause that the applicant was served with a notice to attend a
disciplinary hearing as well as the charges, on 30 June 2025.
[12] It is not disputed that the first sitting of the disciplinary hearing took place on 9
July 2025, at which hearing, the applicant was legally represented. On the
date of this first sitting of the disciplinary hearing, the parties agreed to
postpone the hearing to 27 and 28 August 2025 and 8 to 12 September 2025.
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Submissions
[13] At the outset, I point out that the allegations of the applicant are clumsily set
out and so are his contentions.
[14] In his founding affidavit, he sets out that his cause of action is premised on
unlawfulness, consequent upon the respondents breaching provisions of
regulations 6 and 10. In his founding affidavit, he disavows reliance on the
cause of action relating to an unfair suspension in terms of the unfair labour
practice dispensation of the LRA. Thus, he avers that his cause of action is
premised on a breach of contract.
[15] More specifically, the applicant contends that the respondents have failed to
comply with the provisions of r egulation 6 as he has been suspended for a
period exceeding three months without the disciplinary hearing having
commenced. In the premises, he claims that his suspension is unlawful as the
respondents are in breach of the provisions of regulation 6(6)(a) . Thus, the
applicant seeks an order declaring his suspension i s unlawful and an order
lifting that suspension.
[16] Further, o n the applicant’s pleaded case, he seeks a final interdict as he
alleges that the disciplinary hearing, which was to re-commence on 27 August
2025, is invalid, as he alleges that the respondents failed to commence the
disciplinary hearing within the three months of the date of his suspension.
[17] The applicant avers that the disciplinary hearing commences when the
evidence leader reads out the charges as contemplated in regulation 10(3).
He contends that , as this has not occurred and three months have lapsed
since the date of his suspension, the hearing is invalid , and in his words, the
hearing “lapses”.
4
4 See: founding affidavit at para 4.5 on p 002-11.
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[18] At the outset, the applicant conflates , misinterprets and misapplies the
provisions of regulations 6 and 10. He also misapplies the jurisprudence on
the meaning of the word “ commence” as authoritatively pronounced by the
Labour Appeal Court (LAC). I deal with this below.
[19] It was submitted on behalf of the applicant during oral argument that the
“crux” of this application is the unlawful suspension of the applicant , which
suspension he contends has lapsed by operation of the law. According to the
applicant, his suspension lapsed on 15 July 2025. Mr Mafu, for the applicant,
submitted that the prayers seeking an order interdicting the disciplinary
hearing are abandoned. It was nonetheless submitted by Mr Mafu oddly, that
the disciplinary hearing had not commenced.
[20] The applicant’s heads of argument seem to suggest that the only relief he
pursues is an order seeking a declarator that the suspension is unlawful .5
However, the heads of argument record that the applicant persists with his
application6 and the heads of argument set out in why the hearing should be
interdicted.7 I point out that in his founding affidavit, the applicant seeks final
interdictory relief, however, he has pleaded requirements relating to the grant
of interim interdictory relief. In his heads of argument, he persists that he
seeks interim interdictory relief. I mention this to illustrate the clumsy
approach adopted by the applicant , which demonstrates a lack of
understanding of the legal requirements pertaining to interdictory relief. In any
event, the applicant fails to make out a case for final relief as set out below.
[21] The applicant brought an application for leave to admit a further affidavit. The
purpose of this further affidavit is to place facts before this Court regarding his
suspension that the applicant avers were omitted in his founding affidavit.
Nothing turns on these facts.
[22] On urgency, the applicant contends that this application is urgent as
[22] On urgency, the applicant contends that this application is urgent as
proceeding with an unlawful hearing is a grave injustice. He alleges that he
5 See: para 1.1 of the applicant’s heads of argument at p 009-4.
6 Ibid at para 1.3
7 Ibid at paras 6 and its sub-paragraphs and para 7 at pp 009-14 to 009-15.
8
“raised the issue” with the respondents in early August 2025 and approached
this Court at his earliest convenience.
[23] The respondents oppose this application, contending that there is a misjoinder
of the fourth and fifth respondents, that urgency is self -created and the
application is frivolous.
[24] The respondents submit that the applicant has failed describe the parties in
his founding affidavit and has thus failed to comply with the provisions of Rule
35(5) and consequently, the application is defective and the applicant has
failed to make out a case for joining the third and fourth respondents.
Although t he applicant’s pleadings are not a model for clarity , this is an
application enrolled for hearing on the urgent Court roll and therefore,
technical contentions should be discouraged, particularly where the
respondents have raised a compelling and persuasive defence on the merits
of the application on the applicant’s case as pleaded. In view of the facts that
are common cause which this Court’s order below , it is not necessary to
canvass this preliminary point.
[25] The respondents contend that urgency is self -created, as on 9 July 2025 , the
applicant and his legal representatives, who are the same legal
representatives that represented him during the disciplinary hearing on 9 July
2025, agreed to the postponement of the hearing to 27 and 28 August 2025
and 8 to 12 September 2025, yet, did not launch these urgent proceedings at
the earliest opportunity and did not give the respondents any prior indication
that he intended to launch this application seeking the relief he seeks. The
applicant avers that his suspension lapsed on 15 July 2025, yet he took a
month to approach this Court and ha s not provided any compelling
explanation why this Court was not approached at the earliest opportunity.
[26] Relying on the decisions of our Courts that self - created urgency is fatal to an
applicant in urgent proceedings, the respondents submit that this application
applicant in urgent proceedings, the respondents submit that this application
should be struck off the roll for lack of urgency with costs.
8
8 See: paras 8 to 15 of the respondents’ heads of argument and the authorities cited therein at pp
010-4 to 010-08.
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[27] The respondents contend that the applicant has failed to demonstrate any
exceptional circumstances warranting the intervention of this Court in the
incomplete disciplinary hearing.
[28] Further, the applicant’s case is frivolous and devoid of merit. The respondents
contend that the applicant and his legal representatives conflate the
provisions of rule 6(6)(a) and regulation 10(1) and (3). Regulation 6(6)(a)
makes provision for the commencement of a disciplinary hearing within three
months of an employee’s suspension, fail ing which the suspension lapses ,
while regulation 10(1) makes provision for the commencement of a
disciplinary hearing within three months of the council resolution instituting a
disciplinary hearing. The two time- frames do not run simultaneously. On the
facts, the applicant was suspended on 15 April 2025, and his suspension
would lapse on 15 July 2025 if the hearing had not commenced by that date.
[29] The hearing commenced on 9 July 2025. The respondents place a transcript
of the proceedings on 9 July 2025 before this Court and aver that the
applicant made a material non -disclosure in omitting to mention this first
sitting of the disciplinary hearing in his founding affidavit.
[30] By agreement between the parties, the hearing was postponed by the
chairperson of the hearing to mutually agreed upon dates, following
introductory and preliminary issues being discussed. The postponement was
occasioned by the applicant raising an issue of not having been provided with
the bundle of documents that the first respondent relied on.
[31] As the hearing commenced before the expiration of the three- month period
from the date of the applicant’s suspension as contemplated in regulation
6(6)(a), the respondents accordingly contend that the applicant’s suspension
did not lapse and his claim that his suspension is unlawful cannot succeed.
[32] Further, on 29 May 2025, the council took a resolution to institute a
[32] Further, on 29 May 2025, the council took a resolution to institute a
disciplinary hearing against the applicant . This hearing commenced on 9 July
2025. Therefore, the respondents complied with the provisions of regulation
10(1).
10
[33] The respondents stated that the applicant misconstrues the meaning of the
word “commence” in regulations ( 6) and (10). The LAC in Tshabalala v
Moqhaka Municipality and Another9 (Tshabalala) with reference to this Court’s
decision in Mengo v Lekwa- Teemane Local Municipality 10 (Mengo) and
Moloto and Another v Kagisano Molopo Local Municipality and Others 11
(Moloto) authoratively and unambiguously pronounced that a disciplinary
hearing “commences” when the chairperson of the hearing takes control of
the proceedings and clarified that the proceedings do not commence when
the evidence leader reads the charges to an employee as contemplated in
regulation 10(3).
Evaluation
[34] Regulation 6(6)(a) provides that a hearing must commence within three
months of the date of suspension. Regulation 10(1) (a) provides that a hearing
must commence within three months of a council resolution instituting the
hearing. These are separate events.
[35] On a purposive interpretation of regulation 10, in line with jurisprudence,
12 the
hearing commences when the presiding officer takes charge of the
proceedings. In the words of r egulation 10(2), the presiding officer conducts
the hearing and determines the procedures to be followed. This is what the
presiding officer did in the present application – the presiding officer
commenced the proceedings, took charge and made a determination that the
hearing is postponed after hearing both parties.
[36] It is trite that in disciplinary hearings, the employer bears the onus of proving
the allegations against an employee. Therefore, the employer representative
or evidence leader commences the process of the hearing proceedings by
reading the charges in order for a plea to be entered by the employee,
followed by the evidence leader leading the evidence, whereafter, the
employee leads evidence in his or her defence.
9 (2025) 46 ILJ 590 (LAC).
10 J452/20) [2020] ZALCJHB 255 (11 June 2020).
11 (J4415/18 [2019] ZALCJHB (21 February 2019).
11 (J4415/18 [2019] ZALCJHB (21 February 2019).
12 Tshabalala, Mengo and Moloto supra at fn 10 to 12.
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[37] The applicant misapplies the meaning of the word “commence” to suit his own
contrived agenda. The applicant’s interpretation of the hearing commencing
when the charge is read is incorrect and is incongruent with the meaning of
regulation 10 and jurisprudence. This Court is bound by the doctrine of stare
decisis.
[38] Thus, on a proper application of Tshabalala, the disciplinary hearing
commenced in accordance with the requirements of regulation 6(6) and 10.
This is evident from the common cause facts that the parties convened in the
disciplinary hearing and the presiding officer took control of the proceedings,
navigating the process by addressing introductions, preliminary matters, and
other formalities.
[39] The first sitting of the hearing took place on 9 July 2025. This was within three
months of the suspension of the applicant and in compliance with regulation
6(6)(a).
[40] When this application was heard, the three- month time frame within which to
hold the disciplinary hearing had also not expired. On the facts, this period
would have expired on 28 August 2025. As the hearing commenced on 9 July
2025, the respondent complied with the provisions of regulation 10(1) . The
applicant’s interpretation of regulation 10(1) that the hearing must commence
within three months of his suspension is incorrect. Nowhere does regulation
10(1) provide this. In addition, regulation 10(1) does not provide, as the
applicant incorrectly alleges, that the hearing will lapse if it does not
commence within the prescribed three-month time frame.
[41] In view of the aforegoing, the applicant has failed to make out a case for the
relief sought, as, on the proper interpretation of the word “commence” and on
the common cause facts, his hearing commenced before the expiration of the
three-month period as contemplated in regulation 6 (6)(a), and it commenced
before the expiration of the three month period from the date council instituted
before the expiration of the three month period from the date council instituted
the disciplinary hearing. Therefore, the applicant is not entitled to the relief he
seeks.
12
[42] On his papers, the applicant has failed to demonstrate a breach of the
provisions of regulations 6 and 10 by the respondents. In the premises, his
application cannot succeed.
[43] The applicant has not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances
warranting this Court’s intervention in an incomplete disciplinary hearing. He
agreed to the postponement of the hearing and did not raise with t he
chairperson any gr ounds of the hearing be coming unlawful should the three-
month time period not be adhered to as a result of the postponement of his
hearing. Even if he had raised this, his contention would be devoid of merit for
the reasons that the respondents complied with both regulations.
[44] The applicant agreed to the postponement of the hearing. He participated in
the hearing and placed himself under the control of the chairperson by
appearing and agreeing to a postponement in a hearing he now cl aims is
illegal and wants to interdict. This conduct is an abuse of the Court process.
[45] It is concerning that the applicant and his legal representatives , who are
officers of the Court, did not disclose to this Court that the hearing
commenced on 9 July 2025 and was postponed by agreement to agreed
dates. Had he done so, he knew he would not be entitled to the relief he
seeks and he has wasted the resources of this Court in proceeding with an
application that is devoid of merit.
[46] Not only did he fail to disclose material facts to this Court , in his replying
affidavit, on the one hand, he “notes” the hearing proceedings of 9 July 2025
and transcript thereof, and on the other hand, in the same affidavit, he pleads
a bare denial of what transpired at that hearing and common cause facts.
13
This is misleading.
[47] The applicant refers in his papers to the meeting of 9 July 2025 as the “initial”
sitting of the hearing. He cannot escape the common cause fact that the
hearing initially sat within the prescribed time frame in both regulations and
hearing initially sat within the prescribed time frame in both regulations and
13 See: paras 14 to 18 of the answering affidavit on p 005-7 and paras 10 to 12 of the replying affidavit
on p 006- 9; and paras 25 to 47 of the answering affidavit on pp 005-9 to 005-12 and para 17 of the
replying affidavit on p 006-9 to 006-10.
13
therefore, disingenuously makes nonsensical arguments on the interpretation
of the regulations to suit his contrived agenda to avoid answering allegations
of serious misconduct.
[48] This is an applicant who by hook or by crook, more the latter, is attempting to
avoid answering serious allegations of misconduct by agreeing to a
postponement and later claiming that the very hearing he has participated in
and agreed to postpone, is unlawful . There is no better description of a
frivolous application.
[49] Although I am not persuaded that this application is urgent, I exercise my
discretion to hear it, as striking a n unmeritorious and frivolous application off
the roll will only burden this Court ’s roll were the matter to be enrolled in the
ordinary course.
Costs
[50] The applicant h as not approached this Court with clean hands. He failed to
disclose material facts regarding the initial sitting of the disciplinary hearing.
[51] The application is riddled with multiple errors that range from the
misapplication of legal principles relating to causes of action and jurisdiction,
the misapplication of the legal requirements of interim and final interdicts, the
misapplication of case law on the definition of when a disciplinary hearing is
said to have commenced as contemplated in regulation 10(1),
misinterpretation and conflation of regulations 6(6)(a) and regulation 10.
[52] The conduct of the applicant and his legal representatives as aforesaid, in
launching this fri volous application with a mu ltiplicity of errors and making a
material non-disclosure, warrants a punitive costs order.
Conclusion
[53] In view of the afore-going, the above order was made.
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_______________________
M. T. M. Phehane
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa